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THE CORNERSTONE OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW is the prohibition of transfrontier pollution: states have the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to 
the environment of other states or of areas beyond national jurisdiction. In addi­
tion, there is now a substantial body of international treaties laying down detailed 
regimes for various environmental sectors. Relatedly, recent international con­
flicts have raised fundamental questions about the relationship between 
international law and armed conflict. The notion that the rules of general interna­
tional environmental law continue to apply during armed conflict is now well 
accepted, but the principles that are usually cited remain at a very high level of 
abstraction. 
Dr. Sonja Ann JozefBoelaert-Suominen, legal adviser in the Office of the Pros­
ecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in the 
Hague, the Netherlands, examines the extent to which international law has de­
veloped more detailed rules to protect the environment in international armed 
conflict. After a discussion of the main legal issues, the author focuses on the ma­
rine environment, examining the relationship between naval warfare, on one 
hand, and multilateral environmental treaties on marine safety and the preven­
tion of marine pollution, on the other. 
Dr. Boelaert-Suominen argues that the majority of these treaties do not apply 
during armed conflict, either because war damage is expressly excluded or be­
cause the treaties do not apply to warships. As for the treaties that are in principle 
applicable during armed conflict, her analysis shows that, under international 
law, belligerent and neutral states have the legal right to suspend those treaties, 
wholly or in part. The author concludes that very few of the treaties considered 
take the new law of armed conflict into account and that there remains a need for 
more detailed rules on environmental standards for military operations. 
In 1996, the Naval War College International Law Studies published volume 
69 in its "Blue Book" series-Protect ion of the Environment during Armed Conflict. 
This compilation of papers was written for and presented at the Law of Naval 
Warfare Symposium on the Protection of the Environment during Armed Con­
flict and other Military Operations, held at the Naval War College in 1995. 
Contributors to this conference suggested the necessity for a thorough study of 
the relationship between environmental treaties and the laws of war. It is my plea­
sure, therefore, to publish and commend to our readers Dr. Boelaert-Suominen's 
International Environmental Law and Naval War: The Effect of Marine Safety and 
Pollution Conventions during International Armed Conflict. 
Xll 
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Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy 
President, Naval War College 
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HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF GENUINE CONCERN about the impact of war on  the human environment can be found since the earliest civilisations .  Yet, the 
h istory of war is replete with examples of serious devastation of the enemy's land 
and property. 
The relationship between peacetime human activities and the environmen t  is in 
the stage of advanced public debate and scholarly attention, and much progress has 
been made in recent years regarding the development of appropriate instrumen ts 
and institutions pertaining to the protection of the environment in peacetime. 
The cornerstone of modern International Environmental Law is  the prohibi­
tion of trans fron tier pollution, according to which,  States have the responsibility 
to ensure that activities within their j urisdiction or control do not cause damage 
to the environment of other S tates or to areas beyond national jurisdiction .  In ad­
di tion, there is now a substantial body of international treaties laying down 
detailed rlgimes for various environmen tal sectors. 
Recent international conflicts, such as the 1980-1988 Iran- Iraq and the 
1990-1991 Gulf wars, have raised fundamental questions about the relationship 
between modern International Environmen tal Law and armed conflict. The no­
tion that rules of general International Environmental Law continue to apply 
during armed conflict is now well accepted. 
In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, the International Court ofJ us tice s tressed that  "the obligations of S tates 
to respect and pro tect  the natural environment," applied equally "to the actual use 
of nuclear weapons in armed conflict."J 
However, the in ternational  legal principles for the protection of the environ­
ment in armed conflict which are usually cited, remain at a very high level of 
abstraction . In the above advisory opinion, the Court offered the following broad 
statement :  
... States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what 
is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives. 
Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an 
action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and proponionality.2 
Similarly, whilst environmental considerations are increasingly included in 
military manuals, the ensuing principles remain vague. Thus, the Commander's 
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations for the U.S. Navy provides that: 
.. . the commander has an affirmative obligation to avoid unnecessary damage to the 
environment to the extent that it is practicable to do so consistent with mission 
accomplishment. To that end, and so far as military requirements permit, methods 
or means of warfare should be employed with due regard to the protection and 
preservation of the natural environment. Destruction of the natural environment 
not necessitated by mission accomplishment and carried out wantonly is 
prohibited.3 
This thesis examines the extent to which international law has developed 
more detailed standards to protect the environment in international armed con­
flict, by concentrating on the law of  naval warfare on the one hand and 
multilateral treaties regarding protection of the m arine environment on the 
other. The reasons why this study concentrates on the marine environment are 
as follows. 
First, it will be seen that the bulk of the existing multilateral environmental 
agreements relate to the marine environment. They contain among the most de­
tailed norms of current International Environmental Law. This contrasts sharply 
with the law of naval warfare, which consists primarily of customary rules of in­
ternational law. Although there have been unofficial initiatives leading to the 
1913 Oxford Manual of Naval War,4 and more recently, to the 1994 San Remo Man­
ualon Internat ional Law Applicable to Armed Conflict at Sea,S much of the law of 
naval warfare is un codified and in need of update. 
Secondly, of all types of armed conflict, naval conflicts are the most likely to af­
fect not only the contending States but also States not directly involved in the 
hostilities. Therefore, conflicts with an important naval component may reveal 
State practice and opinio juris regarding the legal effect of maritime treaties for 
contending and non-contending States. 
Thirdly, many of the maritime treaties that will be considered in this study 
have antecedents that go back to the beginning of the twentieth century. This 
means that they may have been affected by several large inter-State conflicts and 
may point to rules of international law on the operation of maritime environmen­
tal law during international armed conflict. 
XVI 
Finally, many of the modern descendants of the early mari time treaties were 
concluded under the auspices of the International Maritime Organisation or its 
predecessor. Institutional memory greatly increases the likelihood of consistency 
in the interpretation of certain treaty clauses. 
This study is divided into two main parts. In the first part, the author examines 
the main legal questions involved. Chapter I discusses the origins and develop­
ment of modern International Environmental Law; Chapter II deals with the lex 
specialis and examines the protection of the environment in the law of armed con­
flict, discussing jus in bello, jus ad bellum and the law of neutrality; Chapter III 
examines the operation of general International Environmental Law during 
armed conflict. 
In the second part, the author examines the legal relationship between naval 
warfare on the one hand and multilateral environmental treaties on marine safety 
and prevention of marine pollution on the other. Chapter IV deals with the exclu­
sion of war damage from the scope of mari time con ventions; Chapter V discusses 
the contingency clauses which appear in some of the treaties and which specifi­
cally address the possibility of war or armed conflict; Chapter VI deals with the 
exemption of warships from the application of some of the mari time conventions. 
In Chapter VII, the author formulates conclusions on the relationship between 
naval warfare and the maritime treaties discussed, whilst Chapter VIn contains 
general conclusions on the legal effect of environmental treaties during interna­
tional armed conflict. 
XVll 
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Modern International Environmental Law and the 
Principal Environmental Rights and Duties of States 
THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THIS FIRST CHAPTER is to review the salient features of modern (peacetime) International Environmental Law. After a discussion of the 
origins and development of the discipline, the author will consider whether it is pos­
sible and useful to define the environment. Section two is devoted to an examination 
of the principal rights and duties of States in relation to their use of the environment. In 
section three, the territorial scope of the identified environmental rights and duties will 
be analysed. The conclusions to this chapter are contained in the fourth section. 
1.1. The Development and Milestones of Modern International 
Environmental Law 
1.1.1. The Impact of UNCHE and UNCED 
The term "International Environm ental Law" (hereinafter IEL) will be used 
throughout this study as a shorthand for the corpus of intern ational law relevant 
to environmental issues. The definition by Dr. Birnie and Professor Boyle offers a 
good starting point to describe the field of international law that this study will be 
concerned with: 
. . . the aggregate of all rules and principles aimed at protecting the global 
environment and controlling activities within national jurisdiction that may affect 
another State's environment or areas beyond national jurisdiction.1 
There is some divergence of opinion in the literature about the historic ante­
cedents of modern IEL. Professor Caldwell dates the earliest international 
The Newport Papers 
co-operative efforts inspired by environmental concerns back to 1872, when the 
Swiss Government proposed an international regulatory commission to protect 
migratory birds in Europe. He discusses the growth of environmental concern 
since the Second World War and argues that a first "wave of environmentalism" 
in the 1960s reached its apex in 1972.2 Dr. Hohmann distingu{shes two main peri­
ods in the development OfIEL: traditional environmental law, based on economic 
considerations, from the beginning of this century to 1972, and modern interna­
tional environmental law, dominated by ecological concerns, from 1972 
onwards . 3 Professors Kiss and Shelton regard 1968 as a turning point, for it was 
then that several international organisations began placing environmental pro­
tection on their agendas.4 
A common denominator in the literature is that modern IEL was formed at the 
end of the 1960s or in the beginning of the 1970s. It was indeed in the early 1960s 
that a number of scientific studies raised the alarm regarding the effects of un­
checked economic development on the human environment. The works of U.S. 
marine biologist Rachel Carson (1907-1964) are widely credited with raising pub­
lic awareness, particularly her book, Silent Spring (1962), in which she questioned 
the widespread use of chemical pesticides. In addition, a series of environmental 
catastrophes in the 1960s underlined the gravity of the increased threats to the en­
vironment and to human health. In Japan, the Chisso Corporation, which for 
more than 30 years discharged mercury into the Minimata Bay and River, was fi­
nally forced into court in 1969. By then the full consequences of the Minimata 
disease -an extreme form of mercury poisoning which caused serious birth de­
fects and ruined the local fishing industry-had come to light. In Europe, the 
"black tides" off the coasts of France and England caused by the 1967 Torrey Can­
yon disaster were a catalyst in the development of a totally new convention 
apparatus for marine catastrophes . 5 In 1968 a diverse group of private and public 
sector experts, worried about environmental decline, formed the Club of Rome. 
Their 1972 report-entitled "Limits to Growth,,6-quickly became an interna­
tional best-seller. Grassroots movements of concerned citizens succeeded in 
mobilising their governments7 and various international organisations to take on 
environmental problems. By 1972, a wide variety of intergovernmental organisa­
tions, both within and outside the UN system, and several unofficial bodies had 
included specific environmental concerns on their agendas.g 
An early milestone for IEL was the Conference on the Human Environment 
(UNCHE) convened in Stockholm by the UN General Assembly in 1972. This high 
profile meeting produced a large number of texts, best known of which are the 
Stockholm Declaration of Principles for the Preservation and Enhancement of 
the Human Environment (adopted by acclamation) and the ambitious Action 
4 
I ! 
1 
I I j I j 
i 
I I I 
I 
International Environmental Law and Naval War 
Plan for the Human Environment, which con tains 109 Recommen dations.9 The 
S tockholm Declaration, which consists  of a Preamble and 26 "Principles," con­
tains provisions not only addressed to the tradit ional  subjects of in ternational 
law-States-but also deals with environmental righ ts and duties of individuals, 
organisations, local and national governmen ts, and in ternational insti tu tions .  I t  
has been said o f  the UNCHE that: 
In environmentally conscious circles, the calendar starts in 1972, the year of the 
Stockholm conference. 10 
Since 1972, the In ternational Law Commission (ILC) and unofficial bodies 
such as the Inst i tut  de Droit International (hereinafter Inst i tut)  and the In terna­
tional Law Association (ILA) have made significant  contribu tions to the 
codification and progressive development of aspects of IEL, mainly in the areas of 
water resource law and transboundary air pollu tion .ll UNCHE is further credited 
wi th giving impetus to importan t regional ini tiatives, such as the development of 
environmental protection rules by the EECY Other regional in tergovernmental 
organisations that have advanced the developmen t of modern IEL are the UN Eco­
nomic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), the Counci l  of Europe, and to a lesser 
extent, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation an d  Development (OECD) . 13 
Apart from the official  recognit ion of the environment as a subject of general 
in ternational concern, another major ou tcome OfUNCHE was the estab l i shment of 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).I4 From rather modest be­
ginnings, UNEP has played an increasingly important role in the promotion and 
development of IEL. For instance, it in i tiated a successful  regional seas pro­
gramme and sponsored the conclusion of agreements on the protection of the 
ozone layer and hazardous waste. IS 
A further imponant  i nsti tution for the development of IEL is the I n terna­
tional Mariti me Organ isation (lMO), establ ished in i ti ally in 1 948 as the 
I n ternat ional  Marit ime Consultative O rganisat ion (IMCO). A specialised UN 
agency concerned with both mari t ime safety and marine pol lution, it promo tes  
importan t environmen tal treaties for which it  often provides secretariat  
functions . 
In celebration of the 1 0 th anniversary of the S tockholm Conference, the UN 
General Assembly adopted in  1982 the "World Chaner for Natu re" with over­
whelming suppon. 1 6  The Charter is aimed at  setting forth "the principles of 
conservation by which all human conduct affect ing nature is to be guided and 
judged."  However, i t  uses mainly aspirational language and is  generally regarded 
as laying down standards of ethical but not legal conduct.1 7 
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The 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was 
timed to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the Stockholm Conference. Dele­
gates from 178 States and 650 non-governmental organisations participated.18 In 
terms of international instruments, the Rio Conference adopted two treaties and a 
set of principles on specific environmental problemsl9 in addition to a general 
Declaration on Environment and Development consisting of 27 Principles aimed 
at reaffirming and developing the Stockholm Declaration. UNCED also led to a vo­
luminous blueprint for action in the 21 st century and beyond, entitled Agenda 
21. 20 It comprises 40 chapters and hundreds of programme areas, the implemen­
tation of which is the responsibility of governments, with key roles for the UN 
system, other official and non-official, regional and sub-regional organisations, 
and with particular attention to broad public participation.21 
Post-UNCED institutions include the UN Commission on Sustainable Develop­
ment, a UN Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, a 
High-Level Advisory Board of experts on sustainable development, a Global Envi­
ronmental Facility and an independent, non-governmental Earth Counci1.22 
In 1997 the UN General Assembly convened a special session for the purpose 
of an overall review and appraisal of the implementation of Agenda 2 1 .23 Apart 
from a programme for the further implementation of Agenda 21, a "statement of 
commitment,,24 was adopted in which a number of positive results were acknowl­
edged, but deep concern was expressed that the overall trends for sustainable 
development25 were worse in 1997 than they were in 1992. Participants hence 
committed themselves to ensure greater measurable progress in achieving sus­
tainable development by 2002. 
1.1.2. The Environment as a Concept 
There is no commonly agreed definition of the concept "environment" in in­
ternational law. It is a term, as Professor Caldwell writes, which everyone under­
stands but no one is able to define.26 The International Court of Justice (IC]) ex­
pressed the same sentiment when it stressed in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that: 
... the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality 
of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn.27 
Many writers tend to shun the task of developing an all-purpose definition of 
the environment or borrow heavily from the natural sciences.28 Professors Kiss 
and Shelton for instance, use the term "biosphere," and define the environ men t as: 
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, . .  any point on a continuum between the entire biosphere and the immediate 
physical surroundings of a person or a group,29 
The biosphere is a concept that originated in geological circles at the end of the 
last century and was adopted by UNESCO in 1966.30 It refers to the relatively thin 
zone of air, soil and water that is capable of supporting life, co mprising the earth 
itself, a sector of several hundred meters above the earth, and a sector beneath the 
earth and the oceans. 
There are several important lessons to be drawn from an excursion into the 
natural sciences. In the first place, natural scientists view the term "environment" 
as an essentially relative and potentially infinite concept, pointing to objects, 
chemical processes or lifeforms surrounding another object or lifeform and which 
stand in relation to it.3 1 To ecologists, there are no limits as to size or complexity 
of the terms "environment" or "ecosystem.,,32 
Moreover, the "natural environment" is probably an outdated concept, for it 
disregards the unique and significant role which humans play in the biosphere.33 
A UNEP Working Group of Experts on environmental damage arising from mili­
tary activities suggested that the definition of the environment should include 
natural elements as well as human elements, i.e., not only "abiotic and biotic com­
ponents, including air, water, soi l, flora, fauna, and the ecosystem formed by their 
interaction," but also "cultural heritage, features of the landscape and environ­
mental amenity.,,34 
In the decades since UNCHE, scholars from various disciplines have advocated 
divergent philosophies as a basis for environmental policy. In an influential arti­
cle that was published in 1972 and quickly popularised as a book, Professor Stone 
proposed: 
... that we give legal rights to forests, oceans, rivers and other so-called "natural 
objects" in the environment-indeed to the natural environment as a whole.35 
These so-called ecorights are radically nature-centred. Their moral ground is 
the intrinsic good or worth of nature. 36 In legal terms, a thorough nature-centred 
morality implies that the environment would need to be protected for its own sake 
in the absence of identifiable human values, rights, or interests.37 Ecocentrist 
ideas have been invoked mainly in U.S. courts, with ambiguous results.38 Some 
legal scholars have expressed sympathy for according rights to certain sentient 
species, such as elephants39 and whales.40 
Ecocentrist theory holds that no part of the environment can be rationally said 
to be more important than another.41 However, it leaves a few serious questions  
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unanswered. Should free nature be allowed to reign? What about natural objects 
such as pests and viruses or natural phenomena such as flooding?-l2 The theory of 
interspecies equity is probably an over-reaction to the serious mismanagement of 
the environment by humans. Recognising that humans are part of a biotic com­
munity may be a step in the good direction, but it does not in itself point to 
guidelines for human behaviour.43 
The debate between anthropocentrist and ecocentrist positions is reflected in 
many (peacetime) environmental instruments. The 1 972 Stockholm Declaration 
seems anthropocentric because of its focus on the protection of nature for the ben­
efit of mankind.-l4 By contrast, the 1 9 82 World Charter for Nature is seen as 
ecocentric, for it emphasises the protection of nature as an end in itself: 
Every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man .. 45 
However, there is great ambivalence within the environmental community 
about the ultimate reasons for protecting the environment. Many recent environ­
mental campaigns continue to appeal to traditional human-centred instincts.46 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the newly developed concepts of inter-genera­
tional equity and sustainable development47 are in essence anthropocentric: they 
refer, inter alia, to interests, entitlements or rights of (future generations) of peo­
ple.48 This prevailing ambivalence was not resolved by UNCED. On the contrary, it 
is possible to regard the Rio Declaration as a step back in the direction of pure 
anthropocentrism, for the first principle strikingly propounds that: 
Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. 
The Biodiversity Convention that was adopted at the same conference, by con­
trast, attempts to combine both anthropocentric and ecocentric values.49 
While the views of animal rights activists and other inter-species equity theo­
rists have drawn much attention in recent years, most international legal 
instruments, apart from a few adopted by the Council of Europe,50 have tended to 
endorse what has been termed an "environmentalist" view. Instead of claiming 
that all species should be protected, however adverse their effect on humans or 
other species, this theory stresses that species need to be protected for ecological 
reasons, as part an ecosystem.51 
The better view seems to be that all concern for the environment shows anthro­
pocentric attributes. Many people value protection of the environment, 
irrespective of its economic worth to mankind. Moreover, the scarcer natural re­
sources become, the more value will be placed on preserving what is left.52 
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Human beings h ave in the last decades become increasingly aware of the possible 
long-term effects of environmental degradation on the human population.53 The 
growing awareness of the i nterrelatedness of all l ife processes on Earth is  another 
reason for extending protection to previously underrated environmental compo­
nen ts. Such moderate anthropocentrism should not be viewed as necessarily 
negative. Non-human components will benefi t  from the "reflex-function" of 
norms created by  and for humans. 54 
I t  is nevertheless legitimate to question i f  i t  matters in  a legal sense that all Na­
ture i s  subordinated to human considerations .  Authors such as Professor Stone 
claim that i t  does, particularly with regard to compensation for environmental 
damage.55 Furthermore, the subordination of Nature to human claims is more ap­
parent  in the law of armed conflict, as will  be seen later. 56 
In sum, a scientifically sound, comprehensive, and all-purpose legal defin ition 
of the environment would have to stress the relative and potentially infinite char­
acter of the concept, the interrelatedness of all environmenta l  components, the 
primordial  role played by m ankind in the en vironment, and possibly also balance 
anthropocentrist and ecocentrist notions .  
Apart  from the difficulty to define and restr ict  the scope of the concept from a 
legal perspective, there are other reasons why there are few all-purpose legal defi­
nitions of the environment. The first one i s  h i storic .  IEL started from a sectoral 
approach, dealing with environmental concerns as they arose in relation to spe­
cific media and resources, thus obviating the need for a wide definition of the 
environment. At first, international law-making in thi s  area was also purely reac­
tive-typ ically in response to a major  industrial accident revealing the 
inadequacy of existing regulations .  By contrast, some recen t treaties a llow for pre­
ventive actions to be taken in response to emerging scientific  evidence. At the 
same t ime, integrated approaches are being developed for transsectoral environ­
mental problems. 57 
There are an impressive number of b i lateral and multilateral treaties on the en­
vironment .5 8  However, the discipline of IEL is hardly codified .  Repeated attempts 
in the 1980s and the 1990s at formulating a comprehensive and b inding treaty on 
the environmental rights and duties of S tates ended in fai lure.59  There is as  yet  no 
uniform conceptual approach to environmental regulation .60 I t  i s  safe to state 
therefore, that the actual content of the environmental rights and duties of States 
depends significantly on the context and objectives of the t reaty instrument at i s ­
sue,  and that it varies according to the sector, media, an d type of activity u n der 
consideration .6l I t  is  therefore neither possible nor advisable to search for an 
all-purpose definition of terms such as environment, pollution, or  harm, at least 
as far as general (peacet ime) IEL is  concerned.62 
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1 .2. The Principal Environmental Rights and Duties of States 
Whilst IEL is predominantly treaty- based law,63 many writers continue to at­
tach great importance to customary international law as an instrument for 
environmental lawmaking.64 In the ligh t of the sub j ect of this work, it  is impor­
tant to determine the con tent of general or customary IEL.65 In the first part of this 
section, the most important multilateral environmental agreements will be exam ­
ined; in the second part, general principles and rules. 
1 . 2 . 1 . Pr inc ipal  Mu lti lateral Environm ental Ag ree ments 
A great number of multilateral environmen tal agreements h ave been adopted 
at the global and regional level establishing specific obligations in relation to vari­
ous environmental sectors. As one commentator observes, it seems that for each 
new environmental problem, a new treaty is negotiated.66 Some of these receive 
widespread support and may reflect rules of general or customary international 
law. Given the subject of this work, the following review will focus mainly on the 
marine environment. 
A. Mar ine Envi ronment. The maj ority of environmen tal treaties deal with 
protection of the marine environment, containing among the most highly devel­
oped norms in the field of I EL. Although the causes of marine pollution are 
diverse, most treaties deal wi th the following types of pollution : operational and 
accidental discharges from ships, pollution arising from the exploration and ex­
ploitation of the seabed, land-based pollution, and deliberate dumping of 
industrial wastes.67 
Marine pollution is a relatively long-standing concern. In 1926 a draft conven­
tion on pollution from ships, limiting discharges of oil and gas into the sea, was 
drawn up at an international conference convened by the United States. It failed 
to gain acceptance as did a second draft prepared under the auspices of the League 
of Nations in 1935 to reduce pollution resulting from tanker-cleaning opera­
tions.68 It was only after the S econd World War that agreement was reached on 
concerted international action .  As a result, the 1954 International Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by O i l  was adopted to prohibit deliberate 
discharges of oil in specified zones.69 Shortly thereafter, prohibitions related to 
pollution of the sea by oil or pipelines, as well as by radioactive wastes, were in­
cluded in the 195 8  UN Convention on the High SeasJo A prohibition on 
pollution by wastes resulting from oil drilling on the con tinen tal shelf was incor­
porated into the 195 8  UN Convention on the Continental Shelf. 71  
1 0  
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Following the Torrey Canyon accident, IMCO sponsored the adoption in 1969 of 
two conventions, one concerning civil liability for oil pollution damage and the 
other related to intervention on the h igh seas in cases of oil pollution casualties.72 
These were later supplemented by a 197 1 Convention creating an additional fund 
for compensation for oil  pollution damage and a 1973 Intervention Protocol for 
pollution casualties caused by substances other than oil .  
Although it was still an ad hoc approach for specific environmental problerlls, 
several instruments for the protection of the marine environment were adopted as 
a result of Principle 7 of the Declaration 73 and of the Action plan 74 adopted at the 
1 972 UNCHE. In its wake a new global treaty was adopted at an intergovernmental 
conference in London :  the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollu­
tion by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter, dealing primarily with ocean 
dumping. One year later, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pol­
lution by Ships was concluded at IMCO headquarters. It has as its ambitious 
objective the complete elimination of all intentional vessel-source pollution and 
the minimisation of accidental discharges ; it lays down detai led rules in six an­
nexes dealing with oil, noxious liquid in bulk, harmful substances in packaged 
form, garbage, sewage, and most recently, air pollution.75 It was i
·
ntended to re­
place the 1 954 Oil Pollution Prevention Convention and was substantially 
amended and replaced by a 1978 Protocol. Usually referred to as MARPOL 73/78, it  
has been widely ratified,76 although the Annexes have received less support. 77 
In  1 973, negotiations for the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea com­
menced. This resulted nine years later in the adoption of an umbrella convention 
comprising more than 400 articles, spread over 17 chapters and 9 annexes that 
form an integral part of the convention. The Montego Bay Convention on the 
Law of the Sea ( 1 982 UNCLOS) is regarded as the most comprehensive environ­
mental treaty thus far, recording customary law, introducing many innovative 
provisions, in addition to striking compromises on perennial and newly emerged 
problems. Intended as a comprehensive restatement of almost all aspects of the 
law of the sea,78  it  sets a global framework for, inter alia, the exploi tation and con­
servation of marine resources and for the protection of the marine environment.79 
It obligates States "to protect and preserve the marine environment" (Article 1 92) 
and enacts a framework envisaging all types of pollution of the marine environ­
ment, whatever the cause: vessel-source, land-based sources, dumping, 
exploitation of the seabed, and air pollution (Part XII, Art. 192-237).  The conven­
tion introduces new provisions aimed at preventing pollution from the 
exploration and exploi tation of the seabed and its subsoi1 . 80 I t  also attempts to 
strike a new balance between the powers of flag States and coastal States, the for­
mer extending primarily to freedom of navigation and fishing, the latter to 
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effec tive regulat ion and control .  It recognises t h e  competence of coas tal S tates to 
combat pollution i n  the terri tori al sea and in the new jurisdict ional  area of the Ex­
c l u s i ve Econom ic Zone (EEZ) 8 1  
A s  is well-k now n, the convention entered into force only o n  1 6  November 
1 994, one year after it had obtained the neces sary 60 ratifications82 and after sub­
stantial  amendments had been agreed i n  July 1 994 regard i n g  Part XI o n  deep 
seabed m i n i ng. 83 Many m ore Wes tern S tates, including the European Commu­
n ity (EC),  have s i nce consented to be bound by the  UNCLO S Convention and th e 
1 994 Agreem ent. 84 As of 1 2  March 1 998, 1 24 S tates h ave rati fied the m ain conven­
tion,  and 8 S  the 1 994 Agreem en t.85  However, m ost commen tators seem to agree 
that 1 9 8 2  UNCLOS did not i n troduce any substan tially new provi s ions  on the ma­
rine enviro n m en t of the high seas. 86 I ts provis ions  are seen as the culmi nation of a 
number of changes i n  th e internation a l  law of the sea that took place earlier .  One 
of these i s  the fun damental principle  that  pol lution can n o  longer be regarded as  
an implic i t  freedom of the sea s . 87 In addition, Part  XII  of 1982 UNCLOS is  largely 
composed of so-called umbrella p rovis ions88 that  have received w idespread and 
con sisten t  support i n  State practice, most notab ly, p u rsuant to m any treaties and 
intern ational rules that implement or complement Part XII . 89 Agenda 21 en­
dorsed the view that this part of UNCLOS reflects customary international law.9o 
At the same time, a sub stantial body of regional  convention s developed.9 1  One 
series of regi onal treaties concern s i n d u strial pol l ution and land-based activit ies 
in the North Sea an d  the North-East A tlan tic area. The first of these was the 1 969 
Bonn Agreement for Co-opera tion in Deal ing with Po llut ion of the North Sea by 
Oil, concluded in the wake of the Torrey Canyon i ncident. 
Other agreements coveri ng the northern hemi sphere are the 1 9 7 2  Oslo 
D umping Conven tion which app lies to the North-East Atlantic, the North S ea, 
and the adj acent Arctic seas, and the 1 974 Pari s Convention which deals  with 
land-based pol lution in  the same area.  They were replaced i n  1 992 by a s i ngle 
comprehensive agreement :  the Convention for the Protection of the Marine En­
vironment of the North-East  Atlantic ( 1 992 OSPA R Convention ) .92 The area is also 
i ncreas ingly covered by measures adopted at a series  of I n tern ational North Sea 
Conferences a n d  by the growing body of EC law.93 
S econ dly, there are the treaties  co ncluded under UNEP's Regional Seas/O ceans 
and Coas tal A ffai rs Program me. The programme w as inspired b y  the 1 974 Hel­
s inki  Convention on the Pro tection of the Mari n e  Environm ent of the B al tic  Sea 
Area in w h ich the li ttoral S tates agreed to a d d ress all forms of m arine pollu tion . 
The 1 974 Conventio n sets stringent standards for dumping at sea, adopts rules in­
spired by MA RPOL 1 9 7 3  for vess el-source p o l l ution, and covers a irborne and 
land-based sources of poUution .94 The UNEP programm e  was launched i n  1 9 7 8  
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and focuses primarily on developing countries of the Southern Hemisphere. By 
1995 , it  included 13 regional  areas, 8 of  which were covered by bin ding in terna­
tional instruments;95 the Mediterranean, Persian/Arab ian Gulf, Gulf of Guinea, 
South-East Pacific, Red Sea and Gulf of  Aden , Caribbean, Indian Ocean and East 
Africa, and South Pacific .  For each regional sea, a simi lar flexible and dynamic 
pattern i s  followed, which often includes the adoption of an Acti on Plan for the 
region and a framework convention applicable to the terri torial sea and the EEZ of 
the State parties . In  the framework convention, Parties agree to take appropriate 
measures to preven t, abate, and combat pollution and protect and enhance the 
marine environment, and to formulate and adopt protocols on agreed measures, 
procedures, and standards.96 This is followed by a series of integrated protocols in 
which specific problems are tackled . Many of these cover combating oil pollution 
and other forms of marine pollution in  cases of  emergency, as well as dumping 
from ships and aircraft;  a few include pollution from exp loration and exploi tation 
of the continen tal shelf, land-based sources of marine pollution, transboundary 
movement of hazardous wastes, and speci ally protected areas .  In 1992 UNEP as­
sisted the six Black Sea S tates wi th the adoption of a s imilar framework 
convention and a number of protocols.  However, many of the regiona l  sea 
programmes lack the detailed regulations applying to the N orthern Hemisphere, 
suffer from weak participation by S tates in some regions, and have a poor record 
of ratification and implementation.97 
The legal relationship between all these in ternational instruments may appear 
complex. As for the relationship between 1982 UNCLO S and other treaties, 
Article 237 states that Part XII is  without prej udice to more specific obligations 
assumed under earlier or la ter convent ions, provided that these are carried out in 
a manner consistent with the general princip les and objectives of  1982 UNCLOS.  It  
follows that righ ts and obligations derived from the 1978 Kuwait Regional Con­
ven tion, and even from specialised maritime conventions such as MARPOL 73/78, 
"trump" UNCLOS provisions provided that they are consisten t with the general 
rules of the latter.98 Moreover, many of the regional seas conventions contain pro­
visions on their  relationship with other international conventions and rules .99 
Furthermore, in its p rovisions on vessel-source pollution, dumping, and sea­
bed operations, 1982 UNCLOS stipulates that States must give effect to 
international  rules and standards as well as recommended practices and proce­
dures, and tha t  they must act  through competent international organisations or 
conferences to establish international global and  regional rules .  1 00 This phraseol­
ogy may imply that 1982 UNCLOS aims a t  incorporating conventions such as the 
1972  London Dumping Convention, MARPOL 73/78  and possibly other special­
ised treaties. 10 1 
13  
The Newport Papers 
The International Maritime Organisation is regarded as the competen t inter­
n ational organisation referred to in many of the U NCLOS provisions regarding the 
regulation of vessel-source pollution. 1 02 It sponsors internationally recognised 
common standards for the regulation of shipping safety and environmental pro­
tection by coastal and flag States. The resulting treaties are regarded as an 
essential albeit indirect means of reducing marine pollution. 103  Apart from the 
IMCO Conventions mentioned earlier, this study will disc uss the 1966 Interna­
tional Convention on Load Lines, the 1 972 Convention on the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Con­
vention, the 1989 International Salvage Convention, the 1990 Oil Pollution 
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation Convention concluded in the wake of 
the Exxon Valdez disaster, and the 1 996 International Convention on Liability 
and Compensation for Damage in Connection with Hazardous and Noxious Sub­
stances by Sea. 
B. Fres hwater Resources. The body of international conventional rules on 
watercourses and other freshwater resources is extensive. 104 However, many are 
contained in treaties with a more general purpose, such as those regulating 
boundary matters between States . l O S  There are very few agreemen ts devoted ex­
clusively to the protection of waters against pollution. In addition, although there 
are m any examples of regio nal co-operation, there are no specific regional re­
gimes, apart from the area covered by EC law. 
Any discussion of global rules on the protection of freshwater resources will 
have to include the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of In­
ternational Watercourses, adopted in 1 997 by the UN General Assembly, 1 06 on 
the basis of a draft prepared by the I LC over a period of more than 20 years . 1 07 Its 
obj ective is to ensure the utilization, developm ent, conservation, m anagement 
and protection of international watercourses and the promotion of sustainable 
utilisation thereof for present and future generations.  
As is the case for many recent international instruments, the 1997 Watercourse 
Convention is a framework agreement. It contains various general principles for 
the utilisation of international watercourses : equitable and reasonable uti lisation 
and participation, the obligation not to cause significant harm, a general obliga­
tion to co-operate and to regularly exchange data and information, and the 
principle that in the absence of agreemen t or custom to the contrary, no use of an 
internation al watercourse enj oys inherent priority over other uses. l OS The con­
vention also lays down detailed obligations for States to exchange information 
and consult each other, and if necessary, to negotiate on the possible effects of 
plan ned m easures regarding the watercourse�09 It has several specific 
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environmental protection provisions. Accordingly, watercourse States need to 
"protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses," I 10 prevent, 
reduce, and control the pollution of international watercourses, I I I  prevent intro­
duction of alien or  new species, and take all measures wi th respect to an 
i nternational watercourse that are necessary to protect and preserve the marine 
environment, taking into account generally accepted i nternational rules and stan­
dards. 1 1 2  Finally, there a re provisions on emergency si tuations, l 1 3  an article on 
armed conflict, 1 1 4  and an annex on arbitration .  
A detailed examination of the extent to  which th i s  convention codifies custom­
ary international law, and which provisions should be regarded as innovative, is 
beyond the scope of this  work. In the literature, the following p rinciples and rules 
are generally regarded as reflecting customary international law: the principle of 
common, equitable, and reasonable utilisation of shared water resources, 1 1 5  en­
dorsed by the IC} in  the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, 1 16 the obligation to 
prevent  (serious) harm to other States, and several principles of transboundary 
environmental co-operation. 1 l7 Furthermore, there i s  i mportant  international 
case law relating to international watercourses, some of which will be examined 
below. 1 1 8  
I t  i s  noteworthy that there i s  little support for the view that pollution o f  inter­
n ational watercourses would be unlawful per se. Instead, the modern trend is  to 
require States to regulate and control river pollution, whilst  prohibiting only cer­
tain discharges and  distinguishing between old and new sources. 1 1 9  Pollution is 
only unlawful if  i t  causes (serious) harm to other (riparian) States. For instance, 
Article 7 of the 1 997 International Watercourse Convention stipulates firstly that 
watercourse S tates need to take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of 
significant harm to other watercourse States; and secondly, should significant 
harm nevertheless occur, that they need to take all appropriate measures in con­
sultation with the affected State to eli minate or  mitigate harm and, where 
appropriate, discuss compensation. 1 20 The ILC does not  view the causing of sig­
nificant h arm as necessarily unlawful per se, but regards equitable utilisation as 
the overriding guiding principle. l 2 l  This includes cases of pollution, pursuant to 
Article 2 1 (2) of the convention and the ILC'S commentary thereon. In As a result, 
even s ignificant harm may have to be tolerated by a watercourse S tate. l 2 3  
Nevertheless, the 1997 Convention also contains environmental protection 
provisions which are not concerned with other riparian States: Article 20 on the 
obligation to protect and preserve the ecosystems of in ternational watercourses; 
Article 22 on the introduction of alien or new species, and Article 23  on the protec­
tion and preservation of the marine environmen t. Although the threshold of harm 
in Articles 20 and 23 i s  not specified, 124 none of these provisions set absolute 
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stan dards, for they are subject  to the general principle of equi table util isation. 1 2 5  
Whatever their curren t legal status, 1 26 i t  i s  clear that the benefits o f  these provi­
sions w i ll ex tend beyond the i n teres ts of riparian States .  I n  The inclusion of 
measures aimed a t  protecting environmental resources per se is  an emerging tren d 
in IEL, which, as will  be seen below, is developing rules transcendi ng the tradi­
tional question of transfrontier polluti on . 1 28 
C. Biod ivers ity . The body of in tern ational  rules concern ing biological di ver­
s ity is formed by ru les adopted at  the local, national, bi lateral ,  sub -regional, 
regi onal, and global level. Biodi versity is a recently developed term a n d  is usually 
un derstood as comprising three notions : genetic di versity, species diversity, and 
ecosystem diversity. 1 29 It  covers the older terminology "wildlife" or "l iving" nat­
ural  resources, which were distinguished from non-l iving n atural resources by 
the fact that they are renewable if conserved and destruc tible if not .  1 30 
There are importan t  differences between marine and terres trial regimes.  Ma­
rine biod iversity is often consi dered common property or shared resources and 
particularly vulnerable to over-exp loitation.  In response, international law ten ds 
to s tress obligations of conservation an d  equitable util isatio n .  Impo rtant provi­
s ions  on marine l ife can be found in conventions wh ich deal  w i th fisheries 
conservation such as the 1 946 In ternational Whaling Convention, 1 3 1  or with an 
even broa der purpose, such as 1 982 UNCLO S . 1 32 In tern a t ional regula tion of terres­
tria l  biodiversity is generally more d i fficult because i t  requi res l imi ting th e 
principle of S tates' permanen t  sovereignty over their natural  resources . To justify 
such interference, in terna tional treaties resort sometimes to concepts as "com­
mon concern," "common heritage" and even "animal righ ts. ,, 1 3 3  
Until  recently, w ildl ife conservation implied a very partial  a d  hoc approach 
consisting of targeting wildlife species identified as threatened w i th extin ction. 
Proper conservation of biodiversi ty, which implies maintaining v iable popula­
tions of species is  now generally thought of as requ iring co mplex sustainable and 
flexible stra tegi es, wh ich i n c lude plan ts, ani mals, micro-organisms, and the 
non-l iving elements of the environ ment on which th ey depen d. 1 3-+ 
The most important  m ultilateral treaties aimed at habitat preservation are the 
197 1 Convention on Wetlands of Intern atio nal Importance (Ram sar Con ven tion) 
and the 1 972 Convention for the Pro tection of the World Cultural and Natural 
H eri tage (World Heritage Convention).  Important  treaties which focus o n  species 
protection are the 1973  Convention on In tern ational Trade i n  Endangered Spe­
cies (CITES) and the 1 979 Conservatio n  of Migratory Species of Wil d  An imals 
(Bonn Conventi on).  Finally, the 1992 Biodiversi ty Con vention a ims at serring an 
o verall framework for this  area of the law. 
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The purpose of the 1 97 1  Ramsar Convention i s  the conservation and the en­
hancement of a particular type of habitat important for waterfowl. I 35 Without 
pre judice to their sovereign rights, State parties must designate at least one wet­
land of international significance in terms of ecology, botany, zoology, l imnology, 
and hydrology for inclusion in a List of Wetlands of International Importance. 1 36 
The deletion or restriction of listed wetlands i s  permitted on grounds of "urgent 
national interest," but  must take into consideration the "international responsi­
b ilities for the conservation, m anagement an d wise use of migratory stocks of 
waterfowl,,, 1 37 and Parties need to compensate, as far as possib le, for any loss of 
wetland resources, e.g. , by creating addi tional nature reserves .  1 38 Parties are also 
under a number of general obligations :  to promote the conservation of listed 
wetlands, and as far as possible, the "wise use of wetlands on their territory," to es­
tablish nature reserves, to endeavour to increase waterfowl populations, and to 
exchange information at the earliest possible time on changes i n  the ecological 
character of li sted wetlands . 1 39 Because of their general nature, the provisions of 
the Ramsar Convention are considered weak and have given rise to problems of 
interpretation . 1 40 Nevertheless, by  29 March 1 998, the convention had 1 06 
Parties and protected 903 wetland sites. 14 1 
The World Heri tage Convention-adopted in 1972 under UNESCO aus­
pices-also works on the basis  of recording sites.  Although its  provisions are 
more stringent than the Ramsar Convention, it has more Parties. 1 42 The conven­
tion's guidelines for the identification of natural heritage are based on physical 
characteristics of outstanding universal value. 1 43 Each State party needs to iden­
tify cultural and natural heritage si tes on its  territory, 1 44 but  listing is subject to a 
decision by  the World Heri tage Committee, which may also consider financial 
implications. 1 45 Apart from the main inventories of n ational and cul tural heri­
tage, 1 46 a l ist  of special "World Heritage in  Danger" is maintained for sites 
threatened by serious and specific dangers, such as the outbreak or threat of 
armed conflict. 1 47 As a result of the latter type of threat, the Old City of 
Dubrovnik in Croatia, the Virunga Natural Park, and the Okapi Wi ldlife Reserve 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were included in this  special l ist . 1 48 
Each State party needs to adopt a national programme for the protection of its 
natural and cultural heritage. 149 In addition, S tate parties "recognise that such 
heritage constitutes a world heritage for whose protection it is  the duty of the in­
ternational community as a whole to co-operate and to lend their assistance 
thereto . ,, 1 50 Importantly, State parties undertake "not to take any deliberate mea­
sures which might damage directly or in directly the cu ltural and natural heritage 
s i tuated on the terri tory of other parties to the convention . ,, 1 5 1  The convention 
further establishes an Intergovernmental Committee and a fund for the 
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p rotection of the heritage in question, a n d  procedures under which S tate parties 
can requ est in tern ational assistance. 1 5 2  
B y  1 June 1 997, a total of l 69 States had b ecome Parties t o  the 1 992 Con ven tio n 
on Biological Di versity. 1 5 3 Under this agreement, which applies express ly both 
within the li mits o f  n ational j urisd iction an d beyond, 1 5 4  Parties undertake a 
n u mber of gen eral ob ligations .  In accordance with their particular conditions and 
c apabilities, they need to develop n ational strategies, plans o r progra m m es for the 
conservation and sustainable use o f  biodiversity, an d integrate, " as far as possibl e  
a n d  a s  appropriate," these strategies i n to other relevant sectoral a n d  cross-sectoral 
plans.  1 5 5  Furthermore, each Party shall, "as far as possible  and as appropri ate," 
engage in identific ation of biodi versity and in monitoring, 1 56 adopt in situ and ex 
situ conservation measures, 1 5 7  use components of b io logical diversity in a sustain­
able manner, 1 5 8  adopt incentive m easures, 1 59 establish programmes for research 
and train ing, 160 engage in  public education and awaren ess, 1 6 1  in troduce environ­
m ental i mpact assessment procedures for proposed proj ects, an d take measures to 
min imise adverse impacts. 1 62 In respect of areas beyond national jurisdiction and 
on oth er matters of general in terest, Parties undertake to co-operate " as far as possi­
ble and as appropriate" either di rectly or through intern ational  organisations.  1 63 
The convention also con tains a number of other provisions that h ave led some 
States, m ost notably the United States, to decide initia l ly  against  sign ing the con­
ventio n :  1 64 Article 19 on the han dl ing of biotechnology and the distribu tion of its 
b en efits a n d  Articles 20 and 21 on fin ancial resources. 1 65 Fu rth ermore, Artic le  22 
( l )  stipu lates that the convention shall not  affect rights and obl igations of any 
Con tracting Party deriving from any existing international  agreement, "except 
where the exercise of those rights an d obligations woul d  cause a serio us damage or 
threat to b iological diversity. , , 166  In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Projecc case,  Hun­
gary relied, inter alia, on this provision to j ustify suspension and termin ation of a 
bi lateral treaty concluded in 1 97 7 . 1 67 Whilst Hungary called this a jus cogens type 
of c1 a im, 1 68 the Ie} has rejected this argum ent i mp licitly. 1 69 Moreover, it should 
be noted that Article 22 (2) gives preem in ence to the law o f the sea with respect to 
m arine biodiversity, thus casting doubt on the alleged peremptory ch aracter of 
the en tire provision. I 70 
Of particular note are a series of con ventions adopted through the Council of Eu­
rope, an d certain EC regulations. They constitute to  date  the only intern ational  
instruments that protect animals from suffering and are inspired-though not ex­
clusively-by ecocentrist and even animal-rights th eories. These include the 
1 96 8  Convention fo r the Pro tection of Animals during Interna tional Transport, 
the 1 979 Convention for the Protection of Animals  for S laughter, and the 1 987 
Convention for the Pro tection of Pet  A n i mals .  
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In conclusion, there is an overwhelming number of treaties on wildlife protec­
tion, ranging from the local to the global level, addressing a great variety of 
s i tuations and methods.  They have attracted wi de  differences in international 
support and are not always implemented and enforced in satisfactory ways. 1 7 1  
Some authors claim that most States accept t h e  need t o  co-operate in t h e  protec­
tion of living resources, to act in good fai th as good neighbours, and that they have 
to arrange some form of equitable use of shared living resources. There is  also con­
siderable agreement on certain conservation strategies and principles.  Beyond 
that, it  remains controversial whether general international law requires States to 
take appropriate s teps to protect endangered land-based species. I 72 As for marine 
biodiversity, it has been argued that  the consensus underlying the relevant provi ­
sions of 1 982 UNCLOS and subsequent practice l 73 show that States have accepted 
the general obligation to conserve m arine species, but some authors question the 
effectiveness of the n':gime. 1 74 
D .  Air Q u a l ity,  the Atm osph e re and C l i m ate C h a n g e .  The treaty regime 
in regard to air quality, the atmosphere, and climate change i s  of recent origin and 
consists of one specific regional and two global framework agreements.  There are 
mainly three problems that have inhibited the development of a proper legal 
regime. First, the degradation of the atmosphere and the l ikelihood of ensuing 
climate change, as well as its causes, have long remained a subjec t  of  debate among 
scientists. 1 75 Secondly, the legal status of the atmosphere in  international law is 
unsettled, 1 76 for it is a fluctuating and dynamic air mass that partly overlaps with 
the airspace above S tates territory and which l ies partly beyond national airspace, 
without forming part of Outer Space. In Thirdly, control of transboundary air 
pollution requires both developing and developed States to make difficult  choices 
and sacrifices in terms of economic and industrial policy. I t  i s  for the latter reason 
that unti l  the mid- 1 980s many S tates refused to agree to firm measures unless 
there was clear scientific evidence of harm. Despite these problems, by 1 997 the 
great majority of S tates had ratified the two global framework agreements, includ­
ing the a ttached protocols .  
Over thirty countries in  the Northern Hemisphere, from both Western and 
Eastern Europe as well as Canada and the Un ited S tates, are parties to the Geneva 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), concluded in 
1 979 under UN/ECE auspices in  response to the growing problem of acid rain .  The 
convention provides a framework for co-operation and development of pollution 
control measures, although the language of many of its commitments is  weak . ln 
Parties undertake to  protect Man and  his environment against a i r  pollution and, 
as far as possible, endeavour to l imit, gradually reduce and prevent air 
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pollution. 1 79 They agree to exchange information and to review their policies, sci ­
entific activities, and technical measures aimed at combating pollution, I SO to 
engage in consultations at an early stage in cases of actual or significant risk of 
long-range transboundary air pollution, l S I  and  t o  notify o f  major changes in policy 
or industrial development l ikely to cause s ignificant changes in  long-range air pol­
lution. 1 8 2  The convention is supplemented by four protocols. 1 8 3 Despite its many 
weaknesses, the LRA TP Convention is considered a qualified success. 1 84 
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was concluded 
in  1 98 5  under UNEP ausp ices. The convention primarily requests that Parties take 
appropriate measures 10 protect human health and the environment against ad­
verse effects resulting or l ikely 10  result from human activi ties that modi fy or are 
l ikely 10 modify the ozone layer. I S5 To this end, an d in accordance with the means 
a t their disposal and their capab il i  ties, Parties agree to co-operate in harmonising 
policies and in formulating agreed measures, procedures, and standards for the 
implementation of the convention. 1 86 Like the LRTAP Convention, the Vienna 
Convention is  a compromise between demands by some S tates for firm commit­
ments and requests by others for further study of the problem . 1 87 Its s ignificance 
lies in the fac t  that it is concerned with the global environment, that it recognises 
the impact of ozone depletion on climate change, 1 88 and the importance of ecosys­
tems i ndependent of their uti l i ty 10 Man. 1 89 I t  a lso alludes to the need for 
precautionary measures, i. e. , for preventive action even i n  the absence of firm 
proof of harm. 1 90 
The Montreal Protocol on  Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer-agreed 
in 1 98 7  following new and alarming scien tific ev idence-is considered more im­
portant than the convention itself: i t  sets firm targets for reducing and 
eliminating consumption and production of a number of ozone-depleting sub­
stances and has the elimination of (all)  ozone-depleting substances as i ts final 
ob jective. 1 9 1  
Amendments a n d  adj ustments adopted i n  1 990 a n d  1 992 brought the timeta­
bles forward and ad d ed new controlled substances. As a result, production and 
consumption of ozone-depleting substances such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCS) 
and halons were to be totally phased out  by 1 January 1 996.  While the Montreal 
Protocol initially allowed for delayed compliance by developing States, the latter 
were subsequently given financial an d technical i ncentives 10 accelerate their 
compliance. 1 92 Furthermore, the protocol controversially bans trade in con trolled 
substances with non-parties l 9 3  and contains innovative flexib le institutional provi­
sions. 1 94 It  entered i nto force on 1 January 1 989, when 29 countries and the EEC 
representing approximately 82 percent of world consumption ratified i t .  By 25 Feb­
ruary 1997, 1 6 1  States ratified the convention and the protoco 1 . 1 95 
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The 1 992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change acknowledges in its 
preamble that climate change an d its adverse effects are a " common concern of 
humankind ."  By 28  February 1 998,  i t  counted 1 74 State parties. 1 96 While the con­
vention recognises that climate change occurs naturally, i ts  objective i s  to prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic  interference with the c l imate system . 1 97 Guiding prin­
ciples are set out in  Article 3 . These are: ( 1 )  the protection of the cl imate system 
for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of eq­
u ity and in accordance with the common but differen tiated responsibi lit ies an d 
respective capabil i ties of developed and developing States ; (2)  the spec ific  needs 
of developing country Parties ; ( 3) the need to take precautionary measures;  (4) 
the need for sustainable development ;  and  (5)  the different socio-economic 
contexts .  
The convention con tains a number of general commitments comparable to the 
Vienna Convention : inter alia, development of national programmes,  environ­
mental impact assessment, international co-operation, consultation, information 
exchange and reporting. 1 98 Although the stringency of the relevant provisions 
has been a matter of debate, 1 99 specific  commitments were agreed to stabalise 
greenhouse gases in  the atmosphere at a safe level and to limit emissions  of these 
by developing countries in  accordance with soft targets an d timetables.200 In De­
cember 1 997, the Conference of the Parties adopted a first ( Kyoto) protocol, 
containing l egally binding emissions targets for developed countries for the 
post-2000 period . 20 1 
E .  C o n c l u s i o n s .  The newest treaty regimes on marine pollution, freshwater 
resources, biodiversity, and protection of the atmosphere show that IEL is moving 
away from the sectoral and ad hoc approaches of the 1 960s and 1 970s.  Increasingly, 
more complex environmental challenges are addressed in which di fficult  scien­
tific, economic, and pol itical questions are intertwined. In response, innovative 
legal and institutional devices have been developed:  e.g. , the framework approach 
whereby the regulation for a specific  environmental secto r is specified i n  a dy­
namic sequence of protocols to the base treaty; or a commitment by the Parties to 
make use of the "best available technology," or to accept standards an d thresholds 
negotiated internationally at expert level, or to accept lists of tox ic  or  hazardous 
substances according to variable criteria of acceptability of harm . 202 
For reasons of space, the  above overview has primari ly been concerned with 
the regulation of specific environmental media and resources, concentrating on 
the marine environment.  It has not dealt with the special treaty regimes of certain 
international areas as Outer Space an d Antarctica nor with the emerging body of 
treaties on specific  products or particular activities, such as hazardous substances, 
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nuclear energy, biotechno logy, environ mental impact assessm ent, and accident 
preparedness and response.  203 Nevertheless, many of the latter treaties will  be ad­
d ressed throughout this work. 
1 .2 . 2 .  Gene ra l  Pri n c i p les and R u les 
What I propose to examine i n  this section are the general environmental rights 
and ob ligations of States that flow from principles and rules purportedly common 
to all  environmental sectors. 
A. Pr incip le 21 of U N C H E .  There is widespread agreement that the corner­
stone of modem IEL is formed by two important rules addressed to States, 
enun ciated by Principle 2 1  of the S tockholm Declaration : 
S t a tes have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the princi ples 
of i nternational  law, the sovere ign righ t to ex ploi t  their own resources pursuant to 
their  own environmen tal  policies, an d  the responsibility t o  ensure that  the activities 
wi thin  their  jurisd iction or control do not  cause damage to the environment of other 
S t ates or of areas beyond the l imits of nat ional j urisdiction.  
The first part of this provision captu res one of the basic tenets of in ternational 
law and applies it to the environment:  it is the sovereign right of S tates to control 
and regulate the exploitation of resources within their territory. This proclama­
tion finds its origin in numerous General Assembly resolutions and international 
instruments dealing w ith the right to self-determ ination of S tates .  In accordance 
with these, self-determination i n cludes, of necessi ty, " permanent sovereignty 
over their natural wealth and reso urces. ,,204 The secon d  element of th e principle 
p laces an important limit on the seem ingly broad interpretation of State sover­
eignty over their resources. It balances States' rights over their own environment 
with the responsib ility towards the environment of other States and areas beyon d 
national jurisdiction ,  
The Stockholm Declaration is a non-binding text, but  Principle 21 is regarded 
as cus tomary in ternational law. In fact, many believe that it reflected existing in­
ternational law at the time of its  formulation, in 1 972 . 205 Indeed, the second 
(limit ing) element of Principle 2 1 ,  which prohibits trans frontier pollution, is gen­
erally regarded as descending from general concepts of the rights and duties of 
States. It derives in the first place from the general principle of international 
law-applied by Huber in the 1 928 Island of Palmas case-206that every State 
must respect the sovereignty and territorial in tegrity of other States.  
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The prohibition of transfrontier pollution is also based o n  the doctrine which 
prohibits abuse of rights207 and the general p rinciple of law of good neighho urli­
nes s :  sic utere tuo ut alienllm non laedas ("so use your own property that you do not 
inj ure the property of another,, ) .208 
In addition, the prohibition of transfrontier p ollution is generally regarded as 
firmly rooted in the conclusions or  obiter dicta of certain long-standing and 
well-known j udicial precedents.  First and foremost among these is the Trail 
Smelter award ren dered on 16 April 1 9 3 8  by the u . S .-Canada International Joint 
Commission.  One of the first j udicial decision s  to deal wi th transboundary air 
pollution, i t  concerned a long-running dispute over damage to crops, pasture, 
land, trees, and agriculture on U . S .  territory caused by sulphur dioxide emissions 
from a smelting plant in Canada. Relying on the Palmas case award, the tribunal 
held in an oft-quoted passage that : 
. . .  no S t a te has the right to use or permit  the use of its territory in such a manner as  
t o  cause injury b y  fumes i n  or to the terri tory of another or the p roperties o r  persons 
therein, when the case i s  of serious consequence and the i n j ury is establ ished by clear 
and convincing evi dence . . . 209 
It should be noted though, that the precedential value o f  this statement was 
somewhat diminished since Canada had previously acknowledged responsibility 
for the damage in the arbitral compromis. The main task of the tribunal was to as­
sess and measure the damage and to determine a means of redress, b u t  not to 
determ ine legal responsibility. 
Other legal antecedents fo r Principle 21 can arguably be found in the Corfu 
Channel case, the Lac Lano1LX arbitration and the Gut Dam Claims arb itration.  In 
the first of these, the ICJ was reques ted to consider, inter alia, an incident in which 
war vessels b elonging to the U K  were struck by mines while p assing through the 
Corfu Channel, a strait in Albanian waters u sed for international navigation.  Al­
b ania knew that the strai t was mined but  failed to preven t or remedy the situation 
and did not notify other S tates of the danger. In a famous ohiter dictum, the ICJ held 
that every State is under the ob ligation : 
. . .  not  to a l low knowingly i t s  territory to be used for acts con t rary to the rights of 
o ther S t a tes .2 l O  
The Lac  Lanoux arbitration ( 1957) concerned a dispute between France and 
Spain over a proposal b y  the fo rmer to permit the construction of a barrage on an 
international waterway on its territory. Spain claimed infringement of her rights 
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as a downstream State because the pro ject would involve diversion of upstream 
waters, and argued that France should obtain Spain's prior authorisation .  The tri­
b unal, while holding that the proposed works did not infringe Spanish rights, 
s tated nevertheless that : 
. . .  t here is a p r i n c i ple w h i c h  p ro h i b i t s  the upstream S t ate from altering the waters 
of a river in such a fashion as seriously 
'
to prej u dice the downstream S t a te . . . . 2 1 1 
Much the same  principles were at issue in the Gut Dam claims arbitration.  
With U.S.  permission,  C anada had embarked in 1 903 on the i ll-fated construction 
of a dam on the St .  Lawrence Seaway. Over the years the dam would cause exten­
sive erosion and flooding on both Canadian an d U .S .  territory. The resulting 
claims for damages by the United States would fester unti l  1 965 ,  when the Lake 
Ontario C laims Tribunal was established to resolve the matter. The tribunal re­
lied heavily on the prior authorisation of the pro ject  by the United States, but  also 
on the acknowledgement of responsib ility by Canada. I t  declared Canada liable, 
inter alia, for the in ju ries sustained by U .S .  citizens without, however, finding 
fault or negligence on its part.2 1 2 
The principles i dentified in the "Trail Smelter" case also received support 
from the practice of States before 1 972 .  In 1 966 Austria lodged a strongly worded 
diplomatic protest over damage caused by  mines laid close to the Austrian border, 
accusing Hungary of: 
. . .  v iolat i ng the uncontested international  legal principle according to w h ich 
measures taken i n  the terri tory of one S tate must  not en danger the l i ves, health and 
p roperty of c i t izens of another Sta te. 2 1 3  
I n  another incident prior t o  1 972 UNCHE, Canadian beaches were polluted by 
an accidental oil spill of 1 2,000 gallons of crude oil i nto the sea at  Cherry Point in 
the State of Wash ington .  Turning the tables on the United S tates, the Canadian 
government pointed to the "principle established i n  the Trail Smelter arbitra­
tion," claiming that it had been accepted by a considerable number of States and 
express ing hope that i t  would be accepted at UNCHE as "a fundamental rule of 
international environmental law., ,2 14  
The formula of Principle 21  has ,  since UNCHE, been repeated-often verba­
tim-in numerous binding2 1 S  and non-binding in ternational instruments.2 1 6  
Therefore, unlike for some of the other principles which will be  discussed bel ow, 
the ma jority of the current specialist doctrine has little difficulty with the custom­
ary law status of Principle 2 1 .2 1 7 
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In  connection wi th the requests by the World Health Organisation and the UN 
General Assembly for an advisory opinion regarding the Legality of Nuclear 
Weapons , several S tates had sough t to minimise the i mponance of Principle 21 by 
s tressing that  i t  formed pan of a non-binding texr . 2 1 8 Their opponents main­
tained that  the Principle formed pan of customary international law.2 1 9  In reply 
to these submissions, the IC] held thar:  
The existence of the general obligation of S t ates t o  ensure t h at ac t ivit ies within their  
j urisdict ion and control respect the environment of other States or  of area s beyon d 
nat ional control is now part of t h e  corpus of international  l aw rel at ing to the 
environment.220 
Whilst the Coun had already recognised in  an earlier case that S tates are under 
the obligation to "respect and protect the natural environment,,,n l  the above 
statement is  significant for i t  was made by the Coun in  a legal opinion on armed 
conflict and the use of nuclear weapons. The IC] believes that even in these ex­
treme circumstances the environmental obligations in question continue to be 
b inding upon S tates . Nevenheless, the Coun's formulation does not  correspond 
verbatim to the wording of Principle 21. While the latter deals with the obligation 
to avoid  damage to the environment of other S tates or of areas beyon d  n ational 
control, the Coun uses a more general formula stressing the obligation to ensure 
respect for these environmen ts .  Whether this distinction wil l  be perceived as sig­
nificant remains to be assessed. In  any event, the Coun repeated i ts  view on the 
matter in  i ts  decis ion on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case.222  
B .  Coro l l a ry Pri n c i p l e s .  The "acquis" of customary IEL,  as la id down in the  
second pan of Principle 21, entails several corollary du ties for S tates . In the  first 
place there exists a duty, variously described as the "no-harm principle" or the 
"principle of harm prevention,, ,223  or the "principle of preven ti ve action,,,224 ac­
cording to which S tates are obliged to prevent environmental harm before i t  
occurs, and reduce a n d  control pollution and environmental harm when i t  occurs .  
While the prior cus tomary rule obligated States to make  reparation for actual 
transboundary harm, the harm prevention principle demands that S tates first and 
foremost, take sui tab le preventive measures, e.g., through national legislation, (0  
protect the environment .225  
Secondly, there i s  the "principle of co-operation, ,,226 sometimes referred to as 
the "principle of transboundary cooperation in  cases of environmental risk,,,227 
or more generally as the "princip le of good neighbourliness" and " international 
co-operation. , ,228 The duty of i nternational cooperation can be  said to underl ie  all 
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international (environmental) law. Pursuan t to this requirement, S tates need to 
co -operate in m i tigating environmental risks and emergencies .  This is now un­
ders tood as entail ing several procedural duties such as the requirement to notify 
other States and to consult with other States in cases of transboundary risk of en­
vironmental damage, and particularly in the case of accidents and emergencies 
likely to cause transboundary harm.229 I t  may also entail  specific commitments 
such as the duty to conduct an environmental impact assessment (E IA), and the 
duty to exchange information.230 The princ iple of co-operation and i ts corollary 
principles of prior consultation based on adequate information are particularly 
fi rmly estab lished in the law of international watercourses .2 3 1  
However, i t  should be no ted that t h e  universal i ty a n d  t h e  scope of these pro­
cedural requi rements i s  not  beyond controversy. 232 The purported duty to 
conduct an E I A has been invoked before the IC} in two recent cases .  I n  1 995 ,  New 
Zealand fi led a request for an Exam ination of the Situation in A ccordance with 
Paragraph 63 of the Court 's 1 974 Judgement in the Nuclear Tests case, accompanied 
by a request for provisional measures .  The basis  of New Zealand's  petit ion was 
that a series of nuclear tests planned by France would lead to the same sort of  ra­
dioactive contaminat ion that  had been brought before the Court in 1 973 .  New 
Zealand claimed, inter alia, that i t  was un lawful  for France to conduct further 
underground nuclear tests before undertaki n g  an E I A  "according to accepted in­
ternational standards," and that unless such an assessment es tab lished that the 
tests would not  give rise, directly or indirec tly, to radioactive contamination of 
the marine environment, the rights under international  law of New Zealand, as 
well  as the rights of other S tates, would be  violated . The Cou rt was also re­
quested to order France to conduct  such an E I A  and, un less this process 
establi shed that the tests would not gi ve rise to radioactive contaminat ion of the 
marine environment, to order France to refrain from conducting the disputed 
tes ts .  233 
In i ts order of September 22, 1 995,  the Court dismissed New Zealand's action 
without entering into the merits of these claims.  I t  held that whilst the 1 974 case 
dealt wi th atmospheric nuclear tests, the case at hand concerned underground nu­
clear tests and that it  fo llowed that the latter could not  be linked to the former.234 
Nevertheless, in h is  dissenting opinion, Judge Weeramantry argued that the 
"principle of continuing environmental impact assessment"  was gathering 
s trength and in ternational accep tance and that it had reached "the level of general 
recognition at which the IC} should take notice of it . ,,235  Likewise, in  his dissent­
ing opinion, Judge Palmer claimed that  EIA was a process to comply with the 
international legal duty to establ ish that a planned activity does not involve unac­
ceptable environmental risks . 236 
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In the 1 997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project  case, Slovakia claimed that the pur­
pose of an EIA was merely to provide d ecision makers with information on 
potential environmental impacts, and that it was still in the process of develop­
ment-even in Europe. 237 Hungary, by contrast, called i t  a procedural norm that 
by 1 989 had become "an accepted means" for ensuring that projects of the dis­
puted type did not cause "untoward environmental damage . , , 238 In  its judgement, 
the Court did not dwell on the issue of ErA directly . But having observed that the 
d isputed project's impact upon, and i ts implications for the environment were a 
key issue, the Court held that in order to evaluate its environmen tal risks, "cur­
rent standards must be taken into consideration . ,, 2 39 
C .  C o ntri but ion of t h e  R i o  Dec l a rati o n .  The Rio Declaration reaffirmed 
and developed-albeit in qualified terms-Principle 2 1  of the Stockholm D ecla­
ration.  Principle 2 of the 1 992 Declaration reads :  
Sta tes have, in accordance with the Charter of t h e  United Nations and t h e  principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their 
own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
act ivi t ies within their j u ri sdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond the l imits of national jurisdiction. 
The difference between Principle 2 1  and Principle 2 is  that, while accord ing to 
the former, States have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources accord­
ing to their own environmental policies, the Rio Declaration adds the phrase 
"pursuant to their own developmen tal policies . ,,240 Whether this addition 
s trengthened or weakened the earlier formulation is unsettled . 24 J Several interna­
tional instruments adopted at the Rio Conference an d others thereafter have kept 
to the earlier formula of Principle 2 1 ,242 thereby casting doubt on the general ac­
ceptance and therefore on the legal status of its Rio update . 
Although the Stockholm Declaration also addressed development issues,243  the 
Rio Declaration will be remembered for elevating, amongst others, the principle of 
sustainable development to a fundamental concept of environmental policy. The 
need for "sustainable development" was one of the centrepieces of the 1 987 report 
produced by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 
also known as the "Brundtland Commission . ,,244 In this  report, entitled Our Com­
mon Future, WCED synthesised and defined sustainable development as: 
. . .  development that meets the needs o f  the p resent wtihout compromis ing the 
b ' l '  ff . h . d , , 245 a I I ty 0 uture genera t IOns  to meet t e lr  own nee s.  
2 7  
The Newport Papers 
In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, both Hungary and Slovakia claimed 
to be  concerned with ensuring sustainable development. The former called i t  a 
concept that only emerged as a legal term in 1 987,  fol lowing the WCED report, and 
gi ven formal and widespread legal recognition by  the 1 992 Rio Declaration . 246 
Slovakia suggested that the principle was devoid  of legal status247 and that all  it 
entailed was a new approach to reconciling economic development with environ­
mental protection .248 In its judgement, the Court gave no more than a moral 
boost  to the concept of sustainable development when commenting on mankind's 
constant in terference with nature. I t  explained that the need :  
. t o  reconci le  eco nomic development w i t h  protection of t h e  environment  i s  apt ly 
expressed in the concept of susta i nable development. . . .  249 
There are other important principles of public policy which have been put in 
relief on a global level with respect to all environmental sectors in the Rio Decla­
ration, among which : inter-generational equity,2 50 public participation at the 
relevant level, 2 5  I the precautionary approach,252  a qualified version of, the pol­
luter pays principle,25 3 and the principle of common but  differentiated 
responsibility of developed and developing S tates. 254 All of these principles had 
previously received recognition to varying degrees through adoption in declara­
tions of principles, programmes of action, and  even in some international treaties. 
On this basis,  the "pollu ter pays" principle is regarded as regional custom, be­
cause of the strong support i t  has received in  most OECD and EC countries. 255 
Furthermore, a case is sometimes m ade that the precautionary principle con­
stitutes (emerging) customary law.256  However, i t  is  doubtful whether the 
principle forms part of present international l aw .257 First, there seems to be no 
uniform u nderstanding of i ts meaning beyond the basic premise that i t  reflects a 
"better safe than sorry approach" to counter the belief that States are not bound to 
act until  there is clear and convincing scientific proof of actual or threatened 
h arm to the environment . 258 Three possible interpretations of the precautionary 
principle are advocated. At its most restric ted, i t  represents a more developed 
form of the preventive princip le :  States are to act carefully and with foresight in 
taking decisions concerning activities that m ay have adverse environmental con­
sequences.259  A wider interpretation is  that i t  lowers the threshold of proof, 
requiring State action in the face of foreseeable harm, even if there is no 1 00 per­
cent scientific certainty.260 The most radical construction implies a complete 
reversal of the burden of proof: it  would become impermissible for a State to carry 
out an activity unless it can be shown that this  will not  lead to unacceptable harm 
to the environment.26 1  
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Secondly, it is significant that after much debate, the UNCED delegates decided 
to settle for the term precautionary approach instead of principle, thereby casting 
doubt on its legal status .  They nevertheless agreed on a formulation in l ine with 
the above view regarding the lowering of the burden of proof. Principle 15 of the 
Rio Declaration reads : 
I n  order [0 protect t h e  enviro n m e n t, the precaut i onary a pp roach shal l  be widely 
app lied by States according t o  their  capab i l i t i es. Where there are t h reats o f  serio us 
irreversible d a mage, lack of ful l  scientific certa inty  shal l  n o t  be used as reason for 
postponing cost-effect ive measures to prevent  environmental  degra dation.  
The precautionary principle has been reli ed on in two recent cases brought be­
fore the ICJ.  In her 1995 request for an Examination of the Situation, New Zealand 
invoked the most radical in terpretation of the principle, arguing that it required 
France to carry out an EIA as a precondition for undertaking nuclear tests and to 
demonstra te that there was no risk associated with them.262 The Court did not en­
ter into the merits of this assertion, but in their dissenting opin ions, Judges 
Weeramantry and Palmer maintained that the principle consti tuted emerging 
customary law.263 
In the 1 997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, Hungary claime d  that the pre­
cautionary principle formed part of customary international law and that i t  had 
evolved into an erga om nes obligation of preven tion of damage, precluding her 
from performing a treaty concluded in  1 977 with Czechoslovakia.264 Given the 
"scientific uncertainty," but "with credible risks and damages," and with "valid 
concerns over vital in terests," Hungary maintained that in  the ligh t of " the pre­
ventive and precautionary approach," her fears for future damage constituted the 
"grave and imminent peri l"  required for the state of necessi ty under international 
l aw.265 S lovakia u rged more caution with respect to the legal status of the princi­
ple, emphasising that i t  was  never intended to di srupt treaty relations, and 
entailed at  most a lowering of the threshold of proof in the face o f foreseeab le seri ­
ous or i rreversible d amage.266 
In  i ts judgement, the Court noted first that neither Party claimed that new pe­
remptory norms of environmen tal law had emerged since 1 977 .267 The Court may 
thus have accepted Slovakia's argument that the precautionary approach/princi­
ple, even if i t  reflects cus tomary international law, does not prevail  over treaty 
obligations.  Furthermore, it rejected Hungary's assertion that the many uncer­
tainties regarding the ecological impact of putting in place the d i sputed barrage 
system, however serious they might have been, fulfilled the objective require­
ments of a "state of (ecological) necessity" under in ternational l aw .268 The Court 
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did not  accept that in  environmental matters the standard of proof in intern a­
tional law regarding the foreseeabi l ity of harm or damage should be lowered. 
In conclusion, i t  should be noted that the majority of the specia l ist  doctrine is  
cau t ious abou t the legal status of  the principles (apart perhaps from Principle 2 in­
sofar as i t  affirms Principle 2 1 ) enunciated in the Rio Declaration .  They are 
neither general principles of law nor are they considered to be universal  princi­
p les of customary in ternational environmental law .  Some may be no  more than 
expressions of desirable publ ic policy, others may be binding only as a m atter of 
treaty law while still others may constitute emerging in ternational law. On the 
whole, wheth er they give rise to actionable obligations of a general nature is open 
to question .269 The uncertain legal status of  the principles of the Rio Declaration 
was confirmed in a document prepared for the 1 997 UN General Assembly Spe­
cial Session.270 
I t  was seen earl ier that the international community has repeatedly failed to 
agree on a un iform set of legal princip les of environmental protection .27 1 It  may 
therefore not come as a surprise that the above review shows that there are very 
few general principles and rules that cover all environmental sectors. The only 
undisputed set of rules that may be said to have achieved such a status are the obli­
gations reflected in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, and in particular, 
the proh ibition of transfron tier poilu t ion.  
D.  The Proh i b it ion of Transfrontier Po l l ut ion in  State Pract ice .  The next 
step is to look at the implementation of  the prohibit ion of transfrontier pol lution 
in State practice. A traditional indicator of the extent to which S tates implement 
international law is to examine what happens when the law is violated .272 Accord­
ing to the law of State responsibi l ity, 
Every in ternationally wro ngful act  of a St ate entails the in terna tional  respons i b i l ity 
of t h a t  State.2 7 3  
Furthermore, in accordance with the well-known holding of the Chorzow Fac­
tory (Indemnity) case, the consequence of State responsibzlity is S tate liability, 
meaning the duty to make reparation : 
It is a princ iple of internalional law, a n d  even a general concep tion of law, thaI any 
b reach of an engagem en t involves an obl igation to make reparation . . . .  274 
Although the body of mult ilateral environmental agreements is growing, it is 
clear that not every instance of environmental harm will  be covered by a 
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specialised treaty. 275 In  addition, even if there is a relevant trea ty, it is often the 
case that the author S tate i s  not a party to it ,  or that the treaty places no binding 
obligation on the State to prevent  such damage. 276 In  such instances, the custom­
ary principles of IEL should provide a safety net .  The law of State responsibili ty 
covers both hypotheses : States must make reparation, including the payment of 
compensation, for damage caused by any wrongful act, regardless of the source of 
the obligation ( treaty or custom).277 
In application of the above, State practice should indicate that breach of any of 
the iden tified "environmental" obligations entails the responsib ility of the au­
thor State, as well as its duty to make reparation.  Yet i t  seems that S tates are 
extremely reluctant to recognise responsibility for transbounary harm on the ba­
sis of the above rules of customary internation al environmental  l aw .278  States 
have even been surprisingly reticent about  pursuing claims inter se for particular 
grievous instances of transfrontier damage.279 
Following the April 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in 
the Ukraine, radioactive air pollution was caused over the territory of some 
twenty countries, with noticeable impacts across the whole of Europe from sou th­
ern Italy to no rthern Scotland and Scandinavia.  Although several European 
States-including the UK and the FRG-reserved their right to do so, none has 
presented a claim to the former USSR for the serious transboundary nuclear con­
tamination caused by the accident .2 80 
The implementation of the above principles of customary internation al law i s  
equally hesitant in treaty practice. The 1 979 LRTAP Convention famously con­
tains a footnote stating that i t  "does not con tain a rule on s ta te  l iabil ity as to 
damage." Traditionally, S tates have been willing to consider environmental dam­
age liability regimes only on a case-by-case basis,  and onl y when i t  proved 
indispensable for the economic viability of a specifi c  ri sk-creating activity, such 
as the nuclear industry and maritime transport of oi l . 2 8 ]  This ad hoc approach was 
set aside only recently in a regional instrumen t, the 1 993  Council of Europe Con­
vention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities D angerous to the 
Environment (Lugano Convention ). S ignificantly though, this trea ty proves re­
markably unsuccessful .  Although i t  requ ires only three ratifIcations for its entry 
in to force, by April 1 998  not a single State had done so. 282 
Furthermore, State in tervention in the area of environmental damage has 
rarely resulted in the establishment of a compensation regime based on S ta te lia­
b il ity. There i s  only one treaty that establishes clear rules of State l iabil ity in case 
of environmental damage: the 1 972  Convention on International Liability for 
Damages Caused by Space Objects (Space Obj ects Liability Convention), which 
stipulates unl imited or  "absolute" international State liability for damage caused 
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on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight. 283  Th i s  is ,  however, a unique 
treaty that deals with h i gh ly sensitive polit ical  and military matters. Its  conclu­
s i on should not be taken as p roof that States are generally will ing to accept 
liability for environmental damage. 284 
I n  the overwhelming m ajority of cases, State intervention has  res ulted in the 
setting up of a regime of "civil liab ili ty." A "c ivil liab ility" regime i s  one i n  which 
l iabi lity for environmental damage is  channelled to private operato rs o r  other sec­
tions of  the industry, leaving the issue of State liability frequently unanswered, 
except when States themselves act  as  private operators .  Good examp les of  this are 
the conventions concluded i n  the aftermath of  the Torrey Canyon disaster. In ac­
cordance with the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund 
Convention, liability for maritime transport of  oil is c urrently borne entirely by 
the profit gain ing industry.285  Th e most amb itious example of  a pure civil liabil­
ity regime, i n  terms of scope of activities, is the above-mentioned 1993 Lugano 
Convention.  
International nego tiations have less  frequen tly led to mixed State!civil liability 
regimes.2 86 This is the case of  the n uclear industry, where States have agreed to 
complement p rivate operator l iability in response to industry demands.287 It is 
noteworthy though that many of these conventional mixed regimes h ave either 
not entered into force or have, at best, a marginal relevance in p ractice because of 
the l imited n umber of contracting Parties. 288  
I t  is safe to state that there are  still many d ifficulties i n  translating States' envi­
ronmental obligations-i.e., State responsibi lity-into principles and standards of 
liability.289 This is due partly to many fun damen tal legal an d technical problems 
that remain unresolved.290 Thus, it is  s till  a m atter of serious controversy whether 
State liability a rises only upon breach of a "primary obligation" of States or whether 
liability is contingent upon the causing of damage, irrespective of breach of a pri­
mary obligation.29 1  Another unresolved issue relates to the nature of this primary 
obligation : is  it a s tandard of due diligence that should be required from States or, in­
stead, an absolute duty to prevent damage? If possible defences a re allowed, the 
options for standards of care with respect to State envi ronmen tal obligations in­
clude : (a) a fault-based standard covering both intention or negligence; (b) strict 
liability, which is a prima facie responsibility allowing for various qualifications and 
defences and (c) absolute liability, which does not allow for any exculpation.292 
Finally, a large volume of l i terature is d evoted to the threshold question .293 As 
recognised by the above-mentioned Working Group on environmen tal damage 
arising from mi litary activiti es, defining "envi ronmental damage" rem ains a 
complex i ssue and requires a two -State approach : defining the environment, an d 
then determ ining what constitu tes compensable damage.294 
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A recent EC Comm ission Green Paper on Env ironmen tal Liability has i denti­
fi ed a whole ran ge of possibilities for the determination of the level at which 
environmental damage triggers l iability. 29S Treaty practice,296 case law,297 and 
doctrine298 h ave suggested that en vironmental damage must  be "significant," 
"substantial," o r  possibly "appreciable . "  Even if  there are n o  agreed i n ternational 
standar ds, S tate practice seems to indicate that the thres hold for liabil ity involves 
a relatively h igh level of environmental damage. 299 
1 . 3. The Territorial Scope of the Prohibition of Transfrontier 
Pollution 
1 . 3 . 1 . Bi latera l is m-at the Root of I E L  
Traditi onally, i n ternational law was a separate legal system with special rules 
aimed only at relations between S tates . 300 Similarly, early IEL was premi sed on an 
inter- State bilateral focus and concerned primarily with tran sfrontier pollution 
caused b y  activities in  the territory or under the j urisdiction o f  one S tate, affecting 
an area u n der  the j uri sdiction of another State. 30 I The origins of this cross-border 
approach seem to lie wi t h  the customary prin ciple of "good neighbourl iness, " 
which is in turn based on the above-menti oned general legal principle "sic utere 
tuo Ul alienum non laedas ."  Gradually the requirement of "neighbourliness" was 
wi dened to include a criterion of adjacency or at least of geograph ical proxim ity. 
However, seen against the background o f  the development of international law as 
a whole,302 i t  is  no surprise that IEL continues to conta i n  the firmest rules when 
dealing with concerns of environmental harm between two S tates o r  with shared 
national resources, s uch as intern ational watercourses. 303 
Still,  understanding of  the laws and m echanisms of nature and of  the effects of  
poIlu t ion have grown consi derably i n  the last  decades . As alrea dy noted earli er, 304 
rules dealing with the environmen t in general, irrespective of where na tural re­
sources are located, are emerging. 
1 . 3 . 2 .  I n ternat i o n a l  Areas and Pr inc i p l e  2 1  
Curre ntly, t h e  high seas and the seabed a s  well as t h e  maritime subsoil  beyo nd 
national jurisdiction (or the "Area" accor ding to 1 9 82 UNCLOS), the air  column 
above all these,  in addition to Outer Space, an d An tarctica an d even the ozo n e  
layer are areas vari ously designated in t h e  literature as : " t h e  commons" or "global 
commons,, ,30S  "common space areas,,, 306 "common spaces,,, 307 " international 
common s,,,308 "international areas,,, 309 "in ternati onalised spaces,,, 3 1 0  "res 
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c o m m U ll lS, " (or  common amenities . )3 1 1 One can only agree with Profess or 
Brownlie  that not too m u ch importa n ce should be attached to termi nology, for 
n one of  these concepts is capab le of  con veying precisely wh at the l egal status of  a 
particular area is . 3 1 2 In the presen t  study the general term "intcrnational  areas" 
wi l l  b e  used as a shorthand fo r all areas that are considered to b e  beyond n a tional 
j urisdiction, in addition to A n tarcti ca. 3 1 3  
Taking the locus o f  dam age a s  criterion, three hypotheses should b e  discu ssed i n  
relation to i nternational areas ; first, dam age m a y  be caused to t h e  environment o f  
other S tates by activities o f  one or more States conducted i n  areas beyond n ational 
j u risdiction ; s econd, acti vi ties of one or more States in areas beyon d n ational j uris­
diction m ay cause damage to rights or i nterests of other States in these areas ; third, 
damage may be caused to the environ ment of areas lying beyond national j u ri sdic­
tion through activities of one or more States-con ducted wi th in or ou tside their  
j urisdictio n-without any im medi a te noticeable effects for third S tates. 
As men tioned above, the " h arm preven tion" component of Principle 2 1  does 
not merely include "the enviro nmen t of other States," b ut also " areas b eyond the 
l imits of national  j urisdiction " :  there is  no su ggestion of a terri tori al  or  any other 
spatial  l imi tation to t h e  conduct to which this obligation appl ies. Furtherm o re, 
by focusing not o n l y  on activi t ies withi n  a State's jurisdictio n , b u t  also to activities 
wi thin S tate concrol , the Principle covers activities b y  persons or ships u n der State 
control, wherever they may ac1 . 3 1 4  
Un der present i n ternational l a w  therefore, a State's obligation t o  pre v en t en vi ­
ronmental h arm (to other States) 3 1 S  applies in any locus over w hich it possesses a 
m easure of legal authority, inclu ding in in ternatio nal areas .3 1 6  It follows that  
States are no lon ger free to pol lute  or degrade i n  ternational  areas and that they are 
ob liged to take s u i  table preventive m easures to protect t h ese environ m en ts .  3 1 7  
However, the above dedu c t i o n  contains two important qu al ificat io n s :  the re­
quirement of "harm " on the one h a n d  and the rights or in terests of "other S tates" 
on the other hand.  This means t h a t  o n l y  two of the above hypotheses are covered 
b y th e i n ternat ional areas provision of Principle 2 1 :  extraterri torial activi ties by a 
S tate (or i t s  nation als) causing dam age to the environ men t or territo ry of ano ther 
state (or its nation als), and d amage to i nterests or rights that other States (or their 
nationals)  h a ve i n  international areas caused b y  extraterritori al activities un der 
t h e  j u risd i ction or control  of another St ate. 
Indeed, while dam age or in jury is not  con sidered a const itutive element in the 
general law of S tate responsi bi l i ty, 3 1 8  State practice i n di cates that  with respect to 
extra-terr i torial acti vities, p roof o f material  i n j ury to States' rights or in teres ts i s  
required. T h i s  is  especi al ly t h e  case wh en the pol lut io n-gen erating con d uct i s  n ot 
govern ed by a specific r u le of i n ternat ional law . 3 1 9 
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The above qualificati ons have important  consequences, for environmen tal 
harm that cannot be construed as direct m aterial damage to States' righ ts or  inter­
ests is  rarely remed ied. In the Nuclear Tests cases, neither Austral ia  nor New 
Zealand sought reparation for proven damage, but they asked the Court to order 
France to stop atmospheric and other tests in the Pacific.  There was evidence of 
radioactive fallout  bur no proof of  harm .  Australia argued, inter alia, that the nu­
clear fallout on its  territory constituted a violation of its  sovereignty, that it  could 
be  poten tially dangerous for the country and its c i tizens, and that the i nterference 
with ships and aircraft on the high seas by radio-active fallou t const ituted in ­
fringements of the  freedom of the  high seas . 320 New Zealand ' s  claim was more 
broadly cast : she also invoked "the rights of all members of the international com­
munity" to  be free from nuclear tests giving r i se  to radioactive fal lout and the 
right to  be  preserved from "unju stified artificial radioactive contamination of the 
terrestrial, maritime and aerial environmen t . ,, 32 1 Although the m erits of these 
claim s were never addressed by the Court, there is  scep ticism in  the l i terature 
about whether such claims can succeed in  the absence of proof of direct material 
damage to State's territories . 322 
The scarce international case law that exists on environmental damage in  in­
ternational areas deals almost exclusively with the transboundary effects to the 
environment "belonging" to S tates, or with damage which, though arguably sus­
tained by the environment as such,  has been invariably reduced to damage to 
property or economic rights of States or their nationals. 323  In addition, this  sort of 
inter-State claim tends to be resolved "out of court" via diplomatic channels .  All  
too frequently this  involves protracted and secretive bargaining in  which legal 
principles play only a m inor role. There are a few instances where St ates have 
made ex-gratia paymen ts or taken remedial measures without ,  however, recogn is­
ing liabi l i ty for damage sustained with i n  and arguably also by resou rces of 
international areas : e.g., the 1 954  Diago Fukuru Maru 324 and the 1 966 
Palomares 325 incidents .  
As seen above, the Space Ob jects Li ability Convention is  the only treaty to 
contain a clear regime of State l iab ility for damage sustained, inter alia, "on the 
surface of  the earth., ,316 Bur  while the latter expression conceivably covers inter­
n ational areas as well, the definition of damage retained by the treaty does not seem 
to cover damage to the environment as such .327 Thu s  far the Space Objects Liabil ­
i ty Convention has been invoked i n  one case .  When in 1 979 the Soviet Cosm os 
954 satel lite crashed in a remote area of Canada, the latter presented a claim for 
more than $6 mill ion dollars to the U S S R .  While expressly invoking the principles 
of the aforementioned convention, Canada d id  not claim compensation for physi­
cal, environmental, or property damage, but  only for part of the cost of locating, 
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removing, an d testing the debris an d for subsequent cleanup efforts. 328 In a diplo­
matic settlement reached in 1 98 1 ,  the USSR agreed to pay a lu mp sum of only $3 
m illion, and never expressly recogn ised liability. 329 
Significantly, in 1 99 1  several ILC members raised the i ssue of whether damage 
to the "global commons" should be addresse d  by the comm iss ion in its  work on 
international liability. But a decision on th is was deferred and the ILC's 1 994 re­
port proc laims firm adherence to the strict bilateral transboundary c onception of 
the stu dy. 330 
Yet, the duty to protect the environment as such, irrespective of locus, appears 
to be addressed by a growing number of m u ltilateral international instru ments, 
which phrase States' environmental rights and duties in general terms withou t 
territorial or spatial references. 33 1  What these instruments show, at a m inimum, 
is that the balance between S tate sovereignty and th e environment is probably 
ch anging i n  favour of the latter. This expanding international interest in environ­
mental resources, wherever situ ated, is  supported by the growing sc ientific 
ev idence of the integrity and the u n ity of th e environment. 332 The growing evi­
dence o f  the interrelatedness of all life processes is legally significant. For if the 
earth's b iosphere represents a single indivisible system characterised by the inter­
relation of its vario us functional and ecological subsystems, the disruption of any 
one of these subsystems promotes the breakdown and destabil ization o f  another.333 
I n  th e  present international legal constellation in which S tates continue to re­
main prime ac tors, the key to protecting the environment beyond the l imits of 
national  jurisdiction lies in giving "th ird S ta tes" lega l standing to enforce protec­
tion and preservation of this environment.  In th is context, the concepts of erga 
omnes obligations and the actio popularis need to be discussed. In th e 1 966 South 
West Africa c ase, the W orId Court rej ected th e notion of actio popularis, thereby 
dismissing th e claim that any member of a community had a righ t to take legal ac­
tion in vin dication of a public interest. 334 This j u dgement was widely criticised in 
the l iterature, a n d  a few years on, th e ICI acknowledged in the Barcelona Traction 
case that there existed:  
. . .  obligat ions of a S t a t e  toward s  the i n tern a t i o n a l  community  as a who le, which by 
their  very nature . . .  are  the concern o f  a l l  Sta tes.  In view of the i mportance of the  
rights involved, al l S ta tes can be held  to ha ve a legal i n terest i n  their  pro tect ion;  they 
a re obligations erga omnes . 335 
While this oft-quoted passage is only an obiter dictum, it was hailed a s  a c lear 
progression from the unco mprom ising stance expressed in th e South West Africa 
case. The types of obligations mentioned by the Court in the Barcelona Traction 
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case were the ou tlawing of acts of aggression in in ternational law and human 
rights .  
In the 1 973/74 Nuclear Tests cases i t  was argued by both Aus tralia and New Zea­
land that such obligations erga omnes exist  i n  addition with regard to the 
preservation of the high seas marine environmen t .  336 As seen above, their peti­
tion was not only bas ed on the alleged violation of their S tates' sovereignty but on 
the infringements of the principle of the freedom of the high seas and on the viola­
tion of "the righ ts of all  members of the international communi ty" to be free from 
n uclear tes ts , 337 Unfortunately, the merits of these claims were never addressed 
b y  the Court,338 although several j u s tices supported an examination of these 
clai m s  sugges ting that the notions of erga om nes obligations and actio popularis are 
closely l inked, 339 
As seen earlier, in 1 995 New Zealand fi led a request with the ICJ b ased on para­
graph 63 of the Court' s 1 974 j u dgemen t in its case again s t  France, Here again New 
Zealand asserted that it  had legal standing to enforce not on ly its own but also 
other Sta tes' righ ts in the marine environment . 34o Although New Zealan d's  ap­
plication found favour with three judges,34 1 the m a j ority of the C ourt held that 
the 1 974 and 1 995 cases were subs tan tially different.342 
In his  treatise on State Responsibility and the Marine Environment, Dr. Smi th sug­
gests an in teres ting way our  of the actio popularis impasse.343 He argues that 
i nternational law n eed not go a s  far as recognising an actio popularis; i t  would suf­
fice to better identify the legal rights and in terests of al l  S tates in th e preservation 
of the marine environ men t. The author propo ses a distinction between multilat­
eral and bi lateral erga om nes obligations.  H e  asserts that while no individual S tate 
has a right or interes t in human rights cases other than as a member of the i n  ter­
n ational comm unity, the high seas marine env ironmen t  p resents a differen t case : 
the legal i n terest  of each S tate in the ob ligation to prevent in j ury to this  area 
would lie within the " subset of duties owed to each state and not j u s t  to the per­
son ified community." 
B u r  even if the need for an actio popularis could be avoided through recogni tio n 
of "bilateral" erga omnes obligati ons, enforcemen t before international tribunals 
m ay remain problematic. This is  especially the case when the author State refuses 
consent to j urisdiction.  In 1 995 Portugal brought a case agai n s t  Aus tralia con­
cerning a 1 989 treaty between Aus tralia and Indonesia regarding the exploitation 
of the continental s h elf of the so-called "Timor Gap ." No case was b rough t against  
Indonesia, since the latter had not consen ted to the ICJ ' S j urisdiction. In its appli­
cation, Portugal sough t to overcome this ob s tacle by claiming, inter alia, that in 
taking m easures to apply the Timor Gap Treaty, Austral i a  had viola ted the righ ts 
of the people of East Timor to self-determination.344 Po rtugal main tained that 
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Australia thus breached rights erga omnes a n d  that accordingly it had jus standz to 
require A ustralia, i n dividually, to respect them regardless of wh ether or not an­
other State (i.e . ,  Indonesia) h a d  con ducted itself in a s imilarly unlawful 
manner. 345 
I n  its  j u dgment of  30 J un e  1 995,  the ICJ c haracterised Portugal's assertion that 
the right of  peoples to self-determ i nation has an erga omnes as " irreproach able. , , 346 
It found, however, that it  could not decide on Austral ia 's  conduct without first de­
ciding why I n donesia could not lawfully h ave concluded the Ti m or Gap 
Treaty. 347 It recalled in this  respect that one of the fu n damen tal pri n c iples of its 
Statute (Article .  36 (2))  was tha t it cannot decide a d i sp u te b etween States without  
the consent  of those States  to i ts  j u risdiction 348 confirm i n g  that this  applied even 
if the obligations  i nvolved h a d  an erga omnes character. 349 
The effect of th i s  holding i s  u n doubtedly, as J udge Weeramantry wrote, to i n ­
hibit  the "practical  operation of  the erga omnes doctrine . ,, 3 5 0  J udge Ran j eva 
regretted that the Court had avoided the many quest ions raised by t h e  existence of 
positive objective law such as rights opposable erga om nes and jus cogens. He won­
dered whether the effec t of  t h e  Court's  j udgement was not  to l i m i t  the domain of 
the Court's jurisdict ion ratione materiae solely to disputes i n volving sub j ective 
rights. 35 1 
The same problem was broached by J udge Weeram antry into the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case. A fter having observed that the  dispute in ques­
tion i n volved o n ly i ssues inter partes, he speculated that the Court m ay in  the 
future be faced with environmen tal l i tigation that raises erga omnes issues of  suffi ­
cient importance.  He stressed that t h e  Court's current inter partes adversarial 
procedures m ay need to be recons idered "if ever a case should arise of the immi­
n ence of  serious or catastrophic  environmental danger, especially to parties other 
than the i m mediate l i t igants. , ,3 5 2  
A step towards better recognition o f  t h e  interests of  t h e  i n ternational c o m m u ­
n ity regarding th e  environm ent was taken by the ILC when i t  proposed to i n clude 
serious i n stances of  pollution in  i ts  l ist  of  "in tern ational crim es" com m itted by 
States : 
. . .  a serious breac h of an international obligation of esse ntia l  i mport ance for the 
safeguarding and preserva tion of the hu man environment such as those prohibiti ng 
massive pollu tion of the atmosphere or of the seas. 353  
The term "m assive" denotes a very h igh threshold, beyond the terms "signifi­
cant" or "substantial" mentioned above. However, th e reaction of States to these 
proposals was rather n egative. Not only is  there much controversy abou t the 
38 
I 1 
i 
1 
I 
j 
1 
i I 
I 
I , 
1 I i 
i 
I I 
l , 
International Environmental Law and Naval War 
notion of "State criminality" as such,354 many governments and scholars seem to 
regard the I LC proposals on m assive pollution at most as a prospect de lege 
/erenda . 35 5 Probably for much the same reasons, the I LC's proposal to include the 
"wilful  causing or ordering" of "widespread, long- term and severe damage to the 
natural environment" as a separate crime into its draft for a Code of Crimes 
against the  Peace and Security of Mankin d356 encountered resistance and was 
even tuall y dropped. 35  7 
It is sometimes claimed that certain environmental norms have achieved the 
status of jus cogens. This peremptory character has been attached to the prohibi­
t ion of "serious damage or  threat to biological diversity," following Article 22 (1) 
of the Biodiversity Convention,358  to " the basic principles" of 1982 UNCLOS, fol­
lowing Article 311 (3),359 to the "procedural principles of co-operation" inherent 
in Principle 21, and to the prevention of climate change, acid rain, and depletion 
of the ozone l ayer. 360 Furthermore, the ILC regards the category of  international 
crimes of States as much broader than the l ist of peremptory obligations, viewing 
the prohibition against "massive pollution of the atmosphere or the seas" as pe­
remptory. 36 1 Even S tates that refuse to regard violation of this norm as an 
in ternational S tate crime may not oppose its jus cogens character. 
Leaving the other requirements of the concept aside, it  should be  noted that an 
obligation can only be peremptory if no derogation is allowed. 362 One of the cir­
cumstances that needs to be examined with regard to environmental norms is 
armed conflict :  if a State may deviate from such a norm on the basis of self-de­
fence or military necessity, the norm would be derogable  under certain 
c ircumstances, thus refuting its alleged "peremptory" status. 
In conclusion to this subheading, it seems safe to state that the extent  to which 
international law currently imposes on States an obligation of conservation and 
sustainable development with respect to the environment in general, and the 
question to whom such a duty would be owed, remain controversial. 363 
1 .3 .3 .  Damage to a State 's  Own E nvi ron m ent 
Another question that  needs to be addressed is whether international legal re­
sponsibi lity attaches to dam age caused by a State to its own environment when 
there are no immediate deleterious effects for other S tates, nor for areas beyond 
national jurisdiction . Can the preventive obligations implicit in Principle 2 1  be 
held to apply to the environment  contained within States?  Here the first element 
of that Principle poses a serious stumbling block : it holds that State sovereignty, 
one of the basic tenets of international law, confers on each S tate the independent 
right to control and regulate its natural resources. A further problem arises upon 
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examination of the second element  of Principle 2 1 , which mentions only "other 
States" and i nternational  areas as protected spheres; this phrase cannot be 
stretched to include international  legal responsib i l ity for environmental re­
sources within a State's own territory. The ILC made this much clear in 1 982 when 
i t  held that State l iab ility does not exis t  when both the activity causing harm and 
the in jury i tself occur i n  the terri tory of  the same State. 364 Even the most recent  
update of Principle 2 1 , i. e . ,  Principle 2 ofthe 1 99 2  Rio Declaration, reflects the or ­
thodox view regarding responsibi l i ty for damage to a State's own environmen 1. 365 
N onetheless ,  it was seen above that i n ternat ional in terest in the preserva­
tion of the environment ,  wherever i t  may be  s i tuated, is growi ng. I n ternational  
concern for the  environment  that  l ies  wi th in  a State's  own bord ers may be j us­
t ified on sc ientific  grounds .  B ecause  of  the ecological un i ty of  the global  
envi ronment, any act  of  pol lut ion, even if  i t  does not  immediately threaten the 
environment of  other S tates or  i nternational  areas,  can have several  systemic 
consequences :  for instance,  i t  may reduce t h e  overall  ass imi l ative capacity of 
the  global  enviro nment  and may affect m i gratory species .  366 Seen in this way, 
any act of pol lut ion or even any fai lure  to take  preventive action by a State with 
regard  to its  own natural  resources,  c reates risks for the ent i re world commu­
nity an d can potent ial ly affect  r ights  and interests of  a l l  States  in t h e  
environment .  I t  i s  for t h o s e  reasons t h a t  s ome h ave proposed t o  add  a further 
element  to Principle  2 1  S tockholm/Principle 2 Rio according to which States 
would have the o b ligation : 
. . .  to p rotect a n d  preserve the  env i ronmen t within the l i m its of their  nat ional 
j u risdict ion. 367 
A second avenue to just ify international interest in the environmental re­
sources contained within a State is a human rights approach .  The 197 2 Stockholm 
Declaration already m entions in its very first preambular paragraph that there is  a 
l ink between human rights and environmental protection : 
B o t h  aspects  o f  m a n ' s  e n v i ro n m e n t ,  the  n a tural  a n d  t h e  m a n - m a de, a r e  essen t i a l  
to  h i s  wel l -bei ng a n d  to the e n j o yme n t  of b a s i c  h u ma n ri gh ts-even the  r i g h t  to  
l i fe i t se lf. 
The first Principle of the Declaration then goes on to state : 
M a n  has the fundamen t a l  righ t to free dom, equa l i ty a n d  a d equate condit ions of l ife, 
i n  an environment of a quali ty that  perm i ts a l ife of dignity and well-being. 
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However, the travaux priparatolres of the Declaration indicate that the question 
of an environmental human righ t was contentious and that the wording of the 
preamble and of Principle 1 was the result of a compromise . 368 This explains per­
h aps the continuing disagreemen t on the meaning of Principle 1 . 369 Principle 1 of 
the 1 992 Rio Declaration can be seen as continuing the doctrinal controversy 
about the ex istence of a human right to environment, for i t  proclaims that human 
beings : 
. . .  are entit led to a hea l t h y  a n d  productive l ife in harmony w i t h  na ture. 
The l i terature remains divided on the s tatus of an envi ronmental human 
right. 370 The fact remains that apart from general proclamations,37 1 the practical 
and procedural i mplementation of this purported human right to a decent envi­
ronment in  i nternational law has been rather hes i tan t ;  for example, despite the 
fac t  that the consti tutions of more than 60 nations grant cit izens a right to a de­
cent  environmen t, thus far no min imum standard of environmental quality to 
which individuals would be entitled has emerged. 372 
A t the far end of the spectrum of this debate stands Judge W eeraman try of the 
ICJ .  In his separate opinion to the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case he argued that:  
E n v i ronmental  ri ghts are h u m a n  rights .  Treaties that  affect  human rights  cannot  be 
applied in such a man ner as  to const i tute a denial  of human rights at  the t i m e  oftheir  
application.  
The l ink between IEL and human rights was also debated in connection with 
the requests for an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the Legality of Nuclear 
Weapons. Proponents of the i l legali ty of these weapons argued that their threat or 
use would violate, imer alia, "the Human Right to Environment . ,, 37 3 In its Opin­
ion on the General Assembly request, the ICJ may have accepted at least  a general 
l ink between human rights and the environment i nsofar as i t observed, as men­
tioned before, that the environment represents "the li v ing space, the quality of 
life and the very health of human beings, i ncluding generations unborn . ,,3 74 
Stil l ,  it should be realised that the h uman rights approach to environmental 
protection may have its drawbacks.  Environmental protection requires more than 
the piecemeal approach that can be offered through the rather individualist ic ap­
proach of human rights litigation . 375 On the other h and, those wri ters who 
believe that a righ t to a decent environment has already been added to the cata­
logue of human righ ts, will  more easily accep t that the balance between S tate 
sovereignty and environmental in tegrity is changing in  favour of the latter. 
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1 . 4. Con clusions to Chapter I 
Public concern about the i mpact of human activities on the environment rap­
i dly found its  way into i ntern ational fora at the end of the 1 960s. The ensuing 
discipline of modern international environmen tal law (I EL) has moved from an 
in ter- State focus based on transfrontier pollution onto dealing with the en viron­
ment situated beyon d  national j u risdiction, and more recently, with t h e  
en vironment in general, irrespective of locus . 
IEL is prim arily treaty-based law. An impressive number of agreements estab­
lish detailed obligations for States in regard to separate environmen tal 
components such as the marine environment, freshwater resources, and wildlife. 
S ince the 1 980s, several instruments have been concluded to deal w ith problems 
across several environmental sectors i n  a comprehensive manner. In addition, 
new treaty tech niques have been developed for tackling complex sci entific i ssues 
such as loss of biodivers ity, ozone depletion and climate change. 
Although there are pri nciples, rules and techniques com mon to many environ­
mental sectors, there exists as yet  no international common law of the  
envi ronment.  Nevertheless, i t  was  argued i n  this  ch apter that  Principle 21  o f  the 
Stockholm Declaration can be regarded as the cornerstone of  modem IEL. Its first 
element holds that States have the sovereign right to exploit thei r natural re­
sources according to their own environmental policies;  its second element that 
activities under the jurisdiction or control o f  S ta tes, both within an d outside their 
own territory, are subject to the proh ibit ion of transfrontier pollution, the impli­
cations and lim its of wh ich have been discussed above. 
Although Principle 21 is regarded as reflecting customary international law, it 
was seen that States are generally reluctant to recognise or pursue claims inter se of 
State Responsibility based on breach of the Principle. Furthermore, there is  contro­
versy on the stan dard of care required from States as well as uncertainty regarding 
the level of prohibited damage, al though the latter is  probably relati vely h igh. 
Two other problems that have been d iscussed in this chapter relate to environ­
m ental damage caused in international areas and within a State's own 
juris diction. International interest in  these environments can be jus tified on sci­
entific grou nds.  However, S tate practice indicates that environmental dam age in 
i n ternational areas will rarely be remedied or compensated unless there is  proof o f  
damage t o  other States' legal rights or in terests.  In addition, the principle of S tate 
sovereignty i nhib its outside interference w hen envi ronmental damage rem ains 
confined with i n  State borders . Furthermore, it is s till a matter of con troversy 
whether there exists at present a human right to a decent environment and 
whether this  offers appropri ate means of ensuring environmental p rotection. 
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In conclusion, its seems appropriate to quote and sl igh tly amend an observa­
tion made by Professor Shearer in 1 996 : 
Probably the only clearly established customary law principle of the natural environment 
is that no State may conduct activities, or permit the conduct of activities, on its terriwry 
[or in international areas] that cause harm to the terriwry of another State, if  that harm is 
of serious consequence and is established by clear and convincing evidence.376 
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Protection of the Environment in the 
La ws of Armed Conflict 
2. 1 .  Introduction 
TH I S  C H APT E R  W I L L  REVIEW TH E E N VI RON M E N T A L  I M P L I C A  T I O N S of the lex spec ialis, i . e " the laws of armed conflict ,  applicable to the m arine environ-
mene Space perm its only  br ief commen ts on m any re levant i ssues ,  In  
part icular,  only i n ternat ional  armed conflict  wi l l  be  addressed,  whi l s t  d isa r-
mament law and weapons  of mass  destruction wi l l  not  be deal t  w i th in d eta i l .  
S ince  the law of neutra l i ty ra i ses  i s sues of  general peaceti m e ( i ncluding envi-
ron mental)  law, some of the i s s ues rai sed  i n  this  chapter wi l l  a lso ari se in  the  
next .  
In  co ntrast to the relati vely recent origins of  I E L ,  the laws of armed conflict are 
of much older vintage, l Mankind has long sought to restrain war through law by 
prescribing both when war i s  permissible and what i s  permissible i n  war i f  and 
when it has begun . 
The con temporary law of armed conflict sti l l  encompasses thi s clas sical di-
chotomy. Any use of armed force in international relations is  subject to a two-tier I ! scrutiny of rules regula ting the resort to armed force (jus ad bellum)  on the one i hand, and rules governing the use of arm ed force (jus in bello ) on the other.2 The 
i former is aimed at preventing the outbreak of armed conflict while the purpose of 
l the latter is to moderate or humanise armed conflict .  This difference in legal ob-I 
i > 
l 
j ective leads to a crucial difference: jus ad bellum allows the intern ational 
community to pass j udgement on the meri ts of resort to armed force and necessar­
ily disti nguishes between victims  and aggressors.  By contrast, jus ill bello applies 
equally to all parties to an armed conflict, regardless of the legal ity of their actions 
u nder jus ad bellum3 However, the theoretical i ndependence of these disciplines 
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and the equ ality of all belligerents under jus in bello have recently come under 
scrutiny. 
While jus ad bellum and jus In bello chiefly regulate relations b etween 
b ell igerents, relationships between belligerents and third States that do not wish 
to become involved in the conflict are governed by the custom ary law o f  neutral­
ity. However, since positions of neutrality vis-a-vis un lawful uses of force are 
i n compatible with the UN Charter, the international law on the relations between 
belligeren ts and third States is unsettled. 
Warfare, as Kalshoven observed, cannot fai l  to damage the natu ral environ­
ment, and it  is therefore important to know what damage must be deemed to be 
unacceptable.4 Many co nflicts this century, in Europe an d elsewhere, led to seri­
ous and probably long-lasting environmental destruction .s Even i f  not all damage 
was inflicted intentionally, his tory shows that bell igerents have never shied away 
from attempting to secure m i litary advan tage by using the forces of nature.6 
Therefore, the problem of environmental dam age during warfare is hardly n ew, 
and rules aimed at controlling the i mpact of warfare on the human environment 
can be found from the earliest civilisations. Thus, ancient norms prohibi ted the 
wanton destruction of forests, orchards, fru i t  trees, an d vines, or the poisoning of 
wells, springs, and ri vers ? 
If environmental dam age during warfare is a perennial pro blem, the extent and 
depth of public concern about it is a relatively recent phenomenon . 8  
The destructive poten tial of means of warfare increased dramatic a l l  y after W orId 
War II  through the advent of nuclear weapons. In 1956 the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (leRC) unsuccessfully proposed express humanitarian legal provi­
sions for these weapons.9 Today, even Nuclear Powers do not dispute that their use is 
governed by the laws of armed conflict. t o  They continue to insist however, that these 
and other "weapons of mass destruction" are best dealt with in arms control fora. I I 
The Second Indochina War ( 1 961-1975 ), (Vietnam War), coincided with the 
surge of environmental awareness in the 1 970s . Init ially, public criticism focused 
primarily on the unprecedented scale of the use of herbicides b y  the Uni ted States 
and i ts South Vietnamese all ies. 1 2 Soon however, the finger was pointed at the 
combined effect of the vast array of so-called conventional weapon s  and tech­
niques used by the United States; it was alleged that they had long-term or even 
irreversible effects on the environment.  I 3 While most of the environmental dam­
age caused during the two World Wars is said [0 have been "coll ateral" in nature, 
during the Vietnam War, the environment itself allegedly became a m ajor  target 
of th� U . S .  milita ry. 1 4 
Towards the end of the 1 960s, claims surfaced that the United States had also 
experim ented with weather modi fication (rainmaking) for mili tary purposes . I S  
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Appeals were launched for the outlawing of this  new crime of "ecocide" in  inter­
national law. 1 6  As will be seen later, the 1 972  Stockholm Conference dealt only 
half-heartedly with the matter of environmental damage during armed conflict . 1 7 
By contrast, the Vietnam War was p ivotal for the development of the environ­
mental jus in bello . 
Aspects of the Vietnam legacy were dealt wi th by the Geneva Disarmament 
Conference, which adopted the 1972 B iological Weapons Convention and the 
1 977  Convention on the Prohibition of M ilitary or Other Hostile Use of Environ­
mental Modification Techniques.  Subsequently, the Geneva Diplomatic Confer ­
ence, tasked with reviewing and developing humani tarian law (hereinafter 
1 974-1 9 77 GDC), adopted general principles an d a threshold for the protection of 
the environment in in ternational armed conflict .  Protection of the environment 
was also dealt  with by the 1980  "Inhumane Weapons Convention, '' ' S  a treaty con­
taining elements of jus in bello and disarmamen t law. Finally, with the adoption in 
1993 of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the use of herbicides in armed con­
flict has been further c ircu mscribed. 1 9  
Recent conflicts have highlighted the role of oil i n  armed conflict. However, oil 
fields, oil installations and oil tankers have always been a prime target for 
belligerents.20 During World War I, British and Rumanian Forces destroyed oil 
fields in Rumania in order to deny them to the Axis Powers.2 1  The destruction of the 
German oil production capaci ty was a key factor in the outcome of World War 11 .22  
The systematic destruction of Egyptian oi l  fields by Israel in  the 1 967 conflict  
prompted Arab nations to propose during the 1 974- 1977 GDC that attacks upon 
such installations be forbidden . 23 This in itiative failed and oi l  installations an d 
oil  tankers were again heavily targeted by belligerents in  the 1980-1 98 8  Iran-Iraq 
war. In spite of the intensity of the "Tanker war,' ,24 there are no  reports of signifi­
cant  pollution resulting from the attacks on tan kers .25 By contrast, repeated Iraqi 
attacks throughout 1 983  on the Iranian Nowruz oil field led to major environ­
mental damage in the Gulf region. 26 Unlike the Vietnam War, however, i t  did not 
lead to new treaty provisions aimed at  protecting the environment.  Nonetheless, 
the N owruz incident did inspire the first academic  study on the subject of the op­
eration of IEL during armed conflict . 27 
Another conflict of major  importance for the subject of environmen tal damage 
during warfare i s  the 1 990-1991  Gulf conflict .  Two of its more enduring i mages 
were the seemingly apocalyp ti c  effects generated by the burning of some 600 oil 
wells on Kuwai ti land2S and the release of m ill ions of barrels of crude  oil, which 
created one of the largest oil  spills in  h istory.29  As a result, massive damage was 
caused in that region to coastal marshlan ds, wildlife, coastal flora, fishing, off­
shore oil operations, and the touri s t  industry. 30 The Saudi-Arabian coast was 
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affected along a stretch of more than 400 kilometres, and there were impacts on 
the Kuwaiti, Iraqi, and Iranian coasts. 3 1  The atmospheric pollution caused by the 
burning oil  wells did not have the apocalyptic effects predicted at first, although i t  
was noticeable far beyond the  battlefield. 32 Whether there are any long-lasting 
impacts on human health and  the environ men t of  the region as a consequence of 
these actions i s  stil l  a matter of debate. 3 3  
There i s  l ittle doubt that  Iraq orchestrated both aforemen tioned disasters34 for 
mi l itary purposes which are hitherto unconfirmed, but  genera lly regarded as 
h ighly questionable. 3 5  I t  transpired later that some 34 oi l  wells were accidentally 
set ablaze by Coali tion attacks, while the oil  spil l  was at least partly caused by in­
tentional or unintentional Coalition actions. 36 
Echoing the charges made during the Vietnam War, the Iraqi actions were 
heavily criticised and called a "crime against the environmen t. , ,37  Some asserted 
that the conflict  showed that a new treaty was needed for the protection of the en­
vironment.3 8  In the months following the 1 990- 1 99 1  Gulf conflict, a number of 
international meetings were held at which the adequacy of the environmental as­
pects of mainly jus in bello were evaluated. 39 The relationship between military 
activi ties, inclu ding armed conflict, and the environment was also briefly ad­
dressed at 1 992  UNCED in  Rio.40 
In addition, the matter was placed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, 
which adopted Reso lution 47/37 ( 1 992) on the subject . 4 1 At the request of the As­
sembly, the ICRC submitted two reports in which it  reviewed the existing jus in 
bello provisions on the protection of the environ men t, as well as proposals for 
their reform, and suggested a series of outstanding problems for consideration by 
the UN S ixth (Legal)  Committee. The ICRC also drafted a model set of instruc­
tions to the mil itary, entitled Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the 
Protection of the Environment in Time of Armed Conflict. 42 
2.2. J u s  i n  Bel lo and Environmental Protection 
In sharp contrast to the relative simplicity of jus ad bellum, jus in bello may ap­
pear as a daunting l ist of successive and ever more elaborate treaty instruments 
that reflect the many attempts by the international community to restrain the 
worst excesses of past armed conflicts. 43 Many argue that the overriding majority 
of these provisions are peremptory (jus cogens) under international law.44 In its re­
cent Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons, the IC} took note of this  
argument but found that  there was no need for it to address this  issue.45 Nonethe­
less, the Court observed that the great majority of these provisions had already 
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become customary law, that they retlected the most universally recognized hu­
manitarian principles, and that they constituted "intransgressible" norms.46 
It should be noted that the overriding majority of jus ill bello treaty provisions 
deal either with armed contlict on land or  with the effects of armed contlict on 
land. There are very few treaties in force concluded especially for armed contlict 
at sea,  and almost none fo r aerial warfare. 47 Thus, there is no naval equivalent for 
the 1 907 Hague Convention ( IV) an d Regulations respecting the Laws and Cus­
toms of War on Lan d.48 There have been several unsuccessfu l  attempts at 
codification, inter alia, by the I nstitut, which published the 1 9 1 3  Oxford Man ual of 
Naval War. 49 The most recent attempt at restatement of relevant law was done un­
der the auspices of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law,  which 
prepared the 1 994 San Remo Manual o n  In ternational Law Applicable to A rmed Con­
flicts at Sea ( 1 994 San Remo Manual) . SO 
Because the law of armed con tlict differs according to the location of the con­
tlict, the protective cover of certain rules may make little sense from an 
environmen tal perspective. On the other hand, precisely because environmental 
damage knows no borders, it will  be seen below that non-terrestrial environments 
and natural resources may be protected through provisions in instruments deal­
ing with armed contlict on land.  
2 . 2 . 1 . U nder ly i ng Pr inc ip les of the Law of Armed Confl i ct 
There seems to be a wide consensus internationally on the identity and content 
of a few cardinal customary principles of the law of armed conflict .  The most basic 
foundation is  the principle, expressed in Article 2 2  of the Regulations attached to 
the 1 907 Hague Convention (IV) on Land Warfare and elsewhere,S l  that: 
The right of bel l igerents to adopt means of in juring the enemy is not unl imited .  
Although there are sl ight variations in  expression and content,  the current 
principles of the law of armed conflict are usually summarised as the principles of 
discrimination, proportional i ty, necessity and humanity. S2 The principle of dis­
crimination demands that weapons and tactics clearly distinguish between 
military and non-mili tary targets. Proportionality requires that the degree of force 
used be proportional to the adversary's actions or to the anticipated mil i tary value 
of the belligeren t 's own actions.  Necess ity demands that the degree of force used be 
reasonably necessary to the attainmen t  of the mil i tary obj ective and finally, hu­
manity, that  no weapon, or  tactic, should be employed if i t  causes unnecessary 
suffering to its victims. 
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Although they may not  carry the same weight in all types of warfare, current 
doctrine accepts that these principles are universal .  5 3  In its 1 996 Advisory Opin­
ion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons, the leI confirmed that  many of these were 
among the cardinal principles constitu ting the fabric of humanitarian law.54 
Since they place limitations on the means and methods of warfare, the princi­
p les of discrimination, proportionality, necessity and humanity are relevant for 
the protection of the environment in armed conflict. This is also the view of the 
leRe, who suggested that they be included into mil i tary manuals as guidelines for 
environmental protection . 5 5  
However, these are general and abstract principles which leave much discretion to 
the military commande�6 and were formulated with the protection of humans-i .e., 
combatants and/or civilians-in mind. As for the principle of discrimination, al­
though contrary views are sometimes expressed,57 there is no State practice to 
support the view that the natural environment may never consti tute a mili tary objec­
tive. The UK declared in relation to Additional Protocol I of 1 977 that : 
. . .  a specific area of land may be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons 
specified in the Article, its total or partial destruction . . .  offers a definite military advantage . . . . 58 
I taly, 59 the Netherlands60 and New Zealand6 ! all filed similar reservations .  
S imi larly, there i s  evidence from the travaux preparatoires of Addi tional Protocol I 
that the practice of "interdiction fire," namely targeting of an area where enemy 
troops are about to pass, even when enemy troops are not yet there, i s  considered 
lega1 .62 For instance, the United S tates reserves the right to bombard certain geo­
graphic targets like mountain passes.63 
The customary principle of proportionali ty was historically a norm developed 
to protect combatants, but since World War I, protection of the civilian popula­
tion from excessive losses has gradually become the dominant concern. 64 I t  i s  now 
generally accepted that the proportional i ty rule serves to protect the environment 
as wel1 .65 The decisive question, however, is what kind of damage can b e  consid­
ered excessive. Unfortunately, the customary rule of proportionality does not 
include any concrete guidelines to this effect. Many consider that the definition of 
disproportionate collateral damage to the environment i s  one of the more press ­
ing contemporary questions.66 
The customary law principle of h umanity is undeniably a norm directed at hu­
mans, i . e . ,  primarily combatants, although some scholars consider the civilian 
population included.67 The indi rect environmental benefits can nevertheless be 
important, particularly when the application of the principle leads to the ban of 
certain inhumane weapons. 
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As for the principle of necessity, it has long been accepted that actions involv­
ing punitive or vindictive destruction not serving a useful  mi litary purpose are 
impermissible. The prohibition of deliberate or wanton des truction of civi lian 
property and inhabited areas is  one of the oldest rules of warfare, and has been re­
corded in one form or another in many jus In bello instruments.68 A provision to 
this effect has been included in the 1 907 Hague Regulations and the 1 949 Geneva 
Conventions. 
Article 2 3  (g) of the 1 907 Regulations forbids destruction or seizure of the en­
emy's property unless "imperatively demanded by the necessi ties of war. " 
Evidently, the environmental merits are l imited because of the terms "enemy" 
and "property. ,,69 
The Geneva Conventions of 1 949 contain an identically worded provision ac­
cording to which the "extensive" destruction and appropriation of property, not 
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly qualify as 
a grave breachJo Although the norm forms part of the enforcement measures, its 
s ignificance cannot be underestimated. The grave breach provision has a wide 
scope, for it i s  not limited to a specific category of property nor to any particular 
period in the course of armed conflict .  However, the destruction involved needs 
to be extensive for it to be qualified as a grave breach, and malicious intent needs 
to be proved.7 1 
The p roh ibition of wanton devastat ion has  received such wide acceptance 
that some regard i t  as  peremptory, at  least  insofar as in ternational  armed con­
flicts are concerned.72  However, the h i s torical context of  the n o rm ind icates 
that i t  is intended to cover those parts of the human environ ment  that can be 
consi dered real and tangible property, such as v i llages, towns, di str icts ,  and 
agr icu l tural areas .  Parts  of  the  en v i ronmen  t w h i c h  may b e  affected  b y  a rmed 
confl i c t  but  which do  not  "b e long"  to a n y  o f  the part ies  i n vo lved  would not  
b e  covered by the norm.  This excludes migratory species  to which a S tate does 
not retain exclusive property rights as well  as natural resources i n  in ternational 
a reas . 7 3 
Nevertheless, since the 1 990- 1 99 1 Gulf war, the prohibi tion of wanton devas­
tation has often been invoked in a broader context in  relation to the environment 
in  genera1 .74 This is the position taken by the UN General Assembly in  Res . 
47/7 375 and by the ICRC guidelinesJ6 In  its 1 996 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear 
Weapons, the ICJ may have confirmed thi s  position. Citing the above mentioned 
reso lution the Court affirmed that: 
. . . destruction of the environment, not j ustified by m ilitary necessity and carried 
out wantonly, is cl early contrary to exist i ng international law.77 
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It is unclear, however, what threshold of environmental damage this wider 
norm may involve. The ILC has proposed that the use of means and meth ods of 
warfare with the intent to cause environmen tal damage, when not justified by 
military necess ity, be classified as a crime against p eace and security of man­
kind?8 However, the suggested th reshold has been set at a very high level .  The 
war crime needs to have been co mm itted " in a system atic manner or on a large 
scale." In addition, the level of environmental damage was taken from Additional 
Protocol I of 1 977 an d should therefore be regarded as extremely high .79 Further­
more, the suggested provision has been cas t in openly anthropocen tric term s. 
By setting close to 600 oil  wells al ight and by deliberately causing a cata­
strophic oil spill i n  the 1 990-1991 Gulf conflict, Iraq is widely regarded as having 
violated at  least the customary proh ib ition on wan ton devastation.  As mentioned 
before, to this day the reasons for these actions remain unclear; t hey may have 
served m i litary pu rposes, bu t they were largely unsuccessful .  However, State 
practice and cou rts have in the past required a very h igh stan dard of proof for the 
war crime of devastation beyond m ili tary necessity.80 After World War II ,  several 
German generals were charged with the war cri m e  of wanton devastation of vil­
lages and cities. In th e face of advancing Soviet troops, they h ad issued orders for 
scorched earth policies in Northern Norway and the U S S R. General JodI was found 
guilty o f  such prac tices by the  main Nuremberg Tribunal.  8 1  However, i n  the  trial 
of  US v. Von Leeb, seven commanders were cleared by the U . S .  Military Tribu nal .  
I t  held that "a great deal  o f latitude must be accorded" to military comman ders 
and that "devastation beyond military necessi ty" in these s ituations requires " de­
tailed proof of an operational and tactical nature . ,,82 
In the case of US v. Lis t (hostages case), German General Rendulic was charged 
with wanton devas tation i n  the Norwegian Province of Finnmark. Although he 
admitted his  actions, he argued that they were taken i n  the belief that Russian 
forces w ere in hot pursuit  of h is retreat ing units .  The court acqu itted th e defen­
dant on the grounds that the defendan t may h ave erred in believing that there was 
mili tary necessi ty for this destru ction and devastation,  but that he was guilty of 
no cri m inal  act.83  This j udgement was extremely con troversial in Norway, for 
there was ev idence that the general had enough information to decide against the 
need for a scorched earth policy.84 Nevertheless, what became known as the 
"Rendulic" ru le h as s ince been adopted as an important gui deline o n  "h inds ight" 
by some m ili tary forces. It has been invoked in defence of two controversial 
air-rai ds m ade by the U.S. Air  Force during the 1991 Desert S torm to excuse pos­
sible reliance on information wh ich, with hinds ight, p roved insufficient. 8S 
In conclusion, the env ironmental benefits of the application of the underlying 
principles of jus in bello is not unqu al ified . Nevertheless, as Professor Roberts 
52 
! � 
J 
1 I i 
! 
t 
, 
I 
International Environmental Law and Naval War 
points out, taken together, the underlying principles of the law of armed conflict 
strongly point to the conclusion that actions resul ting in massive environmental 
destruction, especially where they do not serve a clear and importan t mili tary pur­
pose, would be questionable on many grounds .86 
In addi tion, the principles may provide a safety net in conflicts such as the 
1 990- 1 99 1  Gulf War, where few of the participants were party to jus in bello trea­
ties containing norms specifically directed at the environ ment. 87 
2 . 2 .2 .  The Martens Clause 
The Martens Clause fin ds its or igins  i n  a p aragraph i nser ted i n  th e pream­
ble to Hague Conven tions ( IV)  of  1 899 and 1 907 .  I t  has s ince been inserted in 
one fo rm o r  ano ther as  a separate art ic le  in many jus  in  bello conven tions after 
World  War 1 1 . 88  It s tates that i f  a p art icular rule i s  not express ly  fou n d  in treaty 
l aw, bell igerents ( an d  recently also c ivi l ians)  remain u n der the pro tection of 
customary law, the pr inciples of  humani ty, and the d i c tates  of pub l i c  
conSCIence .  
I t is  generally accepted that the  clause serves as a powerful  reminder of the role 
of custom ary international law and that it warns that even if an i ssue is not ad­
dressed by a specific  treaty provision, it may still be regulated by international 
law.89 However, there is disagreemen t on the significance of the terms "principles 
of hum ani ty and dictates of  p ublic conscience." It  is debated whether this formula 
refers to separate sources of ( legal) rules governing belligerent conduct, or 
whether it  only offers moral guidelines.90 
The possible interpretations of the Martens Clause were extensively dealt with 
in  submissions of States in connection with the WHO and UN General Assembly 
requests for an advisory opinion on the legality of  nuclear weapons .  Among the 
p roponents of their legality, the Russian Federation argued that the c lause was re­
dundant,9 1  whilst the UK held the view that the clause was a mere reminder of rhe 
exi srence of customary law.92 Stares opposing rhese views argued that ,  even if nor 
expressly p rohibi ted  by a treaty norm, nuclear weapons were forbidden because 
their use violates the principles of humanity and public conscience. 93 
In i ts 1 996 Advisory Opinion on the General Assembly request, the Ie] refured 
the Russian position and affirmed the  importance of rhe  Martens Clause explic­
i tly by holding that its "continuing existence and applicab ility cannot be 
doubted" and that it  reflected customary law predaring Additional Protocol I .  
However, the  Court would not  be drawn any further on the  meaning of  th is  clause 
other than observing that i t  has proved to be an effective means of addressing the 
rapid evolution of mili tary technology and that the fact  that certain weapons were 
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not specifically dealt with by the 1974- 1 977  GDC does not permit any legal conclu­
sions relating to substantive issues raised by the use of such weapons . 94 
Although the Martens Clause is undoubtedly anthropocentric, it has been ar­
gued that : 
The customary laws of war, in reflecting the dictates of public conscience, now include a 
requ irement to avoid unnecessary damage to the environment. 95 
Insofar  as the underlying principles of the law of armed conflict already 
amount to a prohibition of un justifiab le damage to the environment, this inter­
pretation of the Martens Clause adds little new to its protection .96 The statement 
may nevertheless serve to emphasise that since environmental degradation is now 
undeniably of major pub lic concern, i t  would be unacceptable for the military to 
neglect these values during armed conflict.97 
2 . 2 . 3 .  Treaty P rovi sions unt i l 1 977 
Until the mid-l 970s, the conventional jus in bello did not mention the environ­
ment by name, although i t  contained a series of norms with environmental 
implications.  One can distinguish five types of such norms: ( l )  provisions aimed 
at  civilians, since these imply protection of the environment on which the civil­
ians depend; (2) provisions prohibiting unnecessary destruction of civilian 
property; (3) prohibitions of attacks on certain objectives and areas;  (4) prohibi­
tions and restrictions on the use of certain weapons and (5) prohibitions and 
restrictions on certain methods of war. 98 The analysis below will be restricted to 
norms which are most relevant for the rest of this study. 
A. Treatment of Private, Semi-public and Public Property. Apart from rules 
on wanton devastation of property, which were discussed above, both the 1 907 
Hague Regulations and the 1 949 Geneva Conventions con tain rules for the treat­
ment of private, semi-public, and public property during belligerent occupation. 
The 1 907 Hague Regulations on Land Warfare reflect customary law and con­
stitute the principal source for the s tatus of property during belligeren t 
occupation. 99 The four Geneva Con ven tions are in many respects the most impor­
tant source of international humanitarian law. They have achieved virtually 
universal participation of all States, consistently attracting more adherents than 
the UN Charter. 1 00 
According to Articles 46 and 56 of the 1907 Hague Rules, private and munici­
pal property as well as holdings of religious, cultural, educational and scientific 
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institutions are immune from interference by the occupier. The latter is further­
more obligated by Article 43-unless absolutely prevented-to respect the 
national laws in force in the occupied terri tory. On the basis of Article 46, an occu­
pier would not be allowed to take possession of privately owned natural resources, 
such as forests . A case can also be m ade that officially established nature reserves, 
regardless of ownership s tructure, are given immunity by Articles 43 and 56. This 
may apply to habitats l isted, e .g. ,  under the 1 97 1  Ram sar Convention on Wetlands 
of International Importance and to si tes designated under the 1 972 UNESCO Con­
vention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage. l O l  
Pursuant t o  Article 5 5 ,  the occupying State m a y  take possession o f  government 
real estate holdings but is obligated to respect the rules of usufruct when adminis­
tering these.  Article 55 reads : 
The occupying S ta te shall be regarded only as admini strator and usufructuary of 
public buildings, rea l  esta te, forests, and agricultural esta tes belonging  to the host i le 
S ta te, and si tuated in the occupied coun try. I t  must safeguard the capi ta l  of these 
properties, and administer them in accordance wi th  the rules of usufruct.  
By its very language, Article 55 seems capable of being read as protecting large 
portions of the human environment, including in particular, agricultural lands 
and forests . l 02 The old Hague rule can be seen as an early expression of the duty to 
use natural resources in sustainable ways . An application of th is  princip le is  the 
Polish Forests case in which a number of former German civilian administrators 
were convicted of war crimes committed during the occupation of Poland.  They 
were found to have caused : 
. . .  the wholesale cutting of Polish Timber to an extent  far in excess of what was 
necessary to preserve the t imber resources of the country. l 03 
The status of certain property during belligeren t occupation i s  regulated also 
by Article 5 3  of the fourth Geneva (civil ians) Convention, which stipulates that: 
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging 
individ ua l ly or col lectively to private persons, or  to the S ta te, or to other publ ic  
authorities, or  to social or  to cooperat ive organizations,  i s  prohibi ted,  except where 
such destruct ion is rendered absolutely necessary by mil i tary operat ions .  
The travaux preparatoires show that the principal goal of this provision was to 
protect al l  private or public property of immediate "domestic" value to citizens, 
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but not pub lic property with a general military value such as airfields and bridges . 
The d ifficulty lies in identifying what kinds of state-owned property mainly serve 
the needs of the individuals. In  the opinion of one co mmentator, the Kuwaiti Oil 
Fields, which were destroyed by Iraq in the closing stages of the 1 990-199 1  Gulf 
Conflict, do not qual ify as a such. 1 04 Furthermore, i t  has been argued that the pro­
vision was only intended to apply during uncontested mili tary occupation.  l OS 
Unlike Arti cles 46 and 56 of the Hague Regulati ons, Article 5 3  of Geneva Con­
vention (IV) allows destruction when "rendered abso lutely necessary by mil itary 
operatio ns." Since forests and nature res erves arguably rarely serve immediate do­
mestic civilian needs, Article 53 does not dimin ish the protection which private 
ecological property an d nature reserves derive from the Hague Regulations.  
There are several limitations inherent in the above prov isions that may ad­
versely affect their relevance for environmental protection . By requiring that 
natural resources "belong" to the occupied State, parts of the natural environ ment 
which cannot be considered property of a particular State are excluded. 1 06 
I t  is importan t to note also that the above provisions do no t apply during com­
bat .  Since 1 907, the status of cultural property during hostilit ies has been 
addressed in several instruments, none of which extend firm protection to natural 
sites. Thus, the 1 954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property and its protocol 
protect a broad range of objects from destruction, damage and pillage, but its pro­
visions and subsequen t State practice indicate that it applies only to built 
environs containing large amounts of cultural property. During a recen t review of 
the convention, a suggestion to include natural sites was rejected as impractical 
and counterproductive. 1 07  
During the 1 974-1977 GDC, it was confirmed that  States do not want to commit 
themselves to any protection for natural sites in armed conflict. Article 5 3  of 1977  
Additional Protocol I prohibits acts of hostility against historic .monuments, 
works of an, or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heri­
tage of peoples . Although this formulation i s  not exclusively concerned with the 
man- made or built environment, and may conceivably include natural si tes, the 
travaux preparatoires of the provision make i t  clear that a proposal to protect any 
and all places of worship was rej ected for reasons of practicality and that there has 
to be more than local fame about protected places. 108 
In addition, at least two proposals were tabled to protect specially designated 
nature reserves . 1 09 One of these proposals read as follows : 
N arure reserves w i r h  adequare markings a n d  boundaries dec lared as such to [he 
adversary shal l  be protected and respected excepr when such reserves are used 
specifically for military purposes. I 10 
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None of these proposals were retained, and consequemly, there is as yet, no jus 
in bello i nstrument  that  protects nature reserves during combat . l l l  
The absence of  any such restriction makes i t  unsurpris ing that mil i tary hosti l i ­
t ies took place in the Kuwaiti National Fores t during the 1 99 1  Desert Storm 
campaign, 1 1 2 and that the Sava Wetlands in Croatia, which had been included in  
UNESCO's B iosphere programme, were disturbed during the recem conflict in  Yu­
goslavia . 1 1 3 
B. Provisions for Naval Warfare. The Hague Regulations apply only to land 
warfare, and there i s  no equivalent instrumem for armed conflict at  sea. Conse­
quently, while the more traditional type of terrestrial  n ature reserve may be 
immune under the regulations, the same cannot  be said to apply to more novel 
types : those with a land-ward and a sea-ward componem, or those emirely located 
at  sea. 1 1 4 Arguably, i t  would appear il logical to extend immunity to terres trial 
components of nature reserves, but not to coastal or marine components. How­
ever, insofar as  rel i ance has to be placed on the "pre-ecological" 1 907 Hague 
Regulations, firm legal ground is lacking. This is ,  a fortiOri , the case for marine 
sanctuaries. 
There is,  afortiori, no legal immunity for marine sanctuaries during armed con­
flict. During the discussions in preparation for the 1994 San Remo Manual, it 
became clear that no consensus could be  reached on the creation of a legal obliga­
tion in this respect. Nevertheless,  the manual encourages belligeren t States to 
conclude special agreements not  to conduct hosti le actions in m arine areas 
con taining : 
(a) ra re or fragile ecosystems ;  or 
(b) the habi tat  of dep leted, threatened or endangered species or other forms of 
marine l i fe .  1 I S  A n d  t o  make use of lists such a s  those maimained, inter alia , under 
the World Heritage Convemion . 1 1 6 
Finally, it i s  undeniable that mines laid at sea have the potential to affect the 
freedom of navigation of many States, whether belligerem or neutral, and that un­
recovered and unexploded mines may lead to  serious pollution incidents after the 
end of naval conflicts.  I 17 Apart from the 197 1  Seabed Arms Control Treaty, 1 1 8  
and Protocol I I  o f  the 1 980 "Inhumane" Weapons Convention, 1 1 9  the only inter­
national legi slation governing the probl em of mine warfare at sea i s  contained in 
Hague Convention (VIII)  Relative to the Laying of Automatic Contact Mines. 1 20 
The material scope of the latter i s  limited to automatic sub marine contact m ines 
and torpedoes. I t  con tains nei ther a general prohibition nor a specific geograph­
ical  limitation of the use of such devices, and is regarded as one of the leas t 
succes sfu l  texts to emerge from the 1 907 Peace Conference. 1 2 1  Because o f  the 
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unrestricted mine warfare of  the two W orId Wars and the technical  develop­
men t  of  naval mines ,  i ts  cont inued legal relevance became a matter of 
dispute. l 2 2  Still ,  i t  is said to reflect customary law for the use of au tomatic con­
tact m in es. l 2 3  
The 1 994 San Remo Manual suggests a series of much needed improvements to 
the legal regime of all types of mine warfare at sea, drawing, inter alia, on princi­
p les of the 1980 "Inhumane" Weapons Convention for mine warfare on land. 1 2 4  
The  suggested rules include, for example, the  interdiction to use free-floating 
m ines, unless (a) they are directed against a military obj ective and (b) they be­
come harmless within an hour after loss of con trol over them ; 1 25 the obligation 
for belligeren ts to record the location where they have laid m ines ;  1 26 and after the 
cessation of hostilities, to do their utmost to remove or render harmless the mines 
they have laid. 127 
2 . 2 .4 .  The 1 977 E N M O D  Convention 
The ENMOD Convention (hereinafter ENMOD) was concluded against the 
backdrop of the Vietnam war, which involved massive use of herbicides as well as 
allegations of attempted weather modification for mili tary purposes . 1 28 In 1 972, 
the United S tates formally renounced the use of climate modification techniques 
as a matter of pOlicy1 29 and agreed to negotiate a treaty to this effect with the 
USSR. 1 30 The treaty was eventually concluded under the ausp ices of  the Confer­
ence of  the Committee of Disarmament, and adopted by General Assembly 
Resolution GA Res . 3 1/72 . 1 3 1 
Article I of the ENMOD reads : 
Each S tate Pa rty to this  Convention undertakes not to engage in mil itary or any other 
hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long- l asting 
or severe effects as the means of destruction, dam age or injury to any other S tate Party. 
Article II provides the following clarification :  
The term "environmental modificat ion tech niques" refers t o  any technique fo r 
changi ng-th ro ugh the del iberate manipulation of natural processes-the 
dynamics, co mposition o r  structure of the Earth, including its biota,  l ithosp here, 
hydrosphere and atmosphere, or  of outer space. 
The Disarmament Conference transmitted a series of common understandings 
of various articles to the General Assembly. 1 32 These were not formally annexed 
58 
I 
i 
1 
t 
i I 
1 
International Environmental Law and Naval War 
to the convention, and although they probably reflect the drafters' in tentions, 
their legal status i s  ambiguous . 1 33 
The understanding to Article I includes a non-exhaustive list of examples such as: 
. . .  earthqua kes, t sunam is,  a n  upset i n  the ecological bala nce of a regi on,  changes i n  
weat her p a t terns, c h a n ges in  cl imate patterns, changes i n  ocean currents,  c h a nges in 
t he s t a te of the ozone layer, a n d  changes in the state of the  atmosp here. 1 34 
There is ,  as yet, no proof that the United States did engage in weather modifi­
cation in Vietnam. 1 35 Furthermore, whether the types of geophysical warfare the 
ENMOD drafters had in mind are realis tic is a matter of debate. 1 36  On the other 
h an d, weather modification is  cu rrently being used for peaceful  purposes, 1 37 and 
the convention encourages development and testing of these techniques for 
peaceful purposes. 1 38 
Furthermore, ENMOD may now be applicable to a b roader range of situations 
than originally in tended. After the 1 990- 1 991  Gulf war, i t  became controversial 
whether the setting alight of Kuwaiti oi l  wells and the engineering of the Gulf war 
oil  spill came within the ambit of the convention . Some claimed that these delib ­
erate acts, although they were "low-tech," induced proscribed environmental 
modification of natural processes. 1 39 Others ob jected that ENMOD was intended to 
ban only advanced technological techniques aimed at changing the "dynamics, 
composition and structure of the Earth . "  During the Second Review Conference 
of ENMOD, held in Septem ber 1 992, State parties failed to solve this con troversy. 
They agreed only to study the possibil ity of clarifying the scope of EN MOD with 
the aim of prohibiting also low-tech environmental modification . 
Surpri singly, however, 1 40 the final conference declaration , adopted by consen­
sus, declares that the "mil i tary or  any other hostile u se of herbicides" i s  an 
environmental modification technique within the ambit of the convention. 1 4 1 
This can only be explained by the fact  that the U.S .  government had already ear­
lier acknowledged that the use of herbicides was covered by ENMOD. 142 In 
addi tion, by 1992, a general con sensus was emerging within the UN Disarma­
ment Con ference that the use of herbicides in armed conflict should be  banned by 
the Chemical Weapons Convention . 1 43 
These recent developmen ts no twithstanding, ENMOD is generally considered 
of l imi ted value for the protec tion of the environment in armed conflict .  1 44 It  i s  a 
di sarmament treaty that does not outlaw environmental damage as such, but pro­
hibits certain uses of the forces of nature as weapons in armed conflict .  
Furthermore, i t  is  debated whether ENMOD requires the actual causing of such 
damage. 1 45 
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I n  addition, the threshold of prohib ited damage i n  EN,\;10D i s  high, although 
not as high as for the provisions of Additional Protocol I, which will be discussed 
fu rther below. Article I of EN M OD uses the terms "widespread, long-lasting or se­
vere effects," and i t  is important to note that because of the dis junctive "or," these 
are meant  to be alternatives. A technique meeting any of the threshold criteria 
will be prohibited. The common understanding of this article gives the fol lowing 
interpretation :  
(a) widespread :  encompassing an area of several hundred square ki lometres;  
(b) long- lasting :  lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season ;  
(c) severe: i nvolving serious or significant disruption o r  harm t o  human life, 
natural and economic resources or other assets; 1 46 
The term "widespread" i s  meant as an absolute standard, which may exceed 
the surface area of  some States. 1 47 Suggestions that a relative standard, taking into 
account S tates' surface areas would be fai rer for small nations were rej ected dur­
ing the negotiations. 1 48 
Many consider it l ikely that the environmental damage caused by the 1 99 1  oil­
well fires and the oi l  s l ick-assuming that they were environmental modification 
techniques-crossed at least one of the ENMOD thresholds. 1 49 However, neither 
Iraq nor several coalition States were a party to the convention at the relevant 
time. l s o  ENMOD broke un dou btedly new ground in 1977, and by 1 992 it counted 
only 55 parties. It is unlikely to reflect customary law .  1 5 1 
Furthermore, the wording of Article I is so strained that some doubt whether 
ENMOD was intended to cover the concept of environmental damage at all . l s2 Im­
portantly, environmental damage as such i s  not outlawed, only the use of certain 
techniques which may cause destruction, damage, or injury to State parties. This 
formulation excludes application of EN MOD not only to non-parties but also to the 
environment lying beyond the national jurisdiction of State parties. This means 
that ordinari ly, environmental damage caused by environmental modification 
techniques on the high seas will not be  covered unless damage of the forbidden 
threshold is caused to the land or sea areas covered by a State party's sovereignty. ! 53 
A final observation is that the convention's remedial measures have never been 
used and that i ts enforcement mechan isms are regarded as unsatisfactory. ! 54 
2 . 2 . 5 .  Add iti o nal P rotocol I 
Protocol I Additional to the four  Geneva Conventions was concluded shortly 
after EN MOD. I t  regu lates primari l y  international armed conflict on land, but in­
cludes the effects of o ther types of  armed conflict  on land under certain  
condit ions .  I S S  By 22 January 1 998,  Additional Protocol I had  1 49 State part ies. ! S6 
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Nevertheless, this protocol remains controversial .  The U n i  ted S tates, for exam­
ple '  has major  objections to the status which i t  gives to l iberation movements, and 
disagrees with other provisions which she sees  as un duly restri c ting mil i tary op­
erations.  These include the provisions on the natural environment . I S7 
Additional Protocol I contains several articles dealing with protection of the 
environmen t .  Of these, two deal explicitly with protection of the natural environ­
ment, the o thers with separate components of the human environmen t :  
agricultural areas, cul tural and rel igious property and indus trial installations.  
Following the 1 990- 1 99 1  Gulf conflict, li terature on the legal significance of 
these provisions has abounded. I S 8  
A. Articles 53 ,  54  and 56 .  Article 53  of Additional Protocol I ,  which was al­
ready mentioned above, deals with the protection in armed confl ict of historic 
monuments, works of art or places of worship which consti tute the cultural or 
spiritual heri tage of peoples.  The travaux preparatoires show that the term "peo­
ples" was used inten tionally to convey a broad purpose. I t  is  noteworthy that 
Article 53 prohibits attacks against certain monuments even if  the health and sur­
vival of the pop Ulation are not affected. I S9 
Article 54  of Additional Protocol I forbids warfare by starvation and deals with the 
protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population such as 
"foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, 
drinking water ins tallations and supplies and irrigation works." However, the article 
permits important exceptions. The first one (paragraph 3) relates to objects which are 
either used solely by the mil itary or in direct support of military action. 
The second exception (paragraph 5) allows Parties to engage in  scorched earth 
policies on their own territory under the following conditions :  
In recognit ion o f  the vita l  requi rements o f  any Party t o  the conflict i n  the defence of 
i ts  national territory against invasion, derogation fro m  the prohibitions contained 
in  paragraph 2 may be made by a Party to the conflict within such territory under its 
own control where required by imperative m ilitary necess ity. 
This is an important exception.  I t  was argued above that S tates are under no 
firm international legal obligation to protect the environment within their own 
borders. 1 60 Even if  some migh t disagree with the general principle, Article 54(5 ) 
proves that at least in international armed conflict, States may resort to extensive 
destruction of their own territories under certain conditions. 1 6 1 
Another provision with environmental implications is Article 56,  which for­
bids attacks on "works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely 
61 
The Newport Papers 
dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations," even if in principle they 
constitute military targets. Paragraph 2 of the article defines the conditions under 
which this special immunity might cease: in general, the protection may cease 
only when the works  or installations are used in regular, significant and direct 
support of mili  tary operations, and if  the attack is  the only feasible way to termi­
nate such support. 
I t  is important to observe that the enumeration of dangerous installations in 
this provision is  meant to be  exhaustive. In  particular, as mentioned before, a pro­
posal that oil installations be given special immunity as well, failed. 1 62 S tates are 
nevertheless encouraged to conclude further agreements providing additional 
protection for ob jec ts containing dangerous forces. 1 63  
Finally, the provis ion is unlikely to reflect customary in ternational law. 1 64 
This  is confirmed by the 1 997 International Watercourse Convention.  Al­
though Article 29 states that watercourse installations remain under the 
protection of  the laws of armed conflict, i t  omits  to mention Article 56  by 
name. 1 65  During the adoption of the treaty by the General Assembly it was 
stressed that : 
Just as article 29 does not alter or amend existing law, it does not purport to extend the 
applicability of any instrument to States not parties to that instrumellI. 1 66 
B. Articles 35(3) and 55 .  The 1 974-1977 GDC was preceded by two preparatory 
expert meetings convened by the ICRC .  During the last of these, in 1 972,  calls were 
made for the inclusion of provisions on the protection of the environment. 1 67 For 
reasons that are unclear, the ICRC decided to retain none of these proposals. Yet, at 
the 1974-1 977 GDC, several delegations brought the issue up from the very begin­
n ing. 1 68 However, differences of opinion emerged quickly. Some delegates 
believed that the protection of the environment in time of war was an end in i tself; 
others considered the continued survival of the civilian population to be i ts pur­
pose. 1 69 Various proposals were formulated, many of which went through several 
stages of deliberations a t  the Conference. 1 70 In the end, no agreemen t was reached 
on a definition of the environment nor on  a single course of action .  An official 
Working Group came up with two proposals for a provision on the "natural" envi­
ronment. The Conference accepted both, and as a consequence, the text of 
Additional Protocol I contains two provisions on the natural environment, each 
with their own rationale and scope. 
The first provision, Article 35 ( 3 ), appears under the heading "Basic Rules" and 
deals with means and methods of warfare. It states that: 
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It i s  prohibited to employ methods or means of  warfare which are intended, or may 
be expected, to cause widespread, long- term and severe damage to  the natural 
en vironmen t. 
The second provision, Article 5 5 , appears in Part IV on the Protection of the 
Civilian Population and reads : 
( J ) Care shal l  be taken in warfare to protect the natural  environment aga inst 
widespread, long-term and severe damage.  This protect ion includes a proh ibit ion of 
the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to 
cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health 
and survi val of the population.  
(2) Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals a re proh ibited.  
These provisions are not a model of clari ty. Their scope and contents, mutual 
relationship as well as the link, if  any, with the strikingly s imilarly worded provi­
sion of the 1 977  ENMOD Convention are hotly debated. 1 7 1 
Neither of the provisions defines the term "natural envi ronment." The 
Biotope group, which elaborated the proposal, thought its meaning to be self-evi­
dent, but this is di sproved by the comments which the provisions elicited even 
during the conference.  The ICRC commentary to the provisions claims that the 
term "natural environment" should be interpreted broadly, covering, inter alia, 
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, mentioned in Ar­
ticle 54. 1 72 Support for this position can be found in the travaux preparatoires. 
These show that an Austral ian proposal, according to which a S tate's own terri ­
tory would be exempted from the prohibi tion ( later) contained in Article 5 5 ,  was 
dropped. 1 73  What this  means is that Article 5 5  sets a l imit  to the defensive 
scorched earth policies permitted by Article 54(5 ) . 1 74 
The l i terature i s  divided on the meaning of the terms "natural environment" 
in  Articles 35(3)  and 5 5 .  Some believe that both p rovis ions share the same obj ec ­
tive, but  disagree on  i ts  content .  1 75 The majority of writers, however, argue that  
Article 35(3)  a ims a t  protecting the environment per se and that  Article 55  pro­
tects the environment for the sake of the heal th and survival of the 
population. 1 76 
In view of the above controversies, it is perhaps not  surpris ing to note that doc­
trinal opinion is  divided also on the ultimate scope of the articles. Unlike ENMOD, 
Articles 35(3) and 55 Addi tional Protocol I do not require that the (actual or 
threatened) damage causes injury to a S tate party. However, does this omission 
mean that the environment of all  States is covered by the provision, regardless of 
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whether they are parties to the convention and regardless of thei r  s tatus in the 
conflict? 
Dr .  Fisher regards Article 35 ( 3 )  as a rule acknowledging the impact of modern 
warfare on non-belligeren t countries. In Professor Lagoni writes that the article 
has three purposes : to protect the environment as such ; to protect the civilian 
population from long-term and severe damage and to pro tect the territory of 
States not parties to the conflict from "widespread" damage to the environ­
ment. 1 78 Others rej ect such views o n  the ground that Additional Protocol I in­
tends to regulate international armed conflict only between State parties .  1 79 
The legal effect of Articles 3 5 ( 3 )  and 5 5  for a reas beyo nd belligerents '  terri­
tory-third States and international areas-is a complex m atter. I t  cannot be 
resolved without determining:  (a) what level of protection exists for these areas 
under general (peacetime) international law; (b) what threshold of environmental 
damage is intended by Articles 35 (3 )  and 5 5 ;(c) whether Articles 3 5 ( 3) and 5 5  
were innovative a t  the time of  their adoption ; a n d  (d) what their current legal sta­
tus  is .  
While the relationship between belligerent States and third S tates will be fur­
ther dealt w ith b e l ow, 1 80 some of the above questions can be answered briefly. As 
to quest ion (a), it  was argued earlier that under general international law, States 
are under a duty not to cause "severe" damage to the territory of other States o r of 
areas beyon d  national juri sdiction, and that there is  no firm obligation with re­
gard to the environment within a State's own borders. 1 8 1  
A s  for (b), i t  is  generally assumed that Articles 3 5 ( 3 )  and 5 5  o nly cover very sig­
nificant damage. Although the terms used in Additional Pro tocol I resemble 
th ose of  EN MOD, the threshold indicated by the two instruments i s  fundamentally 
d ifferent. 1 82 Unlike in  ENMOD, the adj ectives "wi despread, long-term, and se­
vere" used in Additional Protoco l  I are joined by the word "and," meaning that it 
is a triple, cumulative standard that needs to be fulfilled. 
There are no "unders tandings" comparable to ENMOD for the threshold ad j ec­
tives of Additional Protocol I , although some indications can be found in the 
conference records. Some of  these suggest that while the duration of the term 
"long-lasting" in ENMOD was a few months, the adjective "long-term" in  Addi­
tional Pro tocol I would  need to be measured in decades, rather than months, and 
that ordinary battlefield damage of the kind caused to France in World War I is 
not covered. However, some delegates argued that  it was not possible to say with 
certainty what period of time might be involved. 1 83 There was no explicit clarifi­
cation of the terms "widespread" or "severe," although it was suggested that the 
term "health" should be thought of as referring to congenital defects, degenera­
tions or deformities and as excluding temporary or  short- term effects . 1 84 
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Given these sugges tions, it has been argued that Artic les 35(3)  and 5 5  do not 
impose any significant limitation on combatants waging conventional  warfare, 
and that they are: 
. . . primarily directed at high level policy decis ion makers and would affect such 
unconventiona l means of warfare as the mass ive use of herbicides or chemical agents which 
could produce widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environ ment. 1 8 S 
As for questions (c) and (d), at the t ime of their formulation, Artic les 35 ( 3 )  and 
55 were regarded as innovative. States l i ke the United States l 86 and France, 1 87 
an d  many scholars, 1 8 8  continue to believe that they bind o n l y  State parties . In its 
1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ rather enigmat­
ically stated that these provisions provide additional  protec tion to the 
envi ronment and "are powerful  constraints for a l l  States having subscribed to 
these provisions," 1 89 thereby apparen tly suggesting that they do not reflect cus­
tomary law. 
The question of the relationship between existing customary international law 
and Articles 3 5 ( 3) and 55 is essential and depen ds ch iefly on the level of environ­
mental damage permi tted by the latter provisions. Some authors argue that 
because of their high threshold, they do not add much by way of protection to cus­
tomary ru les of the law of armed conflict. 1 90 However, another interpretation is 
possible .  If the threshold set by Articles 3 5 ( 3 )  and 55 is i nnovative, it  m ay entai l a 
more permissive rule than the customary princip les of the law of armed conflict.  
Rather than i mproving on the customary protec tion, the 1977  additions of jus in 
bello m ay lead to an erosion of the custom ary requirements of proportiona l i ty and 
necessity i n  relation to the environment . 1 9 1  
As the above analysis h a s  indi cated, a strong case can b e  made that t h e  in­
tended threshold of Articles 35 (3)  an d 55  i s  much higher than the peacetime 
stan dard of "severe . "  This raises the question of what standard applies i n  armed 
conflict to th ird States and international areas. This issue will  be further ad­
dressed in the next ch apter, 192 but i t seems prima facie unacceptable that 
belligerents would be entitled to inflict environmen tal  damage leading to congen­
i tal diseases i n  third States . Given their h igh thresh old, the provisions of 
Additio nal Protocol I cannot lower t h e  protection which the latter derive from 
general international law . Therefore, the view that th ese provisions should not be 
consi dered applicable to third States appears convincing. 
Another question is whether the provisions would nonetheless cover third 
States that become party to the protoco l.  Would such States accept that they will 
have no cause for complaint unless the dam age caused within thei r territory is of 
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the severity envi saged in Articles 35 (3)  and 5 5 :  i . e . ,  un less i t  lasts for decades , cov­
ers  wide areas and leads to birth defects? I t would be hard to  believe that States 
would accept such a consequence voluntarily. The better view seems to be that  Ar­
ti cles 35 (3) and 55 only cover belligerent S tates, but not third States, regardless of 
whether the latter have b ecome party to the protocol or  not .  
This  leaves the case of  international  areas. It was  seen earlier that  under cur­
rent international  law, environmental damage in these areas i s  only actionable in 
case severe in jury i s  caused to legal rights or interests of States.  In addi tion, whi ls t 
there may be an emerging duty to protect the environment as such, in ternational 
enforcement of  these ob ligations an d  the requis ite legal standing are problem­
atic . 1 93 Consequently, a S tate's ab il i ty to bring a cla im for environmental damage 
arising from mil i tary activit ies in  international areas turns on demonstrating a le­
gal in terest  in  this  environment and an entitlement to that effect. 1 94 
The international  area of most importance to this study i s  the high seas.  How­
ever, p ursuan t to Article 49(3), Section IV of Additional Protocol I applies 
primarily to land warfare; i t  may apply to air and sea warfare if the civil ian popu­
lation, individual c ivi l ians and civ i l i an obj ects on land are  affected. Therefore, 
while Article 3 5 ( 3) applies theoretically unabridged, Article 5 5 ( 1) and (2)  will only 
apply to naval conflicts insofar as  civi l ians or c ivi l ian obj ects are affected. The 
above controversy surrounding the an thropocen tric n a ture of Article 5 5  is there­
fore superfluous for naval conflict . 1 9 5  
Article 5 5  m ay apply to the  destruction of an o i l  tanker and,  a fortiori, of a nu­
clear-powered vessel at sea  prov ided that the  c iv i l ian population on land i s  
affected.  Such consequences are  conceivable when the destruction happens in the 
territorial seas l 96 or  in the Exclusive Economic  Zones of States, but are less l ikely 
further away from the coasts and particularly on the h igh seas .  By contras t, assum­
ing that the purpose of  Art ic le  35(3)  i s  to protect the environment per se, the 
provis ion may be relevan t for the entire marine environment, i rrespective of ben­
efits to mankind .  
However, the high triple standard needs to  be satisfied for both  Articles 35 (3) 
and 5 5 .  Precisely because there are few conventional means and methods of war­
fare which would cause or may be expected to cause en v ironmental damage of the 
severity, duration and spatial d imensions envisaged, the environmental provi­
s ions of Additional Protocol  I are regarded as of  l ittle relevance for naval 
conflict . 1 97 The discussions leading up to the 1 994 San Remo Manual confi rm 
that there is a great deal of uncertain ty regarding the relevance of the env iron­
mental provisions of the new jus in bello for naval warfare. S ign ificantly, the 
provis ion included in the Manual does not employ any of the termi nology of the 
Protocol (or of  ENMOD), but refers to the underlying principles of the law of 
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armed conflict and uses a "due regard" clause borrowed from the peacetime law of 
the sea : 
Methods and means of wa rfare should be em ployed w i t h  due regard for the  na tural 
environ ment taking into account the  relevant rules of i n ternat ional  law. Dam age to 
or destruct ion of  the natural environment not j ust ified by mil i tary necessity and 
carried out wantonly i s  prohib ited. 1 9 8  
Similarly, in the U .S .  N avy's Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations,  "due regard" language has been adopted, but no reference is made to 
either Additional Protocol I or ENMOD. 
· . . the com mander has an affi rmative obligation to avoid unn ecessary d a mage to the 
environment to t he extent that  i t  i s  p racticable to d o  so consi sten t with miss ion 
accomplish ment. To tha t end, and so far as mil i tary requi rements perm i t ,  methods 
or mean s of warfare should be employed with due regard to the protection and 
preservation of the  natural  environment.  Destruct ion of the n atural  en vi ronment 
not necessitated by mission accomplishment and carried our wantonly is  prohibited.  
Therefore, a comma nder should consi der the environmental damage which will  
result from an at tack on a legi t i m ate mil i tary objective as one of the factors duri ng 
targeting anal ys is . 1 9 9 
Finally, a word needs to be said about the environmental provisions of the 1980  
"Inhumane" Weapons Convention.  The preamble of the Convention recalls that 
i t  is prohibited to employ: 
· . .  metho d s  or means of warfare which are i ntended, or  may be expected, to  cause 
widespread, long-term and severe d amage to the natural environment .  
Leaving aside the unsettled status of Article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I ,  it is  
worth observing that the reminder is placed in the preamble of the 1980 Convention 
only. Nonetheless, France attached an express reservation p ursuant to which she re­
gards Article 35(3)  as binding only on States parties to Additional Protocol 1.200 
Furthermore, Article 2 (4) of the th ird protocol of the 1 980 Convention on in­
cendiary weapons,  prohibi ts attacks o n :  
· . .  fo rests an d  other types o f  plant  cover, unless they a re used t o  cover, concea l  o r  
camouflage combatants o r  other m i litary objectives o r  are them selves mil i tary 
objectives. 
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I t should be noted that this protocol covers only weapons pr imarily designed to 
set fire to objects, not those where fire is incidental or consequential .201  More­
over, the exception of military necessity in Article 2(4) seems so encompassing 
that it is doubtful whether the provision affords any serious protection to vegeta­
tion.  The instances in which "forests and other types of plant cover" are not used 
during armed conflict "to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other mil i ­
tary objectives or are themselves military objectives" must be rare. 
For these reasons, the 1 980 Convention does not contribute significantly to the 
protection of the environmen t  in armed conflict. 
2 .2 .6 .  Respon s i b i l ity and Lia b i l ity for Violat ions of E nvironmental Jus in Bello 
Breach of jus in bello obligations may entail State responsibility or individual 
criminal responsibil ity, or both .202 First,  State parties are required to take mea­
sures necessary for the suppression of all violations of the laws and customs of 
war.203 Secondly, State parties are requi red to enact effective penal legislation to 
punish grave breaches, to search for the perpetrators, and to either try or extradite 
them.204 There are also provisions of the Hague Conventions which are expressly 
addressed to State parties, breach of which will engage their responsibil ity.20S 
Even if certain jus in bello provisions are not specifically addressed to States, 
their responsibility might still be engaged. S ince armed forces are to be regarded 
as organs of  a S tate, their conduct will be  attributable to the latter if  they act in  of­
ficial capacity.206 This is simply an application of the general mechan isms of State 
responsibility. Case law has interpreted this principle broadly. States have been 
held responsible for acts which were ultra vires, provided that the soldiers acted at 
least apparently in  capacity. 207 
However, the law of armed conflict may depart from the general principles of 
State responsibil ity in regard to unofficial private acts which a State was not negl i ­
gent in  failing to  prevent. Arguably, the text and the  drafting h istory of Article 3 
of Hague Convention (IV) of 1 907 and of Article 9 1  of Additional Protocol I imply 
that a State may be held l iable for violations by soldiers acting ou tside the scope of 
their official duties.208 Thus, in Eis et al. ( 1 959) the U.S. Foreign Claims Settle­
ment Commission imputed the widespread pillage and destruction of neutral 
property by Imperial Russian soldiers in 1 9 1 5  to the Soviet government .209 
Although there have been several occasions in which States paid compensation 
for damage caused by their armed forces, particularly to third (neutral) States, 
there is  nO indication that the articles in  question have ever been relied on explic­
itly. 2 l 0  State responsibi l i ty has on the whole played a m inor role in the 
enforcement of jus in bello. 
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As for individual criminal responsibility, whil st all v io lations of JUS in bello may 
be characterised as war crimes in the sense of an internationally recognised 
wrong, only certain violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1 949 qu alify as grave 
breach . These are specified grave violations of jus in bello committed wilfully, or at 
leas t intentionally, and against different groups of protected people by each con­
vention.  The perpetra tors of grave breaches must be tried, and any S tate may 
assert universal jurisdiction to do so. The Geneva Conventions require proceed­
ings to be brought both against those who commit  grave breach es and those who 
order their  commission .2 1 1 
Addi tional Protocol I has extended the concept of grave breaches to certain 
acts forming part of the conduct of hosti l i ties,2 1 2  and to wilful omissions,2 1 3 al­
though the latter aspect was probably already customary law.2 1 4 The latter 
protocol introduces also a new concept- "serious violations" of the Geneva Con­
ventions and the Protocol-for which the International Fact-Finding 
Commission may be competent and which should also be made punishable by 
belligerents .2 1 5  
Whilst States have the obligation to prosecute or extradite perpetrators of  
grave breaches, States arguably have the r ight  to assert universal jurisdiction also 
in respect of other, "nongrave" breaches.2 1 6 
Applied to the environmental  jus in bello provisions discussed above, it should 
be noted first that breaches of the customary principles of  the laws of armed con­
flict as well as v iolations of  the Hague Conventions, however serious, wil l  not  
amount to  grave b reaches or  serious violations. Only violations of  the  Geneva 
Conventions or Additional Protocol I can qualify as such.2 1 7  
A s  mentioned above, t h e  Geneva Conven tions contain a n  identically worded 
provision according to which the "extensive" destruction and appropriation of 
property protected under the relevant conventions, not j us tified by mi l itary ne­
cessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly, qualify as a grave breach .2 1 8  
Pursuant t o  Article 85(3 )(b)  a n d  ( c )  o f  Addi tional Protocol I certain w ilful  vio­
lations of  Articles 54 and 56 qualify as grave breaches provi d ed that,  inter alia, 
death or serious in jury of civilians was caused and that there was knowledge that  
this  would be the result .  By contrast, Article 8 5 (4)(d) does not  require such an an­
thropocentric a im for grave breaches committed against certain elements of  
cultural and spiritual heritage which are protected by Article 5 3 .  
Although violations o f  Articles 35 (3 )  and 5 5  may amount t o  war crimes-in the 
sense of a violation of the laws of war2 1 9  -they are not i ncluded in the list of grave 
breaches in Article 85 of the Prowcol .220 This is perceived as a lacuna in the litera­
ture,22 1 and the ILC seeks to remedy this by sugges ting to inclu de into a Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of  Mankind the war crime of: 
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Using methods or means of warfare not  just ified by m i l  itary n ecessity wi th  the 
intent to cause wi despread, long- term a n d  severe d a m age to the n a tural environment 
and thereby to prej udice the health and survival  of the population and [when] such 
damage occurs. 222 
Whilst the ILC characterises i ts proposal as based on Articles 3 5  and 55 of Addi­
tional Protocol I ,  th ere are substantial  differences . Firs t, only crimes commi tted 
"in a sys tematic man ner or on a large scale" will s o  qualify. Second, unlike Arti­
cles 3 5(3) and 5 5,223  the ILC proposal covers only intentional dam age. Third, 
while the threshold of environmen tal damage was taken fro m  Articles 35(3) and 
5 5, the ILC h as couched i ts proposal in even more ope nly anthropocentric terms 
than Article 5 5 ( 1) .  Fourth, the ILC proposal introduces a questi onable defence of 
mil itary necessity.224  In view of the controversies surrounding the existing provi­
sions of Additional  Protocol I, one may well wonder whether the ILC proposal will  
not  add to the confusion i n  this area . 
2 .2. 7 .  Conclus ions on  Jus in Bello 
The traditional  Hague and Gen eva treaty law contains provisions that m ay of­
fer either indirect protection to the environm ent and its components through 
provision s aimed at civilians, or direct protecti on for those environmen tal re­
sources that can be quali fied as real or personal property. Particularly after the 
1 990- 1 9 9 1  Gulf war,  the merit of these provi sions for environmental protection 
purposes has been rediscovered . There is  however, con troversy on thei r value. 
Some a u thors poi n t  out that most of these older jus in bello provi sions were en­
acted in a "pre-ecological"  frame of mind, that they are very anthropocentric in 
scope, protecting primari l y  combatants and civilians or their property, that they 
leave too much discretion to the military comman der and place excessive reliance 
o n  the good faith of the belligerent. 225 Others claim that these old provisions have 
been grossly u nderestimated with respect to their environm ental value. They 
point out that the traditional provisions of the Hague and Geneva law have been 
m ore wi dely accepted than th e new "enviro n m en tal" jus in bello provisions 
adopted si nce the m i d - 1 970s.226 
I n  a d di tion i t  was seen that the provisions of both ENMOD and Additional Pro ­
tocol I were wri tten with the Vietnam legacy in m i n d .  It has b een forcefu l ly 
argued that they no longer correspond to m odem concepts of IEL because of their 
narrow focus on environmental d amage.227 An even more damning judgement 
comes from ecologists.  They argue that failing fu rther legal directives expressed 
in relative terms, they fin d  it  impossible to determine whether environmen tal 
70 
International Environmental Law and Naval War 
damage was caused on the basis of the threshold provisions  of Addi tional Protocol 
1. The reason is  that natural scientists  may be able to measure change in ecological 
processes, but in order to establish whether this  fulfi ls the legal concept of "dam­
age, " baseline data are needed as well as legal directives as to what consti tutes 
excessive change. 228 This may partly explain the disagreement as to whether any 
of the damage caused by the oil  spi l l s  and fires in  the 1 990- 1 99 1  Gulf war techni­
cally crossed the threshold of Addi tional Protocol 1 .229 
Therefore , the protective merits of the new "environmental" jus ill bello, and 
particularly of the provisions which mention the natural environment by name, 
remain debatable. The more significan t l imitations on the causing of environ­
m ental damage in international armed conflict will  still derive primari ly fro m  the 
underlying principles of  the law of armed conflict and from the traditional Hague 
and Geneva law. 
I t i s  now unlikely that the many international efforts aimed at reevaluating the 
environmentaljus in bello after the 1 990- 1 99 1  Gulf Conflict will lead to the negoti­
ation of new treaty provisions dealing with environmental protection during 
armed conflict .  However, the m any studies published since 1 99 1  m ay, in  time, 
lead to a clarification and possibly even further development of the environmen­
ta l  JUS in bello . In addition, i t  has  been forcefully demonstrated that wider 
adherence by States, subsequent national implementation, as well as s trict obser­
vance of the existing body of jus in bello provisions would yield tangible benefits 
for the environment. An example of  improved national implementation is that 
there has been a marked i ncrease in th e  number of  mil i tary manuals and other 
types of publications that i nclude environmental protection provisions . 230 
2.3. Modern Jus ad Be l lum and Environmental Protection 
The modern jus ad bellum consists primarily of the provisions  of the UN Char­
ter. Under the collective security system that came into force with the UN, war 
and the use of force have become, in the words of Kelsen, either a delic t  or a sanc­
tion : a delict, if waged in  violation of the law; a sanction,  i f  carried out in i ts  
defence or  enforcement. 23 1 As i s  clear from the preamble, the drafters of the UN 
Charter were determined "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war ."  To achieve this end,  Article 2(4)  of the Charter replaces the much abused 
term "war" with the more objective threshold of "threat or  use of force : "  
All Members shall  refrain i n  their i n ternational re lations from the threat o r  use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political  independence of any state, or in  any 
manner inconsi sten t with the Purposes of the United Nations.  
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Moreover, exceptions to Article 2(4) are narrowly circumscribed : the right to use 
armed force is bestowed on States individually or collectively, but only when acting 
in self-defence and until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter.2 32 
The Security Council's actions under Ch apter VII  are conditional on the deter­
mination of the existence of three events-th reat to peace, b reach of peace or act 
of aggression-after which it can make either a recommendation or a binding de­
cision pursuant to Article 39.  The measures which the Security Council can 
decide upon accordingly a re "measures not in vol ving the use of force" (Article 4 1 )  
and "action by air, sea, or  land forces" (Article 42) .  Article 4 8  provides that Chap­
ter VII actions shall be taken by all UN members or  by some of them, as 
determined by the Council,  whilst Articles 52  and  53 of the Charter provide that 
regional organisations m ay undertake enforcement actions with Security Council 
authorisation .  
The fundamental nature of the change brought about  by the UN Charter can­
not be  over-emphasised. The ILC has since long suggested that the prohib i tion to 
use armed force in international relations is peremptory (jus cogens),2 3 3  and the ICJ 
is widely regarded as having subscribed to this view in the 1 986 Nicaragua case.2 34 
In addition, the "the outlawing of acts of aggression," was mentioned as a prime 
exam pIe of an obligation erga Milnes by the ICJ in  the 1 970 Barcelona Traction 
case.2 35 The norm expressed in Article 2(4) of the Charter is cons idered binding, 
even by the few States which are not yet members of the main UN organisation, 
most notably Switzerland.2 36 
Furthermore, in  the ILC's draft on State responsib ility, the (aggressive) use of 
armed force in violation of the UN Charter is qualified as an international 
crime,237 which, in contrast to traditional State-to-State wrongs, entails legal con­
sequences not only for the offending and inj ured States, but  for al l  S tates of the 
international community.2 38 
While the ILC's proposal to distinguish between two types of international 
State wrongs-crimes and delicts-has attracted great controversy,239 most scep­
tics acknowledge that  there may be  different categories of violations of primary 
obligations in international law, which should entail different consequences 
based on the seriousness of the international wrong. Furthermore, even the most 
passionate critics appear less reticent to label the use of force by a State in viola­
tion of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as a theoretical or  poten tial State crime.24o 
A third indicator of the importance of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is the 
ILC's Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind; it pro­
poses universal criminal jurisdiction for the individual who commits an act of 
aggression under international law.24 1 
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A fourth indicator is the notion of state complicity in international law. Although 
it has been highlighted only recently,2"2 the prohibition for a State to deliver aid or 
assistance for the commission of an international wrong by another State is regarded 
as customary law.243 The majority of acknowledged cases of State complicity relate to 
the violation of the prohibition to use armed force in international relations, such as 
States permitting the use of their territory for the commission of an act of aggres­
sion,244 or which have political and other dealings with States that have committed 
violations of international law,245 or which provide material aid in the form of money 
or goods to a State enabling the latter to commit aggression.246 
2 .3 . 1 . Li m itat ion of the Resort to Armed Force 
By l imiting resort to armed force in international relations, jus ad bellu m aims 
at  reducing the incidence of armed conflict and consequently environmental 
damage as well .  Logical ly, therefore,jus ad bellum, insofar as i t  is  a imed at  keeping 
or restoring international peace and security, must be seen as an in tegra l  part of 
the international legal protection of the environment. Conversely however, since 
the UN Charter does not ou tlaw al l  ins tances of use of armed force in interna­
tional relations, environmental  destruction will in  some cases be the inevitable 
consequence of lawful use of force under the UN Charter. 
Sti l l, the view that environmental protection is subject to jus ad bellum is  (no 
longer) universally shared. In particular, before the start of Desert S torm, i t  was 
feared in some circles that armed intervention in this oil  rich Gulf region would 
lead to apocalyptic environmental damage.  This prospect was then used to urge 
governments to desist from using any armed force at all, even if it meant that the 
i l legal occupation and annexation of Kuwait would not be  reversed. 247 In addi­
tion ,  the actual environmental legacy of Desert Storm has  convinced some 
scholars that the idea of using armed force, however j ust its cause, should be aban­
doned altogether if such widespread damage to the theatre of  armed conflict 
cannot be avoided.248 What these reactions imply is that States are under an obli­
gation to protect the environment from very serious (or possibly catastrophic) 
damage at al l  cost, even if  this means setting aside provisions of the UN Charter. A 
simi lar but  more restric ted argumen t  was recently m ade before the ICJ in regard to 
the advisory requests  on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons. 249 
However, it is  doubtfu l  whether this view reflects curren t m aj ority th inking. 
Principle 24 of the 1 992 Rio Declaration, agreed one and a half years after Desert 
Storm, declares that "Warfare is  inherently destructive of sustainable develop­
ment. " However, i t  does not set a threshold of environmental damage above 
which use of armed force should be abandoned. Ins tead, States are urged to : 
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. . .  respect interna tional law providing protect ion for the environment in t i mes of 
armed conflict and co- operate i n  its  further deve lopment, as necessary. 
Furthermore, whilst the IC] expressly endorsed Principle 24, it rejected the 
view that environmental ob ligations could override a State's right to use armed 
force in self-defence under international law.2SO 
2 . 3 . 2 .  R u les on the Continuat ion of Armed Force 
There is a strong current of  opinion according to which modem jus ad bellum is 
much more than a branch of the law of peace; it is  said to contain not on ly rules on 
the  lawfulness of the initial use of force, but also on its continuation, thereby regu­
lating the conduct of armed forces.2 S I In this v iew, an initial use of armed force, 
even if in principle lawful, will  continue to remain so only on condition that the 
principles of necessity, reasonableness and proportionality are complied with, in 
addition to any directives issued by the Security Council .2s2  While not univer­
sally accepted,2 S 3  the IC] seemed to have endorsed this view by noting in the 
Nicaragua case that : 
. . .  whether the response to the a tta ck is lawful depends on observance of t h e  c riteria 
of the necessi ty  and the proportionality o f  t h e  measures t aken in se l f-defence.2 S 4  
T h e  ICj's Advisory Opinion on t h e  Legality of Nuclear Weapons h a s  been hailed 
as a further confirmation of this view, not only with regard to the use of armed 
force within the context of self-defense in general,2S S  but also in a specific envi­
ro nmental context. Indeed, the Court held that : 
S t a tes must take environmental  considerations into account when assessi ng what is 
necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military object ives . 2S6  
If  this i nterpretation is correct, the UN Charter may imply that  variable  l im­
its  are set on the region of war. 2 S 7  Under traditional law,  the region of war 
comprised all  areas un der j urisdiction of the belligerents-la nd territory, terri­
torial waters and internal waters and the superj acent air column above these-in 
addition to the h igh seas . 2 S8  Under cu rre nt international law, th e region of war 
h as not only been modified by the various j u ri s dictional zones in troduced by 
the new law of the sea ;2S9  modern jus ad bellum l imits particip ants to  those parts 
where u se of armed force is  both necessary and proponionate.260 As Professor 
Greenwood writes : 
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The t rad i t i o nal  assumption t h a t  the o utbreak of war between two S t a tes necessari ly 
involve d host i l i t ies  between t h e i r  armed forces whe rever they meet,  can no lo nge r b e  
rega rded a s  val i d 26 1 
The 1 994 San Remo Manual con tains three provisions in  which this view is  
adopted for armed conflict at sea, although many ofthese proved controversial .262 
2 .3 . 3 .  Liab i l ity for E nv i ron mental Damage as a Resu lt of Lawfu l  Use of 
Armed Fo rce 
As seen eariier,263 one of the ongoing debates within IEL concerns the fo l low­
ing question : whether causation of (severe) environmental damage is always an 
international wrong in itself or whether environmen tal damage should in some 
cases be considered an unfortunate by-product of a lawfu l  activity for which a sep­
arate regime of liability i s  necessary. The ILC has taken the latter view, having 
since 1 97 8  worked on a regime for the "International Liabi l ity for In jurious Con­
sequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibi ted by International Law. " 
The ILC's model seems well-suited for armed conflict, for it is incontrovertible 
that under the laws of armed conflict environmental damage wil l  be  caused as a re­
sult  of State activities which may be either lawful or  unlawful .  Thus, when a S tate 
resorts to use of armed force in self-defence, keeps its response within the require­
m ents of Article 5 1  of the UN Charter, an d complies wi th all relevant 
requirements of jus in bello, the environmental  damage caused by this act wil l  be a 
by-product of what i s  in essence a lawful  activity: use of armed force in 
self-defence. 
This i s  in line with the ICl 's  advisory opinion on the Legality of Nuclear 
Weapons, where it was held that obligations to protect the environ ment could no t  
deprive a S tate o f  i ts right o f  self-defence under international law.264 Unfortu­
nately, the work of the ILC on State liability for lawful  activities contains an 
exemption based on national securi ty, as well as for armed conflict. 265 
2 . 3 .4 .  L iab i l ity for Envi ronmental  Damage Based o n  Breaches of Jus ad 
Bellum 
Any b reach of international law by a State engages its international respon si­
bil i ty as well as its l iabi l ity, that is ,  the duty to make reparation .266 Since a breach 
of jus ad bellum i s  a b reach of international law, the responsible State's l iability 
should be engaged for any damage caused in consequence. Although interna­
tional claims  on the basis of violation of JUS ad bellum have been rare, there is no 
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doubt about the general principle. 267 Therefore, a State guilty of aggres sion or of 
any other violation of the rules of in tern ation al law on the use of force is boun d to 
m ake reparation for all  losses caused by such violation, including environmental 
dam age.268 O n  the assumption that a breach ofjl ls ad belll lm am ounts to an inter­
na tio nal  crime of State, consistent wi th th e  I LC'S theory of State Responsibili ty, it 
entails legal consequences that  go beyond the mere duty to compensate the victim 
Sta te(s) . 269 
One of the most  n o table ins tances after World War II in which a S tate h as been 
held responsible and liable for breaching jus ad bellum took place after the 
1 990- 1 99 1  Gu l f  war.  Once hostil i ties ceased, the Security Council proceeded with 
the imposition of cease-fire conditions o n  Iraq, pursuant  to  the Security Council 
Resolution 687 ( 1 99 1 )  of 3 April 1 99 1 .  This "cease-fi re resolution" com prises 43 
paragraph s  and subj ects Iraq to a strict regim e of ob ligations,  commands,  con­
trols,  and "reparations ."  Some have l ikened it  to the Versailles Peace Treaty,270 
others to the trusteeship system of the UN Charter.27 1 
The resolution is sign ificant,  for i t  establishes Iraq's l iability for all direct 
losses caused by its breach ofjlls ad bellum, including e nvironmental damage. I n  a 
clause rem i n i scent of the Versai l les "War Gu ilt" Clause, Article 1 6  determines 
I raq's liabil ity u n der i n ternational law following i ts i l legal invasion and occupa­
tion of Kuwai t:  
I raq . . .  i s  l iable, u n der i ntern at ional law, for a ny di rect loss,  damage, i n cl uding 
environ mental da mage and the depletion of natural  resources, or i n j u ry to foreign 
Go vern ments, nationa ls  a n d  corpo rat ions,  as a res ult  of Iraq's unlawfu l  invasion and 
occupation o f  Kuwait .  
I n  addition,  the Resolution establishes a fun d  to pay for the compensation 
clai m s  and a UN Compensation Com m ission (UNCC) charged w i th assessing the 
claim s  and adminis tering t h e  fun d .  
Although th e  m i l itary tribu nals of Worl d War II  already c o nsidered forms of 
war damage w h ich m ay have enviro n m en tal implicat ions,272 Resolution 687 is 
u nique in that environmental dam age is exp ress ly  and prom i n en tly dealt w i th in  
the con text of war reparations . While  some view this  as i n n ovation by customary 
law s uperseding treaty law,273 o th ers regard it  as n o  m o re than an application of 
the general p rinciples of State responsibi l ity and liability.27-1 
The clai m s  fo r environmen tal dam age will  present the UNCC with m an y  tech­
n ical and juridical difficulties . H owever, many of these problems wil l not be 
unlike those encoun tered in non-war related disas ters : ident i ficat ion of the exact 
source of the dam age, establ ishmen t of the causal relationship between cause and 
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effect, assessment of the magnitude o f  the dam age, and quan tification of d amages.  
Since "standing" to bring environmental claims h as been given not  only to gov­
ernments but  also to i n tern ational organisations,  i t  was argued that damage to 
i n ternational areas or to the environment, as such, m igh t be compensated .275 
However, a UNEP working group concluded in 1 996 that clai m s  in relation to in­
ternational  areas were hypothetical since there were n o h i gh seas areas in th e 
Persi an Gulf  and the available evidence did not d isclose measurable damage to in­
ternational areas . 276 
I t  is  important  to n ote also that si nce I raq's l iabi l i ty h as b een based on breach 
of jus ad bellum, m any of the d i stinctions and limi tations inherent in the applica­
tion of p rovisions of  jus in bello to environmen tal dam age will  not be relevant. 2l7 
2 . 3 . 5 .  F i n a l  O b s ervat ions o n  Env i ro n m e nta l I m pl icat ions of Jus ad Bel/urn 
However impressive the above may seem, cases of State l iab il ity fo r i l legal use 
of armed force in intern ational relations remain rare, particularly i f  one looks at 
the incidence of the breaches.  An obvious reason is that  the UN collective security 
system rarely produces authoritative judgements on v i olations of jus ad bellum, 
which m akes the i den ti fication of the  guilty p arty con troversial .  
A further fundamental reason is that the imposition of  d amages for breaches of 
jus ad bellum fo llowing armed confli c t  i s  u sually a one-sided affair.  Most conspicu­
ously, the  exaction of war rep arations after the first and Second World War pl aced 
the vanquished State(s) at the mercy of the v ictor State(s), often in di sregard of vi­
olations of jus ad bellum 278 
A final and no less fun damental reason is  linked with one of the paradoxes of 
the law of armed conflict, namely  the duty to d i scrimi n ate between legal and ille­
gal uses of force under jus ad bellum, coupled with the equality of all  parties before 
jus in bello . In tern ational l aw has thus far failed to reconcile l iabi l i ty for breaches 
of}us ad bellum with l iabil ity for breaches of jus in bello. 279 One school  of though t 
argues that it is counter-p roductive to punish a v io lator of jus ad bellu m for acts 
done pursuant to jus ill bello. 280 A secon d  school holds that an aggressor S tate 
should be held liable for all damage c aused as a consequence of its aggression, 
even if some actions were allowed by jus in bello, and even i f  some of the dam age 
was caused by its adversaries, provided that the latter complied with jus in bello . 28 1 
The third school believes that the aggressor should compensate even damage 
caused by unlawful acts of  the victim State.282  
The work of the UNCC thus far shows that it  applies the second view, with this 
provis o :  it h as thus far not been called upon to examine whether the damage 
caused by Co aliti on mili tary actions complied with the law s of armed conflict.  
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The UNCC relies heavily on the finding that Iraq h as breached )liS ad bellum, and 
that she h as accepted liabi lity pursu ant to the terms of the cease-fire resolution .28 3 
In fu rtherance of exp ress policy clarifications to this effect, the UNCC refuses to 
give Iraq credit for actions which were lawful under jus in bello . This is evident 
from decisions of pri n cip le taken by th e UNCC according to which Iraq i s  liable for 
any loss suffered as a resu lt of "mil itary operations or th reat of m i li tary action by 
either side. , ,284 
These principles were applied i n  the first environmental award, rendered by 
the U�CC on 18 December 1 996. 285  The Well Blowout Control Claim concerned 
damages sough t by Kuwait O i l  Company for the costs incurred in planning and 
execu ti ng the work of exti ngu ish ing the well-head fires that were burning upon 
the with drawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.  A lthough the UNCC expert panel ad­
m itted that part of the dam age for which compensation was sought "may be a 
result  of the all ied bombing, i t  held that the bulk o f  the damage was done by Iraq 
and that the latter was in any event l iable  for damage caused by either side in the 
conflict.286 
2.4. Environmenial lmplications of the Law of Neutrality 
2 . 4 . 1 . Pre-Charter Neutral ity Law 
A. Neutral Duties. U n der the i deal precharter model, States (abo ut to be) in­
volved in armed conflict were expected to issue d eclarations so as to create a state 
of war b etween themselves, wh ereas third States were to issue dec larat ions of neu­
tral i ty. 287 The advantages of the legal concept of the "state of war" w as that it 
m arked the moment at which the nati onal  an d  internati onal rules applicable dur­
ing p eace were rep laced by those applicable duri ng war.288 
The exi sten ce of a state of war did n ot  have any co n s equences for the l ega l 
relationships  among n o n -p articip at ing States, for these remai n e d  governed by 
the law of peace.  I t had con sequ e n ces, how ever, for the  legal relati onshi ps be­
tween neu tral  S t ates a n d  b e l l igere n t  S tates.  A lthough i n  principle governed b y  
t h e  l a w  o f  peace , t h e y  became s u b j ect t o  t h e  requ i rements o f  the  l a w  o f  n e u tral ­
ity.  Neutral S tates were req u i red to comply w i th a s eries of c lass i c  neu tral 
duties: 2 8 9  
T h e  d u ty  of non-i nvolvement, non-interference or abstentio n :  Trade by neu­
trals with belligeren ts is permitted b ut spec ial rules apply to the supp ly of war 
m aterial . Over land, neutral governments n eed to abstain from supplying war ma­
terial to belligerents; over sea,  neutral governments are expected to prevent all 
pub lic and private trade in war materi als with belligerents; 
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The duty of prevention : A neutral Power is obligated to use all means at i t s  dis­
posal to prevent violations  by belligerents of i ts  neutrality.  This encompasses a 
duty to prevent the violation of i ts  terri torial integri ty by belligerents, to prevent 
the use of its terri tory, waters or  airspace by either belligerent, and the prevention 
of the commission of acts of hostility within i ts j urisdiction.  It also i mp lies that a 
neutral Power has the duty to use force, as necessary, to prevent or punish such vi­
olations  of neu tral i ty;  
The du ty of i mpartiality and non -discrimina tion : Any condi tions, restrictions 
or prohibi tions issued by a neutral Power, for  instance in regard to admission in to 
i ts ports, need to be applied in a non-discriminatory manner to a ll belligerents. 
B. Protection to Neutrals offered by Pre-Charter Law. Provided that third 
States complied wi th their neu tral duties, bel ligerent S tates were to respect their 
choice not to become a participan t.  I t  was only in certain well-defined respects 
that neutral S ta tes had to tolerate certain consequences of the exis tence of armed 
conflict between belligerent S tates. The former had to prove that  they complied 
with neutral duties, which mean t that they had to subject themselves to constan t 
moni toring. They might also be requested to adjust their trade relations with cer­
tain belligerents to comply with their duties in respect of war material . 290 
The advan tage of this regime for neutral S tates was obvious. They were enti­
tled to remain outside the conflict and  to maintain economic relation s with 
belligerents sub ject to adjus tments and measures of con trol, particularly at sea. 291 
Neutrality law was a means of l imi ting the scope of in ternational conflicts by de­
claring neutral States'  terri tory, waters and airspace, in  principle, off- limi ts to 
belligeren ts .  
What  the environmental i mplica tions of the regime of neutrality might be  will  
now be exami ned in more detail .  The law of neutral i ty was a flexible regime; i ts 
implications for neutral and belligeren t Sta tes depended on the particular cir­
cumstances. Only part of the customary law of neutrali ty has been codified in 
formal instruments .292 Amongst these, the 1 907 Hague Convention (V) on the 
Righ ts and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land i s  re­
garded as reflecting customary international law. Article 1 provides that :  
"The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable ."  
The convention does not define the term "inviolable. " The conference records 
indicate that the provision was added to stress that neu tra l  States do not only have 
the many du ties l isted in the convention, but that these flow from inhibitions of a 
general character that apply i n  the first place to belligerents.  Article 1 was seen as 
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introducing the acts from which bel ligerents must abstain .293 However, its exact 
scope is not clear, and two interpretations are possible.  The narrow one views Ar­
ticle 1 as the counterpart of the many du ties incumbent  on neutra l  States, which 
relate primarily to proving, enforcing, and defending their neutrality and impar­
tiali ty. The second one is m ore expansive, and confers on neut ral terri tory 
immunity from interference by bel1igerents . 29� 
The 1 907 Hague Convention (XIII)  concerning the Rights and D uties of Neu­
tral Powers i n  Naval War does not  contain a provision comparable to Article 1 of 
Hague Convention (V), but i t  has two provisions on belligerent duties in  th e terri­
torial waters of neutral states. Article 1 of Hague Convention (XIII)  obl igates 
belligerents : 
. . .  to res pect the sovereign righ ts  of neutral  Powers, and to abstain in neutra l 
terri tory or neutral waters, fro m  any act which woul d, if knowi ngly perm i tted by any 
Power, constitute a vi o l a t i o n  of neutra l i ty. 
Article 2 stipulates that :  
. . .  a n y  a c t  o f  host i l i ty, including capture a n d  the exercise of t h e  righ t of searc h, 
committed by bell igeren t warships i n  the terri torial  waters of a neut ral P ower, 
constitu tes a violat ion of neutral i ty  and is  st rictly forb i d den. 
The conference records indicate that both articles were inserted to stress the 
general d uty of bell igerents to respect the sovereignty of neutral States, indicating 
that  the princip le was the same as Article 1 of the  Hague Convention (V) for land 
warfare. 295 Particularly enlightening are the following passages from the report to 
the Third Commission on the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war : 
The s ta rt i ng- point of the regulat ions ought to be the sovereignty ofthe neutral State, 
which cannot be affected by the mere fa ct t h at a war exists i n  which i t  does not 
intend to participate.  I ts  sovereignty shou l d  be respected by the bell ige rents, who 
can not i mplicate i t  in  the wa r or molest it with acts of host i l i t y. A t  the same time 
neutrals cannot exerc ise their l iberty as i n  t i me of peace; they ought not to ignore the 
existence of wa r .296 
and:  
T h e  principle w h i c h  it is  proper t o  affirm at the outset is the obl igation i n cumbent 
upon belligeren ts to respect the sov ereign righ t s  of neutral States. This obligat ion is 
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not  a consequence of the war any more than the  right of the  S ta te to i nvio lab i l i ty of 
i ts  territory i s  a consequence of i ts  neutral i ty. The obl igat ion and the right a re 
inherent in the very exis tence of States . . . . 297 
When read together, the clarifications provided by the travaux of both Hague 
conventions strongly suggest that the art icles in question were a reference to the 
general principles of State sovereignty and the duty of bel l igerents to respect these 
whilst engaged in warfare. 
There is no comparable formal i nstrument for Aerial Warfare, although in 
1 923 ,  a commission of jurists drafted the i nfluential Hague Rules of  Air  War­
fare.298 Article 39 of these rules provides : 
Bell igerent a ircraft are bound to respec t the righ ts of neutral powers and to abstain 
within the jurisdic t ion of a neutral state from the commiss ion of any act which i t  is 
the duty o f  tha t  state to prevent .  
Article 40 stipulates that :  
The airspace of a neutra l s tate is  i nviolable. 
Again, these provisions emb race both el ements :  a duty for bel ligerents to re­
spect the sovereign rights of neutral States and the narrower issue of  impartiality .  
There are many examples of State practice rel ated to incidents during World 
War I and II, in which belligerents paid compensat ion for unlawful entry of neu­
tral territory and destruction of neutral property. The 1 93 8  Nau lilaa case is one of 
the rare j udicial cases to deal with unlawfu l  acts of warfare committed by  a bellig­
erent (Germany) on neutral (Portuguese) territory.299 Most neutral States' claims 
were settled only  after protracted negotiations, ending either in diplomatic settle­
ments, in formal treaties or the set-up of mixed tribunals. Thus, the USSR paid the 
Swedish government 40,000 Swedish kroner because of an aer ial attack upon 
Pajala during the First Finnish War. 300 In  1 949 the Uni ted States and Portugal 
reached an overall financial settlement for four  incidents in  which the former 
bombed the Portuguese territory of Macao. 30 l 
The overwhelming majority of documen ted cases concern Switzerl and, which 
was a neutral in  both world wars and suffered from countless incursions by 
belligeren ts ,  not all apparently in error .  302 The most serious of these incidents 
concerned a ful l  scale raid by the U.S .  Army on the Swiss territory of Shaffhausen 
on April 1, 1 944, as a result of which 37 persons were killed and SO  gravely in jured.  
The settlement of Swiss claims for compensation took several years . 303 
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Three incidents merit special atrention because of their poten tial environmen­
tal relevan ce. 
In  1948 the Vatican p resen ted the United States with clai m s  totalling $ 1 . 5 mil­
lion fo r dam age don e  to p roperty of the Vatican City, the n eutrality of which the 
Allies had agreed to respect.  The setrlem ent of the claims took several years and 
was finalised in 1956 .  The claim related to dam age done to the papal res idence of 
Castelgan dolfo, which lies outsi de Vatican City south of Rome. I t  appears that the 
property had been dam aged b y  ai r rai ds on legitim ate targets i n  close proxim i ty 
thereto. This example of State practice is remarkable for two reasons:  firstly, com­
pensation was paid by a former belli gerent fo r transfrontier collateral dam age 
caused to n eutral property; secon dly, the dam age was caused by l aw ful m i l i tary 
activities on enemy belligerent terri tory bordering or surroun ding neutral 
territory. 
A comparab le ex ample are the cases known as "Fernschaden,"  for which Swit­
zerland tried to obtain compen sation .  During World War II, there were several 
i nstances in which Swiss border towns suffered destruction through shockwaves 
caused by bombing cam paigns on belligerent territory. 3D4 
A further example with obvious environmental relevance were the conse­
quences for Swi tzerland of the destruction of the Kembs Waterworks on October 
7, 1944, by the Royal Air Force. In the 24 hours following the b usting of this Ger­
man dam, the banked h eadwaters of the Rhine had dropped so much that 
riverboats i n  the Sw i ss harbour of Basle were dam aged and grounded in the 
mud. 3D S 
What the above cases of State practice show i s  that b elligerent S tates have in 
the past acknowledged liability for damage to neutral States caused by l awful acts 
of war executed in  the terri tory of enemy belligeren t States. Whereas cases of 
transborder war dam age caused, e.g., by Germany to Swi tzerland, might h ave 
been solved on the basis of the principle of good neighbourliness between States, 
it was clear th a t  this principle was hardly applicable in cases of air raids by the 
Unite d  States and UK on German terri tory. 
After World War I the Swiss Federal authori t ies exam ined the pri nciples un­
derlying their c laims for war damage caused by belligerents.  In a written opinion, 
Burckhardt confirmed that they were not based on any special privileges Switzer­
land would be entitled to because of h er perpetually neutral s tatus, and that they 
were no more than the exercise of rights to which any State is  entitled. 306 
C. Intro duction to Contemporary Environmental Significance.  The con ­
temporary relevance of the pri nciple of neutrality for environmental purposes is, 
as will b e  seen further, a matter of debate. 307 The followin g  observat ions seem, 
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nevertheless, i n  order. The law (or principle) of neutrality is sometimes said to of­
fer immunity to the terri tory and the environment of neutral States and, by 
analogy, to international areas . 308 Such arguments were also advanced before the 
leI by States opposing the legality of nuclear weapons.  309 
These arguments, however, suffer from three difficulties .  First, the traditional 
law of neutrality did not offer genuine immunity to neutral States from acts of 
warfare. The analysis conducted above3 1 O  shows that the basis for the protection 
of neutral S tates in  armed conflict was the duty of belligerents to respect other 
States' sovereignty (and terri torial in tegrity). Respect for other States' sover­
eignty is a dynamic concept in international law : it may have a different content 
today compared with 1 907. I t  i s  not so  m uch a duty especially developed for 
armed conflict, but  the expression of a general principle, applicable i n  peace and 
III war. 
In this sense, armed conflict  i s  but one example of a situation in which S tates 
are obligated to respect the sovereignty of third States. I t  m ay be that one is bound 
to find fewer peacetime cases in which S tate A causes damage to State B through 
activities executed in State C. Even so, un der general (peacetime) environmental 
law, these cases do not present any special problems  of principle : mi l i tary activi ­
t ies  conducted by State A outside i ts juri sdiction are to be considered as being 
under S tates A's con trol and are therefore covered by Principle 2 l .  
The second difficulty relates t o  international areas. The pro tectio n  offered to 
neutral States under the traditional law of neutrality did not deal with environ­
mental  damage as such cau sed in in ternational areas. The obvious reason is that 
the high seas-the on ly in ternational area of historic relevance-formed part of 
the legitimate region of war by reason of customary law. The interface between 
the modern law of the sea and the law of armed conflict will be  further addressed 
below. 3 1 1 Yet, i t  seems prima facie ques tionable to apply the pre-ecological princi­
ple of neutral i ty, whatever its  conten ts, by analogy to modern day in ternational 
areas . 
The th ird difficulty relates to the incompatibility of neutrality with certain ob­
ligations arising from the UN Charter, which will now be d iscussed. 
2 .4 . 2 .  Post-Cha rte r  Neutra l i ty Law 
A. Influence of the UN Charter and Decline of the State of War. Under cur­
rent in ternational law, the legal relationship between belligerent S tates and third 
States is  highly unsettled . There are two interrelated factors that led to this state 
of affairs : the influence of the UN Charter on the law of neu trality and the decline 
of the legal concept of the state of war in international relations.  
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The law of neutrality was deve loped in an era when resort to armed force was 
not in itself illegal, i.e., when war was regarded as a mere duel between Sta tes to be 
treated in the same chivalrous and d istant manner with which the matter was 
once viewed by domestic law . 3 1 2  However, under the collective security systems 
that were developed during this century, inter-State use of armed force i s  no  lon­
ger a "neutral" activity : i t  i s  either legal or illegal .  Provided that the Charter's 
co llective security system works, no  State should be left in  doubt about the lawful­
ness of the position of each participant to the conflict .  Positions  of neutrality in 
the face of unlawful uses o f force in  international relations are logically and ideo­
logically incompatible w ith the Charter. 3 1 3  
However, the Charter does not contain guidelines for when the collective secu­
ri ty machinery i s  not operative or when it i s  blocked. During the 1980-1988 
I ran-Iraq War, the Security Council refrained from expressly i dentifying the in i ­
t ial  aggressor and was  only able  to adopt a binding decision on the conflict as a 
whole, seven years into the war. 3 1 4  This  contras ts sharply with the alacrity dis­
played by the Council i n  August 1990 : a few hours after I raq invaded Kuwait,  the 
Council passed a resolution condemning the invasion and demanding an imme­
diate withdrawal. 3 1 S 
Assuming that the Securi ty Council does not  perform its  role of arb i ter, that 
the General Assemb ly does not  step in  and that leI  is not  seized of the m atter ei ­
ther, there will  be no binding or authori tative deci sion on the rights or wrongs of 
the use of force. As a result, States not involved in  the conflict are left to  their own 
devices ; in these circumstances, it i s  commonly argued that the tradi tional body 
of neutrality law resumes importance. 
A t the same time, the s ignificance of the state of war in  international relations 
has declined. The decline is  due partly to the outlawing of war by the UN Charter, 
although examinations of pre-Charter S tate practice have shown that non-war 
hosti li ties were quite common .3 1 6 
Sti ll, i t  has been demonstrated that a state of war i s  relevant  in  contemporary 
law and S tate practice . 3 1 7 Many States continue to regard the creation of a legal 
state of war as a possibi l i ty .  In addition, when a State currently decides to treat a 
particular conflict as "war," whether involving use of armed force or not, i t  im­
pli es hosti le intent, or extensive war aims-the "animus belligerandi "-and may 
now be qualified as a threat to use force i n  the sense of Article 2(4) of the UN Char­
ter. This may influence the body of non-hostile relations between belligerents 
and  may entail  consequences for relat ions between belligerents and th ird 
States.  318 A state of war, as will be seen i n  the next chapter, has further consider­
able implications for constitutional and municipal law and i s  usually taken as a 
firm directive to municipal courts of the countries involved in the conflict . 3 1 9 
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Some writers claim that whereas a legal state of war was once required to bring 
the law of neutrality into operation, today, the existence of armed conflict is  suffi­
cient. 320 But this is not  borne out by State practice. In the absence of general 
recogni tion that a certain conflict amounts to war, third S tates cannot be forced to 
accept positions of neutrali ty. This means that neutrality is invoked primarily in 
conflicts with a certain intensity. 32 1 However, State practice indicates also that 
overt declarations of neutrality by third States are rare and that there is much un­
certainty about the validity of any appeal to or application of neutrality law by 
non-participating States. 322 
This m ay be illustrated by the attitudes of th ird States in the 1980- 1 9 8 8  
I ran- Iraq a n d  the 1 990- 1 99 1  Gulf conflicts . 
The first is often cited as a paradigm of a classic inter- State armed conflict dur­
ing which the UN Charter system failed, as a result of which traditional neutrali ty 
law was revived . However, on closer examination ,  this conflict shows that third 
States have felt  free to select a panoply of positions varying from :  (a) strict tradi­
tional neutrality; (b) a position variously termed "qualified" neu trality, 
"benevo1en t" neutrality or "non-belligerency," in which third S tates side with 
one of the parties to the conflict, discriminating against  the S tate considered to be 
the aggressor, but without physically participating in the hostilities; or (c)  a new 
form of impartiality and nondiscrimination between belligerents, whereby no 
formal posit ion is ad opted and assistance is delivered to all sides. 323 
Most surprising of all examples is the picture of third S tates' attitudes during 
the 1 990- 1 9 9 1  Gulf war. In  spite of the clear iden tification of the aggressor by the 
Security Council, Iran and India officially proclaimed their neu trali ty. 324 In addi­
tion, two UN Member States (Israel and J ordan) became more or less actively 
involved as non-belligerents on opposite s ides of the conflict,325 whilst two per­
manen tly neu tral States (Austria and Switzerland) dropped their traditional 
stance of neutrality. 326 
B. Current S ignificance of Neutrality Law. Depend ing on the frequency with 
which the UN collective security system will work in  the future, the law of neu­
trality may or may not  retain some of its earlier importance. It is beyond doubt, 
however, that the Hague law on neutrality is in serious need of update and that 
such a res tatement will have to reflect the more marginal  position which neutral­
ity occupies in  contemporary international law. 
Neutrality s till has a p lace under the Charter, but subject to the provisions of 
contemporary international law. Unlike the putative ban on aggression contained 
in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the ban on the use of force in interna­
tional relations is no longer inseparably linked to the effectiveness of the Security 
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Council. 327 This follows clearly from the celebrated s tatement by the leI in its 
very first judgement, the Corfu Channel case: 
The Court can on l y  regard the al leged right of i n tervention as  the manifestat ion of a 
policy of fo rce, such as has, in t he past, g iven rise to most serious abuses and such as 
cannot, whatever be the present defects in in/emational organiza tion, find a place in 
in tern a tional  law . . . . 328 ( i ta l ics added) 
The principle that the non-use of force is not dependent  on the functioning of 
the collective security system was confirmed by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. 329 
This  means that whilst a third S tate may assume the status of a neutral, she 
may be obligated to participate to varying degrees in economic and military en­
forcement measures based, e.g., on Articles 25, 4 1 ,  42,  43,  48 and 1 03 of the UN 
Charter expressed in a binding resolution of the Security Council under Chapter 
VII .  The latter will override many duties of traditional neutrality law. When the 
Security Council has identified one or more parties to a conflict as responsible for 
unlawful  resort to force, third States are obligated to discriminate between 
belligeren ts. They are forbidden from assisting the aggressor, but may lend assis­
tance to the victim S tate. When the Security Council has taken preventive and 
enforcement action under Chapter VII of  the Charter, third States may not rely on 
neutrality law to justify conduct incompatible with their duties as UN Members 
under, e .g. ,  Articles 25  and 1 03 of the Charter. 330 
C. Environmental Implications. To examine the relevance of the contempo­
rary principle or law of neutral i ty for the protection of the environment during 
armed conflict, several hypotheses need to be discussed.  In  the examples below, 
environmental damage is caused to a " third State," modelled on the Iranian posi­
tion during the 1990-1991  Gulf conflic t :  a UN Member S tate desirous of 
remaining outside the conflict. 
In case A,  the damage results from lawful military operations by a victim State 
exercising its right to self-defence; in case B, from unlawful military operations 
by the initial victim State; in case C, damage is caused by an iden tified aggressor 
State; in case D, by participants in an armed conflict in which the UN fails to 
identify the aggressor State. 
The first h ypothesis may have occurred in the 1 990- 1 99 1 Gulf war. As UN 
Members, both Iran and Jordan, were obligated to accept  and execute decisions 
taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII, which included the 
authorisation given to Coalition S tates to use armed force against Iraq. Therefore, 
neither Iran nor Jordan could claim complete freedom from the effects of 
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Coalition military action s  to the same extent as they would be entitled under the 
traditional law of neutrality. An Iranian complaint about Coalition intrusions 
and environmental damage caused by Coalit ion States could not  succeed on the 
basis of the traditional law of neutrality. 
Although firm legal ground is lacking, i t  could be argued that as UN Members, 
both countries could be expected to tolerate environmental damage caused on 
their territory by lawful  actions of Coalition members. It was argued above that 
under present international law, environmental damage may occur as a by-prod­
uct of lawful  military ac tivities, i .e. , use of force that remains within the ambit of 
both the modern jus ad bellum and jus in bello .3 3 1  
Even if " third" States as I ran and Jordan could not claim compensation on the  
basis of traditional neutrality 12w, there might be other paths  that  could be pur­
sued. Following the imposition of economic sanctions  actions against Iraq and 
occupied Kuwait,332 the Security Council established a sanctions committee. 
This was entrusted inter alia with examining, pursuant to Article 50 of the UN 
Charter, requests from States that claimed to experience severe economic difficul­
ties as a result of the embargo. In a parallel move, the U . S .  administration 
established the "Brady" Committee, which provided compensation to the most 
affected States. 333 Although there is under present international  law no fi rm legal 
basis, one could envisage a similar show of solidarity vis-a.-vis States affected by 
mili tary operations authorised by the Security Council .  
A second avenue is  the compensation scheme which the UN currently operates 
for peace-keeping operations . 3 34 Arguably, damage caused to neighbouring coun­
tries by lawful enforcement operations sanctioned by the Security Counci l should 
merit equal attention. 
A third possibility is  that  UN Members who engage in UN-sanctioned opera­
tions, and thereby cause environmental damage to third S tates, agree to 
compensate the latter but recover ultimately from the aggressor State(s). 335  This 
possibility will be  examined further below. 
Case B deals with environmental damage caused as a result of a violation of the 
laws of armed conflict-jus ad bellum or jus in bello-by the victim State and/or 
States that come to its rescue. Under the modem collective security system of the 
UN, the solution of case B is bound to be difficult, s ince i t  may involve contro­
versy over the ultimate responsibility for enforcement actions that, although 
authorised by the Security Council ,  are legally not conducted by the UN i tself. 
Nevertheless, a case can be made that the legality of the act causing damage 
should be immaterial for questions of compensation related to any UN au thorised 
"peace" operation . Arguably, the UN compensation scheme for peace-keeping op­
erations should be  extended to include environmental damage caused to " third" 
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States du ring all UN-sanction e d  p eace-enforcement operation s .  The question of 
wh ether the UN can recover any mon eys paid out from the p eace-enforcing 
State(s) that  transgressed the law,  should not be  of concern to the "third" State  
that suffered the environmental damage. 
However, there is an alternative to the solution of both hypotheses A and B .  
A rgu ably, all  d amage caused t o  t h e  territory o f  "third" States results from a 
b reach of jus ad bellum by the aggressor  State an d shoul d h ence b e  compen sated 
by the latter .  This altern ative will b e  dealt with together with the n ext  
hypoth esis .  
The t h i r d  hypothesis covers damage caused t o  a "th ird" State by an aggressor 
State. The fo rm er is in principle entitled to compensation for all damage caused as 
a consequence of thejus ad bellum b reach by the aggressor State. In this respect the 
legal relationship between the third State and the unlawfu l  aggressor State resem­
bles the principles on which compensation was payab le u n der the traditional law 
of neutrality. This principle has been expressed in Article 16 of Resolution 678 
( 1 991), discussed above. 336 
Howeve r, it was seen above that the UNCC has adopted a wide interp retation of 
this provision . As a consequen ce, Iraq is liable not on ly for damage caused by 
I raqi m i l itary operations that violated jus in bello, but also for those in compliance 
with jus in bello, and in add ition fo r damage caused as a consequence of Coalition 
military operation s .  It was seen too that according to a more extreme view, Iraq 
could b e  held lia ble  fo r damage caused by Coalition actions in violation of the 
laws of armed conflict.337 Howeve r, the latter view is open to challenge on two 
grounds:  arguably, an illega l  act by the Coalition would break the chain of causa­
tion between the unlawfu l  Iraqi invasion and the subsequent damage; moreover, 
it  woul d  conflict with the principle of ex injuria jus non oritur. 
In fact, the UNCC has n ot excluded Iranian claims despite the government's as­
s e rtion of neu trality in the 1 990- 1 99 1  Gu lf con flict.  From th e point of view of 
I ran ian citizens, this so lution has to be applauded.  There is no reason why any en­
viro n m ental d amage caused to Iran as a d irect resu lt of the conflict, should not be 
considered by the UNCC as well.  
H ypothesis D concerns cases that occur more frequently, but b ecause of the 
u n certain ty surrounding the legiti macy of posit ions of n eutral ity under the UN 
Charter, the solution is very unclear. Theoretically o n e  could argue with, e .g. , 
Switzerland,338 that all  States of th e intern ational commun ity are un der a duty to 
comply with the implication s of the prohib ition of the use of force under the UN 
C harter. Each State would hence b e  u n der an in depen den t  duty to iden tify the ag­
gressor State, to refuse co-operation with the latter, and to discrim inate in favou r 
of the victim State. 
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Such duties would b e  incumbent on all States of the world community because 
of the jus cogens character of jus ad bellum,  the legal force of which does not  depend 
on the effectiveness of the Security Council .  However, the State practice discussed 
above shows that in  the absence of firm directions from the Security Council,  
thi�d States feel free to adopt a panoply of attitudes to b el ligerents .  Space does not 
permit to go into detai l  about possible consequences which these varied attitudes 
may entail  for environmental protection.  
2.4.3 .  Conc lus ions  on Neutral ity Law 
The present state of the law of neutrality is unsettled. Whilst  there is no doubt  
about i ts  continued importance, the  determin ation of i ts  exact contents presents 
many legal and conceptual difficulties .  The above analysis has shown that i t  does 
not  offer a universally reliable nor comprehensive legal foundation for the protec­
tion of the environment in armed conflict. Support for this contention may be 
foun d in the 1 996 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons in which the Ie] admitted 
the existence of the "principle of neutrality" and called i t  of fundamental charac­
ter. However, the Court strongly suggested that its content was controversial  and 
that i t  was sub ject to the relevant provisions of the UN Charter. 339 
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The Operation of General International Environmental 
La w during International Armed Conflict 
THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THIS CH APTER IS to examine whether In ternational En­vironmental Law (IEL) continues to operate during international armed 
conflict, and if so, to what extent .  The author will  analyse the main legal princ i­
p les involved and propose a methodology to determine the legal effect of 
multila teral environmental agreements during international armed conflict .  
This chapter is  divided into five sections .  The first sec tion discusses instances 
of recent S ta te practice, ending with S tate submissions before the ICJ in connec­
tion with the advisory requests on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons . Section two 
deals with the rela tionship between general (peacetime) interna tional law and the 
laws of armed conflict .  Section three ana lyzes the relationship between Principle 
2 1  of the S.tockholm Declara tion and armed conflict .  Section four deals wi th the 
relationship between mult i lateral environmental agreements and a rmed conflict .  
Section five contains the conclusions to this chap ter and in troduces the case stud­
ies to be conducted in the second part of this s tudy. 
3. 1 .  State Practic e Regarding IEL in Armed Conflict 
Since IEL is a relatively young discipline, questions related to i ts applicabil i ty 
during in ternational armed conflict have arisen only rarely. Th is section wil l  ex­
amine the principal ins tances of S ta te practice in this regard. 
3 . 1 . 1 . The Tanker  War and the Law of the Sea.  
In  mid-Sep tember 1980, Iraqi forces seized a dispu ted area from Iran,  escalat­
ing a centuries-old dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab . l Durin g the ensuing eight 
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years of war, third S tate shipping and, in particular, oil  tankers , fell vict im to at­
tacks from both b elligerents in a campaign allegedly started in earnest by  I raq in 
1 984. 2 In what came to be  called the Tanker War, merchant sh ips  suspected of 
sustaining the enemy's war effort were attacked in and outside war zones pro­
claimed by  both parties, very often without prior warning.  3 Iran an d Iraq also laid 
naval mines that were set adrift or  came loose from their moorings, damaging 
third State ships.4 1 t  i s  es timated that I ran and Iraq attacked more than 400 mer­
chant ships, 31 of which sank and 50 of which were declared total losses . 
The Security Council passed four resolutions condemn ing the attacks on third 
S tate ships. S It i s  reasonable to assume that much environmental damage was 
caused as a result of these attacks, but this aspect did not receive  any media atten­
tion, and there are no scientific  or  legal assessments available. 6 
The Tanker War took place shortly after the conclusion of the 1 982  UNCLOS 
convention. As seen earlier, UNCLOS i s  one of the most comprehens ive environ­
mental treaties concluded thus far? I t  lays down the obligation of all States "to 
protect and preserve the marine environment" (Article 1 92), confirms Principle 
2 1  of the Stockholm Declaration (Article 194 (2)) ,  and enacts a framework envis­
aging all types of pollution of the marine environment, whatever the cause:  
vessel-source, land-based sources, dumping, exploitation of the seabed, and air 
pollution (Part XII) .  
To what extent the environmental obligations of belligerents, as recorded and 
developed in 1 982 UNCLOS, continued to operate during the Iran-Iraq conflict i s  a 
complex question.  The first hurdle is that since the convention was not yet in force, 
the customary s tatus of many of its provisions was hotly debated in the beginning of 
the 1 980s. Iran for instance, formally stated that it regarded the righ ts concerning 
transi t  passage and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as "contractual" in nature 
and therefore not available to non-parties such as the United States and the UK.8 
The second problem is that during the UNCLOS negotiations, S tate delegates 
had honoured a long tradition of reticence about discussing mili tary uses of the 
seas .9 As a result, the term "mil itary activities " appears only once in the Conven­
tion, in the provision list ing the optional exceptions from the compulsory third 
party dispute settlement system . 1 0  But this does not mean that the Convention 
does not regulate mil i tary activities at all .  On the contrary, some authors contend 
that what motivated major military powers throughout the negotiations was pre­
cisely their concern to preserve the freedom to conduct mili tary activities . l l  To 
what extent this goal was achieved remains a matter of controversy and requires 
detailed assessment, article b y article. 
The uncertainty surrounding the regulation of military activities under the 
convention applies, a jortlOTl, to questions of armed conflict .  It is  noteworthy that  
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the ILC had stressed in regard to i ts  first draft on the law of the sea-which ulti­
m ately led to the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions-th at i t  was only concerned 
with "the law of peace . ,, 1 2 Many au thors believe that, like i ts  predecessor treaties, 
1 982  UNC LOS was drafted mainly for peacetime .  1 3 But this presumption does not 
resolve the difficul ties, for the Convention contains no provisions on its  con tinua­
t ion, modification or abrogation in time of war or  armed conflict .  
The tactical  si lence of the final treaty text on mil i tary uses of the seas in  peace 
and war has made it a document that can be invoked to support opposing theories. 
One example is the clause that seems to form a leitmotiv of the new law of the sea : 
in a few well-known provisions, the Convention rules that the high seas, the EEZ 
and the Area-th at is, the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the 
limits of national j urisdiction-are reserved for peaceful purposes or uses. 1 4 
These clauses gave birth to two diametrically opposed positions : one asserting an 
outright prohibition of mili tary activit ies (at least in  the Area) and the other 
claiming that the "peaceful  purposes/uses" clause merely forbids actions i n  viola­
tion of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The latter position, which undoubtedly 
coincides more with the opinio juris and State practice, has since gained the upper 
hand. I S  
Third S tates were divided o n  the many legal issues that arose during the 
1 980-88 Iran-Iraq conflict, including on the relationships between bell igerents 
and S tates not directly involved in  the conflict .  Significantly though, the exercise 
of traditional belligerent rights was tolerated to a certain exten t.  Thus, Iran re­
sorted to measures of economic warfare and several States accepted that she could 
exercise the right to visit  and search third State merchant shipping. 1 6  
Although paralysed by cold-war rivalry, the Security Council m an aged to pass 
several resolutions on the conflict. In some of these, the Council stressed the im­
portance of freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the protection of oi l  supplies 
from the region . In the light of what has been said above on the uncertain rela­
tionship between the law of the sea and mil itary uses, i t  is noteworthy that the 
Council often i nvoked the law of the sea and even appeared to suggest that free­
dom of n avigation needed to prevail over belligerent activitiesP 
3 . 1 . 2 .  The 1 983 N owruz Oi l  Sp i l l ,  the 1 978 Kuwait Reg iona l  C onvent ion  and 
1 982 UNCLOS 
In 1 983, a major incident would draw the world's attention to another aspect of 
the conflict :  its devastating impact on the environment .  Late February or  early 
March 1983, Iraqi bombers hit an  already leaking Iranian offshore oil installation 
in the Nowruz field, about 60 km from the Kharg I sland oil port, destroying an 
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unspecified number oflranian oil tankers and oil installations as well as s ix other 
wells nearby. 1 8  The fire raged for weeks, and when the well b lew out, 7,000 to 
1 0,000 barrels a day leaked into the Gulf. The spill has been ranked among the 
three largest recorded in human history. 1 9  It  threatened Bahraini, Qatari and 
Saudi desalination p lants, and affected other areas beyond bell igerent j urisdic­
tion. For instance, fish imports into the UAE were stopped because of oil 
contamination of fishing grounds .  
The Nowruz oil spi l l  became a turning point in the history of legal thinking 
about "war" and the environment.  Firstly, i t  is one of the few instances of docu­
mented State practice with respect to the effect of an ongoing inter-State armed 
conflict on the continued application of an international en vi ron mental treaty. 
The treaty at issue was the 1978  Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on 
the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution (hereinafter Kuwait 
Regional Convention), to which both belligerents and m any of the affected coun­
tries in  the region were party.20 It  contains a provision, Article IX (a) on 
"pollution emergencies," which obligates all Parties to take individually and/or 
jointly:  
. . .  all necessa ry measures . . .  to deal with pollution emergencies in the Sea Area, 
whatever the cause of such emergencies, and to reduce or eliminate damage resulting 
therefrom. ( Italics added. )  
Whether th i s  and other provisions of the  Convention remained relevant during 
the conflict will be discussed later in more detail. For now, it suffices to mention the 
following points. Several attempts were made both within and outside the Conven­
tion's institutions to work out a temporary and partial cease-fire between 
belligerents in order to implement the Kuwait Regional Convention, stop the spill ­
age, and remedy the ensuing environmental damage.2 1  These negotiations failed. 
Iraq continued bombing the source of the spill and made its position clear in letters 
addressed to the UN Secretary General .  In these, Iraq rejected not only calls for a 
partial cease-fire so as to allow repairs to the wells,n but asserted also that : 
. . .  the provisions of the Kuwait Regional Convention on Cooperation for the Protection of 
the Marine Environment from Pollution and the protocol annexed thereto have no effect in 
cases of armed conflict. 23  
There i s  no  record of any official State reactions to  this  position .  The Security 
Council chose n ot to condemn Iraq explicitly, but  instead issued a disappoint­
ingly vague call to :  
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. . .  both part ies to refrain from any action that  may  endanger peace and security as 
well as marine l i fe in  the region of the Gulf. 24 
Following this incident, the EC commission asked five scholars to study the 
problem of the protection of the environment in t imes of armed conflict .  Their 
1 985  report is-as far as is known-the first academic paper on the subject .25  
The experts concluded that Principle 2 1 , as confirmed by Article 1 92 UNCLOS, 
applies in  armed conflict between belligeren ts and third States, and by analogy to 
international areas .  They maintained that armed conflict gives belligerents no 
right to deviate from treaty rules protecting the territorial integrity and the envi­
ronment of th ird S tates . They pointed out that violation of environmental 
obligations may bring into play the rules of international law on the responsibil­
i ty of States regardless of where the damage arose. 
As for treaty relations between belligerents, the EC experts stated, illler alia, 
that the mere occurrence of armed conflict does not  put an end ipso facto to their 
treaty obligations in regard to the protection of the environmen t ;  that  parties to 
such conventions have the obligation to ensure that the rules on the protection of 
the environmen t are respected to the greatest exten t possible and that in cases of 
environmental emergency, all parties, including belligerents, need to co-operate 
in its preven tion and accept offers of assistance. Finally, the experts believed that 
the ICRC or any other impartial humanitarian organisation can offer i ts  services in 
this regard . 26 
Although in tended to assist  in the consideration of possible in i ti atives at  the 
international level,n the report does not appear to have led to any such actions, ei­
ther by the EC or by any of its Member States. 
Despite the obvious meri t  of many of  its conclus ions ,  the report  h as several 
weaknesses .  First, it is important  to note that it glosses over the fun damental 
changes  which the  UN Charter brought about  in jus ad bellum and neu tral i ty 
law.28 Because the  s tudy was done i n  1 9 84- 1 98 5 ,  t h e  experts could perhaps be 
forgiven for th ink ing  tha t  the Securi ty Council  would never i n tervene in  the 
I ran- I raq conflict  un der Chapter VII  of the  Charter . 29  However ,  i t  i s  submit ­
ted  that  the fa i l ings of  the  U N  collective s ecuri ty  sys tem do  n o t  j us t ify 
assess ing the  s i tuat ion exclusively-as the  report  does-on the bas i s  of n eu ­
trality law la id  down befo re the fi rst  World War, n o r  us ing  Swi tzerlan d as  the  
on ly  example of a " n eu tral" th i rd State . 30 Even i n  cases of Security Counci l  
gridlock, the  C harter 's  principles remain  vali d . 3 1  Furthermore, in  t he 
post -Charter era,  i t  would  be  an overs impli ficat ion to equate th ird  States '  a t t i ­
tudes to inter- State  armed confl ict  wi th  the  type of neutral i ty pract i sed by 
Swi tzerland in  the  fi rst half  of th i s  century. 32 
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Secondly, with respect to the issues raised by the Nowruz oi l  spill, the EC re­
port asserts that since the Kuwait Regional Convention was negotiated for a 
region where tensions were known to exist,  the phrase "whatever the cause of such 
emergencies" (Article IX) must be taken to include instances of environmen tal 
damage caused during armed conflicr .  33 This assertion as well as the rest of the 
conclusions of this seminal report will be evaluated later in  this study. 34 
Thirdly, i t  was seen earlier that  following Article 237 of UNCLOS, regional con­
ventions, such as the 1 97 8  Kuwait Convention, pre-empt UNCLOS provided that  
their provisions are consistent with i ts general rules. 35 However, since i t  predates 
the latter, the Kuwait Convention does not contain a provision comparable to Ar­
t icle 1 92 (nor to Article 194) of UNCLOS enunciating comprehensive and 
u nqualified duties towards the marine environment. 
Whilst acknowledging that the general obligation for States to protect the ma­
rine environment m ay only be emerging customary law, the EC experts asserted 
nonetheless that this principle appl ies to the environment of neutral S tates. 36 
Many naval lawyers doubt,  however, whether the environmental provisions of 
UNCLOS can be transported in unqualified form to situations of armed conflict .  
One of the treaty's negotiators, Professor Oxman, points out  that  Article 192 was 
the principled foundation for a much more detailed body of rules that followed i t, 
explicating its meaning and effecr .  He believes that applying it to armed conflict 
in  unqualified form amounts to taking the provisions out of context, ignoring the 
lex specialis character of the laws of armed conflict  as well as the fact that  UNCLOS 
was not intended to regulate the latter. 37 His views were confirmed by the naval 
specialists who drafted the 1 994 San Remo Manual. As mentioned earlier, whilst 
they agreed that States are under a general duty to protect the marine environment, 
they could not agree on creating corollary legal obligations during armed conflict. 38 
3 . 1 .3 .  Operat i o n  " P rayi ng Mant is , " C ustomary Law and t h e  Kuwait Reg i o n a l  
Convent i o n  
An examination of the  legal effec ts of armed conflict on environmental treaties 
can only provide a partial answer to the problem of environmental protection dur­
ing armed conflict .  As demonstrated in the previous Chapter, a great part of the 
analys is will have to be  devoted to the lawfulness of the use of force, both from the 
p erspective of jus in bello andjus ad bellu m .  Moreover, in ternational armed conflic t  
often creates situations that  are  beyond the immediate reach of the  law of treaties, 
for the simple reason that not all States involved in the conflict may be bound by 
the same treaties .  This can be  illustrated with Operation Praying Mantis, the U.S .  
code n ame for a mil i tary operation carried out aga inst Iran during the 1 980-1 988 
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Iran-Iraq War, which forms part of the Oil Plat/arms case currently pending before 
the ICJ . 39 
I t  i s  common knowledge that the United States, whilst officially proclaiming 
its neutrality in  that Gulf conflict, was nevertheless heavi ly  invo lved in armed 
confrontation against I ran. In an effort to deter I ran from attacking thi rd State 
merchant shipping, the United States dec ided in April 1 98 8  to attack an Iranian 
frigate an d  three offshore gas/oi l  separation platforms belonging to I ran .  I t  la �er 
emerged that the U . S .  servicemen were i nstructed to avoi d  civilian casualties, col­
lateral damage, and "adverse environmental  damage" to every possible degree. 
Seen from a U .S .  perspective, Operation Praying Mantis was carried out accord­
ing to plan, although Iran claimed that there were several civi l ian casualties .40 
I t  is not clear whether any significant environmental damage was caused.4 1 But  
since the operation involved destruction of gas/oi l  separation platforms, there was 
at least a risk of serious marine pollution. If the U . S .  rai d  had caused a serious o i l  
sp i l l ,  the  ascription of legal responsib i l i ty would  defy easy analysis .  Whi l s t  Iran 
and I raq were undisputedly the main bell igerents of the conflict, the U . S .  claim to 
neutrality status is  more tenuous, certainly as far as Operation Praying Mantis is 
concerned. Both I ran and Iraq are Parties to the 1 978 Kuwait Regional Conven­
tion, which deals wi th pollution emergencies but which does not contain an 
explic i t  clause to deal with emergencies created by or  during armed conflict .  In 
addition, in  the above hypothesis ,  the pollution emergency in ques tion would 
have been created by a State which not  only denied involvement in  the conflict 
between Iran and Iraq but which i s  not  a party to the 1 978  treaty. 42 
3 . 1 .4 .  The 1 99 1  G u lf War O i l  S p i l l  and the  1 990 OPRC Convent ion  
I t  was seen earlier that the  1 99 1  Gulf war oi l  spill  was  largely-though not ex­
clusively-caused by deliberate Iraqi actions : the opening valves at Iraqi and 
Kuwaiti oi l  terminals, and the dumping of oi l  from five Iraqi tankers.43 These ac­
tions were not only highly quest ionable from ajlls in bello point of view,44 Iraq was 
also i den tified early on as having unlawful ly resorted to the use of armed force in 
the first place.45 
Whilst the exact size of the o i l  sl ick i s  debated, i t  i s  generally regarded as the 
largest ever recorded in  human h istory. I t  destroyed marine flora and fauna, in­
cluding migratory species of b irds, and interrupted food chains for all forms of l ife 
in  the Gulf. It ruined fishing groun ds for many countries in the region, and  made 
b eaches unsuitable for the tourist industry. The oi l  sl ick caused serious pollution 
of the Kuwai t i  and Saudi Arabian coasts ,  and seriously threatened the latter's de­
salinisation plants and offshore o i l  operations . 46 
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In sharp contrast to the hands-off approach during the 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 8  Iran-Iraq 
conflict, the 1 99 1  Gulf war oil spi ll elicited a massive world-wide response. Al­
ready during the  hosti l i ties ,  local  teams in  Saudi Arabia  managed to save 
s trategic ins tallations  from impending disaster .47 After the cessation of  hosti l i ­
t ies,  an  enormous environmental assessment and remediation effort got 
underway, involving an impressive number of local, regional, b i lateral and mul­
ti la teral organisa tions .  48 
More im portant for this study is the evidence that States an d in ternational or­
ganisations resorted to international insti tutional mechanisms agreed for 
"peacetime. ,,49 Because of i ts  territori a l  competence in the region, the instru­
ments and institutions agreed under the 1 97 8  Kuwai t Regional Convention were 
an obvious candidate for the provision of emergency relief. Unfortunately, its Ma­
rine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre in Bahrain was not able to participate, having 
been incapaci tated by a prolonged lack of funding.  Nonetheless, another regional 
mechanism, the Gulf Area Oil Companies Mutual Aid Organisation contri buted 
successfully with equipment and services.  50 
The singular most impressive case was the IMO-led early implementation of the 
1990 International Convention on Oil  Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co­
operation COPRC Convention) and associated resolutions .  The OPRC Convention 
had been signed b arely two months earlier and was not  yet in force. Although the 
Convention was apparently concluded with accidental oil-spil ls in mind,5 1 the 
IMO considered the Gulf war oil  spi l l  to be of the "severity" envisaged in Article 7, 
justifying requests for assistance from government agencies in the countries 
threatened by the spill .  52 The early implementation of this convention, five years 
before its official en try into force, provides, together with the Nowruz Oil Spill, 
one of the rare instances of State practice on the legal relationship between armed 
conflict and environmental treaty law .  An evaluation of this case will  follow later 
in this work.5 3 
3 . 1 . 5 .  State S u b m iss ions i n  the Advisory O p i n io n s  o n  N u c l ear Weapons 
In their submissions to the I CJ on the Legali ty of Nuclear Weapons, States were 
fundamentally divided on the question of the con tin ued relevance of IEL during 
armed conflict. 
Of the States opposing the legality of nuclear weapons, the Solomon I slands 
presen ted the most elaborate case in favour of the persistence of environmental 
obligations during armed conflict. To support their conclusions on the i l legality 
of  nuclear weapons, they argued that the use of these weapons was forbidden by 
current IEL.54 Their  detailed contentions can be summarised as  follows : 
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First, regarding the operation of in ternational law in general d u ring armed 
conflict, they submitted that : ( 1 )  State obligations  arising fro m custom ary princi­
ples and treaty law apply in peace and in war, unless expressly mentioned 
otherwise ;  (2) Hence, multilateral treaties that contain no provi sion s  expressly 
excluding their application in times of  war, apply in times of war; (3) Multilateral 
treaties are not ipso facto term inated by t he outbreak of arm ed con flic t ;  (4) Bellig­
erent parties can only suspend or term inate treaties in their relation with other 
belligerents;  they are not allowed to do so in relation to neutral S tates; 
Secondly, applied to IEL, i t  followed according to the Solomon Islands that :  ( 1 )  
Principle 2 1  o f  the S tockholm Declaration, as reaffirmed b y  the Rio Declaration, 
continues to apply during armed conflict;  (2) Multi lateral enviro n m ental agree­
ments continue to apply in times of armed con flict, unless exp res sly provided 
otherwi se;  (3) Several importan t en vironmental instruments establishing de­
tailed regi mes for various environmental sectors-i. e. , freshwater resources, the 
marine environment, biodiversity, climate system and the ozone layer-continue 
to apply during armed conflict, s ince they phrase State duties in u n conditional 
and general terms and con tain n o  provision to the contrary; (4) The latter agree­
ments have become wi dely supported and m ay reflect rules of custo mary 
international law; they establish ob ligations of such essen tial importance to the 
safegu arding an d  preservation of the human environmen t that their  violation is  
an in ternational crime;  ( 5 )  Environ men tal agreemen ts may only be suspended 
between belligeren ts during armed conflict; (6) Environ mental agreemen ts may 
not be suspen ded by belligerents  vis-a-vis  third States. 5 5  
Third, t h e  Solomon Islands conten ded that since a n y  use of n uclear weapons 
would violate environ men tal ob ligations arising from intern ational custom an d 
treaty law, their use was forbidden by current IEL. This amounts to a claim that 
lEL is  n ot only con cerned with States' peacetime activities, but  th at it also regu­
lates belligerent activities during armed conflict.  
Neither the Court itself, nor States opposing the tenor of the advisory requests 
provi ded a full an swer to all ofthe ab ove prin cipled argu ments . As will be  seen be­
low in the following two sections,5 6  the Court accepted the opponents' 
submission that the legal questions raised by the request fro m the UN General As­
semb ly deserved a narrow answer, primarily limited to the worst-case scenario of 
the use of nuclear weapon s. 
3. 2. The Relationship between Pea cetime La w and the La w of 
Armed Conflic t in General 
Since IEL i s  pri marily treaty- based law, a large portion of this stu dy will  be de­
voted to ex amining whether-and if so, how-multilateral envi ronmen tal 
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agreements apply during armed conflict.  However, this question cannot be an­
swered without exploring first the pl ace of IEL and the laws of armed conflict in 
the in ternational 1egal order. 
It was once believed that th e distinction between war and peace was so sharp 
that as soon as war had begun, the ru les valid in peacetime were replaced by those 
of the laws of wars. 57 Even if not  all  wars were formally declared, there was li ttle 
discussion that the rules prevailing during war were fundamentally different 
from those in peacetime.  The relationship between the law of war and the law of 
peace was one of leges specialis, superseding the rest of i n ternational law. 58 To 
complete this ideal picture, Grotius wrote "inter bellu m et pacem nihil  est me­
dium " :  there is no i n termediate s tate between peace and war.59 
However, since there were often hostilities without formal  recogni tion of war, 
the delimi tation between war and peace in State practice was not as clear as the 
theory implied.60 The tradi tional  legal dichotomy between war and peace was 
challenged by authors such as Schwarzenberger, who i n troduced the notion of 
sta tus mixtus in international law.6 1  During a status mixtus, th ird States would be 
free to decide for themselves whether they wished to regulate their rel ations with 
belligerents in accordance with the law of peace or the law of war.  Although much 
written about, the theory was controversial and has never been accepted in inter­
nation al law. Moreover, it  did not solve the question of the delimitation between 
war and peace, but added a th ird S tate to be demarcated .62 
It was seen in the previous chapter that the importance of the state of war has 
declined.63 Particularly s ince World War II ,  there has been a shift away from the 
traditional concept of war as a phenomenon ch aracterised by the formal com­
mencement of hostili ties . Instead, i n  many instances, use of armed fo rce is  l im ited 
in scale, or develops only gradually into a full-blown intern ational conflict.  Such 
hostilities may resemble traditional wars, but the conten ding parties may resist 
this label because of its incompatibility with the UN Charter.64 
Th e disappearance of the dichotomy between war and peace raises the question 
of whether there is now a new dich o tomy between armed conflict a n d  "no armed 
conflict" and what its implications are for general international law. 
Whilst military lawyers have continued to maintain that the relationship be­
tween general international law, including environ mental law and the laws of 
armed conflict, was one of lex generalis/lex specialis ,65 this assumption has in recent 
decades co me un der scrutiny, both from hu man rights and environ mental legal 
perspecti yes . 
Since World War II,  the impact of humanitarian law and the development of 
human righ ts law has been such that there is now a core body of fundamental 
norms for the protectio n of the hu man person ,  which dem ands respect from 
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States in peace and in war or in si tuations of armed conflict and of no armed con­
flict. This has been recogn ised by the Ie] in the Corfu Channel and in the 
Nicaragua cases, in which the Court stressed the exacting nature of certain ele­
mentary considerations of humanity, applicable in peace and war. 66 
S imilarly, as seen in the first section of this study, since the 1 9 80s it has been 
argued more often that S tates' rights and duties with respect to the environment 
continue to operate during armed conflict. In this  view, armed conflict  offers no 
excuse for S tates to deviate from important duties towards the environment aris­
ing from general international law . 
These assertions have come to a head in States' written and oral submissions to 
the ICJ regarding the requests for an advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weap­
ons . Many S tates opposing the legality of nuclear weapons argued that there exists a 
principle of "environmental security" which outlaws the threat or use of these 
weapons of mass destruction . They asserted that general international law prohibits 
a State from carrying out or authorising activities which damage human health and 
the environment and that international obligations for the protection of human 
health, the environment and human rights apply during armed conflict.67 
None of the proponents of the legality of nuclear weapons invoked the lex 
generalis/lex specialis argument explicitly, although this was implied by their asser­
tions that the principal purpose of environmental treaties and norms was to 
protect the environment in time of peace. Thus, the United S tates argued that 
none of the environmental instruments referred to was negotiated with the inten­
tion that i t  would be applicable to nuclear weapons.68 In  addition, she warned that 
if the Ie] were to decide that the use of nuclear weapons was prohibited or re­
stricted by international environmental agreements or principles, very serious 
damage could be done to international co-operation and the development of legal 
norms in this area.69 The UK submitted that the real issue before the Court was 
whether any rules of human rights or environmental protection could be con­
strued as prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons when carried out  
by way of legitimate self-defence. 70 
In  its advisory opinion on the General Assembly request, the Ie] took note of 
the arguments advanced by the two camps . 7 l Accepting the UK submission it 
judged that : 
. . .  the issue is no t whether the treaties relating to the pro tection of the environment 
are or not applicable during an armed conflict, but rat her whether the obl igations 
stemming from these treat ies were inten ded to be obli gations of total restraint  during 
m i l itary conflict .7 2 
The Court further held :  
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. . .  that the most  directly relevant applicable law governing the quest ion of which i t  
was seized, is  that relat ing to t he use o f  force enshrined i n  t h e  United Nations 
Charter and the law appl icable in  armed conflict which regu lates the conduct of 
host i l i ties, together wi t h  any specific treaties o n  nuclear weapons that the Court 
migh t determine to be relevant J3 
The answer given by the Court transcends the issue of the worst-case scen ario 
of the use of nuclear weapons, for the opinion in dicates that the law of armed con­
flict operates as lex specialis with respect to questions of interpretation related to 
human righ ts instru men ts and environmen tal obligations arising from general 
international law. This follows directly from the Court's analysis of the human 
right to li fe in armed conflict,  which preceded its exam ination of environmental 
obligations .  The Cou rt observed that, in principle, the right to not be arbitrarily 
deprived of one's l i fe applies also in hostilities, bur that the test of what is an arbi­
trary deprivation of life, needs to be determined by: 
. . .  the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in  armed confl ict  which i s  
designed to regulate t h e  conduct  of host i l i t iesJ4 
The Court then turned to environmental law. It accepted that States are un der 
a general obligation to ensure that activit ies within their jurisdiction and control 
respect the en vironment of other States or of areas beyond national con troL7 5 
How ever, it rejected the view that this would entail an obligation of total restraint 
in armed conflict or a ban on the use of force in self-defenceJ6 
The above does not mean that the Court regards environmental law as irrele­
van t in armed conflict.  On the contrary, as was seen eariier,77 it has firmly laid to 
rest any suggestion that the duty to protect the environment would b e  of concern 
to S tates only in times of peace :  
S t a t es m u s t  t a k e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  co n s i d e ra t i o n s  i n t o a c c o u n t  w h e n  assess i n g  
w h at is n e c e s s a r y  a n d  proport i o n a t e  i n  t h e  p u r s u i  t of legit i mate m i l itary 
ob j e c t i v e s .  Respect  fo r the e n v i r o n m e n t  is  o n e  of t h e  elements that  g o  t o  
assess i n g  w h e t h e r  a n  a c t i o n  i s  i n  c o n formi t y  w i t h  the pri n c i p l e s  of necessi  t y  
a n d  p roport i o n a l i  ty .  7 8 
The Court also recalled its recent Order in the Request/or an Examination o/the 
Situation case, in which it concluded that i t  was "without prejudice to the obliga­
tions of States to respect and protect the natural environment. ,,79 In the advisory 
opinion the Court stressed that: 
Although that statement was made i n  the contex t use of n u clear testi ng, i t  
naturally also applies to the actual  use of nu clear weapons i n  arme d confl ict. 80 
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However, the opinion remains vague about how exactly environmental con­
cerns m ight inform the law of armed conflict .  As seen in the previous chapter, the 
advisory opinion has been un derstood as confirming that the requirements of ne­
cessity and proportionality apply to use of armed force both from the perspective 
of jus ad bellum and jus in bello .8 l  
The paragraphs i n  which the ICJ discusses the need t o  take environmental as­
pects into consideration during belligerent activities touch on both disciplines.82 
Whether the explicit reference to the principles of necessity and proportionality in 
this context includes both jus ad bellum and jus in bello i s  less clear. 83 As for jus in 
bello, the opinion suggests that the new environmental jus in bello provisions of Ad­
ditional Protocol I do not constitute customary law and that l imitations on the 
causing of environmental damage in  armed conflict derive primarily from the ab­
stract principles of the law of armed conflict discussed in  the previous chapter. 84 
In conclusion, the inference to be drawn from this advisory opinion i s  that 
whilst certain S tate obligations towards the environment continue to apply dur­
ing armed conflict, they cannot be used to override the law of armed conflict, and 
certainly not rights derived from jus ad bellum.  
Accordingly, even "massive pollution of the atmosp here and the seas," which 
the ILC has termed an international crime,8S could theoretically be justified in 
armed conflict provided that, inter alia, the customary requirements of necessity 
and proportionally are complied with .  
The implications for the worst-case scenario of use of nuclear weapons are de­
bated . As seen before, the majori ty opinion has been unders tood by many to 
imply, or  at least, leave open the possibility that the use of nuclear weapons would 
inevitably violate jus in bello, but that their use would nevertheless be just ified in 
extreme cases of self-defence. 86 In his  dissenting opinion,  J udge Schwebel used 
the 1 990-199 1  Gulf conflict to illustrate ci rcumstances in  which the threat of the 
use of n uclear weapons might have been just ified.  He acknowledged though, that 
the consequences of their use would have been "catastrophic," not  only for the co­
alition forces and populations, but also for the p rinciples of co llective security and 
for the United Nations. 87 
3. 3. The Relationship between Principle 21 and International 
Armed Conflict 
3 . 3 . 1 . Armed Confl ict ,  U NCHE and UNCED 
T h e  Court's v iew on  t h e  relationship between general i n ternational law and 
the laws of armed conflict is supported by an analysis  of the relationship between 
Principle 2 1  and armed conflict .  
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The s tarting point of this analysis is that  Principle 2 1  has a general tenor, and 
that it  can be understood as embracing all types of  State "activities," including 
military activities .  As seen above, i t  was recen tly argued before the IC1 that Princi­
ple 2 1  applies in  peace and in war. 88 More specifically, it was asserted that :  
. . .  u se of the word control  i ndicates that  the obligat ion extends t o  act ivi  t ies carried 
out by S t ates, t h rough, for example, submarines, vessels or aircraft wh ich might 
launch a nuclear weapon from an a rea beyond i t s  national j urisdict ion . 89 
Accordingly, Principle 2 1  was said to apply to the use of nuclear weapons in  
war  or other armed conflict . 90 
It is true that normally the actions of a State's armed forces should be regarded 
as wi th in  i ts jurisdiction or control; hence, State mil i tary actions are subject to 
the requirement not to cause severe damage to other States or areas beyond na­
tional j urisdiction. But  does this include armed con flict? 
In the previous chapter i t  was explained in  detai l  how, as a result of  the Viet­
nam conflict, environmental concerns increasingly informed the development of 
environmentaljus in bello and disarmament law from the 1 970s onwards. 9 1  Princi­
ple 21 was formulated at the 1 972 Stockholm Conference (UNCHE). This widely 
attended international environmental conference was held against the back­
ground of the Vietnam conflict, which brought allegations that the United States 
had engaged in a policy of deliberately targeting the environment, sometimes 
termed "ecocide ."  It may hence seem p eculiar that  the impact of war on the envi­
ronment was kept off the agenda. The reason is that the issue was considered 
politically sensi tive : it was feared by the organ isers that broach ing the problem 
would be interpreted as direct criticism of the ongoing U .S .  mil itary operations. 
This did not prevent the then Swedish Prime Minister Palme from sharply de­
nouncing the omission in his opening statement at the Conference. 92 
Nevertheless, the environmental aspects of Vietnam were not totally ignored. 
Not only were they discussed at a rival parallel conference held simultaneously in 
Stockholm,93 during the official UN conference, Tanzania attempted to break the 
silence by  proposing the condemnation of : 
. . .  the  use of chemical  and bio logical agents in wars of aggression t h e  use of which 
degrade man and his  environment. 94 
This in i tiative failed, an d the only principle of  the Stockholm Declaration to 
deal with armed conflict-albeit implicitly-is Principle 26. Far from 
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condemning environmental disruption for military purposes, i t  p laces most of the 
issues raised by Vietnam in the politically less sensitive context of disarmament 
negotiations and the use of weapons of mass des truction :  
Man and his environment  must  b e  spared the effects  of n u c l e a r  weapons and a l l  
other means of mass  destruct ion.  S tates must  s t r i ve to reach prompt agreement, in  
the relevant internati onal  organs, on t h e  el imina t i on and complete destruct ion of 
such weapons .95 
Twenty years later at  UNCED, held in Rio in June 1 992, history appeared to re­
peat i tself. I t  was seen in the previous chapter that in the months following the 
1 990-9 1 Gulf conflict, the adequacy of exi sting law with respect to protection of 
the  environment during armed conflict  became the subjec t  of world-wide de­
bate .96 Most of these early debates centred on the adequacy of the envi ronmental 
jus in bello, although questions were rai sed regarding the possible contribution of 
general IEL on the sub j ect .  In a reaction to the environmental legacy of  the 
1 990- 1 99 1  Gulf con flict, the EC had introduced the condemnation of "ecological 
crimes" for inclusion in UNCED'S agenda.  Since the conference was tasked with re­
viewing and updating the S tockholm Declaration, i t  was offered an excellent 
opportunity to state that  Principle 21 would be applicable during armed conflict 
as well. But following debates in  the UN General Assembly and a preparatory 
committee, the main UNCED Committee side-stepped the issue .  Although a para­
graph was inserted into Agenda 2 1 ,  it uses only exhortatory language, which adds 
l i tt le of substance:  
Measures i n  accordance with international law should be consi dered to address, in  
t imes of armed conflict, large-sca le  destruction of  the environmen t that  cannot b e  
j ust ified under international l a w .  T h e  General Assembly and i t s  S i x t h  Committee are 
t he appropriate forums to deal with the sub ject .  The specific competence and the role 
of the Interna tional Commi ttee of the Red Cross should b e  taken into account.97 
More i mportantly, by mandating the General Assembly's Sixth Committee 
and  particularly the ICRC to study the issue further, UNCED's handling of the m at­
ter strongly suggests that the issue was a problem for the laws of armed conflict 
and not  for general I E L .  
The only principle of the Rio Declaration to deal  with armed conflict  i s  Princi­
ple 24, which reads :  
Warfare i s  i nherently des tructive of sus tainable developmen t .  S tates should therefore 
respect international law providing protection fo r the environment i n  times of armed 
conflict and co-operate i n  its further developm ent as  necessary. 
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The weakness of these recommendations is apparent from the fact that during 
the 1 997 UN special session (UNGASS), the subj ect of mil i tary activities or  armed 
conflict was, as far as can be judged fro m  the available documentation , not dis­
cussed.98 
To conclude, the travaux priparatoires of the Stockholm and Rio declarations 
show that delegates to these widely attended environmental con ferences­
UNCHE and UNCED-thought that the subject of protection of the environment  
during armed conflict needed to be  addressed in specialised forums dealing with 
the lex specia lis, that is ,  the laws of armed con flict and disarmament negotiations.  
However, since h istorical antecedents are not necessarily decisive, the ques­
tion of the relationship between Principle 2 1  and armed conflict m erits further 
atten tio n.  Offensive or  defensive operations in the course of armed conflict m ay 
be subject to Principle 2 1 ,  if not because of the general tenor  of the Principle, per­
h aps by analogy to peacetime activities. A proper evaluation of this hypothesis 
requires an examination of the nature of armed conflict and of its i mpact on the 
environment; What are the parallels, if any, with States' peacetime activities ? 
3 .3 .2 .  Host i l e  M i l itary Activit ies Com pared to Peacet ime M i l i tary Activit ies 
It  i s  difficult to escape the conclus ion that State activities during armed con­
flict differ fundamentally from State activities in peacetime.  
Whilst  the prohibition of transfrontier pollution has s ince 1 972 evolved to in­
c lude activities within States' control, the m ost common case to which Principle 
2 1  applies in  peacetime  is that of activi ties within a State's terri tory or jurisdiction 
causing transboundary pollution to another S tate's territory or juri sdiction .  By  
contrast, hostile mi li tary activity is either directed a t  or takes place in areas that 
l ie per definition beyond a State's j urisdiction : ei ther in international areas or 
within opponents'  territory or j urisdiction . 
Moreover, the nature of hostile acti vi ty seems hardly reconcilable wi th the first 
premise of Principle 2 1 , which obligates S tates to take al l  reaso nab le measures to 
prevent, reduce, and control transboun dary pollution.99 Rather than preventing 
the occurrence of transfrontier damage, belligerent activities imply the deliberate 
infliction of harm directed at other S tates. This is recognised by the law of armed 
conflict, which acknowledges in the view of one commentator : 
. . . that intentional destruction of l ife and property is a necessary aspect of the conduct 
of hostilities, and that collateral damage and injury--even to noncombatants, civi l ian 
property and the natural environment-are an in evitable (though regrettable) 
consequence. 1 00 
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These negative environmental consequences set use of armed force apart from 
State ac tivities in peacet ime :  armed contlic t  implies necessarily tha t  the  environ­
ment will  be targeted and destroyed-often intentionally. In legal terms, 
therefore, armed conflict i s  d i s tinct  from all other human activi ties, even from 
those tha t  are routinely regarded as "(ultra-) hazardous," such  as activities relat­
ing to the nuclear energy sector. Accord ing to the I LC, (u l tra-)  hazardous 
(peacetime) act ivity is  one with a low probabi l i ty for catastrophic damage. 1 0 1  By 
contrast, State activities in the course of armed conflict appear to carry a high proba­
bility of all kinds of environmental damage :  from the negligible to the catastrophic. 
General environmental law has evolved fro m  pr inciples such as good neigh­
bourliness and respect for o ther S tates' sovereignty and territorial integrity; 102 
the hypothesis of damage delibera tely inflicted on other S tates seems entirely 
anathema to it. Therefore, at least between belligeren ts, hosti le m ili tary activity is 
a direc t negation of Principle 2 1 . 1 03 
There remains of course the question, already broached in the previous chapter, 
whether the principle remains valid for relationships between belligerents and third 
States, and how the principle might apply in armed conflict in  international areas. 
3 .3 .3 .  Neutra l i ty and Princ ip le  2 1  
According t o  a view primarily held i n  environmental c ircles, Principle 2 1  re­
m ains val id in armed conflict for relationships between belligerents and neutrals 
and for relationships between belligerents and in ternational areas. This was also 
explicitly argued in the recent requests for an advisory opinion on the legali ty of 
nuclear weapons.  1 04 
I n  the l i terature, several grounds are offered for these contentions. The a rgu­
ment seems based on a presumed legal dichotomy between belligerents an d 
neutrals an d on the lex generalis/lex specialis rule.  Accordingly, whilst  i t is admitted 
that armed conflict changes the law applicable between belligeren ts, i t  i s  argued 
that belligerents and neutrals remain governed by  the law of peace, i ncluding 
Principle 2 1 ,  which is then applied by analogy to in ternational areas. l OS In addi­
t ion, i t  i s  argued that  there is no principle under customary law according to 
which neutral S tates would have to tolerate damage to their territories caused by 
belligerent activi ty .  1 06 
Such abs tract conclusions seem fraugh t  with difficulties on various grounds .  
First ,  any theory that  relies in  one way or  another on a s tr ict  division between war 
and peace on the one hand, and a further dichotomy between bel ligerent and neu­
tral  States on the other, is problematic .  It  was seen earl ier that under the modern 
jus ad bellum, i t  has become much harder to dist inguish between neutral and 
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belligerent or co-belligerent States .  What is more, posit ions of complete neutral­
i ty are, s tric tly speaking, incompatible with the UN Charter's principles. 1 07 
Therefore, a scheme based on a dicho tomy between bell igeren t and neutral S tates 
may a t the very least prove of I i  t tle use in cases where the neu trali ty of third S tates, 
i .e . ,  of those not d irectly invol ved in the host i l i t ies, i s  con troversial or contested . 
Secondly, i t  was seen earlier that whilst  there i s  no longer a s trict divi sion be­
tween the law of peace and the law of war, the IC] has taken the view in i ts  1 996 
Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons that the lex generalis/lex specialis ru le  con­
tinues to govern questions relating to conduct of belligeren t aeti  vi ties . 1 08 
However, the Court was extremely reluctant to d raw any firm conclusions on the 
implications of the use of nuc lear weapons in regard to third States. 
The Court held that neutrality was a principle of fundamen tal character applica­
b le in armed conflict, but added that its content was debated and that its application 
was subject to the relevant  provisions of the UN Charter. 109 The latter remark sup­
ports the view that rel iance on the principle of neutrality is a t  leas t debatable in 
cases where the Security Council takes b inding decisions obligating UN Members 
to discriminate between aggressor and victim States. This conclusion is further un­
derscored by the fact that the Court stressed that i t  could not lose sight :  
. . .  of t h e  fundamen tal right o f  every State to survival,  and t h u s  i t s  righ t [ 0  resort to 
se l f-defence, in accordance with Article 5 1  of the Charter, when its survival is at 
stake. I I O 
As for the application of the principle of neutrality to the use of nuclear weap­
ons, the IC] noted that some S ta tes argued that their effects cannot be contained 
within the terri tories of the conten d ing S tates, I I I  whilst  other S tates ob j ected that 
this was not  necessarily the case. 1 1 2 The Court  held that i t  did not  have sufficient 
elements at  i ts  d isposal to determine the validi ty of the latter view. I 1 3  
This part o f  the judgement could b e  construed a s  indicating that-had the 
Court found that there was sufficient evidence that the effects of  nuclear weapons  
can never be contained wi th in  the " terr i tories of the  contending States"-it 
migh t  have found their use contrary to the principl e of neutrality. 
However, such a conclusion is not necessarily warranted.  First,  b y  insist ing on 
the fundamental right of every State to survival, the Court has left open the con­
troversial possib i l i ty that  resort to such weapons m ight be j ustified regardless of 
compa tibil i ty with the principles of)1ls in  bello . Secondly, even if this interpreta­
tion of the j udgemen t is not accepted, i t is clear that the opinion does not indicate 
what level  of en vironmental protec tion non-contending Sta tes m ight derive from 
the princ iple of  neutrality in  armed conflict .  According to the Principal Deputy 
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Legal Adviser of the U .S .  S tate Department, the opinion leads to the proposit ion 
that a lawful exercise  of self-defence under Article 5 1 -one wh ich meets the re­
quirements of necessity and proportionali ty-would not violate neutrality; hence 
there would be no absolute prohibit ion on attacks that would cause col lateral 
damage in a neutral State. 1 1 4 
Thirdly, the advisory opinion does not address the issue of environmental 
damage in relation to in ternational areas . I t  was argued earlier that the traditional 
law of neutral ity was premised on respect for the territorial sovereignty of States, 
and that i t  cannot be construed to confer any type of " immun ity" from belligeren t 
interference to international areas . I I S  I n  addition, i t  should not b e  overlooked 
that under general in ternational law, the application of Principle 21 to in terna­
tional areas or to the environment per se is  heavily qualified. Whilst the duty to 
protec t the environment per se migh t be an emerging principle of customary in ter­
national law, State practice indicates that it is primarily other States' righ ts and  
in terests in these environmen t s  that are pro tected. 1 1 6 
In conclusion, resort to a legal dichotomy between war  and peace, the lex 
generalis/lex specialis rule, the princip le of neutrality or an analogy between peace­
time and belligeren t mil i tary activities does not offer a sufficiently fi rm, nor a 
universal legal basis for the protection of envi ronments beyond the j urisdiction of 
the contending States during armed conflict .  
3. 4. The Relationship between Multilateral Environmental Agree­
ments and International Armed Conflict 
3 .4 . 1 .  I ntrod uct io n 
I t  was seen earlier that IEL is primarily treaty-based law . 1 1 7 Although treaty law 
cannot be divorced entirely from customary international law, it forms to a great ex­
tent a self-contained source of international law and merits separate analysis. J J 8 
The purpose of this  section is to examine whether m ultilateral envi ronmental 
agreements continue to apply during armed conflict and, i f  so, to what extent. The 
resolution of this question must be sought in an analysis of the relationsh ip be­
tween multi lateral environmental agreements and armed conflict, and requires 
answers to the following fundamental questions : Can these agreements be said to 
apply at all  to belligerent activities during international armed conflict ?  If  so, do 
contracting part ies have the legal right to terminate or suspend the operation of 
such agreements during the conflict? 
One school of thought opposes the contin ued relevance of multilateral envi­
ronmental agreements during armed conflict on the grounds that :  (a)  these 
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agreements are not applicab le to belligerent activities or (b)  that even if they may 
be  said to apply, contracting parties have the legal righ t to terminate or suspend 
the operation of these agreements during armed conflict. 1 19 
Advocates of the continued relevance of multilateral environmental agree­
ments during armed conflict would argue that: (a) these agreements apply to all 
State activities, even in armed conflict;  and (b) that armed conflict is not a suffi ­
cient ground to terminate or suspend the operation of these agreements. 120 
Apart from these positions at opposite ends of the spectrum,  there are a variety 
of compromise positions possible. For instance, some adherents to the first school 
of thought concede that these agreements may apply during armed conflict, but  
that armed conflict is a sufficient ground in itself for belligerents to suspend or 
terminate the agreements between themselves. Others assert that the question is 
s imply not relevant since environmental treaties rarely deal with the kind of dam­
age caused during warfare. 1 2 1 It i s  also argued that belligerents may suspend the 
operation of such agreements if incompatible with armed conflict, but only be­
tween themselves, and that in any case, the suspension of such agreements will 
not affect obligations which are binding on States regardless of treaty law . 
I t  was seen earlier that there exists State practice on the legal effect of armed 
conflict on multilateral environmental agreements , but that it ra ises more ques­
tions than it answers . 1 22 
As for legal doctrine, it was seen that the EC Expert report written during the 
1980-1988 Iran-Iraq conflict was the first legal study devoted to the subject.  Fol­
lowing the 1 990-1991  Gulf conflict, the need to study the issue of the legal effect 
of armed conflict on mu ltilateral environmental treaties has been raised regu­
larly. 1 2 3  However, the scope of most of the studies conducted thus far is severely 
restricted. Not only do they concentrate primarily on the environmental treaties 
directly affected by these conflicts, almost invariab ly, reliance is p laced on 
pre-Charter law and legal doctrine. 1 24 The suggestions made by an lCRC Commit­
tee of Experts to study all major environmental treaties with a view to ascertaining 
whether they continue to apply in times of war have thus far not been fo llowed. 125  
Unsurprisingly therefore, in their  recent submissions before the  lq, States 
were sharply divided on these questions.  Both proponents and opponents of the 
legality of nuclear weapons admitted that the vast majority of environmental trea­
ties are si lent on the question of their effect during war and armed conflict, 1 26 but 
they drew opposing conclusions from this fact. The Solomon Islands argued that 
this silence proves that they are designed to ensure environmental protection a t  
al l  times, in peace and  war, unless expressly exc\uded. 1 27 It was further argued on 
their behalf that the outbreak of war or other armed conflict does not automati­
cally suspend or terminate the operation of those treaties and that, in any event, 
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such treaties con tinue to apply where they are in force between one or  more par­
ties to a conflict and third States . 1 2 8  
The United States and  the  U K  replied tha t  the  nature and  the  scope of these 
agreements, and the intention of the drafters, cannot be construed as an implied 
p rohib ition on the threat or  use of nuclear weapons.  129 In addition, the Court it­
self held that whether such treaties were applicable or not in  armed conflict,  was 
not relevant to the legal question before i t . 1 30  
In view of the above, it seems necessary to broaden the inquiry and examine the 
relationship b etween armed conflict and treaties in  general. 
3 . 4 . 2 .  The Relat ionsh ip  between I nternat ional  Armed Confl i ct and Treat ies i n  
General  
The question of the continued relevance or vali dity of treaties during armed 
conflict is a subject that i s  regularly described as one of the problem areas in  inter­
national law. 1 3 1  In  the 1 929  case of Karnuth v.  United States, the U .S .  Supreme 
Court made an observation which many scholars would still  find  true today:  
The effect of war upon treaties is a subject in res pect of which there are widely divergent 
opinions. . . . The authorities, as well as the practice of nations, present a great contrariety 
of views. The law of the subject is still in the making, and, in attempting to fonnulate 
principles at all approaching generality, couns must proceed with a good deal of caution. 1 32 
In spite of various attempts at codification, which will  be discussed b elow, 1 3 3 
there are no international treaties in force which explicitly regulate this sub ject .  
In what follows, evidence of State practice and opinzo juris will be  discussed, fol­
lowed by an analysis of case law and a review of the doctrine on the legal effects of 
armed conflict  on treaties i n  general .  This section of the chapter ends with a 
methodological proposal for the examination of the relationship between multi­
lateral environmental agreements and armed conflict .  
A. S tate Practice and Opinio Juris 
A t  the Outbreak of Hostilities. 
Under the traditional model, premised on a legal dichotomy b etween war and 
peace, questions regarding the con tinued operation of treaties between b elligerents 
did not arise. At the outbreak of armed conflict, b elligerent States issued declara­
tions of war, according to which, all treaties with belligerents were abrogated .  Thus, 
in 1 9 1 1 Turkey declared war on Italy and proclaimed that al l  of her treaties with It­
aly were thereby at an end. 1 34 This was still the official French position at the 
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outbreak of World War 11 . 1 35 In its declaration of war against Japan, the French 
government announced the abrogation of all conventions with the former. 1 36 
At the end of the war, the fate of pre-war treaties was decided by subsequen t 
peace treaties .  Thus, Article I I  of the Definit ive Treaty of Peace between Great 
Britain and France, signed at Paris in 1 7 83 ,  "renewed and confirmed" the treaties 
which had existed previous to the war. 1 37 
A U .S .  author commented in 1 9 5 8  that in  "modern "  wars, such proclamations 
are not ordinarily made. 1 3 8  However, even if modern armed conflicts are less fre­
quently characterised by the formal commencemen t of hosti l i t ies, treaty relations 
between contending States may stil l be  affected as a resu l t  of official government 
policy .  I t  was argued before that the legal concept of a s tate of war remains signifi­
cant  despite the outlawry of war  by  the collecti ve security systems of the 20th 
century. Moreover, many countries continue to regard the creation of a formal 
state of war as a possib i l i ty. 1 39 
A formal declaration of war has considerable consequences for domest ic  l aw. 
For example, in  the United States and the UK, Trading with the Enemy acts come 
into operat ion.  The opponent bell igerent becomes an enemy, and  all  those l iving 
and trading in  that  country become enemy aliens.  Most obligations and transac­
tions involving enemy aliens wil l  be nullified and may become criminal .  The 
1 939 UK Trading with the Enemy Act in troduces a stringent regime of prohib i ­
t ions and con trols, and proceedings involving enemy aliens become sub j ect to  
serious constraints . 1 40 In  the Uni ted States, war  suspends the right of enem y  
plaintiffs to bring court proceedings. 1 4 1  
Absent a formal declaration of war, such effects d o  n o t  come into operation au­
tomatically, but may be brought into operation by specific measures. Thus,  in the 
1 982 Falklands/Malvinas conflict, the UK broke off diplomatic relations with Ar­
gentina,  froze Argentinean assets, prohib ited imports from the l atter, and ceased 
export credi t guarantees. A s imi lar course was followed by the UK following the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in  1 990. In  i ts  immediate aftermath, the UK brought a 
series of statutory instruments into operation to give effect to UN and Ee sanc­
tion s aimed at  depriving Iraq of any financial and economic benefits and to 
induce i t  to change course. 1 42 
A t  the Conclusion of Peace Treaties . 
From the above it fo llows that government opinion and State practice on the 
effect of hostil it ies on pre-war treaties may be derived not only from declarations 
and documents a t  the outbreak of hosti l ities but also from clauses included in 
subsequent peace treaties .  1 43 Nevertheless, there are several obstacles.  The terms 
of some peace treaties are b iased in favour of victorious States, even a t  the expense 
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of third States. 1 44 Furthermore, the l anguage used by  many treaties is,  at best, in­
conclusive as to the question which concerns u s  here : namely the legal effect of 
pre-war treaties during the conflict .  For instance, the Versai lles Peace Treaty (and 
its counterparts 1 45 ) includes elaborate provisions for the fate of multi lateral and 
b ilateral treaties .  As to the former ca tegory, Articles 282 to 288 contai n detailed 
provisions for specially named m ult ilateral conventions .  Articl e  2 82 enumerates 
26 conven tions of an economic and technical  character that "shall be  applied" as 
between the Allied Powers and Germany; A rticles 2 8 3  to 286 deal wi th multilat­
eral conventions in the area of postal communications, telegraphic conventions 
and intel lectual property that will  be applied between the victorious powers and 
Germany upon the fu lfillment  of certain  condi tions.  The arb i trary character of 
these provisions is  revealed in  Article 287, which stipulates that one particular 
convention will  be  applied between a l l  parti es, except for France, Portugal and 
Romania . 1 46 Moreover, u se of the term "apply" in respect of these multi lateral 
conventions does not indicate what the status of these treaties was during the past 
war. 
As to the category of b ilateral trea ties, the Al l ied an d Associated Powers were 
gi ven the right by Article 289 to select b i la teral treaties they wished to "revive" by 
means of a notification addressed to the vanquished power(s) .  Use of the term "re­
vive" might  suggest that these b ilateral treaties had not been annul led during the 
war, but that they had at  mos t been suspended between belligerents for the dura­
tion of the conflict. However, such an in terpretation is  far from certain since the 
penultimate paragraph of Article 289 of the Versailles treaty stipulates that all 
o ther b ilateral treaties concluded between the former b el l igerents "are and re­
main abrogated. , , 1 47 In  addition, the last paragraph of Article 289 gave all  Al lied 
and Associated Powers the right to "revive" b i lateral treaties with Germany, even 
if  they had never declared war on the latter. 
The peace treaties concluded after World War II differ from the Versail les 
model in  that only b i lateral treaties between vic torious and vanquished powers 
were expressly dealt  with. The absence of a regulation for mult i lateral treaties has 
subsequently been seized upon as proof that this type of treaty had not been abro­
gated between belligeren ts at the outbreak of World War I I ,  but had been 
suspended, a t  most . 1 48 
With regard to the fate of b ilateral treaties, World War II peace treaties follow in 
the footsteps of  the Versailles treaty. 1 49 Hence, the victorious Powers were allowed 
to select those treaties which they wished to apply for the future. I SO This allowed 
Great Britain and India to take control over Thailand's post-war treaty relations . I S I 
Again, there is evidence of arb i trariness in the State practice following World War 
II .  The United States used the treaty revival procedure to notify a few "new" treaties 
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to defeated Powers-Italy, Bulgaria, and Japan-although none of these had been 
in force between the United S tates and the defeated States prior to the conflict. I S2 
Moreover, the language used in the peace treaty clauses after World War I I  re­
veals very l i ttle about the status of bilateral pre-war treaties between belligerents.  
Whereas World War I peace treaties used the term "revive," most  of World War II 
peace treaties use the formula "keep in force or revive . ,, 1 5 3  As for the s tatus of trea­
ties not notified, each of the peace treaties concluded after World War II resolved 
the question by providing that they shall be regarded as abrogated. I S4 I t  i s  in ter­
esting to note that whilst the victorious States chose to revive very few prewar 
treaties after World War I,  a far greater n umber of pre-war (bilateral) treaties were 
revived after World War 1 1 . 1 5 5  
In sum,  the language used in these peace treaties shows that  the drafters did not 
wish to be drawn on any theory regarding the effects of the past conflicts on trea­
ties . They were pri m arily concerned with the settl ing of post-war Treaties and 
other relations with the defeated States for the future. 
The post-war settlement of treaty relations involving Austria and Germany con­
firm the growing irrelevance of peace treaties for the question that concerns us here. 
The State Treaty of Austria, signed in 1955, did not include provisions on prewar 
treaties, apparen tly because she was not considered a vanquished State by the 
Allies. 1 56 Professor Verosta claims that Austria "applied again" all multilateral and 
bilateral pre-war treaties which she had concluded since 19 18, but that some addi­
tional protocols were needed to meet the new circumstances. I S?  As for Germany, 
the third Reich was dissolved at the end of World War II ,  and no formal peace 
treaty was signed. No comprehensive solution was ever devised, and  many U.S .  
courts had to  deal with cases involving pre-war treaties with Germ any. I S8 
A further problem is that since World War II, inter-State armed conflict is only 
rarely terminated through the conclusion of formal peace treaties. No such treaties 
were concluded after the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq l 59 and 1990-1991  Gulf conflicts. 1 60 In 
addition, the few that were concluded lack provisions on pre-war relations for a vari­
ety of reasons. The 1970 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty ends the state of war between the 
Parties by express provision, 1 6 1 but it does not contain a settlement of pre-war treaty 
relations, since presumably, there were none. The same applies to the 1983 Agreement 
between Lebanon and Israel l 62 and to the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty. 1 63 The 
1995 DayronlParis Peace agreements do not contain any such provisions either.164 
Other Evidence of Government Views . 
Shortly after World War I I ,  a Swedish scholar sought the views of several gov­
ernments  on the effects of World War II on, inter alia, multilateral treaties of a 
technical  or non-political nature, the fate of which had not  been expressly 
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regulared by rhe peace rrearies .  The mosr represen rarive replies received were as 
fol lows. The Br i rish Foreign Office replied rha r :  
It i s  not the view o f  His MaJt'sty's Crruernment that multilateral conventIOns ipso facto should 
lapse with the olllbreak of war, and this is partiClllariy tnle in the case of conventions to whidl 
nelllral Powers are parties. . .  (. . .  ) Indeed, the true legal doctrine would appear to be that it is 
only the suspension of normal peacefol relations between belligerents which renders impOSSIble 
the fulfillment of multilateral conventions in so far as concerns them, and operates as a 
temporary suspension as between the belligerellls of Sllcll conventions. 1 6 5  
Similarly, a former direcror of rhe French Foreign Ministry accepred that multilat­
eral treaties may have only been suspended during the war between belligerents. 1 66 
The legal adviser of the U .S .  Department of State repl ied that with regard to 
nonpolitical m ult i lateral treaties, rhe Un ited States rook the view thar these were 
nor ipso facto abrogated by  war, bur rhat certain provisions m ay, as a practical mat­
rer, have been inoperative. He added that : 
The view of this C(JVern ment is that the effect of the war on such treaties was only to terminate 
or suspend their execution between opposing belligerents, and that, in the absence of special 
reasons for a contrary view, they remained ill force between co-belligerents, between 
belligerents alld nelllral parties, and between nelllral parties. 1 67 
During the hearings before the U.S .  Committee on Foreign Relations on the 
proposed Test Ban Treaty ( 1 963) ,  the question was raised whether i t  would pro­
h ibi t  the use of nuclear weapons in time of war. Article 1 of this treaty (hereinafter 
PTBT) prohibi t s :  
. . .  any  nuclear test weapon test explosion, or any  o ther  nuclear exp losion, a t  any 
place under i ts jur isd ic t ion or control .  I 68 
In reply, the U .S .  Department of  Defense argue d tha t  it was s tandard prac­
t ice  " in  treat ies  outlawing the use of specified weapo n s  or  ac ti o n s  i n  t ime of  
war"  for the treati e s  to s t a t e  expressly th at  they  apply  i n  t ime  of war, and tha r  
s ince  the p roposed treaty di d not  con ta in  such langu age, i t  m u st,  therefore, be  
p resumed that  no such  p roh ib i tion would  apply. 1 69 Whi l s t  the reasons  given 
may be  open to chal lenge, an  analysis  of the  travaux preparatoires ind ic ate tha t  
the  words  "or  any other  n uclear explosion"  were  in serted or ig ina l ly  a t  the  re­
quest of the UK fo r the p u rpose of banning "peaceful -use"  explos ions  as well a s  
t e s t  explos ions . 1 70 
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This view i s  notable for several reasons .  Al though the PTBT is on i ts  face a dis­
armamen t trea ty, i t  has obvious environmental implica tions.  S ince the purpose of 
the treaty is "to end the contamination of man's environment by  radioactive sub ­
s tances, ,, l 7 l Schwelb regarded i t  a s  n earer t o  a "human rights, world health or 
safety at  sea conven tion" than a disarmament  conven tion .  Furthermore, he con­
s idered i t  significant that the treaty does not prohibi t  undergroun d  testing nor, in 
his  opinion, the use of nuclear weapons in  time of waL ln Moreover, the above 
U . S .  view contradicts claims made before the ICJ by opponents of the legal i ty  of 
nuclear weapons.  Several S tates argued that  the PTBT appl ies  in  peace and in war, 
and  that i t  should hence be interpreted as prohib i ting the use of nuclear weap­
onsY3 Finally, it is noteworthy that the 1 996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) does not  contain any provision for the outbreak of armed conflict 
either. l 74 
B .  Case Law. There is considerable case law on the effect of war on treaties .  
But i t  consists predominantly of municipal case law dealing with situations aris­
ing from World War II,  and/or with narrow issues regarding a formal state of 
war. l 7 5  There are, nevertheless, a few international dec isions on  problems related 
to armed conflict and trea ties. 
International Jurisprudence . 
There are several international cases concerning the relationship between war 
or armed conflict and treaties . Some of these deal with the fun damen tal question 
as to whether certain treaties can continue to appl y  during war or  armed conflict .  
Others discuss principles of interpretation.  
The North A tlantic Coast Fisheries case ( 1 909- 1 9 1 0) concerned disagreements 
between the Un ited S tates and Great B ri tain on the effect of the War of 1 8 1 2  on  a 
treaty of l 783  which granted fish ing righ ts to Americans in the North Atlantic .  In 
i ts award, the Permanent Court of Arb i tration noted in passing that : 
In tern a tional  law in i t s  modern development recognises t h a t  a great  n umber of  
treaty  obligat ions are  n o t  ann ulled by war,  but  a t  most  suspended by i t . 1 7 6  
This  statement should be contrasted wi th the  award rendered in Dalmia Ce­
ment Ltd. v. National Bank of Pakistan ( 1 976). Appointed as sole arbi trator, 
Professor Lalive needed to determ ine whether the hostil it ies of 1 965 between In­
dia and Pakistan, which lasted 17 days and involved a substantial n umber of 
troops,  had amounted to a state of war. He decided in  the negative on two main 
grounds.  First, he rej ected the argument that  a state of war cannot exist  between 
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UN Members, holding that the Charter led to a mere presumption that its parties 
did not intend to create a state of war in the absence of clear indications to the con­
trary. l n  Second, he found it significant that neither party had broken off 
diplomatic relations nor regarded any of the b ilateral treati es between themselves 
as  cancelled upon the outbreak of hosti l i t ies . 1 78 This arb itral decision is  debatable 
on several counts .  
Apart from Pakistan's claim that she was a t  war wi th I ndia, 1 79 there was con­
siderable evidence that both parties had attempted to exercise  traditional 
belligerent rights, including measures of economic warfare affecting third 
States. I SO Moreover, the arbi trator relied on the outdated theory that a state of war 
implies the "complete rupture of in ternational relations" and the automatic can­
cellation of treaty relations between bell igeren ts .  l S I  
The la tter part of t h e  award i s  at  variance with current principles o f  in terna­
tional  law reflected, inter alia , in the 1 969 Vienna  Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. 1 82 As was stressed by the panel of arbitrators in Lafico and Burundi 
( 1 99 1 ) :  
The i dea that the exec u t i o n  o f  treaties should b e  affected b y  the severa nce of 
diplomatic  and consular  relations i s  even more i nco ngruous when it i s  borne i n  
m i n d  t h a t  t h e  m o s t  a uth oritative recent  doctri ne, e m a n a t i n g  fro m  the I nstitute of 
I n ternational  Law, considers that even armed conflict  does not s uspe n d  the 
applicat ion of t reat ies . 1 8 3  
The ICJ has in several contemporary cases dealt ei ther directly o r  incidentally 
with the problem of the continued relevance during modern-non-war-hostili­
ties of bilateral treaties concluded primarily to regulate commercial relations 
between States. 
In its 1 980  decis ion regarding the Hostages case, the ICJ assumed jur i sd ic ­
t ion,  inter alia, on the  b as is  of  the Treat y  of  Amity, Economic  Relat ions ,  and 
Consular  Righ ts concluded in 1 95 5  between the  U .S .  and Iran . 1 84 The Court 
fou n d  Iran respons ib le  towards the  Uni ted S tates  for having commit ted  suc­
cess ive  and cont inuing breaches of  the obl igat ions laid upon i t, m ter alia, b y  
t h e  1 955  Treaty .  Th e import  of t h i s  deci s ion is  t h a t  the  C o u r t  d i d  not  regard 
the treaty as abrogated, suspen ded, or not  applicab le  to acts  of v io lence  com­
m i tted agains t  the U.S .  Embassy  and its  s taff, for which i t  held the  Iranian 
govern ment responsible . 1 8S 
The same treaty lies at the basis of the claims currently pending before the 
Court in the Od Platforms case, which includes claims concerning Operation 
Praying Manti s . 1 86 I n  i ts  app l ica t ion ,  I ran con ten ds that  the  attack and the 
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destruction of three offshore oil p ro duction complexes carried out  by the U . S .  
Navy in 1987  a n d  1988  constituted a fun damen tal b reach of various p rovisions of 
the 1955 Treaty of Amity. 1 8 7  The U n i  ted S tates raised as prel iminary ob jection 
that questions concerning the use of  force fel l  outside the amb i t  of the 1 95 5  
Treaty, since i t  deals with commercial a n d  consular provisions. 188  
I n  i ts  decision of 12  December 1 996, the Court rej ected the U.S .  ob jection . I t 
pointed out first, that neither party con tested that the Treaty of Amity was s ti11 in 
force and reca11ed that a similar view was taken in its above-mentioned decision in 
1 980 . 1 8 9  It then noted that the treaty did not expressly exclude certain matters 
from the Court's jurisdiction and h eld that a violation of the rights of one party 
u nder the treaty by means of the use of force was as unlawful as a violation b y  
other means . 190 T h e  Court subsequen tly held that the contested m i litary actions 
of the U ni ted States had the potential of affecting the freedom of commerce to 
which I ran was entitled accordi ng to the treaty. 1 9 1  
A s imilar dispute h a d  b een a t  issue in t h e  decision in th e Nicaragua case. In i ts 
memorial,  Nicaragua h ad relied as a subsidiary means on the jurisdictional clause 
of the 1956  Treaty of Frien dship, Comm erce and N avigation with the United 
S tates. I n  Nicaragua submitted that the dispu ted U. S .  military and paramil i tary 
activities constituted a violation of the treaty, whilst the Un ited States ob j ected 
that the disputed activities fel l  outsi de its amb it. In its  1 986 j udgemen t, the ICJ 
h el d  that the United States had acted in breach of the 1956 Treaty and had com­
mitted acts calcu lated to deprive the treaty of its ob ject and purpose. The mil itary 
and paramil i tary activities specifica11y men tioned by the Court i n c luded a series 
of attacks directed against Nicaraguan terr i tory and ports, the laying of mines in 
th e  internal or territorial waters of the claim an t, and the declaration of a gen eral 
emb argo on trade. I 93 
What these three decisions have in common is that the Court held that ques­
tions related to the use of force were n o t per  se excluded from the scope of bilateral 
commercial treaties.  The relevance of this case law for the present study is  as fol­
lows : although these commercial treaties were premised on the existence of 
frien d ly relat ions  between contracting parties, their ob ject and purpose were, in 
the words of the Cou rt, "not to regulate peaceful  an d friendly relations between 
the two S tates in a general sense., , 1 94 In addition, none of the treaties contained 
specific provisions on armed con flict .  
I n  the 1 92 3  case of the S S  Wimbledon before the Permanent Coun of lnterna­
tional Justice (peIJ) and in the requests by WHO and the UN General Assembly 
concer ning the Legality of Nuclear Weapons, a further principle of treaty in terpre­
tation was debated. The 1 923 case concerned the in terpretation of Article 380 of 
the Treaty of Versai lles, which provided that:  
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The Kiel Canal and i t s  approaches shall  be maintained free and open to the vessels of  
commerce and  of  war  of a l l  nat ions at peace w i th  Germany on terms of ent ire equality.  
In  March 1 92 1  Poland was at war with Russ ia, and Germany had declared her­
se lf  a neutral in the conflict .  In  application of express prior neutrality orders, the 
Kiel Canal director refused entry into the canal to the SS Wimbledon,  an English 
vessel chartered by a French company to carry war m aterials for the  Polish gov­
ernment  to the naval port of Danzig. 1 95 In the ensuing case before the PCI], 
Germany pleaded that Article 380 of the Versai l les treaty posed no obstacle to the 
application of neutrali ty orders in the Kiel Canal . ! 96 I ts  opponents argued that  
Germany's obligations under the treaty were supreme and that Art ic le 380 was a 
permissible infringement upon Germany's sovereignty. The majority of the 
Court resorted primarily to a l iteral in terpretation of Article 380, finding that its  
terms were clear and gave rise to no doubt.  Th ey held that Germany was perfectly 
free to regulate her neutral i ty in  the Russo- Polish war, but subj ect to the provi ­
sions of the article in question ' ! 97 
In  their jo int  dissenting opinion, Judges Anzi lotti  and Huber saw the legal 
question differently. They asked whether: 
. . .  the c lauses of the  Trea ty of Versa i l les relat ing to the Kiel  Cana l a l so apply i n  the 
event of Germany' s neutrali ty, or do they contempla te  normal c ircumstances, that  i s  
to say, a s ta te  o f  peace, without affecting the  righ t s  and duties of neutra l i ty? 198  
They found that even in  the absence of an express treaty provision allowing her 
to do so, in ternational law permitted Germany to take exceptional measures af­
fecting the t reaty, if done for the purpose of preserving her position of neutrality 
or self-defence: 
The righ t  of  a Sta te  to adopt the course which i t  consi ders best sui ted to the 
exigencies of i t s  security and the maintenance of its  integri ty, i s  so essen t ia l  a r ight 
that ,  in  case of doubt, treaty st ipul a t ions  cannot be i n terpreted as l imiting it ,  even 
h h h . I '  d fl "  h h '  . 1 99 t oug t ose Sl ipU atIons  0 not con Ic t  wit suc an mterpre ta t lOn .  
Although this proposit ion formed part  of a jo int  dissenting opinion,  the UK 
argued in  1 995  in  connection with the advisory requests on the legality of nuclear 
weapons that this opinion was not at variance with the PCI] 'S majority judge­
ment. 200 She further submitted that the fundamental and overriding character of 
self-defence in international law constituted a principle of general app lication 
to interpretation of treaty law.20 1 As seen before, in  i ts 1996 Advisory Opinion, 
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the ICJ accepted that environmental treaties could not  be construed so as to deny 
a State the right to use armed force in sel f-defence or to entail obligations of  total 
restrain t in armed conflict .  202 
Municipal Case Law . 
The municipal j urisprudence is so closely l inked with constitutional munici­
pal issues,  and so diverse, that i t  is  difficult  to detect common principles and rules 
that could be transferred easily onto the international plane. 
In his report to the Institut de droit I nternational ( Institu t), Professor Broms ar­
gued that the Judiciary ought to ascertain the opinion of the Executive before trying to 
solve the problem of the legal effect of war on treaties.203 This procedure is followed in 
one form or another by many countries.20-t For instance, it would be usual in proceed­
ings before the English Courts for the Executive to be asked to certify whether there 
was a state of war, indicating the precise moment of its commencement and i ts termi­
nation. The Crown is asked for guidance even if the UK is a non-contending party.20S 
The dominant theory applied by U .S .  courts was expressed i n  a letter from the 
Department of State to the Attorney-General in  1 948 as follows :  
. . .  the determinative factor I S  whether or not there is an incompatibility between t h e  treaty 
prrruision in question and the nlmntenance of a state of war as to make it clear that the 
prrruision should not be enforced. 206 
This theory was already earlier applied by Judge Cardozo in the celebrated case 
of Teeht v. Hughes ( 1 920), in which a rather dim view was taken of academic at­
tempts at  rule-making :  
The effect of  war  upon  the exist ing treaties of  bel l igerents is  one  of  the unsettled 
problems of the law . . . .  International law today does not  preserve treaties or annul 
them, regardless of the effects produced. I t  deal s wi th such problems pragmatical ly, 
preserv ing or annul l ing as the necess i t ies  of war exact .  It es tabl ishes standards, bu t  i t  
does not  fetter i tself wi th  rules .  When i t  a t tempts to do more, i t  fi n ds tha t  there i s  
ne i  ther  unan imi  ty of opinion nor uniformi ty of practice .  207 
The study conducted by McIntyre after World War I I  shows that when the 
U.S.  Executive considered i t  in  i ts  own national security i nterest to suspend or ab­
rogate a treaty during war, i t  would do so, and  that the  courts often deferred to 
whatever policy the government of that moment adhered to, particularly on af­
fairs such as trading with the enemy and on i nheritance issues . 2os Thus, in Clark 
v. A llen ( 1 947) the  U .S .  Supreme Court noted that the Department of State had 
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changed its earlier position, no longer favouring the view that World War I I  had 
abrogated all provisions of the 1 92 3  Treaty of Friendship with Germany. The 
Court subsequently held that a c lause providing inheritance of realty under the 
1 923 Treaty was not incompatible wi th national policy.209 
Particularly in commercial  cases i nvolving interpretat ion of con tract clauses, 
courts h ave been reluc tant to apply the tradit ional  technical m eaning of the s tate 
of war as in tended by the Execu tive. English law on the effects of undeclared 
wars has been s trongly influenced by the case of Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki 
Kaisha of Kobe v. Bantham Steamship Co ( 1 939) . 2 1 0 This  concerned a charterparty 
clause allowing cancellation " if  war b reaks out  involving Japan . "  In  1 93 7  heavy 
fighting took p lace between the regular forces of Japan and China ,  even though 
war had not been declared and diplomatic relat ions were not b roken off. A cer­
t ificate obtained from the Foreign Office declared that the Engl i sh  government 
was not prepared to say whether  a state of war exi s ted, but  that this  migh t not  
necessari ly be  conclusive for the interpretation of the term "war"  i n  particular 
documents or  statutes . 2 1 1  The j udge subsequen tly fel t  free to construe the term 
"war" in  the sense i n  which "an ordinary comm erci al man would  use  it" and 
concluded that  war exi s ted for the purposes of the charterparty. This  p recedent 
was subsequently fo llowed in five cases related to the 1956 Suez conflict ,  during 
which the Prime Minister had categorically denied that the U K  was at war wi th  
Egypt .  The courts recognised that  there were host i l i t ies  between the U K  and 
Egypt, albeit  not  involving war. 2 1 2 In  appl icat ion of thi s case law i t  h as been sug­
gested that i f  a B ri t i sh court were ca l led upon to construe the express ion "war" 
o r  s imi lar terms in  a commercial document, facts involving the Desert Storm 
phase of the 1 990- 1 99 1  Gulf war would be held to const i tute b el l igerency i n  a 
colloquial  sense.2 1 3  
Although general s tatements with respect to municipal j urisprudence are d iffi­
cult to make, there are a few common trends.  Municipal j u dges are generally 
reluctant to consider political treaties as unaffected by war. 2 1 4  A more l iberal l ine 
i s  followed for extradition agreements, for perpetual r ights  accorded to individu­
als, and in commercial matters including in  particular intellectual property 
rights .  These treaties are often regarded as, at most,  suspended during war be­
tween belligerents . 2 I 5  The above principles have been confirmed b y  cou rts in 
Austria,2 1 6 Belgium,2 I 7 Germany,2 1 8 Greece,2 1 9  Italy,220  Luxembourg,22 1 the 
Netherlands,222 Norway,223 the Uni ted States224  and the U K.225  The French 
Cour de Cassation, however, seems to adhere firmly to the theory that war annuls 
most (bilateral) treaties between belligerents . 226 
Unsurprisingly, courts in  many countries conform to the legal standpoint  of 
the Executive regarding quest ions as to whether a state of war exists, particularly 
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if the country itself is involved in the conflict . 227 It is also a matter for the Execu­
ti ve to decide on the formal end of a state of war. 228 Absent a formal declaration of 
war or a firm indication by  the government, j udges are relu ctant to consider treaties 
as automatically terminated or suspended by the outbreak of armed conflict.229 
Still, a caveat needs to be added for cases involving pub lic policy. It has been 
noted that British courts will probably refuse to enforce contracts which are con­
sidered detrimental to the interests of the country, even in  undeclared wars. This 
may affect transactions considered as assisting opponents in modern jus ad bellum 
"non-war" hostilities such as UN enforcement operations  and self- defense mea­
sures.230 Hence, municipal courts are empowered to examine whether the 
continuation of a particular treaty would be incompatible with express or implied 
government policy of national and perhaps even international security interests .  
As a consequence of the above, the same hostilities may be construed differ­
ently, depending on the c ircumstances and purposes of the legal assessment.2 3 1 
Thus, while the Korean con flict d id  not amount to war in the legal sense in the 
U K, courts in the Australia, France, New Zealand, and the United States232  have 
regarded the conflict as war for purposes such as insurance policies2 3 3  and mil i ­
tary discipline.2 34 
However, there is little jurisprudence on the type of treaties this study is con­
cerned with, although there is  case la� on treaties dealing with in land navigation : 
In The Golden R iver v. The Wilhelmina ( 1 950), the District Court of Rotterdam 
needed to decide whether the Convention of Mannheim of 1 86 8  concerning N avi­
gat ion on the Rhine remained applicable during World War I I  between Holland 
and Germany. The court decided that this multi latera l  treaty was not  concluded 
in contemplation of war and that i t  was suspended as between Holland and Ger­
m any from May 1 940, but only insofar as, and as long as, its provisions had in fac t  
become inapplicable. Applying this c r i  terion of factual inapplicabili ty to the  case a t  
hand, it furthermore held that the  convention remained suspended after the  uncon­
ditional surrender of Germany, during the period necessary to consolidate this 
surrender and to restore order in  the chaos as a result of the fighting in Europe.2 3 5  
In conclusion, i t s  needs to  be observed that the  existing case law contributes 
little to the main questions this study i s  concerned with . Municipal case law does 
not answer the fundamental question as to whether m ulti lateral environmental 
agreements can be said to apply at all during armed conflict .  What it does indicate 
is that the views of the Executive on the effect of treaties during armed conflict are 
regarded as binding and that, fai l ing a clear indication to that effect, courts will  
check whether the continued operation of a treaty is  compatible with national 
pol icy. If  the outcome of this analysis is  posi tive, courts favour the view that most 
treaties survive the outbreak of war but that some provisions may be inoperative 
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on  practical  or factual grounds. However, municipal case law does not reveal any 
standards to determine whether, and if  so on what grounds, contracting Parties 
may terminate or suspend the operation of such agreements during armed 
conflict .  
C .  Deve l o p m ent of Legal  Doctr ine.  In the period between the turn of the cen­
tury and World War II,  the problem of the effects of war on i nternational treaties 
attracted the attention of several scholars.236 In addition, two major academic stud­
ies were published. The first of these was a report written by Politis on the "Effects 
of War on International Obligations and Private Con tracts,,,2 37 adopted by the 
Institut at its Christiana session in 1 9 1 2 .238 The second major study was conducted 
by Professor Garner for the Harvard Research in International Law on the Law of 
Treaties. The proposed draft convention with comments on the law of treaties was 
published in 1 935 ,  and i t  contained an elaborate provision on the effect of war.2 39 
After World War II in terest in the subj ect all but  disappeared.240 The ILC con­
sistently refrained from including the effects of war/armed conflict i n  its studies, 
including, in particular, treaty law. Nevertheless, many of the disciplines of in ter­
national law which the ILC has tried to codify and progressively develop are 
relevant for the question of the continued operation of multilateral environmen­
tal treaties in  armed conflict .24 1 
I n  the mid- l 970s, academic  interest i n  the subject  of the effects of armed con­
flict on treaty law was rekindled when the  Institut agreed to review the work of 
Poli tis and appointed Professor Broms as rapporteur. It was only ten years later, 
and after much discussion, that the Institut finally adopted a Resolution on "The 
Effects of Armed Conflict on Treaties," at i ts 1 9 8 5  Helsinki  session.242 The most 
recent contribution of the Insti tut will be discussed later in  more detai l .243 
It i s  often said that there are two opposing doctrinal schools on the legal effect 
of war on international treaties. 
• a first one according to which all  treaties are annulled by  war/-H 
• a second one according to which the outbreak of war as a rule does not affect 
treaties;245 
However, the first "radical" theory, according to which the outbreak of war 
brings nothing but chaos to international relations and consequently annuls ipso 
facto all treaties, has never received many adherents. Politis already expressed doubt 
about the conception that war had an annulling effect on all treaties.246 On the 
other hand, even Garner's theory that there were no reasons of public policy why 
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any treaty should be regarded as ipso facto annulled by war247 was never fully ac­
cepted in S tate practice .248 
Currently, the most universally accepted doctrinal premise is that war and 
other forms of armed con fl ict  have no automatic ( ipso facto ) cut-off effect on trea­
t ies, but that some trea ties are, may, or may have to be  suspen ded. 
There are mul tiple reasons for this  change of heart by legal doctrine.  Some of 
these are related to the changing concept of war, others to principles of treaty law. 
As to the fi rst, in ternational armed conflict is no longer regarded as causing total 
disruption of all legal bonds between States; belligerents need to observe some ba­
sic rules of humanity between each other, and State practice shows that 
contending States often continue to maintain legal relations with each other in 
several areas.2 49 As for treaty law, there i s  a mo dern l egal presumption-favor 
contractus-which  favours the  con t inued operat ion of treat ies ,  even in such ex­
treme c i rcum stances  as armed conflic t . 2 50 This  i s  related to  the  fun d amen tal 
pr inc ipl e  of pacta sunt servanda , laid down in Art ic le  26 of the 1 969 Vienna 
Conven t ion on the Law of Treat ies ,  the importance of  w h ich  the ICJ  reaffi rmed 
i n  i ts j u d gement  in  the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case . 2 5 1  
Modern legal doctrine on the legal effect of armed conflict on treaties tends to adopt 
a pragmatic approach, taking into account the intention of the parties as well as the type 
oftreaty concerned.25 2 Although this does not amount to a consistent theory, it aims at 
reducing the impact of armed conflict on treaty relations whilst recognising that in 
some areas, the continuing effectiveness of treaties is incompatible with a state of war or 
armed conflict.2 53 The pragmatic approach of modern doctrine combines the tradi­
tional technique of classification of treaties with the intention theory. 
Under the classification theory, treaties are organ ised according to their nature 
and  type, and different  rules are said to apply to different  classes of treaties, ac­
cording to various criter ia : 2 54 
• b ilateral treaties are distinguished from multilateral treaties; 
• treaty relations between contending (bell igerent) States are distinguished 
from those involving non-contending (neutral) States ; 
• political treaties such as treaties of friendship and commerce, of alliance and 
non-aggression and peace treaties between belligerents are annulled (ac­
cording to the older theories) or  at least suspended (modern theories) 
during the conflict  between belligeren ts ; 
• executed treat ies such as those entailing territorial settlements and interna­
tional boundaries remain unaffected, and by extrapolation, the same rule  
applies to treaties establishing international regimes or entail ing a special 
status for a region ; 
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• treaties conclu ded w ith war in m ind, su ch as conventions of the Hague Law 
type, forbidding certa in means and m ethods of wa rfare, rema in in fo rce ; 
• the  operat ion of treaties that  establish i n ternational  o rgan isati o n s  remain in 
effect b etween b elligeren ts and n eutrals, but may be suspended as b etween 
belligerents ; 
• n on-poli tical treaties such a s  those regu lating com merce, n a v igation,  and 
matters of  private  in tern ational  law b etween citizen s o f  bel l igerent coun­
tries ,  may be suspended between b ellige rents;  
A recent add ition to the clas sificati o n  theory is  the ca tego ry o f  h u m anitarian 
treaties, pu rsuan t to a rule in troduced b y  the 1 969 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treati es .  According to Article 60( 5 )  of  th i s  Co n vention, the righ t to termi nate 
or suspend the operation of  a treaty as a consequence of i ts  b reach-the exceptio 
non adimpleti contractus-does not exi st fo r :  
. . .  provisions relat ing to the  protect ion of the  human  person contained i n  treat ies of 
a humani tarian character, in  particular ro provis ions prohib i t i ng any form or 
repri sals against persons protected by such treaties .  
I t  is  widely accepted that the phrase "provis ions  rela ting to the pro tection of 
the hu m an person . . .  " includes interna tional human i tarian law. 2 5 5  From the 
Namibia Advisory Opinion i t  can b e  i n ferred that  the  leI con s i dered A rticle 60 ( 5 )  
an expression of  a general  principle of law that p redated th e 1 969 V i e n n a  Conven­
tion b y  at least half a centu ry.2 5 6  
The classification theory has several weaknesses.  First, i t  i s  obvious that not a l l  
modern treaties c a n  b e  labelled as b elonging exclusively t o  one or t h e  o t h e r  cate­
go ry. Secondly, the theory fails to take the complexities of international armed 
conflict into accou nt.  For example, i t  is  often asserted that exec uted treati es such as 
those involving territorial and boun dary settlements remain unaffected between 
belligerents .  Yet, history shows that this rule remains valid only as  long as the 
treaty at issue is  not a casus belli: i .e. , the reason why the Parties reso rted to armed 
force i n  the first place.  In deed, disputes over natural resources and territorial claims 
are often causes of  war; battles tend to take place along strategic "natural" places 
such as ri verso 257 The recen t contlict in the fo rmer Yugoslavia is a stark reminder of 
the continuing fragility in in ternational law of the purported principle of the "in­
tangibil ity" of State bo rders.258  State p ractice proves that  several  criteria and rules 
s uggested by classification th eorists belong to the realm of jus de legu ferenda . 
Under the in tention theory, first  advocated by Hu rst, the primary test as to 
whether or not  a treaty s u rvives the outb reak of war b e tween parties i s  to b e  found 
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in the inten tion of the parties at the time the treaty was concluded.259  It was this 
theory that inspired the Harvard Research proposal for a provision on the effect of 
war on treaties . 260 
However, i t  i s  clear that the intention theory wi l l  rarely lead to results that dif­
fer radically from the classification theory. The real contribution of the in tention 
theory lies in its accommodation of those treaties which cannot be readily classi ­
fied in  any of the above-mentioned classes, provided that the parties' in tention i s  
clear or can be  inferred :  for example, i t  wil l  accommodate all treaties w ith a provi­
s ion on the outbreak of war/armed conflict .  
A major weakness of this theory i s  that i t  rests on two debatable assumptions ;  
first, that drafters of treaties have a particular inten tion wi th  respect  to the  ques ­
t ion of armed conflict, and secondly, that this intention can be uncovered. In  
regard to the  attendant problem, the theory i s  therefore of little real help. When a 
treaty contains a clause on armed conflict, the intention of the drafters is c lear, 
and one does not need the theory to resolve the issue. The difficult  cases concern 
treaties that are silent on the issue of armed conflict .  In some instances it might  be 
that the problem was discussed during the travaux preparatoires, but the rules of 
treaty in terpretation do not necessarily permi t  resort to statements that have not 
been formally recorded in the treaty text .  The inten tion of the parties should be 
derived primarily from the wording of the treaty i tself or from related ins tru­
ments.  Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation such as the 
travaux preparatoires or  the circumstances surrounding its conclusion, in case the 
general rules of interpreta tion lead to an ambiguous, obscure, manifestly absurd 
or unreasonable meaning of the text.26 1  
Finally, i t  should b e  noted that most o f  the doctrine  o n  the sub ject  i s  primarily 
concerned with the effect of (a formal s tate of) war on treaties, and that compara­
tively l i ttle attention has been paid to the effects of armed conflict. However, there 
i s  l i ttle doubt that the tendency in international  State practice, case law and doc­
trine, to reduce the i mpact of war on treaty relations will apply a fortiori to armed 
conflict .262 Armed conflict does not involve a total  disruption of treaty relations 
between States, and the treaty law principles of favor contractus and pacta sunt 
servanda should obviously apply in relation to armed conflict as well .  
This i s  supported by the work of the Insti tut that, as wil l  be seen immediately 
below, has equated a s tate of war with armed conflict  for the purposes of its 1 9 8 5  
Helsinki Resolu tion.  263 
D .  T h e  Cod ifi cat i o n  Effo rts of t h e  I nstitut de Droit I nternat i o n a l  be­
tween 1 974-1 985. I t  was seen above that the Institu t  took more than ten years to 
conclude the sub ject .  During these discussions, several members obj ected to the 
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adoption of the resolution on the grounds that the sub ject  was too poli tical,264 
that  the suggested principles were too selective,265 or that some principles were 
not supported by S tate practice.266 Professor Brownlie questioned the utility of 
the entire endeavour. He saw it  as internally contradictory insofar as it claimed to 
enunciate principles of positive international law whilst asserting that State prac­
tice in these matters was not uniform .267 
These criticisms may explain some of the following peculiari ties. For instance, 
in i ts preamble, the Resolution states that it shall not prej udge the application of 
the provisions of the Vienna Conven tion on the Law of Treaties .  As pointed ou t 
by  Professor Dinstein, this  amounts to a "double negative renvo!," since the Vi­
enna Convention i tself contains several articles s tipulating that i t  shall  not 
pre judge questions related to the use of force.268 
A second peculiarity concerns the definit ion of the term armed conflict for the 
purposes of the resolution. Article I defines this concept as : 
. . .  a state of war or an internat iona l  conflict invo lv ing armed operations which by 
their nature or exten t are l ike ly  to affect the operation of treaties between States 
part ies to the armed confl ict  or between S tates part ies to the armed conflict and third 
States regardless of a formal declarat ion of war or other declarat ion by any or al l  of 
the parties to the armed conflict.  269 
From the trm.'aux preparatoires, it appears that the formulation served several 
purposes : to take the real i t ies of modern warfare into account, to convey a de 
m inimis thresh old, and to exclude the possibil ity that a State which i s  not materi­
ally engaged in hos tili ties would be enti tled to affect trea ty relations by a simple 
declaration of war.no The problem, though, is that the definit ion results in a pe­
l ilia principii, for i t  provides a circuitous answer to the question of the effects of 
armed conflicts on treaties:  One can argue i ndefinitely on what type of conflict  
"by their nature or extent are likely to affect the operation of treaties between 
States.  " 
The Insti tut 's modest ambitions are clear from the preamble, which describes 
the resolution's aim as affirming certain principles of international law consider­
ing the lack of uniformity in State practice. Furthermore, whilst  aiming at  
reducing the effects of armed conflicts  on treaties, the resolution was mean t pri­
marily as a residual means of in terpretation.2 7 1 However, the contradiction 
between the enunciation of principles of posi tive i n ternational law and the admit­
ted lack of uniformity in S tate practice was never ful ly resolved .272 
The operational part of the reso lution affi rms much of the modern legal doc­
trine discussed above. The outbreak of armed conflict does not ipso facto terminate 
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the operation of treaties in force between parties to the conflict (Article 2) ;  i t  does 
not  ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of bilateral treaties between a 
party to an armed conflict  and a third Stare, nor of the operation of multilateral 
treaties between third Srates or  between parties to an armed conflict and third 
States (Article 5) ;  and i t  b rings i nto operation treaties which by reason of their na­
tu re or  purpose are to be regarded as operative during an armed conflict (Arricle 
3 ) .  Article 1 1  u rges parr ies to resume suspended treaties as soon as possible at  the 
end  of an armed conflict or  to agree otherwise. 
The provisions that merit special attention are the following. Article 6 of the 
Resolution stipulates that a treaty establishing an in ternarional organisation "is 
not  affected" by the existence of an armed conflict between any of its parties . 
However, mos t  reports by international organisations on their work during both 
World Wars contain evidence of the considerable extent to which their activities, 
income and membership were affecred by rhe ongoing hostili ties. For some of 
these organi sat ions rhe implications were severe. Thus, during World War I I  the 
International Labor Organisation was forced into changing its headquarters from 
Europe to the U nited Sta tes, whils t  the Central Commission for the Navigarion of 
the Rhine suspended work entirely during this  conflict .  Even organisations lo­
cated i n  neutral countries, such as the Universal Postal Union (uru) in  
Swi  tzerland, were not  spared.273  Another obvious example is  the  collapse of the  
League of Nations  O rganisation .  Some Member S rates ended their participation 
in compliance with the Covenants' provisions on denunciarion, whereas others 
simply withdrew, with or  wi thout offering legal grounds .  Following the establish­
ment of rhe U N, the League of Nations was dissolved. 
Seen against the background of the serious  disruption that many international 
organisations went through d uring both World Wars, as  well as many previous 
conflicts ,  the affirmative language of this provision appears, at a minimum, to 
amount to a proposal de lege ferenda . In  mitigation one should add thar the 
Institut's travaux clarify that Article 6 was narrowly conceived in  that whilst the 
workings of internarional organisations may be affected by war, the treaty estab­
lishing the organisation i tself should not be affected.274 This i nterpretation is 
supported not  only by State practice of the two World Wars : the case studies d is­
cussed in  the begi nning of this study demonstrate that during the 1 980-1988  and 
1990- 1 99 1  Gulf conflicts, regional institutions continued to function .275  
A further provision that  merits separate discussion i s  Article 4, which stipulates : 
The existence of an armed conflict does not  ent i t le  a party unila teral ly to terminate 
or to suspend the operat ion of treaty provi s ions rela t ing to the protec t ion  of the 
human person ,  un less the  treaty otherwise provides. 
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This provision is no teworthy for several reasons .  It was argued above that one 
of the crucial questions that needs to be answered is-as suming that multilateral 
environmental agreements can apply d u ring armed conflict-whether a n d  un der 
what circumstances con tracting parties  may invoke the exi s tence of armed con­
fl ict as  a ground for suspending (or terminating) their operation.  
Environmentalists would argue that current international  law requires every 
ground fo r treaty su spension to be exp ressly agreed upon.  Absent a provis ion 
authorising su spen sion i n  case of war, contracting parties would not  b e  allowed to 
invoke armed conflict as an excuse. Mili tary lawyers might obj ect that armed con­
flict  i s  lex specialis, an d that every Sta te has the righ t to suspend trea ties in  cases of 
war or armed con flict, even if  such a poss ibility is not expressly provi d ed for i n  the 
treaty itself. 
Both s ides of the argument were, as seen above, invoked i n  State subm issions 
before the ICJ in  connection with the  requests for an advisory opinion on the legal­
i ty of nuclear weapons. 216 The argument has obvious environmental significance, 
for few international  environmental treaties deal expressly w ith armed con flict.  
Two d iametrically opposed positions have been advocated i n  the doctri ne on this 
issue.  The EC Experts repo rt concludes that because arm e d  conflict  contingency 
clau ses are rare, absent such clau ses, parties are not allowed to suspen d the opera­
tion of treaties on the ground of armed conflict.277 Others contend that the 
absence of a clause on armed conflict proves that the treaties in question cannot be 
applied in armed conflict, or at least that thei r application is uncenain.278 Both 
positions will be tested in the case studies of conventions on m arin e pollution and 
m aritime safety that wi l l  be con ducted in the next part of  thi s stu dy.279 
The Institut's opi nion on this problem may not be i m mediately apparent, but 
i t  i s  noteworthy that Article 4 i s  the only provi sion (apart fro m A rticle 6) to deny 
contracting Parties the right to suspend certain treaties on the groun d  of armed 
conflict .  The traDaux show that the Institut was of the opinion that a blanket de­
nial of the right to suspend or term inate any treaty as a result  of  arm e d  conflict 
"would not  be based on the facts relating to the known practice of  States. , ,280 They 
further demon strate that Arti cle 4 was inspired by Article 60( 5 )  of  the 1 969 Vi ­
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a n d  that it covers provis ions  of both 
human righ ts treaties and humanitarian law.2 8 1  
Article 4 o f  the Resolution i s  noteworthy in another respect. It  was seen earlier 
that there is a school  of thought according to which environmental protection 
should be li nked with human rights .282  This  was a dvocated also before the leI in  
regard to the Legality a/Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion.2 8 3  I f  such a l ink be­
tween environmental protection and human rights is  recogn ised, Article 60(5 )  of 
the 1 969 Vienna Convention offers an excellent veh icle  through which States 
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cou ld be denied t he right to suspend international  environmental agreements in 
case of armed conflict.  
During the 1 985  Hels inki  session, one of its memb ers proposed that IEL trea­
t ies should be treated in s imi lar fashion as humanitarian treaties on the ground 
that protection of the env ironment was in essence "a  natural extension of the pro­
tection of the human p erson . "  The tenor of the amendment was to proh ibi t  
bel l igerent parties to terminate or suspend environmental treaties.  However, i ts  
proponent failed to convince the meeting .  Some members thought that the sub­
ject was brought up too late a n d  deserved to be studied separately; others 
express ed serious doubt on the validity of the proposed rule. The amendment was 
overwhelm i ngly rej ected. Nevertheless,  the meeting agreed to place o n  record a 
statement to the effect that humanitarian treaties may "to a certain exten t" com ­
prise protection of the environmen t.284 
Fi nally, the Hels inki  Resolution is  remarkable because of the importance i t  at­
taches to consequences of unlawful u se of force u n d er the UN Charter. The 
rei evan t provisions were h ighly controversial .  The disagreement centred on 
whether treaty relat ions should be settled pursuant to the principle of equal ity of 
all  belligerents followingjus in bello ,285 or follow the mo dern JUS ad bellum di stinc­
tion between lawful and unlawful  uses of force instead .286 
Some members argued that the entire i ssue of treaty relations as a consequence 
of armed conflict should be resolved in accordance with the UN Charter's princi­
ples .287 Consequently, an aggressor State should be denied all  benefits  un der 
treaty l aw, b ased on the principle ex injuria JUS non oritur.288 Other memb ers ob­
j ected that there was no State practice to support such a di stinction between 
aggressors and victi m s  with respect to treaty relation s .289 A further suggestion 
was that the Inst i tut  should restrict itself to guidelines for treaty relations durante 
bello on the basis of the principle of equali ty of belligerents, but that it should 
leave open the possibi l i ty that post bellum another assessment may be needed pur­
suant to the pri nciples of jus ad bellu m . 290 This debate s trongly resembles the 
d iscussions on compensation for v i olation of jus m bello and jus ad bellum exam­
ined earlier.29 1  
Whilst  the final  text of the Resolution does  not take a pos i t ion on al l  of the 
above i s s ues , i t  i s  noteworthy that i t  devotes not  less than th ree of i ts eleven art i ­
cles to the con sequences of modern jus ad bellum on t reaty relati ons in armed 
conflict.  Article 7 allows v ictim States to su spen d treaties in  whole or in p art if in­
compat ib le w ith the exercise of i n d i v i dual or collective self- defence. Article 8 
obligates States to term i nate or sus pend treaties to comply w ith resolution s of the 
Securi ty Council.  Article 9 denies unlawful aggressor States the right to term inate 
or suspend treaties " if  the effect would be  to benefit that State. " 
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Far from being unreali stic,  i t  seems that these articles have been remarkably 
prescien t i n  anticipating the i ncreased impact of the Charter's collective security 
system fo llowing the end o f  the Cold War. The legal aftermath of  the 1 990- 1 9 9 1  
Gulf Conflict,  Res . 6 8 7  ( 1 99 1 )  a n d  the work of  the U N  Compensa tion Commis­
s ion illustrate the possible  effect of Articles 7 to  9 of the Helsinki  Resolutio n .  
Fin ally, Article 10  entails again a renvoi t o  un settled matters ins ofar as it pro­
vides that the Resolution does not  prej udge rights and duties arising from 
n eutrali ty. 
3 . 4 . 3 .  C o ntr ib uti o n s  Made by the I LC Cod ificatio n s  
T h e  I LC h a s  consistently ab stained from con sidering t h e  effects o f  war o r  
armed conflict in i t s  work.292 As seen before, i t  w a s  excluded from i t s  studies on 
the law o f the sea,293 and on S tate liability for acts not  prohibited by in ternational 
law .294 
However, i n  respect of its own 1 994 draft articles on watercourse law, the I LC 
commented that "the presen t articles themselves remain in effect even in time of 
armed conflict. , , 295 I n their statemen ts before the IC] o n  the legality of nuclear 
weapons,  the Solomon Islands relied on this  comment and requested the Court to 
apply "the same presumption in favour of applicability where an instrument was 
silen t .  ,,296 
I t  should be n o ted firstly that the obs ervation was not  recorded i n  the draft 
articles them selves but o n l y  in the comments th ereto . In any event, the ILC's  ob­
servation appears far to o gen eral, s i n c e  past  practice shows that  i nternati onal 
waterco u rses have s trategic value and may become the scene o f  armed con­
fl ict . 297 The ILC has not  indicated whether i ts  observation applies o n ly to Sta tes 
no t  involved in the conflict or includes contending p arties as wel l .  Hence, it may 
amount to a rule de lege ferenda . As seen before, during the debates in the General As­
sembly on the ILC draft, delegates were anxious to stress that the only article to deal 
explicitly with armed conflict-Article 29-was not intended to change the status of 
the protection of watercourse installations under current laws of  armed conflict.298 
As fo r treaty law, there are several articles of the 1 969 Vienna Convention on 
th e Law of Treaties that touch on the use of  force in in ternational relations, but 
th ey expressly leave open the matter that  concerns us here .  Apart  from Articles 63 
and 74, which stipulate that the severance of diplomatic and consular relations 
does not  in principle affect treaties between parties nor their capacity to conclude 
treaties, the drafters' reluctance to be drawn any further on the matter of armed 
conflict is apparent from Article 7 3 :  
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The p rovisions of the p resent Convention shal l not  p rej udge any ques tion that  may 
arise i n  regard to a t reaty from a succession of S tates o r  from the internat ion al 
responsib i l i t y  of a S tate or  from the outbrea k of hosti l i t i es between S t ates.  
an d  Article 75 : 
The provisions of the present Convention are without prejudice to a n y  ob l i gation in 
rela tion t o  a t rea ty which may arise fo r an aggressor State i n  consequence of measures 
taken in  conformi t y  with the Charter of the Uni ted Nat ions with reference to that 
State's aggression .  
This trend was co nfirmed by the 1978 Vienna Convention on S uccession of 
States in Respect of  Treaties,299 and by the 1 9 86 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties between States and International Organisations or  between Interna­
tional Organisations. 300 
However, the fact that the Vienna Conven tion on the Law of Treaties does not 
"prej u dge" the effects and i mplications of  armed conflict on treaties, does not 
mean that its provisions may not apply. Whilst the 1 969 Vienna Convention by 
express p rovision does not have any retroactive effect, it is important to note that 
m any of its provisions are nevertheless regarded as custo mary law. This includes 
the articles on suspension and termination, as emphas ised by the ICJ in the 1 997 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case. 30 1 
I n  the latter case, the ICJ also clarified the relationship between the law of trea­
ties and State responsibil ity. The Court held that those two b ranches of 
international  law were different in scope and expan ded on their relationship as 
follows : 
A determ inat ion of whet her a con venti on is or is not in force, and whether it has or 
has n o t  been properly suspen ded or d enoun ced, is to be made pursu ant to t h e  law of 
t rea ties.  On the ot her ha nd, an evaluat i o n  of t he extent to which the suspension o r 
denunciat ion of a conven t ion, seen as inco mpatible w i t h  the law of treat ies, invol ves 
t he responsibil i ty of the Sta te which procee ded to it, is  to be made u n der the law of 
State  responsibil i ty .  
Referring to its earlier case law on the issue, the Court also stressed that:  
I t  is, m o reover, we ll  established t h a t  when a Sta te has commi tted a n  i n ternationally 
wrongful  act,  i t s  i n ternational  respon sibi l i ty is  l ikely to be i nvolve d ,  whatever the 
nature of the obligat ion it has fa i led to respect 302 
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3 . 4 . 4 .  Methodo logy Suggested 
In application of the fo regoing, it is  submitted that no sweeping generalisation 
can be made regarding the application  or non-application of m ulti lateral environ­
mental  agreemen ts during in ternational armed conflict. Given the great 
differences that  exist amongst the conven tions in  the area of I E L, a cautious ap­
proach i s  advisable. Each treaty needs to be examined separately in  order to 
determine whether or not it can apply to the specific environmental problem 
posed. 
Furthermore, since the solution involves both questions related to the applica­
tion of international treaties and the use of force in international relations, regard 
must be given also to the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibi l i ty :  
( 1 )  Whether environ mental problems related to the use  of armed force are gov­
erned by a particular treaty needs to be determ ined primarily according to the 
terms of the treaty ( the pactu m )  itself. Apart from the ru les on treaty interpretation 
recorded in the 1 969 Vienna Convention, regard must be  given to the principles 
discussed in this chapter that relate specifically to questions of armed conflict. 
These include the rule that no treaty is ipso/aao abrogated or  suspended by armed 
conflict, and the related rule that i s sues related to the use of force are not, per se, 
excluded from the scope of treaties; on the other hand, it should be kept  in mind 
that  the law of armed conflict operates as lex specialis with respect to conduct of 
belligerent activities, and that no environmental treaty can be construed so as to 
overrule a State's inherent righ t to self-defence. 
If  the outcome of this examinat ion is that the treaty applies i n  principle to 
questions of armed conflict or if the outcome of this  examination is uncertain, 
several further tests n eed to be carried out .  
(2)  The treaty may contain explicit provisions on its  continued operati on dur­
ing armed conflict, such as a clause allowing Parties to suspend the operation of 
the treaty. Such a clause m ay then be resorted to by the contracting Parties. How­
ever, there may be  grounds arising under the Law of Treaties or the Law of S tate 
Responsibi l i ty which override such provisions .  
Thus, a s  seen earlier, pursuant t o  Article 60(5 )  o f  the 1 969 Vienna Conven tion 
on the Law of Treaties, suspension or termination does not extend to provisions 
relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties with a hu­
manitarian character .  It remains an open question,  though, whether and to what 
ex tent this  prohibition covers environmental provisions . 303 
A treaty clause allowing suspension or  termination i n  armed conflict may also 
be in conflict with a new peremptory norm of general international law (jus 
cogens), as stipulated by Article 64 of the 1 969 Vien n a  Convention .  While the 
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principle in question may reflect customary law, the procedure suggested by this 
Convention may nor. 304 Furthermore, i t  should be  noted that the Vienna  Con­
vention cannot be applied retroactively. 30S 
According to Article 75, the provisions of the 1 969 Vienna Convention are 
wi thou t  prejudice to any obligation in  relation to a treaty which may arise for an 
aggressor State in  consequence of measures taken in conformity with the UN 
Charter with reference to that State's aggression.  This is a clear reference to the 
possible implicat ions of Security Council  decisions under Chapter VII of the 
Charter for treaty relat ions between UN Members and iden tified aggressor States. 
This i s  in  accordance with, inter alia, Article 1 0 3  of the Charter which st ipulates 
expressly that " in  the event of a conflict between the obl igations  of the Members 
of the United Nation s  . . .  and their obligations under any other international 
obligation," their Charter obligations prevail .  306 
The relevance of the latter hypothesis was underlined in the Lockerbie case. In 
i ts  order for prov isional measures in  1 992, the IC} gave an extensive in terpretation 
to the powers of the Securi ty Counci l .  I t  held that by  virtue of  Articles 2 5 - 1 0 3  of 
the UN Charter, a deci sion of the Council i s  able to prevail over treaty obligations 
of the parties under any internat ional agreement. 307 
( 3 )  Even if  a particular treaty does not include an express provis ion on the oc­
currence of armed conflict, it would stil l  need to be examined whether armed 
conflict can form a ground of treaty suspension or termination pursuant to the 
Law of  Treaties . Space does not permit to discuss every hypothesis in  detai l ,  but a 
few remarks may nevertheless be i n  order. 
Even if one accepts the modern view that no treaty is  suspended ipso facto on ac­
count of the outbreak of armed conflict,308 a b elligerent can sti ll decide to 
withdraw from a treaty, in full compliance with its provis ions .  In fact, bell igerents 
may even decide to suspend or  terminate bilateral or multi lateral agreements inter 
se b y  mutual agreement. 309 
Ge nera l  p r i n c i p l es of t rea ty  law may be appl icab le  to th e s u b j e c t  m at ter 
a s  we l l .  Non-conte n d i n g  S t a tes  may conceivab ly  i nvoke  ( m a ter i a l )  impos s i ­
b i l i ty  o f  p erformance, 3 1 0 an d reb u s  s ic s tantibus  to j u s t i fy u n i l a teral 
su spens ion  o f  a trea t y . 3 1 1 However, i n  the  Ga bcikovo-Nagymaros Project 
ca se, the lc}. h a d  the occa s i o n  to s t res s tha t  t h i s  type of  defe n ce to  the gen eral  
rule  o f  pacta su n t  servanda s h o u l d  o n ly be  excep t iona l l y  a l l owed to s tan d . 3 1 2  
I n  a dd i t i o n ,  t h e  S t a t e  a n d  t rea ty  prac t i ce  tha t  w i l l  b e  ex a m i n e d  i n  the  fo l­
l o w i n g  ch apters  i n d ica te  that armed conflic t  in  i t se lf  is  n o t  s u ffi c i e n t  a 
gro u n d  to invoke  the  p lea  o f  rebus s ic s tantibus . Moreover, there i s  reason to 
be l ieve t h a t  the  rebus s ic  s ta n tib us t heo ry was  developed m ai n l y  to dea l  w i th 
peaceful change . 3 1 3  
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(4) The next frame of reference i s  the Law of  State Responsib ility. As the ICJ in ­
dicated in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, the 1 969 Vienna  Convention 
confines itself to defining-in a l imitative manner-the conditions in  which a 
treaty may lawfully be denounced or suspended. The effects of a denu nciation or 
suspension seen as not meeting those conditions are to be j udged according to the 
Law of State Responsibili ty, which i s  expressly excluded from the scope of the Vi­
enna Convention following Article 73 .  
The Law of  State  Respons ib i l i ty  was among the  fi rs t  topics  which the  I LC 
selected as s u i table for codificat ion i n  1 949.  This  pro j ect i s  st i l l  ongoing .  Chap­
ter V of Part  Two of the  Commiss ion ' s  draft i s  t i t led "Circumstances 
P recluding Wrongfulness " ;  i t  was  prepared at the  turn of  the  1 970s and the 
1 9 80s  under  the  respons ib i l i ty  of Mr. Roberto Ago and was accepted prov i ­
s ional ly i n  1 980 . 3 1 4 According to  the  Commiss ion,  t h i s  chapter deals with 
except ional  c i rcumstances which render an i n ternat ional  obl igat ion inopera­
t ive and preclude the  at tribut ion  of  wrongfulness to  an ac t  cou n ter  to  that  
obligation-and the  normally result ing respons ib i l i ty . 3 l S  These specia l  c i r ­
cumstances are : 
( 1 )  Consent validly given by the State whose rights are affected (Article 29 of 
the draft) ;  (2)  Countermeasures i n  respect of an internationally wrongful  ac t  (Ar­
t icle 30) ;  ( 3 )  Force majeure and fortui tous event (Article 3 1 ) ; (4) Distress (Article 
32); (5) State of necessity (Article 3 3 ) ;  (6) Self-defence (Article 34) .  
Many of  these draft art ic les  are regarded as reflec t ing customary law to vary­
ing degrees . For instance, in  the  1 997 Gabcikovo-Nagy m aros Project case,  the  ICJ 
had apparen tly no d iffi culty  treat ing the art ic les on necessi  ty and coun  termea­
sures as authori tative .  However, in the  1 990 R a inbow Warrior A rbi trat ion , the  
arbitral  pane l  rel ied pr imarily on  the  I LC ' s  descript ion offorce m ajeure and d i s ­
tress, but  treated i t s  proposal  for " s tate of  necess i ty" as con  trovers ia l .  3 1 6  
All o f  these special circumstances precluding wrongfu lness may be  o f  potential 
relevance to the subject at hand.  Thus, Article 34  of the ILC's draft stipulates that : 
The wrongfulness of an act of State not in conformity with an international obligation 
of that State i s precluded if the act consti tutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in  
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. 
As is clear from Article 7 of the Institut's Hels inki  Resolution, a victim of ag­
gression may resort to suspension of treaty relations as a self-defence measure. 3 1 7  
( 5 )  Finally, i t  i s  submitted that there i s  a further possibil ity that needs t o  b e  ex­
amined. Article 73  of the 1 969 Vienna Convention, as mentioned before, does not 
only reserve judgement with regard to the Law of State Responsibil ity but  also to 
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questions related to the outbreak of hostilities .  This  i s  a renvoi to problems which 
have been touched on before, i. e . ,  the implications for treaty law of the righ ts and 
obligations  which States derive from the outbreak of hostil i ties. A related issue is  
whether the law on belligerent reprisals may affect the continued operation of a 
treaty. All  these questions point to the need to examine if there are customary 
principles related to the laws of armed conflict that may affect the operation of in­
ternational environment agreements, and more generally, whether the 
implications for treaty law should follow the jus  in  bello principle of equality of 
bell igerents durante bello, or the jus ad bellum principle of d i scrimination between 
aggressors and victims instead. 
3. 5 Conclusions and Introduction to Part Two. 
3 . 5 . 1 Conc lus ions to Chapter I I I  
The purpose o f  this chapter has been t o  establ ish legal principles and a meth­
odology to determine the application of  IEL in general during armed conflict.  
The analysis has l ed to the fo l lowing sl igh tly contradictory observat ions .  
First, the 1 996  Advisory Op in ion  of the ICJ i n d icates that  ru les devised for the  
conduct  of be l l igerent acti v i t ies operate as lex spec ialis for questi ons  related to 
the  interpretat ion of prov i s ions of  general  in ternat ional law, inc lud ing en vi ­
ron menta l  law,  in  armed  con flic t .  Furtherm ore, whi l s t  the Court stated that  
env ironmenta l  con cerns form part of  the laws of armed co nflic t, i t  he ld  that 
mu l ti lateral environmental  agreements can not be construed so as to deny a 
S tate the  fu n damental  r ight to use  armed force i n  self-defence .  3 1 8  This  conclu­
s ion i s  supported by  the records of  1 972  UNCHE and 1 992  UNCED.  
On the other hand, there is  a strong tendency in modern international State 
practice, case law, and  legal theory towards main taining the val idity of treaties in­
sofar as compatible  with national policy and with obligations stemming from 
Securi ty Council  decisions un der Chapter VII . 3 1 9  
In  1 993 ,  the ICRC suggested that the following guidelines be included in to  mili­
tary manuals : 
I nternational  environmental  agreements and re levant  rules of customary law may 
contin u e  to be applicable in t i mes of armed conflict to the exten t that  they are not 
inconsistent w i t h  the appl icable  law of armed conflict .  
O b l igations rel ating to the protection of the environ men t towa rds S tates not party to 
an armed conflict (e.g. ,  neighbouring States) and in relation to  areas beyond the 
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l imits  of nationa l  jurisdiction (e.g. , the High Seas)  a re not affected by the exi stence of 
the armed confl ict to  the extent that they are not inconsistent with the applicable law 
of armed conflict .  320 
C learly, the application of the key criterion of "inconsistency wi th the applica­
ble l aw of armed conflict" suggested by the ICRC is no simple matter. The I LC has 
carefully avoided studying the problem explicitly in its various codifications of 
international law, whils t the Institut has come up with some useful-albei t at  
t imes con troversial-principles regarding the legal effects of armed conflict  on 
treaties in  general . 
The State practice, case law, and legal theory examined in th i s  chapter has 
failed to answer certain pertinent ques tions .  On the assumption that certain prin­
ciples of IEL in general may continue to be relevant in armed conflic t, and that 
certain multi lateral environmen tal agreements may continue to apply during 
armed conflict, to what extend are contending Parties enti tled to deviate from 
such obligations on the ground of armed con flict? More specifically, how should 
the rights of contending parties be balanced against the enjoymen t of 
entitlements by non-contending States (and perhaps by international areas as 
well) under IEL  in general and multi lateral environmen tal agreements in 
particular? 
This u ncertai n ty may not  be  surpri s ing  given that  use  of armed force, as 
seen in  the Second C h apter of th is  s tudy, raises many difficul t  legal quest ions .  
When the fa i l i ngs of the col lect ive  securi ty system leave the legal  pos i t ion of 
States not  direct ly involved in  the hos ti l i t i e s  unclear, the treaty relat ions  be­
tween the l a tter an d  the bel l igerent  S tates  wi l l  be  inevi tably affected by the  
uncerta in  ty. 
Furthermore, one would be hard pressed to general ise rights and obligations 
ari sing from the many environmental treaties in  force.  I t  was seen earlier that 
there are a great number of treaties from the bilateral to the global level dealing 
with a vast array of environmen tal problems in a variety of media.  Some regimes 
are very detailed and put in stringen t terms , o thers are obviously more abstract or 
exhortatory in character. 32 1 
Drawing further on the two main disciplines involved, i . e . ,  the Law of Treaties 
and the Law of State Respons ibil i ty, it was concluded that each multi lateral treaty 
needs to be examined separately in order to determine its application to the prob­
lem in  question . 
First, the pactum between contracting States needs to be  examined, applying 
the relevant articles of the 1 969 Vienna Convention on treaty interpretat ion as 
well as the principles of interpretation related to armed conflict examined in this 
1 3 7  
The Newport Papers 
chapter. Secondly, provision needs to be made for obligations arising from jus 
cogens, humanita rian provisions and binding Security Council decisions. Thirdly, 
regard must be had to the grounds of suspension and termination arising from the 
Law of Treaties, and fou rth, to the "circumstances precluding wrongfulness" aris­
ing under the Law of State Responsib il ity. The final possibility that needs 
examining is  whether there are any customary rules on the fate of multi lateral en­
vironmen tal agreements during armed conflict outside the frames of reference of 
the Law of Treaties or  the Law of State Responsibility.  
3 .5 . 2  I ntrod uct ion to Part Two 
The aim of the second part of this study is  to take a closer look at the problem of 
the relationship between international armed conflict and  multilateral environ­
mental agreements by examining one particu lar category of mari time agreemen ts .  
The reasons why this study concentrates on the m arine environment were set 
out in the introduction to this study. A series of represen tative treaties regarding 
marine safety an d prevention of marine pollution were selected. These cover the 
following themes:  (1) Safety Aspects and Navigation ; (2)  (Civil) Liability Con ­
ventions;  ( 3 )  Prevention of Oil  Pollution and other forms of  Marine Pollution ; (4) 
Maritime Emergencies.  
Three types of basic clauses with a possible bearing on armed conflict will be 
examined:  ( 1 )  Clauses exempting war damage from the scope of the convention ;  
(2) Clauses dealing with the  possibility of war/armed conflict/hostilities and  (3) 
Clauses dealing with the exemption of warships and other State craft .  A chapter 
has been devoted to each clause and the analysis will fo llow the same basic plan. 
First, a short j ustification will be provided for why the selected clause may have a 
bearing on armed conflict .  This will be followed by an analysis, treaty-by-treaty, 
of the negotiating h istory of the clause and, if possib le, by an examination of State 
practice, opinio juris , and doctrine where relevant. Finally, for each clause, a con­
clusion will be formulated on the sign ificance of the absence or presence of the 
clause for the relationship between armed conflict and the treaties in question. 
Although the majority of the conventions that will be discussed were con­
cluded under IMCO/IMO auspices, others have been concluded under UNEP, Li\EA, 
the Council of Europe and the UN/ECE . In addition, throughout this study, refer­
ences will be made to similar clauses contained in  other multilateral 
environmental agreements. All in all, close to 60 international treaties and instru­
ments will be discussed either directly or indirectly. 
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Chapter XV 
The Exclusion of War Damage from the 
Scope of Maritime Conventions 
4. 1 .  General Comments 
lTN l'v\ ATTERS OF LIABI LITY AND REPARATION, a distinction i s  usually made be­
Jl tween State and civil liab i l i ty. Both are legal frameworks for settling issues of 
reparation. State liability refers to the duty of States to make reparation for dam­
age caused by a breach of public in ternational law ; civil l iab i l i ty, by contrast, is  
determined primarily on the basis of private-municipal or  international-law. 
The trea ties reviewed in this section are usually said to regulate m atters of civi l l i ­
ab i l i ty .  However, many regimes that  wil l  be discussed involve S tate  participation 
in one form or another :  States may ei ther act as supervisors or  guarantors of a par­
ticular compensation scheme, contribute to a particular indemni ty fund, incur 
complemen tary or residual liab i l i ty, or  may even be  l iable as principal operators. l 
Taken as whole, the liability regi mes discussed here are therefore best described 
as mixed regimes .  
As wil l  be  seen below, many-if not all-civil l iab il ity conventions excl ude 
coverage for damage caused by war and o ther ins tances of armed conflict .  From 
an insurance point of view, this  may not be surprising, for in commercial law, 
damage caused by war is  a risk usually excluded from normal coverage by the in­
surer.  Many contemporary s t andard forms used in the commercial trade exclude 
losses caused not only by wars in the traditional sense (classic, declared, 
in ter-State conflicts), but contain expressions excluding a whole range of o ther 
types of armed conflic ts :  formulas as "act of war" and "act of public enemies" in 
the Hague Ru les2 and Hague- Visby Rules ; "war, civil war,  revolution, rebell ion, 
insurrection or civil strife arising therefrom, or any hostile act  by or against a bel­
ligerent power" as in the marine insurance clauses of the Ins t i tu te Time Clauses 
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(Hulls) and the Insti tute Cargo Clauses.  The net is cast particu larly wi de in the 
Gencon Charterparty which exc ludes damage caused by: 
. . .  any blockade or any action which is announced as a blockade by any Government or 
by any bel l igerent or by any organized body, sabotage, piracy and actual or threatened 
war, hostili ties, warl ike operat ions, c ivi l  war, c ivil commotion or revo I ution 3 
The latter formula makes it absolutely clear that hosti l it ies other than "war" in 
the formal legal sense are also in tended. This avoids the problems that arose in 
Kawasaki Kisen Kabushi Kaisha of Kobe v. Bantham Steamship Co, where the 
charterparty contained a c lause all owing cancellation "if war breaks out involving 
Japan . ,,4 As indicated earlier, domestic courts and arbitral tribunals tend to con­
strue term s as "war" or "acts of war" in insurance policies broadly, holding that 
they apply to undeclared wars,s and even to actions by resistance or guerrilla 
forces. 6 The implications of this  flexib le in terpretation m ay be illu strated with 
the case of Dreyfus & Co v. Dunca n (Lloyd 's Underwriters ) a nd A nother ( 1 98 1 ), in 
which the B elgian Court of Appeal of Antwerp needed to construe an insurance 
policy which expressly excluded "riot,  social  d isorder and malicious damage" but 
not war or armed conflict as such. The Court deci ded that this phraseology ap­
plied to the starting of fires and the bomb attacks by rebel troops in the course of 
th e conflict in  East Pakistan in 1 97 1 , wh ich ultimately led to the creation of the 
State of B angladesh ? 
The underlying idea is that war and other instances of  armed conflict are con­
s idered an abnormal risk, akin to force majeure, which the insurer should not  be 
required to bear-8 unless, of course, the  cl ient took out  special war risk coverage. 
4. 2. Discussion 
4 . 2 . 1 . Nuc l ear I nd ustry as Mode l  
• (Paris) OEeD Convention on Third Party Lia bility i n  the Fi eld of Nuclear En-
e rgy, 1960 
• Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Sh ips, 1962 
• (Vienna) Convention on Civil Lia bility for Nuclear Dam age, 1963 
• Protocol to Amend the 1 963 Vienna Convention, 1 997 
• Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage,  1 997 
Since the beginning of the 1 960s, a number of in ternational conventions were 
concluded to regulate and channel questions of l iability regarding two special 
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risk-creating industries : the nuclear industry and the sec tor of maritime carriage 
of oil. The impetus for a civil  liab i l ity regime for the nuclear sector can be situated 
towards the end of the 1 950s .  It was linked with the fear for potential astronomical 
compensation claim s for nuclear incidents involving land-based reactors and 
transportation of nuclear materials. The nuclear supply industry considered these 
risks too incalculable to bear or insure. Since these liab il ity issues could j eopar­
dise the development of a peaceful nuclear energy sec tor, the OECD governments 
decided to in tervene. 
The first conven tion in which this was done was the 1 960 Paris Convention. I t  
applies to nuclear inciden ts wi thin Western European S tates and establishes an 
exclusive non-fault civil  l iability regime. It completely relieves the nuclear supply 
industry and channels all l iability, sub ject to certain cei l ings, exclusively to the 
operators, who need to cover their liability by compulsory insurance.  The 1 963 
Vienna Convention provides similar solutions but on a more global scale.9 Again 
in response to industry demands, two more additional l iabi l i ty layers to the Paris 
Convention were subsequen tly agreed upon. The 1 963 Paris Supplementary Con­
vention establishes a second tier of residual State l iabil ity as well as a third one, 
constituted by a private insurance poo l . l O A Joint Pro tocol agreed in 1 988  be­
tween IAEA and the OECD/NE A  linked the Vienna and Paris Conven tions into one 
system . 
In 1 990, the I A EA S tanding Comm ittee on Liabi l i ty for Nuclear Damage was 
set  up to revise  the Vienna Convention and prepare a supplementary compensa­
tion scheme. On 1 2  Sep tember 1 997, a Protocol to amend the 1 963 Vienna 
Conven tion and a Convention on Supplemen tary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage were adopted . The new instru ments contain,  inter alia , a better defini ­
t ion of nuclear damage that  a l so  ad dresses the concept  of environmental damage 
and includes compensat ion for preventive and remedial  measures. 1 1 In addi­
tion, the Convention on Supplemen tary Compensation applies to nuclear 
damage suffered in or  above the Exclusive Economi c  Zones and Continental  
shelves of Con tracting Parties,  1 2  whilst  the  Protocol  m ay apply to nuclear dam­
age, "wherever suffered," including in  the territory and any maritime zones 
established by a non-Contrac ting State in  accordance with the international law 
of the sea. 1 3  As will be  seen further below, the two new in  strum en ts not  only ap­
ply to civi l ian instal lations,  but may cover (m ili tary) instal lations used for 
"peaceful purposes . "  1 4 
However, none of these nuclear l i ab ility instruments cover war damage. Pursu­
ant to an identically worded clause, no l iabil i ty shall attach to an operator for 
nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident "directly due to an act of armed con­
flict, hosti l i  t ies,  ci vii war or insurrection ."  1 5  
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The Convention on the Liab i l i ty of Operators of Nuclear Sh ips (hereinafter 
1 962 NS Conven tion) was adopted at a Diplomatic Conference in Brussels under 
the auspices of the Com ite Maritime intmzatlOllal and I AEA, in 1 962 .  It deals with 
questions  of l iabil i ty in much the same way as the above mentioned conventions :  
absolute o r  strict l iabi l i ty o f  the operator, with ceil ings o n  compensation, and 
compulsory insurance. Like the Paris and Vienna Conventi ons, the 1 962 NS Con­
vention was basical ly forward- looking, concluded mainly to provide a liabi l ity 
channelling and compensation regime for the potential incalculable claims that 
might follow from a nuclear incident . 1 6  As  wil l  be  discussed below, the main in­
terest of this Convention for th is  study lies in its explicit  inclusion of incidents 
involving nuclear warshipsY The reasons why the latter were finally incorpo­
rated-after much discussion-were essentially of a pragmatic nature : nuclear 
propuls ion on ships was at that t ime sti l l  the reserved domain of the military of a 
few countries (i. e . ,  the United S tates and the USS R), 1 8  and it was predicted that 
this situation would pers is t  in the near future. 1 9 However, at  the Brussels confer­
ence, the inclusion of warships led to a heated debate on the corresponding 
liabi l i ty coverage. Several countries, mainly from Eastern Europe, argued that the 
liab i l i ty of the operators of warships- i. e . ,  of the States concerned-needed to be 
unlimited.  Limi ting a State's liab i l ity for incidents involving warships would in 
their view legalise the use of nuclear energy for purposes of war . 20 Despite these 
protestations, the conference let the States off with l imited liability for warships 
as well (Article I I I ) .  
Article VIII  of the  1 962 N S  Convention contains a clause which  resembles the 
exoneration clauses mentioned above, in that i t  excludes coverage for :  "an act of 
war, hos til it ies, civil war or  insurrection ."  True, the conventions of the Paris and 
Vienna group use the expression "act of armed conflict,"  which on its own could 
be  wider than "act of war," used in the 1 962 NS Convention .  However, such an in­
terpretation i s  not certain.  Even if  the term "act of war" in the latter treaty would 
have to be interpreted na rrowly as  referring only to a state of war in the lega l -tech­
n ical sense, other instances of use of armed force would st i l l  be excluded from the 
N S  convention because of the term "hostil it ies . "  
I t  seems extraordinary though, that  the  N S  Convent ion a l lows  even  the  op­
era tors of nuclear warships, i . e . , State governments ,  to take advantage of  the 
exemption clause for losses  caused by  war or  other forms  of host i l i t i e s .  It  
would undoub tedly have been more prudent for the negotiators to  i nclude a 
"sav ings clause" to the  effect that  A rt ic le  VI I I  i s  wi thout  pre judice  to the rules 
of general internat ional  law 0 11 Sta te respon s ib i l i ty .  The  issue wi l l  p robab ly  re­
main of  acade mic  i nterest on ly s ince the convent ion i s  u n l ike ly ever to en ter 
i n to force . 2 1  
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4 .2 .2 .  M ar it ime Carr iage of O i l  
• International Convention o n  Civil L i ability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 
• I nternational Convention on the Estab lishment of a n  International Fund for 
Compensation for O i l  Pol lution Damage,  1 9 7 1  
Quest ions of l iabi l ity and compensat ion in relation to the  sector of marit ime 
oil  transport were b rought to the fore at the end of the 1 960s .  Unlike with the nu­
clear industry however, i t  was  an  actual disaster that became the catalyst for the  
negotiation of a special l iabi li ty regime.  Following the 1 967  Torrey Canyon inc i ­
dent, lMCO adopted a programme for measures and studies in  relation  to  marine 
pollution from m arit ime casualties .  This included for the fi rst t ime legal mea­
sures ( I )  on intervention on the high seas and (2) on  questions  relating to the 
nature and extent of the liability of the owner/operator of the ship or  cargo. Sub­
sequently, at a Conference organised i n  Brussels, two conventions were 
adopted :  one on in terven tion, the other one on ci vil l iabi l i  ty. The 1 969 Ci viI  Li­
ability Convention (hereinafter CLC) was soon supplemented by the 1 97 1  lOPC 
Fund Convention .  Together these conventions provide a l iabi l i ty and compen­
sation scheme for m arit ime oi l  transport, in spired largely b y  the l iabi l i ty 
regimes for the nuclear industry. There are, nevertheless, some i mportant dif­
ferences . The 1 969 CLC puts the burden of l iabil i ty neither on  the vessels' 
operator nor on the cargo owner, but on the shipowner. Although the latter's lia­
bi lity is strict, it i s  l imited in most cases according to a formula related to the 
tonnage of the ship and an overall total (Article 5). The 1 97 1  Fund Convention's 
s tated purpose is  to provide addi t ional compensation to the vict ims of o i l  pollu­
tion.  Unlike most sch emes in the nuclear energy sector however, States have 
been reluctant to shoulder even a part of this  burden . The additional layer of 
compensation agreed in  1 97 1  i s  financed by  a levy on  the  oil  i mporters and oi l  
cargo interests (Article 1 4) . 22  
According to most commentators, the 1 969 CLC already covered environmen­
tal damage occurring in  the territorial sea of a Contracting Party, including the  
cost of preventive measures to  minimise such damage. 2 3 Nonetheless, the  rele­
vant clauses were given divergent interpretations in practice, both by  the lOPC 
Fund and by national legal systems.  In  response to appeals for an  interna tionally 
agreed uniform definition, the clauses were revised by two 1984 Protocols .24 The 
revised provisions not only increase the level of compensation substantially, they 
provide an explicit though narrow definition of environmental damage and ex ­
tend the scope of the conventions to the Exclusive Economic Zone of contracting 
States. 2 5 
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The CLC and the IOPC Convention contain in part an identically worded escape 
clause for pollution damage " resulting from an act of war, hostili t ies, ci  viI war an d 
insurrection ." In both cases the burden of proof rests wi th the party to which the 
main l iability has been channelled : either the shipowner or the Fun d. In the case 
of  the CLC, the clause came from an alternative proposal on strict l iabil ity of the 
shipowner, made by IMCO'S Legal Committee. I t  was obviously inspired by the l i ­
ability conventions for the nuclear industry.26 The proposal did not el icit  any 
subs tan tial comments27 and was accepted almost unaltered, apart from cosmetic 
improvements relating to the proposed exclusion for natural disasters.28  The ex­
emption for natural phenomena "of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible 
character" follows immediately on the exclusion for war damage. This indicates 
that the conference delegates regarded war and other types of armed conflict as ex­
traneous circumstances, akin to force majeure, which totally escape the shipping 
industry' s control. 
The basic hypothesis underlying the draft for the 1 974 IOPC Convention was 
that the Fund (supported by the oil industry) should be able to offer compensa­
tion in cases not fully covered by the 1969 CLC: i .e . ,  either if the shipowner is  not 
l iable, or, if he was li able, but  neither he nor his insurer were able to meet their  ob­
l igations, or if the damages exceeded the owner's liabil ity.29 Yet, no  agreement 
could be  reached on the philosophy or nature of the Fund. As pointed out by one 
delegation, the conference remained divided over whether the Fund should pro ­
vide additional relief t o  o il pollution victims in  all cases where t h e  1 969 CLC 
offered compensation or, instead, whether the Fun d  should be no more than an 
insurance policy. 30 This ambivalence became apparent when the delegates 
clashed over two draft proposals by IMCO: one to exonerate the Fund from liabil­
ity for oil  pollution caused by war and other instances of armed conflict (as in the 
1 969 CLC); the other to make the Fund bear the risk of damage caused by natural 
disasters (unlike in the 1 969 CLC) . 3 1 
The proposal to exonerate the Fund from liabi lity in  cases where it could prove 
that the pollution damage resulted from an "act of war, hostilities, civil war or  in­
surrection," was the sub j ect of protest before the conference started. 32 It attracted 
the most passionate of debates during the conference. Both proponents and oppo­
nents of the provision relied on a panoply of arguments allegedly based on the 
"legal tradition" in th is area, equity, economic principles, philosophical argu­
ments, and even common sense. 
The m ost fervent opponent of 1M CO 's draft proposals was the U .S .  del ega tion .  
They proposed t h e  deletion o f  t h e  war damage exoneration clause arguing that the 
fundamental question involved was "whether innocent v ictims of pollution dam­
age should be denied rel ief under any circumstances . "  During the debates, the 
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United States and her supporters (Australia, Canada, Lebanon, Portugal, S inga­
pore, Spain) developed this argument as follows : 
• pollution victims should not be m ade to bear the cost of war damage; this 
should be spread over all those benefiting from the o i l  trade; otherwise the 
full cost of  such damage would fal l  on the individual ;  
• excluding war damage from coverage is  particu larly unfair in  case the victim 
is  not connected with a belligerent State;  
• excluding war damage will  lead to much discussion and litigation and wil l  
be subject to varying interpretations ; 
• the Fund should fill  gaps left in the compensation schemes by other conven­
tions and by insurance companies ;  
• the  convention should be forward-looking; 33  
The proponents (Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Rumania, UK, US SR) of the exclusion of  war damage in­
voked the following grounds :  
• war acts  are excluded in other conventions ; inclu ding i t in  the Fund Con­
vention would lead to discrepancies;  
• war damage i s usually not compensated ;  most  insurance companies exclude 
war damage for good reasons ;  there is no reason why victims of oi l  pollution 
caused by war should be placed in  a mo re favourable position ; The Fund 
should not be a charity; 
• not all victims are completely innocent ;  
• i t  is  up to the  States-and hence to the society a t  large-to pay  compensa­
tion in  cases of war and armed conflict ;  
• since the Fund is to be financed by  the private industry, it should not and 
cannot be required to bear this burden ; war ris k  insurance i s  too costly; 
• in case of armed conflict, a large number of oil  tankers can be destroyed si­
multaneously, exceed ing the Fund's capacity to pay; 
• dropping of the exoneration clause would require the Fund to deal with a 
host of minor incidents, leading to an unacceptable administrative burden ; 
• if the shipowners are allowed to escape liability in case of war damage, the 
oil  cargo/imponing industry should not be required to provide coverage 
either; 
• common sense indicates that many S tates wil l  be deterred from signing the 
Convention if  war damage i s  covered;  this wil l  impair the financial viabi l i ty 
of the Fun d ;34 
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The latter poin t of view carried the day. The U .S .  proposal was rejected by 25 
votes to 1 0, with 7 abstentions. 35 
St ill, that was not to be the end of the discussion, for the conference remained 
in two minds about the ultimate purpose of the Fund. After having excluded war 
damage, the delegates broached the issue of natural dis asters, which had been ex­
empted previously from the 1969 CLC. The m aj ority of the delegates now thought  
that  natural disasters presented a different case  from war  altogether :  i t  was  said 
that  the former did not have their origin in  human activity, and the examples 
which were b rought up during the discussions related to extremely rare occur­
rences such as "a meteorite hitting a ship . "  Greece thought that including natural 
disasters would become too onerous. During the debates, s imi lar counter-argu­
ments as  in case of war damage were heard :  the IOPC Fund Convention should not 
put  v ictims of natural disasters in  a more favourable p osition ; the conference 
should not cause legal discrepancies with other conventions, such as those relat­
ing to the nuclear industry and particularly the 1969 CLC; if the shipowner is 
exonerated in case of damage by a natural disaster, it would be  unjust  to require 
the oil  companies to bear the full  weight of  this .  However, this time the propo­
nents of the widest possible safety and  compensation net won the argumen t. The 
Greek posi tion was rejected by 1 9  votes to 14 with 8 abstentions. 36 
4 .2 .3 . Marit i m e  Carr iage of N uclear Materi a l  
• Con vent ion Relating to Civi l  Liabil ity i n  the Field of Mariti me Carriage of Nu­
clear Material, 1 97 1  
The Convention Relating t o  Civil Liability in  the Field o f  Maritime Carri age 
of Nuclear Material was adopted at an international conference co-sponsored by 
IMCO and the OECD. 37 The need for the convention arose as a result  of an apparent 
conflict between n uclear law and maritime carriage l aw .  The question had been 
studied since 1 968  by the European Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD, by IAEA, 
IMCO and the Comite Maritime International. A comprehensive study of the prob ­
lems fo llowed a t  a Symposium held in  Monaco i n  1 968 . 38 
The crux of the problem seemed to be  that under marit ime law, the carrier 
could incur l iabil ity, whereas the nuclear conventions  were based on the no-fault  
absolute l iabi l i ty of the nuclear industry and its insurers. Following the l imita­
tion of the liability of the operators of nuclear i nstallations  under the Paris 
Convention and the Vienna  Conventions, maritime carriers of  nuclear material 
began to request indem n ity to cover their possible l iabil ity. The operators them ­
selves were unable to get insurance for this and even governments were not 
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normally prepared to do so.  The OECD reported that as a result, the transport by 
sea of nuclear substances had come practically to  a standstill .  Unless either a war­
ship could be m ade available or a government indemnity could b e  given, 
transport had instead to be done by air at a greater expense, and this was only pos­
sible because the a ir  carriers did not consider i t  necessary to demand indemnities 
at all and were conten t to rely on the operator's insurance. 39 
The 1 97 1  Convention gives primacy to the nuclear law and ensures that the op­
erator of  a nuclear installation will be exclusively l iable fo r damage caused by a 
nuclear incident occurring in  the course of maritime carriage of nuclear 
material40 unless the damage is  caused by a nuclear inciden t involving the nuclear 
fuel or radioactive products or waste produced in  the ship.4 1  
The  1 97 1  Convention does not  contain an  express clause relating to damage 
caused by acts of armed conflict .  Bu t  th is  should no t to be taken as proof that ex ­
oneration for such damage would not b e  avai lable. In deed, from the text of the 
convention it i s  clear that its rules rely primarily on the l iabi li ty regimes of the 
nuclear industry.42 Moreover, according to Article 4,  the convention supersedes 
any international conventions in  the field of mari time transport to the extent that 
such conventions would be in conflict  with it. Any defence available under the 
nuclear l iabi l i ty regimes will therefore apply to the maritime carriage of nuclear 
material as well. 
4 .2 .4 .  Mar it ime Carr iage of H azardous and Noxious  S u bstances 
• Convention on Liab ility and Com pensation for D amage in Connection with the 
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by S e a  (HNS ), 1996 
The plan for a Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS)  Convent ion has 
b een wi th IMCO/IM O s ince the m i d - 1 970s .  It  was a t  i ts  29 th session in  1 976 that 
the Legal Committee concluded that i t  would b e  desi rable to have a new com­
prehensive international convention dealing wi th l i ab i l i ty for mari t ime 
carriage of  substances other than o i l :B Over the years  th i s  proposal  ran into 
many difficult ies .  The draft was unsuccessfully placed on the agenda of the  1 984 
International Conference on Liabi l i ty and Compensat ion for Damage in 
connexion with the C arriage of Cer tain Substances by Sea :+4 Afterwards the IMO 
Secretary-General repo rted tha t  there remained sub stantial  d ifferences of  opin­
ion on ( I )  the geographical scope of  the convent ion;  (2) the  scope of application 
in  respect of the  r isks and damage to be covered;  (3 )  the party to  be  held l iable  
under the convention ;  (4) the l imits  of  l iabi lity to be placed on the party liable; 
and even on (5 ) the necessity i tself for an internat ional  convention on l iabil ity 
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and compensation Of H N S . 45 I t  i s  a test imony to the Legal Comm ittee's tenacity 
that agreement was reached after all .  The HNS Convention was adopted on 3 
May 1 996. 46 
The final text of the con vention is based on su bstan tially remodelled proposals 
discussed within the Legal Commi ttee during the secon d  half of the 1 980s .  I t  
combines elements o f  both t h e  1 969 C L C  and the 1 97 1  IOPC Fund ConventionY 
For instance, it takes inspiration from the 1 969 CLC in channelling l iabil ity essen­
tially to the shipowner, adopting a strict but mostly l imited liab ili ty approach and 
requiring compulsory insurance ; it also adopts many elements of the IOPC Con­
vention in that i t  proposes, inter alia, the establishment of a special Hazardous and 
Noxious Substances Fund (H�S Fund) to provide compensation in addition to 
the required compulsory insurance. 
The fi rst  d raft art ic les  fo r the Convention were prepared by  an i n formal 
Working Group, which presented the  Legal  Com mittee a t  i ts  3 7 th sess ion in 
1978 with several alternat ives .  Alternat ive I of that  proposal  channelled the 
main l iabi l i ty  to the sh ipowner and followed c lose ly  the bas ic  rules  on l iabi l i ty  
an d  t h e  various  defences con ta ined i n  the 1 969 C L C .  I t  copied the C LC ' s  war 
d amage exclus ion clause verbatim . 48 The only t ime this art icle el ic i ted com­
ments  was in  1 978 ,  when a member of the  Legal  Committee quest ioned 
whether the exclus ion  of l iab i l i ty in  the  case of a natural  phenomenon was not  
too wide.  In  reply, i t  was  recalled that  this  had been extensi vely discussed at  
the 1 969 B russels Conference and that  i t  was generally agreed that  the  excep­
tion was much narrower than an act of  God, s i n ce it required that the 
phenomenon be  "of an excep tiona l, i nevi table  and irresis  tible ch aracter . "  N ev­
ertheless,  i t  was  suggested th at this  exception might  be  further restricted if 
feasible from an insurance  standpoin t .49 
D uring the many versions the HNS p roposal went through subsequently, the 
war damage exclusion clause remained unch anged and unchallenged. In  a s imi­
lar vein,  the provis ion to exonerate the H NS Fund for war damage in  the last 
draft (Article 1 4(3 ) )  was copied d irectly from the I OPC Fund Convention's Arti­
cle 4(2 ) .  I t  did not  attract a single comment .  In the final  version of the HNS 
Convention, adopted on  3 May 1 996, the exoneration clauses  for the  shipowner 
and for the Fund can be found in Articles 7(2)(a)  and 1 4( 3 )(a)  respectively.  The 
final  HNS Convention follows the solution of the CLC and the IOPC Fund not only 
in  spir i t  but  also to the letter :  the sh ipowner is allowed an escape clause not only 
in case of damage caused by  war etc . ,  but  also in case he proves that  the damage was 
caused by a natural phenomenon of an exceptional,  inevitable and i rres ist ible 
character. The H N S  Fund, however, needs to provide coverage in  the l atter 
event .  
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4 . 2 . 5 .  Draft Co nvent ion  on Wreck Removal 
Draft Convention on Wreck Removal, 1995 
A t  its 69 th session i n  1 993,  the IMO Legal Com mittee considered a request for 
an intern ational convention to establish uni form rules on w reck removal in inter­
n ational w aters. According to its promoters,50 the convention would have to be 
consistent with coastal States' powers u n d er the 1 982 LOSC, but would fill the gaps 
i n  the existing international law . 5 1  S ince 1 993, preli m i nary drafts for such a con­
vention have been sub m i tted b y  Germ any, the Netherlands, and the UK.  
Consi deration of the draft w as inc luded in the Commi ttee's work programme for 
1 996- 1 997. 52  
According to  the 1995 draft, shipowners would be held strictly l iable for the 
costs of locating, marking and rem oving of hazardous wrec ks.5 3  However, un der 
proposed Article VIII ( 1)(a),  shipowners would be ab le to escape their l iabi lity if 
they could prove, inter alia , t hat  the casualty res ulted from an act of w ar, hostili­
t ies, ci viI  war, insurrection or a n atural phenomenon of an exceptional,  inevi tab Ie,  
and i rresistib le character. 5-t The proposed war dam age exoneration clause was 
copied from the 1 969 CLC Article III  (2 ) .  
4. 3. Con clusions to Chapter IV 
Recent d a t a  demonstrate that t h e  1 00 States party t o  t h e  1969 C L C  represent 
8 8 . 5 5  percent of world tonn age. The 197 1 Fund Convention h as attracted 76 
ratifications represen ting 62 .03 percen t of world tonn age, whi lst  the 1 97 1  Con­
vention concerning maritime carri age of nuclear l iabi l i ty is  dec i dedly less 
popular : i t  has only 14 parties representing 23 .01  percen t of world tonnage. 55  
Regardless of wh ether the 1984 protocols to the 1 969 C L C  and the 197 1 I O PC w i l l  
enter i nto force o n e  day, 56 m a rine pollution and related dam age to t h e  env i ron­
m ent caused by belligerents during armed conflict, are not  covere d.  The 
exo neration clauses for war dam age i ncorporated in both these conventions an d 
the extensive deb ates held on the issue during the 1 97 1  Conference leave no doubt  
that  vict ims of o i l  po llution damage in instances, such as  the 1 983  N owruz and the 
1 99 1  Gulf War oil "spills," will  h ave to look elsewh ere for co mpensat ion .  
This  will  b e  the  case, m oreover, irrespective of whether the conflict is  i nterna­
t ional  or internal, or one waged b y  a National  Liberation Movement, whether i t  i s  
sm all-scale or large-scale, a declared or un declared war, an d  regardless of  the pre­
cise mili tary circumstances in which the marine po llu tion w as caused. 
Furthermore, the exoneration clause ho lds good irrespective of w hether the 
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belligerent responsible for the pollution resorted to armed force on lawful jus ad 
bellu m grounds (e.g. , in  self-defence or in execu tion of a UN Security Council  reso­
lution taken under Chapter VII) or not  and regardless of whether the damage to 
the marine environment was caused as a consequence of actions permissib le un­
der the jus in bello or not .  
The same observations apply, m utatIs mutandis , to the nuclear liability conven­
tions of the Paris and Vienna group. I t  is too early to say whether the war damage 
exoneration clause currently i ncorporated in the draft on Wreck Removal wil l  re­
main unchallenged. However, i t  would come as a surprise if this clause were 
dropped or even substan tially modified.  
T h ere i s  a fi rm l egal  tradi t ion of exc luding war dam age fro m  "c iv i l"  l iab i l i ty  
convent ions  dea l ing wi th  var ious  r i sk -crea t ing act iv i t ies .  Apart  from the d i s ­
cu ssed conven tions  on mar i t ime transp ort of  o i l  and n uclear l iabi li ty 
conven tion s, one  can fin d  a war damage exonerat ion clause-identical  to Arti­
c le  I I  (2) of  1 969 CLc-in the 1 9 77 Conven t ion deali ng wi th the exp loration 
an d exploi ta t ion of seabed mineral  resources 5 7  and i n  the  1 9 89 UN/ECE Con­
ven tion on Civi l  Liabi l i ty for Damage Caused Dur ing  Carriage of  Dangerous 
Goods by Road, Rai l and Inland Navigat ion Ves sels  (CRTD Convention) . 5 8 
This  defence has  even been incorporated in  the 1 99 3 Counci l  of Europe's  
Lugano Convent ion,  which regulates civi l  l iab i l i ty  for dam age resu l ti ng from 
a l l  act ivi t ies  dangerous  to the env i ronment .  5 9  S ince  the  ma jor i ty  o f  these 
clauses are, moreover, worded in identical  terms,  one  can truly speak of a 
" s tandard war damage exonerat ion clause" i n  S tate a n d  treaty practice .  This  
practice was  confirmed once more  in  th e  three recent ly  adopted c iv i l  l i ab i l i ty 
ins truments  d iscussed in  th i s  chap ter : the 1 996 HNS Convention concluded 
under IMO auspices and the two new ins truments  on civil  l iab i l i ty  concluded 
in  1 9 97 under IAEA auspices .  
Given this  legal tradition, it  i s  perhaps not surprising that, as noted earlier,60 the 
ILC has excluded war damage from i ts work on State liability for acts not prohib i ted 
by international law.6 1  Special Rapporteur Mr. Julio B arboza justified this proposal 
on the ground that such an exoneration clause is often contained in civil liability 
conventions. The text of the suggested provision reads in  relevant part : 
( l )  The opera tor shall  not be l iable : (a)  If the h a rm w a s  d i rec t l y  a tt ributable to an act 
of war, host i l i t ies,  civil  war, i n s ur rect ion or a na tural phenomenon of an excep t i o nal, 
inev i tab l e  and i rresis t i b le character.  . . .  
Although not  fully spelled out in the above conference records, there are fun ­
damen tal reasons why, e.g., the  owners o r  operators of ships should not be  
required to  bear the costs of damage resulting from armed conflict .  
1 52 
International Environmental Law and Naval War 
It was seen that the Un ited S tates argued strongly in favo ur of war dam age cov­
erage by the lOPC Fund. She pleaded that the burden of oil pol lution caused in the 
course of armed conflict should not b e  borne b y  i nnocent v ictims,  but that i t  
should rest instead w i th the private i n d ustry and with t h e  coun tries profiting 
fro m  marit ime carriage of oil .  These views were rejected by the maj ori ty, who be­
lieved that there were good reasons for the exclusion of war d amage by insurers, 
that the lOPC Fund was not a chari ty, and that it was up to the S tate to pay com­
pensation i n  case of war or armed conflict .62 
It is  submitted that there remains a fun damental distinction between damage 
caused in  the normal course o f  shipping operations, and damage c aused by acts of 
warfare. Leaving the question offorce majeure and natural disasters asi de, i n  the 
fi rst case, the ensuing dam age is  caused by acts not i ntended to inflict  damage. In 
such a case,  there i s  much to be said fo r making the i n dustry bear the brunt of the 
cost of risks associated with their profit- m a k ing activities,  regardless of the pre­
cise cause of the dam age. 
B y  con trast, war damage to ships is  the result of delib erate acts by b elligerents 
who are determi ned to inflict  dam age on the ad versary, ei ther directly or indi­
rectly. As seen before, general IEL does not  cover the h ypothesis of the i n ten tional 
infliction of dam age b y  States.63 I t  i s  one thing to ask the operators or owners of 
ships to act as  insurer for risks associated with mari t i m e  carriage of environmen­
tally hazardo us ma terials, such as nuclear substances and o i l .  It  i s  quite another to 
ask the industry to act as insurer for the entire world, including for extraneous 
acts by belligerents during armed conflict .  Environmental  damage caused by ac ts 
of warfare are not meant to be addressed by civi l  l iabi l i ty or m ixed State/civi l l i a­
bi l ity regimes. Un der current interna tional law, they are, however, a ddressed b y  
the gen eral rules of S tate responsibil ity, which were d i scussed above, in  Chap ter 
Two.64 
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Chapter V 
Contingency Clauses for Armed Conflict 
in Maritime Treaties 
5. 1 .  General Comments 
1fT WAS S EEN TH AT TO EXAMINE THE POSSIB LE EFFECT of a particular mul ti lat­
Jleral environ mental agreement in armed confl ict, the exact term s of the pactum 
b etween parties would need to be establ ished first. If there is  an express clause 
permitting suspen sion, withdraw al,  modification or term ination of the treaty in 
case of war  or other a rmed conflict, it should be possible to determine the d rafters' 
intentions with out difficulty. Ab sen t such a clau se, reco urse must be had to the 
general rules of treaty in terpretation in addition to the principles examined 
above, which relate specifically to armed conflict. l 
There exists, as seen b efore, broad consensus on the fact  that the maj ority of 
multilateral environmental agreements are silent on the question of their effect 
during war or armed conflict .  However, whilst some regard this as evidence th at the 
agreements contin ue to apply, others believe that this proves that they were not de­
signed for this purpose.2 These assertions will be critically tested in this chapter 
through an analysis of a series of maritime safety and pollu tion prevention conven­
tions. Some of these treaties contain clauses dealing expres sly with the possibility of 
war, armed conflict and other types of hostilities, whilst others do not. 
5.2. Discussion 
5 . 2 . 1 . The Salvage Co nventi o n s  
• Convention for t h e  Unification of C e rtain Rul e s  o f  Law relating t o  Assistanc e  
a n d  Salvage a t  S ea, 1 9 1 0  
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• International Convention for the Unification of C e rtain Rules relating to Assis­
t a n c e  and Salvage of Airc raft or by Airc raft at Sea, 1938 
• I nternational Conve ntion on S alva ge, 1989 
A. T h e  1 9 1 0  Salvag e C o n v e nti o n .  The or ig ina l  Salvage Convent io n was 
s igned on 23 September 1 9 1 0 . It en tered in to  force  on  1 March 1 9 1 3 , on  the  
eve o f  the  o u t b reak of  Wor ld  War  I ,  for t h e  fo l lowing c o untr ies : Aus t r i a ,  Be l ­
g ium,  France,  Germany,  the Netherl ands , Rom ani a, Russ ia ,  the  UK and the 
U S A . 3 The provi s ion  of  mos t  i nteres t t o  this  chapter i s  A rt ic le  1 1 , according 
to  which every sh i pmaster  i s  b o u n d  to render ass i s tance to  everyb ody, even 
though an enemy,  fou n d  a t  sea in danger  of be ing lost, to  the exten t tha t  he  can 
do so wi thout  s eri o u s  r i sk  to  h i s  s h ip ,  c rew , o r  passengers . 4 Accord ing to  an 
A m er ican commentator ,  the  n a ture  of  the  treaty, and part icu lar ly Art ic le  1 1 , 
demon strated " the  man ifest  in tent ion  tha t  i t  (the treaty)  should  b e  op erat i ve 
i n  war  as we l l  a s  peac e . " S I n  support  of  th i s  i nterpreta t ion ,  reference was  
made to two munic ipa l  cases ,  of  1 948  an d 1 9 5 0  respec t ively, in  w h ich Amer i ­
can courts  assumed tha t  the  convent ion  remai ned in  force  after  the  o u tb reak 
of  World War  1 1 . 6 
However, i t  i s  unl ikely that  the  1 9 1 0  Convent ion was designed to apply un­
abr i dged during inter -State armed conflict .  The 1 9 1 0  Convent ion was 
in  tended to regulate matters of  pr ivate  mari t ime law, and did not  apply to  war­
sh ips  (Art ic le  1 4) .  During b o th World War I and II ,  most  merch an t sh ips 
b elonging to b ell igerent countries  came un der the governmen t  contro l . 7 Pre­
sumably therefore, the  ins tances in  which  the convention was applied during 
th ose armed conflicts  mus t  have been sharp ly red uced . Furthermore,  the two 
U . S .  court cases dealt only wi th  th e appl icat ion of the conven tion between 
friendly o r  co -be l l igeren t countr ies .  The  1 9 5 0  case for instance, was about  as­
s i s tance rendered i n  1 943 by  a U K  to a U . S .  vessel .  There seems to be  no  case 
law on the appl icat ion of the 1 9 1 0  S a lvage Convention between coun tries 
which are enemies .  
After World War I ,  t h e  1 9 1 0  Salvage Convention was among t h e  mult i l a t ­
era l  treaties of "an economic  and techn i cal  n ature" enumerated i n  Art ic le  282  
of the Versail les Peace Treaty "to  b e  appl ied"  from the coming in  to fo rce of the 
Trea ty .  But ,  as men tioned befo re, the form ulat ion of that  art ic le  d oes not  per­
mit  to say anything defin i te  about the status of the  Salvage Conven t ion during 
the war  between opposing be l l igerent s .  In s imilar vein,  after World War I I , the 
Un ited Sta tes no tified Germany of i ts des ire  to have the conven t ion of 1 9 1 0  
"p laced i n  effect"  b etween the Uni ted S t ates and Germany. S ignifica n t ly, th i s  
was  accompanied by  a statement  tha t  the  not ice  was : 
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. ll'uhOIlI prejudice 10 the previous s ta tus of any POrt lO l Z  ofdze conventIOn which may have 
remained opera live or may have agalll becollle operatriJe al any lime s lIlce the outbreak of 
hOSll lilzes belween Ihe Un ited Stales and Gernwll),. , , 8  
This purposely ambiguous statement proves at a minimum that the U . S .  ad­
ministration was uncerta in about the legal status of this pre-war convention 
during and immediately after World War I I, at  least  insofar as its relations with a 
( former) enemy were concerned. 
I t  may indeed have been the case that the 1 9 1 0  Salvage Convention remained in 
force between neutral and other mutually friendly countries during both world 
conflicts .  However, i t  i s  submitted that i t  i s very unlikely that the Convention con­
tinued to apply between opposing bell igerents , in spite of the wording of Article 1 1 .  
This i s  supported by the explanation given by a commentator who examined 
the travaux priparatoires of the above conven tion exten sively. " Wildeboer believes 
that the addition of 'meme ennemie' simply referred to the possibility that the 
contracting States might be at war with each other;  that in that case the conven­
tion would no longer be applicable be tween the parties at war; but that since 
Article 1 1 rested on a moral obligation not dep endent upon the question who i s  
the person in danger or to  which state he belongs, i t  was  in tended to  make an ex­
ception . ,,9 
That this is a more likely in terpretation is confirmed by the 1 9 1 1 UK Maritime 
Conventions Act implementing the Sal vage Convention . Article 6 of this Act ob­
ligates every shipmaster to rend er assi stance to everybody, even though an 
enemy, found at  sea i n  danger of being lost, and stresses that this holds " . . .  even if 
such person be a subject of a foreign State at war with his  Majes ty. " 
Finally, a further clarification of the exac t meaning and scope of Article 1 1  
came wi th the 1 967 Protocol to the 1 9 1 0  Conven tion .  The purpose of this protocol 
was to extend the application of the 1 9 1 0  Conven tion to ships of  war and other 
State-owned ships . I O However, each Party to the Protocol was given the right to 
determine for i t self whether and to what exten t Article 1 1  of the 1 9 1 0  Convention 
would apply State-owned ships. 1 1  If nothing else, the 1 967 Protocol confirms that 
Article 1 1  has no bearing on the status of the 1 9 1 0  Convention in times of war. 
Therefore, the import of "me me ennemie" in the 1 9 1 0  Con vention seems to have 
been l imited to the (moral) obligation to render assis tance, an ob ligation that re­
mained even between nationals of States a t  war with each other. 
The above conclusions are entirely compatible with the law of  naval warfare, 
which contains detai led regulations on the obligation to search for casual t i es after 
naval engagemen ts . Hague Conven tion (X) of 1 907 for the Adaptation to Mari­
time Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Con vention requires bel ligerents to 
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"take steps to look for the shipwrecked," after each engagemen t, "so far as mili tary 
interests permi t . , , 1 2  This obligation is addressed more stringen tly in  Geneva Con­
vention ( I I )  of 1 949 for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. Article 1 8  of the latter no longer 
refers to m i li tary interests, and obligates Parties to act wi thou t delay: 
After  each engagement, Parties to the conflict shal l ,  without delay, take al l  possible 
measures t o  search for and col lect the shipwrecked, wounded and sick, to pro tect 
t hem aga inst p i l lage and i l l - t reatment, to  ensure the ir  adequate ca re, and to search 
for t he dead and preven t the ir  be ing despoiled.  
Whenever circumstances permi t ,  t he Parties to the  conflict shall  conclude local 
arrangements for the removal of the  wounded and s ick b y  sea from a besieged or 
encircled a rea and for the passage of medical  and rel igious personnel and equipment 
on their way to that area .  
The 1CRC commentary to this provision refers explicit ly to Article 1 1  of the 
1 9 1 0  Salvage Convention and emphasises that there i s  a general obligation under 
in ternational law to search for and collect victims, whether mi li tary or  ci vilian, of 
any incident occurring at sea. 1 3 S imilarly, Additional Protocol I of 1 97 7  enunci­
ates a general obligation to respect and protect the shipwrecked. 14  
Given the  above, the  International Convention on Assis tance and Salvage of 
Aircraft or by Aircraft at Sea of 1 9 3 8 ,  could be j udged as a s tep back for it does not  
contain the addi  t ion that the obligation to ren der assis tance holds good, even if  
the person in danger belongs to an enemy coun try. I S  However, since that conven­
tion never entered into force, i t  would be futile to speculate on its  wartime status. 
B. The 1 989 S a l vage Convent i o n .  The 1 989 Salvage Convention was con­
cluded un der 1MO auspices, mainly in  response to increasing environmental 
concerns. The 1 9 1 0  Convention incorporates the "no cure, no pay" principle, giv­
ing li ttle incen tive to a salvor to undertake an operation which has only a slight 
chance of success and little reward for attempts to prevent or minimise environ­
mental damage . The 1 989 Conven tion seeks to remedy this by providing for an 
enhanced salvage award, taking into account efforts to prevent or minimise dam­
age to the environmen t.  Article l (d) defines environmental damage as : 
" . . .  substant i a l  p h ys ica l  damage to h u m a n  hea l t h  o r  to marine l i fe or resources i n  
coastal  o r  i nl and  waters o r  areas ad j acent t hereto ,  c ause d  b y  po l lut ion ,  contami ­
na t ion,  fi re, explosion or s i m i l a r  ma jor  inc idents . "  
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Whilst  Article 14 introduces "special compensation" for salvors who fai l  to earn a 
reward in the normal way ( i. e . , by salving the ship and the cargo). 
There i s  no clause in  t he 1 989  Convention that deals expressly with the  con tin­
gency of war/arm ed conflict .  Article 1 0, on the "Du ty to render ass istance," much 
like the above 1938 Conven tion, does not  include a reference to enemy nat ionals .  
S til l, there are several o ther artic les t h at have m i l i tary implicat ions and that  m ay 
have a bearing on armed conflict : Article 4 on S tate-owned vessels, Article 25 on 
S ta te-owned c argoes, and Article 26 on Humani tarian c argoes. All of these will be 
discussed in t h e  n ex t  chap ter. 1 6  
5 . 2 . 2 .  T h e  Load L ines Conventions  
• International Convention respecting Load Lines, 1930 
• International Conve ntion o n  Load Lines, 1966 
A. The 1 930 Load Lines Conve ntion .  It has long been recognised that l im i ­
tations on the draugh t t o  which s h i p s  m ay be loaded m a k e  a significant 
contribution to the safety of life and property at  sea. The first International Con­
vention on Load Lines, adop ted on 1 January 1 930, est ab lish ed uniform principles 
and rules on the b asis of reserve buoyancy. I ts successor convention, adop ted on 5 
April 1 966 un der IMCO a uspices, sets l i m i ts in the  form o f freeboards,  w h ich con­
stitu te, besides external weathertight and w a tertigh t in tegri ty, the main objective of 
the convention .  Its regulations take into accou nt the potential h azards p resent in 
different zones and different seasons .  The tech nical annex contains several addi­
tional  safety meas ures concerning doors, freeing ports, h atchways and other items .  
T h e  m a i n  p urpose of these meas ures i s  t o  ensure t h e  watertight integrity of  ships' 
hulls below th e freebuard deck. All assigned load lines must be marked amidships 
on each side of  the ship, together with the deck l ine. l 7  
The 1 9 3 0  Convention contained provisions for i t s  modification and revision 
(A rt icl e  20) and provided for the poss ib i l i ty of denunciat ion a fter the exp iration 
o f  a five-year period from i ts coming in to force (Article 2 5 ) .  It  did not  provide for 
the possibi l i ty of s uspension.  However, the 1 966 Convent io n contains an exp ress 
clause on "suspension, in case of war or other ex traord inary circumsta nces" (Arti­
cle 3 1 ) .  The trava ux prepara toires of the latter Convention show that t h is was don e 
at the initi ative of the U nited States, with the express intent  of legalising u n i l at­
eral meas ures taken in 1 94 1  concerning the  1930 Convention J 8 
As is well  known, in 1 94 1 ,  two years after the o utbreak of World War II in Eu­
rope, the Uni ted S tates was st i l l  fo rmally a neutral coun try, 1 9 i n  s pite o f  being 
heavily engaged in supp l ying friendly belligerents with war m a terials .  I t  was 
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p articularly the increased dema n d fo r o i l  th at m ade it  desi rab le for the United 
S tates to increase the amount she was a l l owed to carry in her  tankers over the l im ­
i ts  al l owed by th e  1 930  Load Lines Co nvention. 20 The United S tates discussed 
the m atter with other S t ate parties to the Convent ion-i n c lu d i ng the U K-but 
there was disagreem e nt on the c o u rse to fo l low . 
The UK-which was at th a t t ime involved in World War II as a belliger­
en t-th ough t that the convention was essen tially a peacet ime agreement and that  
i t  should be regarded as inopera t ive during war.  She proposed that  t h e  conven tion 
be modified i n  common agreemen t so as to perm i t deeper load in g o f  vessels .  Th e 
U n ited States argu ed, however, that  no modification o r  revis ion was necessary, o n  
the ground that the convention cou l d  b e  regarded as suspended o n  the b asis  o f  the 
legal theory o f  rebus sic stantibus (ch anged c ircumstances) .  
The American stan dpoint  was b ased on a l egal opinion sough t from Actin g  At­
torney Genera l Biddl e . 2 1 The la t ter reasoned in subs ta nce th at the Load Lines 
Convention was a p eacetime agreement,  that peace t im e com merce was a b as ic as­
su mption of th e treaty, and that  t h e  prevailing situation w i t h  respec t to s h ipp i ng 
was wh olly differen t :  of the 36 part ies t o  the treaty, 10 were at  war, and 16 were un­
der m i l i t ary occupation . Moreover, the actual destruction of merchan t sh ips, 
h owever loaded, h ad b ecome a major war strategy. H i s  op in ion con cluded as 
follows : 
Under these circumstan ces there is n o doubt in my m ind that the conventio n has ceased to be 
binding upo n the United States. It is a well-established principle of international law, rebus 
sic stantibus , that a treaty ceases to be binding when the basic conditions upon which it Was 
fou nded have essentially changed. Suspension of the convelllion in such circumstan ces is the 
u nquestioned right of a state adversely affected by such esselllial change. 
In a di rect reference to the UK's positi o n , he further ad m i t ted t h a t :  
. . .  it may well b e  that ordinarzly the procedure would call for the government  to inform the 
other parties to the treaty With respect to the matter and request agree ment for term inatioll or 
suspension of the treaty. The matter of procedure, however, does not affect the right of 
termination or suspensio n .  22  
In his  opinion,  i t  was not necessary ei ther  to denounce the treaty under Article 
2 5  or to have it otherw is e  ab rogated. Fol lowing t h i s  advice, President Roosevel t 
i ssu ed a presiden tial p roc lam ation on 9 Augu s t 1941 ,  based expli ci tly on the rebus 
sic stantibus th eory. The proclamat ion referred, mter alia, to th e fac t  that  t h e  condi­
t ions envi saged b y  t h e  Con ven t ion h ad been for the time b eing almost wh olly 
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destroyed, that the partial and imperfect enforcement of the Conven tion could 
operate only to prejudice the "victims of aggression," and that :  
. . .  under approved principles o (  intematiollal law i t  has become, by reason of such changed 
co nditions, the right of the United States to declare the CO/well /ion suspended and 
1 Il0 perative. 23 
The reaction of other parties to the treaty can be called one of general acquies­
cence. No State seems ever to have protested against this unilateral suspension; the 
eight American States which were parties to the Convention gave their express as­
sent thereto, and even the UK accepted the U .S .  action in a diplomatic note.24 
During the war, severa l States followed the U.S.  example and unilaterally sus­
pended the convention .2 5  After the war, the proclamation of 9 August 1 94 1  was 
revoked by  presidential proclamation of 2 1  December 1 945,  effective 1 January 
1 946.26 
B .  The 1 9 6 6  Load L i n es Conventi o n .  The above even t represen ts an impor­
tant piece of State practice and op inio juris on  the legal effect of a rmed conflict on 
multi lateral treaties; not in the least s ince i t  constitu tes one of the best  docu­
mented episodes in which a (formally) neutral S tate, upon the outbreak of armed 
conflict between other contracting parties to a multilateral treaty, decided to sus­
pend the operation of that treaty unilaterally. In  the light of this,  th e discussions 
held in 1966 for the revision of the 1930 Conven tion carry particular in  teres t .  The 
draft suspension clause proposed by the United States was iden tical to Article VI 
of the In ternational Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1 960, which, as will 
be seen below, had i tself given rise to serious con troversy.27 
The proposed new Article 5 on suspension in case of war, read in  substantial 
part as follows : 
(a) In case of war or other hostilities, a con tracting Govern ment which considers that it is 
affected, whether as a belligerent or as a neutral may suspend the operation of the whole or 
any part of the Regulations annexed !terelO. T h e  suspending Govern m e n t  shal l  
i m media tely give not ice of a n y  suspension t o  t h e  Organiza t ion;  (b) Such suspen sion 
shall  n o t  deprive o ther Contracting Governments of any right  of control  under the 
presen t Convention o ver the ships of the s uspend i ng Government when such ships 
are w i t h i n  their  ports;  (c) The suspending Governmen t may a t  any t ime terminate 
such suspension a n d  shal l  i m mediately give not ice of such termi nat ion to the 
O rganisat ion;  ( d )  The Organizat io n shal l  n o t i fy a l l  Con trac t i n g  Governments  o f  a n y  
s uspension or term i n a t i o n  of suspensi o n  u n der t h i s  Art ic le .  ( I tal ics a d d e d . )  
1 6 1  
The Newport Papers 
The reactions of other governments to the U .S .  proposal can be summarised as 
follows. France argued that the clause should not be adopted, for three reasons : 
(1) The en tire article appeared unnecessary, "as i t  is always open to a Governmen t, 
in case of war, to denounce a Convention" ;  (2 )  The use of terms such as "war" and 
"hostilities" rendered the clause too vague; (3) By granting other govern men ts a 
right of control in subparagraph b, the entire proposal was internally contradictory. 28 
The USSR, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria also argued in favour of deletion of the 
American amendment, but  for more legal or  ideological reason s. Their delegates 
ins isted that the draft clause was incompatible wi th the precepts and the spirit of 
the UN Charter, and in particular, that it was contrary to Article 2(4) of the Char­
ter.29 The Uni ted States replied that its proposal : 
. . .  would enable governments to take such immediate measures as were necessary In case of 
hostilities and in the interests of national security it v ..'ould seem indispensable. 
This view was supported by Western S tates including the UK, Norway, Can­
ada, Greece, and by Argentina, China (Taiwan) and Liberia. 30 
When the proposal for deletion of the draft provision was overwhelmingly re­
jected in the General Committee, the USSR and Poland tried another strategy. They 
introduced an amendment aimed at b ringing the suspension provision more in line 
with what they considered to be the spirit and purpose of the Convention as well as 
the UN Charter. They suggested to replace the expression "In case of war or other IlOstil­
ities" used in subparagraph (a) of the suspension clause proposed by the United States, 
with the following:  "In case of an armed attack or in extraordinary circumstances, which 
affect the vital interests of the State of any Contracting Government . . . .  ,, 3 1  
With the United States and other governments will ing to compromise, this So­
viet-Polish proposal became the basis of the text which was final ly agreed by the 
1 966 Conference.  The text  of the final provis ion retained the procedural require­
ments of the above-mentioned U . S .  proposal, but changed the substantive 
requirement. 32 Article 31 ( 1 )  now reads : 
I n  case of hostilities or other extraordinary Clrcumstances which affect the vital interests of a 
State the Government of which is a Contract ing Government, that Government may 
suspend the operation of the whole or any part of the present Convention.  The 
suspending Government shal l  immediate ly give notice to any such suspension to the 
Organi zation. ( I ta l ics  added . )  
This end result  represents a substan tial update of the suspension clause ini­
t ial ly proposed by the United States, in several respects :  
1 62 
International Environmental Law and Naval War 
1 .  It no longer uses the terms "war," "belligerent" or "neutral . "  While the USSR 
appears to have been successful in convincing other delegates that such terms 
would sit  uncomfortably with the UN Charter, the conference nonetheless de­
clined to adopt either the expression "armed attack" or  "armed conflict ." The 
latter would have been more in accordance, respectively, with thejus ad bellum ter­
minology employed in the Charter and with the current jus in bello terminology. 
2. The conference decided instead on the expression "hostilities or other extraor­
dinary circumstances," which is much less precise a definition of the circumstances 
in which State parties may decide to suspend the convention . The l icence given for 
auto-determ ination of the case for suspension of  the convention i s  therefore 
wider than would have fo llowed from use  of  the term "war or  other host i l i t ies . "  
One cannot  help but doubt  whether th i s  was an outcome which the U S S R  and Po­
land had intended. 
3 .  The previous observation is only partly tempered by the additional require­
ment that the circumstances must affect the "vital interests" of a State. It is  far from 
certain for instance, whether other contracting parties would be entitled to dispute 
a party's decision to suspend. The only course of action open to other contracting 
parties under the treaty seems to l ie on the diplomatic level. Subparagraphs (3) and 
(4) of Article 31 might facilitate such diplomatic discourse, but these are provisions 
of a mere procedural nature which do not affect a State's substantive right  of deci­
sion to suspend.33  
4 .  The provision of subparagraph (2)  can indeed be regarded as a moderating 
element. Accordingly, suspension by one State party of its obligations under the 
convention does not affect the right of other State parties to continue to exerc ise 
control in  their ports over ships registered with the suspending State. This provi­
sion was borrowed from the Safety Conventions and wi ll be discussed below.34 
Although the above events took place when the U nited S tates was not yet  an of­
ficial bell igerent in the War, it is difficult to deny that  rebus sic stantibus was 
invoked in connection with international armed conflict between a third State 
and a belligerent. I t  was suggested before that h istorically, the rule of rebus s ic 
stantibus was developed to deal with p eaceful change. 35 The Load L ines episode 
seems to contradict this. However, i t  i s  submitted that the circumstances in which 
the rule was invoked here were unique, and that the ensuing suspension clause 
does not meet the substantive and procedural requirements that cu rrent intern a­
tional law attaches to the rebus sic stantibus p lea under the law of treaties. 
First, Article 62 of the 1 969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, wh ich 
represents largely customary international law,36 lays down strict substantive re­
quirements for the plea of "fundamental change of circumstances . "  Subparagraph 
( 1 )  requires a heavy burden of proof: the circumstances must  not only h ave been 
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unforeseen, the original circum stances must  have consti tu ted an essential basis of 
the consent of the parties to be  bound by the treaty, and the effect of the change i s  
t o  radically transform t h e  extent o f  obligations stil l  t o  be performed under the 
treatyY Thus formulated, it seems debatable whether the circumstances which the 
United States invoked in 1 94 1  meet these demands. The Presidential proclamation 
did attempt to demonstrate that "peacetime commerce" was a basic assumption of the 
1 930 Convention, and that the war had radically altered this assumption .  Neverthe­
less, it seems that the prime purpose of the 1 930 Convention was to deal with safety 
regulations of ships, which the United States subsequently found burdensome or in­
convenient to her activities as (qualified) neutral in the conflict. 
Even if  the U . S .  standpoint would be correct, the IC],S j udgments in the 1 973 
Fisheries Jurisdiction and 1 997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project cases demonstrate that  
the party invoking a plea of changed circumstances i s  not the sole judge of its mer­
its . 38 Although the 1 966 Convention suspension clause does not exclude judicial 
review, the wording of the substantive requirement39 and the lack of substantive 
say which o ther treaty Parties are accorded4o do seem to imply that the suspend­
ing S tate i s  given a much l arger measure of di scretion than allowed by  the modern 
plea. The latter point i s  confirmed by  the fact that under the 1 966 Convention, 
States are allowed to decide whether they shall suspend the convention as a whole, 
or only in part, whilst Article 62 of the Vienna Convention deals with reasons for 
withdrawing fro m  a treaty, terminating it or suspending i ts  operation as a whole. 
Furthermore, Article 3 1  (3) of the 1 966 Convention gives S tates the discretion not 
only as to when to suspend but also as to when to terminate the suspension.4 1 
Furthermore, the modern version of the rebus sic stantIbus theory attaches spe­
cific procedural requirements to all cases of termination and suspension : 
notification to the other treaty Parties, the right of other Parties to formulate ob­
j ections,  peaceful  settlem ent of any disputes, and  the expiry of  a period of not less 
than three months before the suspension or  termination can take place in case no 
objections are formulated.42 While i t  i s  not excluded that all these conditions 
could apply between belligerents and third Parties, the suspension clause which 
was included in the 1 966 Convention indicates that the treaty Parties wished to 
grant each other as li ttle substantive say as possible with respect to suspension 
based on armed conflict .  
The preliminary conclusion, based on the legal h istory of the 1 966 Load Lines 
Convention, i s  that the suspension clause which the treaty parties decided on, and 
which applies between belligerents and third States, does not meet the standards 
of the modern plea of fundamental change of c ircu mstances. 
Finally, i t  i s  submitted that modern requirements of the plea make it unlikely 
that i t  can ever be u sed as a ground  to suspend or terminate treaties between 
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belligerents on the basis of the exis tence of armed conflict alone. It was seen ear­
lier that reliance on this defence in  the case of armed conflict is  not as such 
excluded by the 1 969 Vienna Convention.-n However, the plea' s specific  proce­
dural requiremen ts-noti fication, period for the formulation of objections 
etc . -are unsui table for application between belligerents.  Furthermore, Article 
62(2) of the 1 969 Vienna Conven tion excludes the plea of changed circumstances 
in two cases that seem to bar application in armed conflict :  in case (a) the treaty 
establishes a boundary; or (b)  if the fundamen tal change is the result of a breach 
by the party invoking i t  ei  ther of an obligation under the treaty or of any other in ­
ternational obligation owed to  any other party to  the treaty. The firs t 
subparagraph means that  the plea cannot be relied on by belligeren ts fighting 
over a boundary treaty. The secon d subparagraph implies tha t  at  least "i llegal ag­
gressors" would not be allowed to take advantage of th is defence. 
5 . 2 . 3 .  The Safety Convent ions  
• Convention for the S afety o f  Life at S ea, 1914 
• International Convention for the Safety of Life at S ea, 1 929 
• Inte rnational Convention for the Safety of Life at  Sea,  1948 
• International Convention for the Safety of Life at S ea, 1 960 
• Convention for the Safety of Life at  Sea ( SOLAS), 1 974 
The Safety Conventions in their successive forms a re generally regarded as the 
most important of all in ternational treaties concerning the safety of primarily 
merchant ships. The first version was adopted in 1 9 1 4, the second in  1 929, and the 
third in  1 948 .  The 1 960 Convention was the first major  task for IMCO after i ts cre­
ation, and i t  represented a considerable s tep forward in  modernising regu lations 
and in keeping pace with technical developments in the shipping i ndustry. The 
intention was to keep the convention up-to-date by periodic amendments, but in 
practice the amendments procedure proved to be too slow.  A completely new con­
vention was adop ted in  1 974-the Convention for the Safety of Life at  Sea 
(SOLAS) .44 
A. The 1 9 1 4  Safety Conventio n .  The 1 9 1 4  Safety Convention was con­
cluded as a direct in ternational response to the 1 9 1 2  Titanic disaster, one of the 
wors t mari t ime acciden ts in  h istory. I ts provisions included safety precau tions for 
ice and other dereli cts floating i n  the sea, ru les on radio- telegraph ins tallations 
and signalling lamps, and led to the set-up of the first in ternational ice patro 1 .45 
The 1 9 1 4  Convention was concluded on the eve of World War I. Although it did 
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provide for emergency s i tuations such as "s tress of weather" and other ins tances 
offorce majeure ,  46 it was meant to apply to merchant ships onlin and con tained 
no  prOVISIOns on war. 
The global conflict of World War I, which eventually involved 32 nations, had a 
major effect on the treaty. Article 69 of the trea ty provided for its en try in to force on 1 
July 19 1 5, but because ofthe 1 9 1 4-1 9 1 8  conflict, this never materialised. 48 Unlike the 
1 9 1 0  Salvage Convention, the 1 9 1 4  Safety Convention was consequently not listed 
among the "multilateral treaties, conventions and agreements of an economic or 
technical character" to be "applied" between defeated Germany and the Allied and 
Associated Powers in accordance with Article 282 of the Versailles Peace Treaty.49 
B.  The 1 929 Safety Convention .  It was only 1 1  years after the end of World 
War I that a second international conference on the Safety of Life at Sea could be 
convened. The conference produced a revised version of the 1 9 1 4  Convention and 
also recommended changes to the International Collision Regulations (hereinafter 
COLREGS).50 The UK government was charged with obtaining the necessary inter­
national agreements to modify the latter .5 1  O ther than that, the 1 929 Conference 
did not entail any major i nnovations in the general provisions of the 1 9 1 4  Conven­
tion. More in particular, no clause was inserted to deal with the effects of war. This 
may not be surprising, since, after all, the 1 9 1 4  Conven tion never en tered in to force, 
and the i ssue of the legal effect of war on the execution of that treaty never arose. 
The 1 929 Safety Convention entered in to force on 1 January 1 9 3 3  and was rati ­
fied by 3 5  governments . 52 According to some accounts, the conven tion conti nued 
to remain in force during World War II. Thus, McIntyre refers to various domes­
tic implementation measures taken by the United States during the w ar . 53 
However, from the documents that will  be discussed immediately below, it is 
clear that if the 1 929 Safety Convention was applied during World  War II,  i t  was 
certainly not in  "unabridged" form. 
C. The 1 948 Safety Conventi o n. After World War II, a thi rd I nternational 
Safety Conference was convened in London. I t  led to a substantially revised 
Safety Convention and to a renewed proposal for amendments to the COLREGS. 
World War I I  had at least one clear negative effect on the execution of the 1929 
Convention :  it prevented the UK governmen t  from carrying out the mandate re­
ceived in the 1929 Convention regarding the revision of the COLREGS. 54 The 
influence of World War I I was also apparent from three further questions which 
the conference tackled: an explici t provision on the effect of war on the treaty, an 
exemption for humanitarian evacuations,  and a resolu tion extending a temporary 
waiver for "the s i tuation created by the Second World War." 
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During the 1 948 Safety Conference, the United S tates proposed an elaborate 
new provision for the contingency of war. The new article would allow contract­
ing governments, in case of war, if they consider that they are affected, whether as 
belligerents or as neutrals, to suspend the convention as a whole or in  part and 
also allow exemptions for h umanitarian reasons . 5 5  
What i s  more, early on  the conference delegates agreed to adopt a resolut ion 
on the "S i tuation created by the Second Word War . ,, 5 6  In  the  final act ,  the t i t le  
of the proposed resolution was changed to " Carriage of  Passengers in Excess  of 
Co nvention Limits . "  The s ubstantive part of  the  Resolut ion (No. 1 )  i tself  was 
never challenged and read in i ts  final  vers ion as  fo llows : 
The Internat ional Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, 1 948  
RECOGNISING, 
That as a consequence of the situation created by the second  World War the number 
of passengers needing to be carried by sea at the present  t ime is st i l l  consi derately 
greater than the passenger accommodation available,  and t hat a number of 
Governments signatory to  the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
signed in  London on M ay 3 1  st, 1 929, have accordingly been obl iged to allow 
passengers to be carried in their ships in  excess of the l im i ts a l lowed by that 
Convention 
RESOLVES, 
That Governments shou ld  each b ring their  pract i ce into conformi ty  with the 
p rovisions of the said Convention as soon as practi cab le, and  in  any event not later 
than the 3 1 st day of December, 1 950 . 57 
What motivated these two ma jor  i n novat ions-one perm anent  ( suspen­
s ion/exempt ion  c lause) and o n e  temporary (Reso lu t ion  I )-were the  
prob lems  wi  th execution experi e nced b y  m any  S tates  dur ing  the  pas t  war .  
D ur ing the  1 948  Conferen c e, m a n y  governments confessed to hav ing  been 
u n able  to fu l ly abide by the  provi s ions  of the  1 92 9  Convent ion due  to the  ne­
cess i  t ies  of  war :  
• The United States admitted that i t  had tried in vain to obtain the agreement 
of other contracting Parties on  the suspension by the United States of cer­
tain provisions ;  5 8 
• The UK explained that the draft resolution on the circumstances created by 
the second World War " . . .  dealt with a situation which h ad been forced 
upon the UK government and others,, ; 5 9 
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• France also admitted to having suspended part of the 1 929 Convention for 
she declared being unable to bring the proposed waivers in relation to the 
situation c reated by the past  war to an end before December 3 1 st, 1950 .60 
By  insist ing on the inclusion of a suspension clause, its promoters wanted the 
conference to acknowledge the real ity of World War II and thus in a sense absolve 
their governments post-factum from any blame. Another reason why the suspen­
sion clause was considered necessary is  that many delegates wished to obtain from 
the conference an authorisation to do the same in the future, should the necessity 
arise again .6 1 Finally, many governments foresaw that they would need about two 
years before being able to return to th e fu ll implemen tation of the requirements of 
the convention. That i s  why Resolution I extends a waiver until the end of 1 950 .  
St i l l, the  proposal to include a provision in the Safety Convention to allow bel­
ligerent and neutral States to suspend the whole or any part of its  regulations, 
proved extremely controversial. Opin ion was divided on whether such a provi­
sion was needed at all ,  and to a lesser degree, on the effect  of suspension on the 
right of (port-State) control by third Parties.62 As to the first issue, delegates soon 
split  into two main camps. Countries such as the United States and the UK 
pressed hard  for the  inclusion of such  a provision, on  the foHowing grounds:  
• I t  was common knowledge that many Parties to the 1 929 Convention had 
been in breach of i t ; 63 
• As governments did not wish to violate the convention, some provision should 
be made to meet conditions such as those obtained during the late war; the pro­
posal would assure that governments were "correct internationaIly, , ;6-l 
• Coun tries would, in time of war, suspend whatever provision they wished; 
the proposal would merely enable Parties to do so without violating the 
treaty; i t  would be far better to recognise the contingency of war and the 
l ikelihood of suspension of the conven tion;65 
• Other conventions as the leAO Convention and many League of Nations 
treaties already con tained such a clause;66 
Delegates who opposed the inclusion of the war contingency clause or  who 
voiced doub ts about  the wisdom of doing so, 
• expressed fear  for possible abuse of the clause;67 
• or argued mainly with the USSR, that the convention should only deal with 
"normal conditions" ;  that war was not  a normal condition ; that in the event  
of war, every country, whether belligerent or  neutral, would make its own 
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rules to deal with the si mation, and that in any case, the provisions on emer­
gency and jorce majeure were sufficient ;68 
• or claimed that the entire i ssue was of mi li tary nature, and that the confer­
ence was not competen t to deal with such delicate matters as obtained 
during war; 69 
It was only at a very late s tage that the implications of the recently concluded 
UN Charter were brought up. Yugoslavia drew attention to the fact  that because 
of the Charter, the Safety Convention would have to distinguish between the 
rights of victim and aggressor States with respect to armed conflict .  However, the 
delegate conceded that this  was a delicate and difficult ma tter. He therefore pro­
posed that the Conference should decide not to deal with the issue at all ,  and leave 
it to general international law?O This hurdle was crossed when a clear majority of 
delegates appeared to be in  favour of incorporating the contingency of war in ex ­
press terms? ] 
The second hurdle consisted of the extent of (port-S tate) control other con­
tracting Parties would be left with in case of suspension of the conven tion by a 
Party because of war. Greece 72 and the Netherlands took a h ard-line approach, ar­
guing that third S tates should not be allowed to continue the controls?3 India 
wished to see the right of control l imited to the extent it  was in tended to secure 
the safety of na tionals of the country in whose port the vessels are located for the 
time being?� 
This  line of argumentation was rejected by the maj ority. They considered it  
unacceptable that third States would lose their right to exercise safety controls in 
their  ports, simply because the State to which the sh ip belonged was at war and 
had decided to suspend part or whole of the con ven tion.  This,  they argued, would 
not only be contrary to third States ' sovereign authority, but it  might even be 
taken as violation of the latter's duties  of neutrali ty?5 I t  was also pointed out that  
in  World War I I, suspending action was taken by certain  Parties and that  govern­
ments which so desired had exercised contro1. 76 The proposals to restrict  or 
forbid the right of control by third States in case of suspension of the convention 
by a Contracting Party were subsequently defeated by a large maj ority.7 7  
The other provision, which had been undoubtedly inspired by the experience 
of World War II ,  was the proposal to exempt a contracting government from com­
plying with the  convention in case i t  needed to evacua te private cit izens whose 
lives were threatened. 78  True, according to i ts  promoter, the proposed provision 
was of a pure humani tarian nature and not intended as a special applica tion of the 
suspension clause in case of war. 79 The proposal met with l ittle resis tance during 
the conference. 
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The final text of Article VI on Suspension in case of War read in substantial 
part as follows: 
(a) I n  case of war, Contracting Governments which consider that they are affected , 
whether as belligerents or neutral s ,  may suspend the whole or any part of the 
Regulations annexed hereto.  The suspending Government shall i mmediately give 
notice of such suspension to the Organisat ion ; (b) Such suspension shal l  not deprive 
other Contracting Governments of any right of control under the present 
Convention over the ships of the suspending Government when such ships are 
within their ports ;  (c) The suspending Govern ment may at any t ime terminate such 
suspension and shall immediately give notice of such termination to the 
Organisation ;  (d) The Organisation shall notify all Contracting Governments of any 
suspension or terminat ion of suspension under this Article. 
The 1 948 Convention proved widely successful .  I t  entered into force in 1 950,  
and by the t ime of the 1 960 Safety Conference, the Convention and its Regula­
tions had been accepted by 52 governments. 80 The text of the provision that was 
finally agreed upon (Article VI) apparently grants contracting States a fairly un­
fettered right to auto-determine not only when but also what provisions to 
suspend.  As discussed in relation to the 1 966 Load Lines Convention,8 1  the re­
quirements of subparagraphs (c) and (d) are only of a procedural nature and do 
not affect the substance of the righ t accorded to Contracting Governments in sub­
paragraph (a). However, the leeway given to all contracting States has been 
moderated in the same article by two other factors . First, the only type of armed 
conflict which the Conference took into consideration was that of "war." This re­
flects undoubtedly the type of conflict a large part of the world' s  nations had just 
gone through : a large-scale international conflict affecting many States, belliger­
ent and neutral alike. A second limit to the right of auto-appreciation accorded in 
subparagraph (a) fol lows from the preservation of the right of port-State control 
by  third States in subparagraph (b) :  a unilateral decision taken by a Government 
to suspend the convention will therefore not imply, ipsoJacto, that other contract­
ing States will lose their rights (of control) under the convention. 
Although the contingency clause of the 1 948 Safety Convention clearly pre­
dates the formulation of the 1 966 Load Lines contingency clause, the 
circumstances which led to the adoption of the respective clauses are fairly simi­
lar.  During the travaux preparatoires of both conventions, many States adm itted to 
having unilaterally suspended part or whole of the convention during World War 
I I, and declared that they wished to put this situation right for the future. More­
over, both contingency clauses are almost i dentically worded. 
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It is submitted that not too much significance should be attached to the differ­
en t legal grounds invoked. I t  was seen above that  in  the Load Lines  Convention 
case, the United States officially relied on rebus s ic stantibus . This theory was, how­
ever, not mentioned at  all  during the 1948 Conference, during which, the UK 
delegate seemed to invoke, instead, some doctrine of necess i ty .  
There i s  no doubt  about it, Gentlemen, that in t i m e  of war we shall be faced-if ever w e  
have another war, which G o d  forbid-as w e  were I n  t h e  last war, with t h e  necessity of 
failing to carr_v o u t  certain other requirements of this Convention. We had to do it in the 
last wa r-not only my Government, b u t  many other Govern ments had to do the same 
th ing. 8 2 
Although other delegates also referred to the "necessities of war," i t  is unlikely 
that the above excerpt can be un derstood as a reference to the theory of necessity 
under international law. As seen in Chapter Three, the theory of necessity forms 
part of the general law of State responsib il ity as a ground precluding wrongfulness 
under international law83 and i s  technically distinct from the plea of rebus sic 
stantibus under the law of treaties. 
Moreover, the apparent leeway which con tractin g  parties are given in the 1 948 
Convention seems to be  at  odds with the substantive requirements which intern a­
t ional law attaches to the plea of necessi ty. Article 33  of the I LC's current draft on 
State Responsibi l i ty lays down very strict sub stantive conditions for the invoca­
tion of the "State of necessity," which i t  considers "deeply rooted in general legal 
th inking,,84 and which the ICI regards as reflect ing customary intern ational law. 
The World Court recen tly s tressed in the 1 997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case 
how heavy the burden of proof attached to these requirements i s :  there needs to be 
evidence of the existence of a "grave and im mi nent peri l" ;  the act being chal­
lenged must h ave been the "only means" of safeguardin g  that interest;  the act 
must not have "serious ly impaired an essential  interest" of the State towards 
which the obligation existed; the S tate whi ch is the author of that act must not  
h ave "contributed  to  the  occurrence of the  state of necessity"; the party invoking 
this plea i s  not the sole judge of i ts merits . 85 For all  those reasons, what has  been 
said above on the relationship between the modern version of the rebus s ic stanubus 
rule and the 1 966 Load Lines Conven tion con tingency clause applies mutatis mu­
tandis to the relati onship between the theory of necessity and the 1 948  Safety 
Convention contingency clause. 
Finally, there remain s the suggestion by Yugoslavia that the Safety Conference 
should pay heed to the  new jus ad bellum following the UN Charter, d i stinguish 
between vict im and aggressor S tates and therefore discriminate between legal and 
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illegal acts of suspen sion .  The sugges tion was not  fol lowed up.  The conference 
was apparently more co ncerned with rectifying a situation that h ad existed before 
the UN Ch arter than with taking the new, and admittedly more complicated, jus 
ad bellum into consideratio n .  However,  the sta tement of the Yugoslavian delega­
tion in 1 948 was a fo reb oding one. As seen p reviously, it touches on a deb a te 
which to date remains un reso lved.86 At the same time, Yugoslavia also "pio­
neered" a lin e of  a rgumentation th at  would be more frequently heard a t  ma ritime 
conferences from 1 960 onwards:  namely, that  contin gency cla uses, which al low 
any State to suspen d part or whole of the conven tion in case of war and similar c ir­
cumstances, a re at odds with the UN Charter. 
D. The 1 960 Safety Convention.  The fo urth i n ternational  safety conferen ce 
of 1960 was the first o n e  to be organised under the auspices of  1M eo. It became im­
media tely clear that one of the major issues the con ference would have to deal 
wi th was the righ t o f  suspension in case of  war. Once again,  the main protago n ists 
o f  the deb a t e  were t he USSR  a n d  the U n ited S t ates .  W h i l e  the fo rmer power 
proposed the deletion of the Article VI of the 1948 Conven tion,87  the latter, by 
contrast, wished to expand the a rticle to  encompass the h andl ing of "emergency 
s i tuations  occurring in international  relations  n o t  culm inating in war," and pro­
posed the fol lowing new subparagraph (a) :  
Action i n  c a s e  of war or emergency: 
(a) N o t h i n g  i n  the present  Conve n t i o n  shall precl ude a Contracti ng G o vernmen t  
fro m  t a k i n g  a n y  act ion which i t  consi ders necessary fo r t he protection of essential  
secu ri ty i n terests in t i me of war o r  other  emergency in i n ternat ional  relat ions .  A 
Con tra c t i n g  G o ve rnment  that t a ke s  any su c h  act ion,  which may include the 
suspension of the whole o r  a n y  part  of t he Regu l a t i o ns a n nexed t o  the Convention,  
shal l  i m mcdi ately give notice of the act ion t o  t he Orga n i s a t i o n . 88 
T h e  debate  on t h ese two diametr ica l ly opposed a m e n d m en ts was fo ught on 
m u c h  th e s a m e  gro u n d  a s  d u r i n g  the 1 94 8  Conference.  H owever,  the b a ttle 
l i n es were dra w n  even more sharply along the ideologi c a l  Eas t-West divi de, 
and the le gal  arguments  wh i c h  were invoked seemed to  b e  m o r e  sharply fo ­
c used than before.  The Uni ted Sta tes, fo r one,  denied t h a t  i ts amendment  
carr ied  p o l i t i c a l  s i g n i fi c a nce,  affi r m i n g  t h a t  i ts  p u rpose was  s imply to recog­
n i s e  c o n d i t i o n s  " a s  they had exi s ted, do ex ist  a n d  m i gh t  ex i s t  i n  the  fu r u re . ,, 89 
H e r vi ews we re supported by the  UK, who stressed that  the arti cle was only con­
cerned with practical  considerations .90 
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The U S S R, supported by other East  Block coun tries, objected n o t  o n ly to the 
a mendm en t  propo sed b y  the United States, but argued even against  keeping the  
1 948 version of the c lause .  Their  delegates i n s i s ted that the en tire arti c le  was  i n  vi ­
olation of  the  spiri t of  the UN Charter and that the  U n i ted S tates amendment, by 
broaden i n g  the category of circumstances in  w h i ch the suspen sion clause could 
be  i n voked, would m a k e  the s i tuation even worse .  They therefore urged the con­
feren ce, at a m i n im um, to s tick with the 1 948 version of the clause, which they 
saw as the lesser of two evi ls . 9 1  When the clause was discussed i n  the General Pro ­
visions Com m i ttee, the USSR found some support among Wes tern S tates who 
considered the terms o f th e  U.S .  proposal as  being too wide.92 I n  reply to this  crit i ­
cism, the United States agreed to temper the language of i ts  amendm ent, 
sugges t ing an al tern ative that was in essence a rep etition of  the clause agreed for 
the 1 9 5 4  O I LPOL Con vention.9 3  
Th i s  d id  n ot  sat i sfy the Russian delegate who asserted t h a t  the  n e w  Am erican 
proposal increased the possi b i lity of the suspension of the convention by extend­
ing i t  al so to "certain difficult situations i n  i n t ernational relations ."  That, in his  
opinion, was m uch too broad, and open to ab use. The delegate asserted gravely 
that the texts would outlast the goo dwill  of the conference, and that he saw an­
other serious defect i n  the  U.S. proposal in  that i t  reta i ned in an i n ternational text 
the notion of  a "state of tens ion . "  Th is, he argued, was contrary to the spiri  t of the 
Convention and would be a di stortion of internati o n al law. He added that t he 
U niversa l  Postal Union and the International Teleco m m unications Union Con­
ventions n o  longer included any provision of that n ature, and concluded that if  
need be, he would favour, i nstead of deletion, retention of  exist ing text .94 
However, several delegates pointed out that there was now a legal tradition of 
this type of conti ngency clauses and that the righ t of suspension was tempered by 
the provision under which third S tates would retain their  right of control pursu­
ant to sub p a ragrap h  (b). Follow ing this exchange, the (USSR) proposal for deletion 
of the article on suspension in  case of  war was heavily defeated in the General 
Commi ttee, while the l ates t ( U . S . )  version of the suspen sion clause found fa vour 
wi th man y members.95 During the subsequent plenary session, both the U S S R  and 
the United Sta tes restated thei r case. The U . S .  proposal for a widened set of cir­
cum stances i n which suspen sion o f the conventio n  would be  allowed, i .e . , not only 
in case of war b u t  al so in  case of "other host i l i t ies " was carried with 2 8  vo tes i n  fa­
vour, 6 against, and 9 abs tent ions .96 
One can only  speculate on the type of internatio nal  ten sion the U . S .  delegation 
had in mind when proposing an amendment to Article VI.  It  i s  nevertheless strik­
ing that the  above deba te was conducted entirely in fairly abstract legal ter m s ;  no 
particular conflicts were m entioned to illustrate the type of "o ther hosti l i t ies" the 
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final  version of the article was intended to cover. Furthermore, the travaux 
preparatoires of the 1 960 conference do not contain any indication of whether the 
contingency clause of the 1 94 8  Conven tion (or of the 1 954 O I LPOL article) had led 
to any significant State practice between 1 948 and 1 960. 
E .  The 1 974 S O LAS Conve ntion.  The 1 960 Conference entered into force on 
26 May 1 965 . Since its amendments procedure proved too slow in practice, i t  was 
put up for review again in 1974. The ensuing SOLAS Convention includes not only 
the amendments agreed upon up until  that date but also an improved amen d­
ments procedure. The main ob j ective of  the 1 974 Convention is to specify 
minimum standards for the construction, equipment and operation of ships, com­
patible with their safety. Flag States are responsible for ensuring that ships un der 
their flag comply with its requirements, and a number of certificates are pre­
scri bed in the Con vention as proof that this h as been done.97 
Surprisingly, the suspension clause that had sparked many a passionate ideo­
logical an d  legal argument during the 1 948 and 1960 conferences now hardly 
aroused any interest.  The entire clause was unceremoniously dropped by the 
Committee on General Provisions.  Since the summary records of this committee 
were never published, one can on ly speculate on the reasons for this  deletion : its 
members must have judged either that the clause was outdated or that i t  was a 
matter of general international law beyond the conference's competence. The 
Chairman's report simply mentions  that the committee decided to delete the sus­
pension clause together with a provision on non-self-governing territories. 
Subsequently, the p lenary accepted the deletion of both clauses without further 
ado. 9S 
5 . 2 . 4 .  Th e Pol l ut ion Prevent ion Co nventi ons 
• International Convention for t h e  Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by Oil 
(OILPOL), 1 954 
• Convention on the Preve ntion o f  Mari n e  Pollution by Dumping of Wastes a nd 
Other Matter (Lond on Convention), 1972 
• International C onvention for the Prevention o f  the Pollution by S h ips 
(MARPOL) 73/78 
A. The 1 954 OILPOL Convention and the 1 962 O P  Conference. The 1 9 5 4  
OILPOL Convention cons tituted the  fi rs t  successfu l  attempt a t  international reg­
ulation of oil pollution from tankers.99 Its original scope, however, was l imited to 
prohib iting discharges within 50 m iles off land. It contain s a clause, Article XIX, 
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similar to the ones discussed above, according to which Parties are enti tled to sus­
pend  part or whole of the conven tion in case of war or  other hostilities : 
( I )  In case of war of or other hostilities , a Contracting Government wh ich consi ders 
that i t  is  affected ,  whether as a belligerent or as a neutral, may suspend the operation of 
t h e  whole  or any part of the present  Convention in respec t of a l l  o r  any of the 
terri tories.  The suspending Government s h a l l  i mmediately give notice o f  any such 
suspension to the Bureau.  
(2)  The suspend ing Government  m ay a t  any time terminate such suspension a n d  shall 
in any event terminate it as soon as it ceases to b e  j ust ified under paragraph ( 1 )  ofthis  
Article .  Notice of such term ination shall  b e  g iven immediately to the Bureau b y  t h e  
Government concerned. 
(3) The Bureau shall n o t i fy all  the  Contracting Governments of any suspen sion or 
term inat ion of suspension under this Article.  ( I ta l ics  added.)  
Although the clause was probably inspired by  the 1 948 Conven tion, 1 00 there 
are two differences. The latter uses the term "war," whils t the 1 95 4  Convention 
contains the significant addition of "other hostil it ies ." l O l Furthermore, whilst ac­
cording to Article VI  (c) of the former convention, the suspension may at any time 
be  terminated, Article XIX (2) of the OILPOL Convention obligates governments 
to end the suspension "when i t  ceases to be  justified ."  1 02 
As far as can be gauged from the published preparatory documents, the pro­
posal to include thi s  contingency clause did not attract any comments. I t  was 
discussed neither at the 1954 OILPOL Conference, 1 0 3 nor at  the 1 962 OP Confer­
ence, 1 04 which amended the 1 954 Convention so that i t  applied to smaller gross 
tonnage and extended the zones where dumping was prohibi ted. 
As will be seen below, at the 1 954 OILPOL Conference, most of the debate on mil­
itary aspects was devoted to the issue of warships .  The same occurred during the 
1 962 OP conference:  the issue of the application of the convention to warships was 
heavily debated, but the armed conflict contingency clause of the 1 954 Convention 
was left unchallenged. l OS It may be that delegates at the OILPOL/OP conferences be­
lieved that the issue of the legal effect of war and other types of hostilities on the 
treaty was clearly regulated by international law, and that it had been given ade­
quate expression in the proposed suspension provisions. However, this explanation 
seems doubtful when one considers that the question of the status of such treaties in 
times of armed conflict was broached again in 1 966 during the International Con­
ference to update the Load Lines Convention. 1 06 A more plausible explanation for 
the lack of interest for the contingency clause i s  that the OILPOL/OP conferences 
took place shortly after the 1 948  and 1 960 Safety Conferences, during which similar 
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provisions had been the subject of extensive debate. Presumably, no delegation felt 
the need to re-open this debate so soon after that, in 1 954 and 1 962 respectively. 
B .  MARPOL 73/78.  The 1954 Convention and its sub sequent amendments 
did little to reduce the amount of oil  in troduced in the oceans, and their main ef­
fect  was to move oil pollution outside coastal areas .  The 1973 International 
Convention on Marine Pollution was intended to improve this situation substan­
tially. It i ncorporates the requirements and standards of  the 1 954  OILPOL 
Convention, extends the regime to all  ships operating on oceans (and not just  
tankers), and sets ambitious goals for the complete elimination of  all intentional 
pollution of  the marine environment by  oil and other harmful  substances and the 
minimalization of acciden tal discharge of  such substances . Nevertheless, some 40 
States remain bound by the 1 954 Convention and its cont ingency clause for war 
and other hostil it ies . 1 07 
Th e 1 9 7 3  In  ternat ional  MARPO L Conference was preceded b y  years o f  prepa­
ratory work under the  auspices  of l!v\Co's Marit i me Safety Committee and i ts 
technica l  Subcomm ittee .  I DS The draft provis ions which were submit ted subse­
quently to  governments fo r comments no  longer contained a clause on  the 
contingency of war or armed conflict .  1 09 Surprisingly, however, the deletion of 
this clause was not challenged at all, and this fact foreshadowed a similar develop­
ment regarding the Safety Conventions discussed above.  Finally, as wil l  be seen 
further on, the MARPOL Conference continued the tradi t ion of the OILPOL/OP 
conferences in that it was the provision related to warships that proved more con­
troversial during the  1973  Conference. 1 1 0 
C .  The 1 972 London D u m p i n g  Conventio n .  A final treaty instrument 
which needs to be  mentioned is the Convention on the Du mping of Wastes at Sea. 
It  was concluded at an intergovernmental conference in London, convened in 
November 1972  at the invi tation of the UK.  IMCO was made responsible for the 
Secretariat duties related to i t .  The Conv ention has a global  characterl l l  and ap­
pli es to a l l  marine waters other than internal waters. 1 1 2 I t  entered into force in 
1975 and has thus far been ratified by 72  States representing 67 .64 percent of 
world tonnage. I 1 3  
"Dumping" i s  defined i n  the convention as the del iberate disposal a t  sea o f  
wastes o r  other matter from vessels, ai rcraft, platforms o r  other man-made struc­
tures as well as the deliberate disposal of these vessels or platforms themselves. 1 1 4 
Article IV prohibits the dumping of  certa in  hazardous materials and requires a 
prior specia l  permit for the dumping of a number of other identified materials and 
a prior general permit for other wastes or matter. I I S Wastes which cannot be 
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dumped and others for which a special  dumping permit  is required are lis ted in 
the annexes. Article V(2) allows the issuing of permits fo r the dumping of even the 
most dangerous was tes into the sea in cases of emergency "posing unacceptable 
r isk relating to human health and adm itting no o ther feasible solution ."  How­
ever, this except ion-which may be waived _ 1 1 6 is contingen t on a series of 
procedural requirements :  other Parties need to be con sulted, and the Organisa­
tion may recommend appropriate procedures . 
The Conven tion does not  contain an express clause dealing with war or armed 
conflict, but includes the fo llowing exception in Article V( l ) :  
The provisions o f  Art .  IV shal l  not apply when i t  i s  necessary t o  secure the safety of 
human l ife or of vessels,  a i rcraft ,  platforms o r  other man-made structures in cases of 
force majeure cause d by stress of weather, o r  in any case which const i tutes a danger to 
human l ife or a real  threat  to vesse ls, a ircraft ,  platform s  or other man-made 
s t ructures at sea, if dumping appears to be the o n ly way of aver t i n g  the t hreat and i f  
t here i s  every proba b i l i ty  tha t the damage consequent u p o n  s u c h  d u m p i n g  wil l  b e  
less t h a n  w o u l d  o t herwise occur. S u c h  dump i n g  s h a l l  be so conducted as  to m i n i mise 
the l ikelihood of damage to human o r  marine l i fe and s hal l  be reported fort hwith  to 
the Organisat ion .  1 1 7  
The phrase "or in any case which con stitutes a danger t o  human life o r  a real 
threat to vessels etc ."  seems broad enough to jus tify deviation from the conven­
tion in times of armed conflict .  This impression is reinforced by the fac t  that, 
unl ike for emergencies (Article V(2» , no waiver is  foreseen for resort to Article V 
( l ), nor any prior consultation procedure. 
This in terpretation is in accordance with U . S .  domestic practice. Thus, the 
1 988 U . S .  Public Vessel Medical Waste Anti -Dumping Act prohibits the disposal 
of poten tial ly infectious medical waste into ocean wa ters, unless this is done be­
yond SO  nautical mi les from the neares t land. This interdiction does not apply, 
however, when either the health or safety of individuals on board is  threatened, or 
"during time of war or a declared na tional emergency. ,, 1 l 8  
5.3. Conclusions to Chapter V 
The travaux preparatoires of some of the maritime conven tions show that refer­
ence was made to the contingency clauses of the Convention on Air Navigation of 
1 9 1 9 1 1 9 and the ICAO Conven tion of l 944. 1 20 These s tipulate that  the treaties do 
not apply during war, or at least do not place l imits  on the freedom of action of 
bell igerent and neutral  S tates during war or other types of emergency.  However, 
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the tenor of the marit ime clauses agreed on subsequently was often different .  
Leaving aside the o ld  1 9 l O  Salvage and  19 14  Safety Conventions, the  contin­
gency clauses discussed in th is  chapter indica te that the drafters in tended that 
the conventions would,  in  pr inc iple, continue to apply during international 
armed conflict .  But the contingency clauses permit Parties to deviate from the 
convention in whole  or  in part in accordance with certa in subs tantive and/or 
procedural requ irements .  
I t  is noteworthy that most of the conventions discussed in this subchapter 
deal(t) with war or o ther types of armed conflict in a fairly simi lar manner. When­
ever conference delegates were called upon to deal with the question, the majori ty 
agreed that armed conflict was a contingency that might allow a State party to sus­
pend some or all of its ob ligations under the conventions .  However, it is striking 
that none of the clauses under review entail any pre-determined autom atic legal 
effects of the outbreak of armed conflict on the treaty. Although some delegates 
voiced the opinion that war "ipso facto " meant that the treaty would be terminated 
or suspended between belligerents, none of the texts which were finally adopted 
supports that view. 
The various conference documents discussed above and the wording of the 
clauses that were fin ally adopted demonstrate that the del egates' overarching con­
cern was to deal with the issue in as pragmatic a manner as p ossible.  As a 
consequence, legal subtleties that follow from the new jus ad bellum under the UN 
Charter, or even the more establ ished distinction between belligerent and neutral 
coun tries, were not really taken in to account. Many of the provisions which were 
adopted after World War I I  reflect primarily experiences related to the large-scale 
international conflicts of the First and Second World Wars.  The consequences of 
these conflicts were inevitably felt globally; they had affected world sh ipping and 
navigation and h ad caused impacts on the commercial operations of all S tates, re­
gardless of their formal pol it ical or  legal s tatus in these conflicts .  
Another s ign of  the purposely pragmatic way in which the conference dele­
gates dealt with the cont ingency of war/armed conflict  is th at the resul ting 
clauses tend to treat all  types of armed conflict as temporary emergencies ,  which 
could affect a part or the whole of the operation of the convent ion .  At  fi rs t 
glance, there seems to be  l i tt le real difference in the way the treaties j u dge in­
stances as force majeure, stress of  weather, humanitari an emergencies and war  or  
armed conflict .  All  of  these  m ay just ify temporary non-app licat ion of certain 
provis ions .  Particul arly str iking for instance i s  the substantive and procedural 
s imilarity between the clauses on " carriage of persons  in emergency" and "sus­
pension in case of war" adopted for the first t ime at the  occasion of the 1 948 
Safety Conference .  
1 78 
I ! 
I 
International EnD/ronmental Law and Naval War 
There are nevertheless some differences between war/armed conflict and other 
types of emergency: ( 1 )  ins tances asforce majeure and stress of weather do have au­
tomatic ipso facto effects on the execution of the treaty: 1 2 l  B y  defini tion,  these are 
circumstances that leave a S tate party with l ittle choice of action ;  1 2 2  by contrast, 
as men tioned before, the con tingency clauses for war/armed conflict  assume that a 
State party is still  left with some freedom of choice, not only as to whether to sus­
pen d or not, but  also as to what provisions to suspend; therefore, an armed 
conflict contingency clause usually i ncludes a number of procedural require­
ments regarding the duty to inform and notify other contracting Parties ; (2) 
compared toforce majeure and s imilar emergencies, war/armed conflict may affect 
a different type and range of provisions of the treaty. 
It was seen as well that the insertion of a suspension clause in the 1 930 Load 
Lines Convention and the 1 929 Safety Convention had been jus tified on  different  
legal grounds :  rebus s ic stan tibus in  the  former, l 2 3  the  "necessi ties" of war  in the 
latter. 1 24 I t  was argued above that  these claims do not  meet the requirements 
which current international law attaches to the pleas of either "fundamen tal 
change of circumstances" under the law of treaties or the "state of necessity" un­
der the law of State responsibility. 
In  addition, there is reason to believe that even before World War I I ,  in terna­
t ional  l aw distinguished between the suspension of treaties i n  case of war, and 
suspension/termination on the basis  of rebus s ic stantibus, or on other grounds such 
as duress.  For instance, the 1 935 Harvard Research draft treaty on  the law of 
treaties l 2 5  contains provisions with separate substan tive an d procedura l  require­
ments for rebus sic stantibus, 126  duress, l 27 and effect of war. 1 2 8  Perhaps an even 
clearer example is  given by the dist inction which the Washington Naval Disar­
mament Treaty concluded in  1 922-i. e. , eight years before the 1 930 Load Lines 
Convention-makes between the procedure for revision of the treaty on  the 
ground of rebus s ic stantibus (Article 2 1 ) :  
I f  during t h e  term of t h e  p resent Treaty t he reqUIrements of lIaliolla/  secu rity o f  any 
Contracti ng Power i n  respect  o f  naval  defence a re, i n  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  the Power, 
materially affected by any change of circ umsta nces, t h e  Contracting Powers wil l ,  at the 
request of such P ower, meet  i n  conference w i t h  a v iew t o  the reconsideration of t h e  
prov i s i o n s  o f  t h e  Treaty and its  a m e n d m e n t  by m u t u a l  agreement.  ( I t a l i cs a d d e d . )  
and unilateral suspension of the treaty in  the case of war (Article 22) :  
W h enever a n y  Contracting Power shall become engaged i n  war which i n  i ts  o p i n i o n  
affects t h e  naval defence of its national security, s u c h  Power may after notice t o  the other 
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Con tracting Powers suspend for t he period of h o s t i l i t i es i t s  obligat ions  under the 
present Trea ty  . . .  prov ided that  such Power s h a l l  notify the other  Con tract ing 
Powers that  t h e  em ergency is  of such a character as to require such s uspension.  
(I talics added.)  
On the basis of the above, including what h as been said on this issue in  Chapter 
III , 129  a clear case can be made that the discussed maritime contingency clauses 
point to the existence in in ternational law of a separate ground allowing Parties to 
suspend a treaty in  whole or  in part in  the case of armed conflict .  
Are such con tingency clauses now outdated?  The analysis has shown that, at  
least  up to 1 966, (mainly Western) S ta tes  succeeded in  convincing the majority of  
conference delegates that i t  was  better not  only to preserve this type of treaty 
clause :  in 1 960 and 1 966 the set of circumstances under which a State party could 
decide uni laterally to suspend part or who le of the convention, was even ex­
panded; to "other hostilities" in  the 1 960 Safety Convention, 1 30 and to 
"hostil ities or other extraordinary circumstances" (affecting) the "vital interests" 
of a State, in the 1 966 Load L ines Convention . 1 3 1  
Al though some o f  these clauses are still i n  force today (e.g. the 1 954 OlLPOL 
Convention and the 1 966 Load Lines Convention),  i t  is  noteworthy that none of 
the conventions concluded since the 1 970s contain such a provision.  Moreover, as 
was seen above, the contingency clause was deleted without much ado from the 
1 974 SOLAS Convention, 1 32 and does not  appear in MARPOL 7 3/78 either. 1 3 3  How­
ever, without a further examination of the other clauses of these treaties, any 
conclusion on their s tatus in t imes of armed conflict would be premature. 
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Chapter VJ[ 
Sovereign Immunity and the Exemption of Public 
Vessels from Maritime Conventions 
6. 1 .  General Comments 
A GREAT NUMBER OF MARITIME CONVENTIONS DO NOT APPL Y TO WARSHIPS, a fac t  which is sometimes seized upon in  the l i terature as proof that  these trea­
ties would not apply in  times of armed conflict .  1 I t  i s  submitted that the validity of 
such an inference depends on the scope of the exemption granted. The reasons for 
why warships are exempted are complex, give rise to confusion, and need to be ex­
plored in detail .  
There are two basic interrela ted principles which have l ed  to  the  curren t s i tua­
tion. His torically, the ruler was equated with the State. Under the traditional law, 
laid down, inter alia, in Tobin v. The Queen, "The King could  do no wrong," which 
meant that under no circumstances could a sovereign be sued in the courts, not 
even of his own country.2 A similar proh ibition s ti l l  applies to foreign heads of 
State.3 While sovereigns are no longer equated with the S tate, a foreign State is nor­
mally gran ted qualified immunity from the ju risdiction of another S tate, in  respect 
of  its conduct or property.4 This is based on the concept that S tates are co-equal on 
the international planeS and regarded as an act of comity under customary interna­
tional law.6 Sovereign immunity may be waived, but since this constitutes an 
exception to the general rule, a waiver should be interpreted restrictively. 7 
The precise l imits of S tate imm unity are controversial  and const i tu te one of 
the most l i tigated aspects of international law.  8 Under current in ternational law, 
the principle is  l imi ted to acts of ius imperii , or governm ental acts in  official capac­
i ty, as opposed to acts of ius ges tionis,  or  acts done in a private or commercial 
capaci ty. 9 There is also a tendency to exempt cases of non-commercial torts from 
the principle of immuni ty, 1 0  and in particular, cases of gross violations of human 
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rights by  a foreign government. I I  The 1 989  case of the Hercules demonstrates, 
however, that acts of warfare by foreign governments are covered by the principle 
of sovereign immunity and do not fall under the non-commercial tort exception. 1 2 
Similarly, in the case of Koohi and Others v. United States ( 1 992), the U .S .  Court 
of Appeals needed to decide whether the shooting down of an Iranian civilian a ir­
craft by the U .S .  cruiser Vincennes, as well as other instances of U .S .  intervention 
in the Iran- I raq war, were justifiable. The Court decided in  the negative, deciding 
that these operations fel l  within the "combatant activities exception" to the 
waiver by the U . S .  of sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 1 3  
As noted b y  the U .S .  Supreme Court i n  Alfred Dunhill Inc.  v. Republic of Cuba 
( 1 976), whilst  discernible rules of i nternational law have emerged with respect to 
the commercial  dealings of governments in the international market, there is no 
consensus as to the rules of international law concerning exercise of governmen­
tal power, including military powers. 1 4 
Because of the legal fiction that they form part of their flag State's territory, 
ships belonging to a foreign State have of old been entitled to immunity from ju ­
risdiction of any  S tate other than the flag  S tate. I S  The  locus classicu of U .S .  and 
international law is  that of The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,  decided by the 
U .S .  Supreme Court in 1 8 1 2 . 1 6  In  this case, two American cit izens attempted to 
assert tit le to a French military vessel harboured in Philadelphia, claiming that 
she had been unlawfully seized from their custody by persons acting under orders 
of the Emperor Napoleon. Chief Justice Marshall, in denying the claim formu­
lated the principle that public armed vessels in  the service of a foreign sovereign 
are generally exempt from the jurisdiction of any nation but the flag stateY The 
next case which has strongly influenced in ternational law is the UK case of The 
Parlement Beige ( 1 879- 1 880). This concerned a vessel owned by the Belgian King 
that had rammed an English steam tug. Although employed primarily as a mai l  
carrier, the vessel  was also engaged in  carrying passengers and freight. Reversing 
the judgement del ivered i n  the fi rst instance, the Court of Appeal decided that a 
foreign sovereign cannot be sued in personam and that an action in rem cannot be  
brough t against  h is  ship i f  she is being used substantially for public purposes . 1 8 
Currently, the legal s ituation with respect to State-owned ships i s  also deter­
mined by various national laws and international treaties, which lack uniformity.  
Apart from provisions in  maritime conventions which will be  discussed below, 
there have been several attempts at codification of the issue of j urisdictional im­
munity. The 1 926 International Convention for the  Unifi cation of Certain Rules 
relating to the Imm unity of State-owned Vessels includes several exceptions to 
the jurisdictional immunity of warships and other State-owned ships .  I t  modified 
the position taken by the English courts in The Parlement Beige by explicitly 
182 
1 
InternatIOnal  Environmental Law a nd Naval War 
denying immuni ty in cases of collis ions and other acciden ts of navigation . 1 9  The 
1 934 Protocol thereto clarified that this convention did not  affect the rights or ob­
l igations of belligerents and neutrals nor the jurisdict ion of prize courts .20 The 
1 940 Treaty on International Commercial Navigation Law adopts the same prin­
ciples as the 1 926 B russels Convention regarding actions in respect of collisions 
involving warships  and o ther Sta te-owned ships.2 1  
B y  contras t, the 1 972 Council o f  Europe Convention on  State Immunity and its 
Additional Protocol inclu d e  many exceptions to the principle of j urisdictional 
immuni ty, but  these do  not  apply to S tate-owned ships nor their cargo .22  In its  
1 99 1  Draft of Articles on J urisdictional Immuni t ies of S ta tes and their Property, 
the ILC adopts the la tter approach, specifying that warships, naval auxiliaries, and 
other ships owned or operated by a State and used exclus ively on government 
noncommercial service remain covered by the sovereign immunity principle, 
even in respect of coll is ions and other accidents of navigation .  23  
There is  still no generally internationally recognised definition of State-owned 
ships, although there is  a common understanding of the basic elements and catego­
ries.24 The most important category for this study is formed by warships and 
similar vessels;25 the second comprises ships employed for public, non-commercial 
purposes, including for example, police, customs or other patrol vessels .  The third 
type of State-owned ships would be those employed for commercial purposes ; how­
ever, according to current international legal theory and practice, the latter 
category of ships is  probably no longer entitled to tradi tional sovereign immunity. 
Many of the prov isions which w ill be discussed in th is  chapter deal ostensibly  
with "sovereign immunity" or with the exemption of vessels "ent i tled to sover­
eign immunity under international law." I t  is important to dist inguish, however, 
between j urisdictional immunity on the one hand, and exemption from substan­
tive legal provisions on the other. State ju risdiction can theoretically cover two 
dist inct types of legal authority:  prescriptive and jurisdict ional .  The fi rst is syn­
onymous with the authority of a sovereign nation to prescribe substantive rules 
and regulations, primarily appl icable and l imited to i ts territory and its nation­
als 26 By contrast, the j urisdictional or enforcement authority of a S tate refers to 
"the exercise of the power to ad judicate, normally assumed by the judic iary or 
magis trate within a legal system of the terri torial S tate," and by extension, to the 
exercise "of all o ther administrative and execut ive powers, by  wh atever measures 
or  procedures and by  whatever authorities of the terri torial State in relation to a 
jud icial proceeding.  ,,2 7  
Sovereign immunity i s  generally assumed not  to  entai l  exemption from the  j u ­
risdiction to  prescribe, and  therefore no t  to  imply exoneration from compliance 
with substantive rules of law. 28 I t  follows that when a maritime treaty contains a 
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classic sovereign immunity reservation, it applies fully to all ships, including war­
ships and noncommercial ships, but that enforcement of applicable rules is  
reserved exclusively for the flag State.29 If  the exemption of pub l i c  vessels relates 
to j urisdictional matters only, it is  subm itted that this has no bearing on the effect 
of the (substantive) rules of the treaty during armed conflict .  
However, as will be seen below, many maritime treaties extend immunity to 
warships from matters of substance, often under the misleading title of "sover­
eign" immunity. Such an exemption bears on the effect of the treaty during armed 
conflict. While for most of the time navies of modern sea powers operate a t  least 
technically in a state of peace, they may engage in some type of  hostile or even 
forcib le action in the pursuit of their countries' po licies. Incidents at sea may 
range from "bumping incidents," i .e . , deliberate collisions, to open conflicts. 3D 
When a warship or  other naval vessel is  exempted from the substantive rules of a 
maritime treaty under normal circumstances, it will ,  a fortiori, not be bound by 
that treaty during armed conflict .  I n  cases where the drafters did not wish to be 
drawn on this  issue,3 1  the substantive rules laid down in the treaty may or may not  
be  applicable to the "exempted" category, and the answer m ay h ave to  be  sought 
in general international law. I f  the reason for the exemption is not  clear from the 
wording of the treaty, an  examination of the travaux preparatoires may be 
necessary. 
6. 2. Discussion 
6 .2 . 1 . Load L ines 
• International Convention respecting Load Lines, 1930 
• International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 
Both the 1 966 Load Lines Convention32 and the predecessor treaty of 1 93033  
contain a clause exempting "ships of war"  from the scope of the  convention. It was  
seen above that during the 1 966 Conference, the  proposal to  a l low suspension of 
the co nvention during armed conflict  proved controvers ia1 . 34 By contrast, the 
proposal to retain the exemption of warships was not chal lenged at  a l l .  The con­
ference records show that the list of exempted ships was moved from the 
Regul ations to the general provisions of the convention. 35 
The wording of the exemption provision of the 1 966 Convention leaves little 
room for doubt about the type of immunity warships are entitled to .  The exemp­
tion extends to the entire treaty, exonerating warships from compliance with the 
substantive rules of the treaty and al l  its regulations .  In the l iterature, this 
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exemption h as been j ustified on the grounds of securi ty .  Professor Treves, for in­
stance, po in ts to the requi rement of confidentiali ty regarding data on the 
construction of warships and their operational procedures. 36 
6 .2 . 2 .  Safety Convent ions 
• Convent ion for t h e  Safety of Life, 1 9 14 
• Inte rnational Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,  1929 
• International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,  1 948 
• International Conve ntion for the Safety of Life at Sea,  1960 
• International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),  1 974 
The 19 1 3  Safety Conference was held to remedy the many safety defects of pas­
senger ships discovered as a result of the 19 1 2  Titan ic disaster. As is  made p lain by 
the text of Articles 2 and  5 ,  the conven tion was intended to apply to merchant 
ships of a certain description only:  "mechanically propelled, which carry more 
than 12 passengers and which proceed from a port of one of the said States to a 
POrt s i tu ated outside that State . . . .  " As a resu lt, warships-which were not even 
men tioned in the convention-were not  expected to comply with the substantive 
(safety) provisions.  
The Final Act of the 1929 Safety Conference comprises, apart from the text of 
the 1929 Convention i tself, two appendices : Annex I ,  which contains the (Safety) 
Regulations, and Annex II, which contains a proposal for amending the In terna­
tional Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS). The latter are 
"rules of the road at sea," which have of old app lied to all types of ships, including 
in  particular, warships 37 However, the fact that an annex on COLREGS was ap­
pended does not imply that these became part  and parcel of the 1929 Safety 
Convention .  On the contrary, the text of several articles make c lear that the 
COLREGS were considered to be wholly separate. 38  The 1 929 Conference could do 
no more than propose amen dments to the COLREGS, which dated back from the 
previous century and for whose revision the agreement of parties not present at 
the Safety Con ference was required. 39 
Finally, it transpires from Article 2( 4) of the main provisions of the 1 929 Con­
vention that the status of warships under the conven tion was unchanged from 
1 9 1 4 :  
T h e  present Convention,  un less expressly provided otherwise, does not apply t o  
ships of war. 
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Although this cautious formulation leaves room for the possibili ty that some of 
the convention's provisions might apply to warships, no such express provision 
has been adopted. 
The 1 948 Safety Conference led to a complete overhaul of the structure of the 
previous convention . First, with respect to the part relating to Safety, m any 
clauses were moved from the main body of the convention to the regulations, in­
cluding the provision on exempted ships (which became Regulation 3) .  The 
conference decided to keep the main body of the convention as su ccinct as possi ­
ble, confine i t  to matters as ratification, denunciation and modification, and move 
all other "technical provisions" to the Regulations .  Second, just  l ike in 1 929, the 
conference proposed a series of revisions to the COLREGS, which were appended to 
the final act .  Although attempts were made to integrate the latter with the rest  of 
the Safety Convention, the task proved impossible for the following reasons :  
• The COLREGS were observed by m any more countries than were parties to 
the 1 929 Safety Convention, and i t  was rea lised that  this might continue to 
be the case in the future;40 
• Over 50  countries had accepted the CO LREGS, but only 30 were present at 
this  Conference : some 20 ratifications of those not present would be  needed 
for new COLREGS to come into force;4 1  
• There were several technical obstacles t o  integration, which included differ ­
ent  dates for entry into force and different procedures for amendment;42 
During the 1 948 Conference, the exoneration clause for warships became the 
subject of debate. However, the question at issue was not whether warships should 
or  should not be  exempted from the safety provis ions, but  what other types of mil­
i tary vessels might be  allowed to benefit from the same exemption.43 Agreement 
was eventually reached on exempting both "ships of war" and "troopships" (Reg­
u lation 3) .  I t  was noted for the record that it was the meeting's stated intention 
that the term "ships of war" should be interpreted b roadly, whils t  " troopships" 
narrowly. The (UK) chairm an of the Working Party added that i t  was not the in­
tention to exempt commercial ships carrying troops on a particular voyage.44 
The verdict on the application of the Safety Convention and the Safety Regula­
tions produced by the 1 948 Safety Conference is the same as for the previous 
Safety Conventions. Although the exoneration clause for warships was moved in 
1 948 from the m ain  body of the Convention to the Safety regulations, this was 
done for the technical reasons explained above. Furthermore, none of the dele­
gates at the 1 948 Conference challenged the exemption for warships ;  on the 
contrary, the entire debate related to what additional categories of ships w ith a 
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mili tary mi ssion might be exempted. Finally, Artic le  I I  of the main provisions 
stipulates that the 1 948 Safety Convention app lies (only) to "ships regis tered in 
countries . . . .  " From the records of the 1 954 OI LPOL conference, i t  i s  clear that the 
term "regi stered" was at that t ime undersrood as  excluding warsh ips .45 
The 1 960 Safety Conference retained the structure of the previous conference. 
Annex A ro the Final Act contains the text of the amended Safety Convenrion as 
well  as of the newly agreed Safety Regulations .  Annex B ro  the final act contains 
the proposed new version of the COLREGS, which, as before, were not integrated in 
the Safety Convention.  IMCO was requested ro in itiate the necessary procedure for 
their revis ion.  
The major  innova tion brough t abou t by the 1 960 Safety Conference was the in­
corporation of provis ions and recommendations on the safety of n uclear ships, 
despi te the fac t  that many delegates thought that the matter was premature.46 
As for warsh ips, the 1 960 Conference decided ro retain the c lauses of both Arti­
cle II and of Regulation 3,  Chapter I of the Safety Regulat ions of the previous 
convention:n As was the case in 1 948, ships of war and troopships were hence ex­
onerated from complying with the substance of the Safety Convenrion and i ts 
Regulations "unless expressly provided otherwise . " However, l ike in  1 948, the 
1 960 Conference does not seem ro have adopted any such express provis ions .  On 
the contrary, the  express exclusion of warships i s  repeated in  two of the Safety 
Regulations' Chapters : in Chapter V on the Safety of Navigation,  which, accord­
ing to Regulation 1 ,  applies to all  ships on al l  voyages, except ships of war; and in 
Chapter VIII  on Nuclear Sh ips, which,  according ro Regulation 1 ,  appl ies ro all 
nuclear ships except ships of war. 
The 1 974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOL AS) was 
adopted about nine years after the previous Safety Convention entered into 
force,48 and about two years after the COLREGS had been revised in  a separate con­
vention.49 None of the amendments tab led ei ther before or during the 1 974 Safety 
Conference pertained to the exoneration of warships and troopships .  Conse­
quently, there was no debate about thei r exc lusion from the substance of the 
Convention . As a result, the relevant provis ions th at are st i l l  in  force today are 
iden tical to the principal exemptions adopted by the 1 948 Safety Conference. 
What has been said before in relation ro the meaning and the s ignificance of these 
exemptions,  remains valid . Accord ing ro Professor Treves, this  exclus ion is  j usti­
fied for reasons of confidentiality.50 
6 .2 . 3 .  COLREGS 
• COLREG S  appended t o  t h e  Final A c t  o f  t h e  1929 S afety Conference 
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• COLREGS appended to the Final Act of the 1 948 Safety Conference 
• COLREGS appended i n  Annex B of the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at  Sea, 1960 
• Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREG S  ) 1972 
As indicated before, the in tern a tional "rules of the road" at  sea have of old ap­
plied to warships .  The Regulations presently in force were revised by  an 
international conference held under IMCO auspices in 1 972 . 5 1  As of 1 February 
1 998, 1 3 1  States represen ting 96.02 percent of the world's tonnage were party to 
this 1 972 treaty. 52 
One of the most important innovations in the 1972 Regulations  was the recogni­
t ion given to traffic separation schemes (Rule 1 0) .  The Convention groups 
provisions into sections dealing with s teering and sailing, lights and shapes and 
sound and light signals. There are also four Annexes containing technical require­
men ts concerning lights and shapes and their positioning; sound signalling 
appliances ; additional signals for fishing vessels when operating in  close proximity, 
and international distress signals .  Guidance is provided in determining safe speed, 
the risk of collision and the conduct of vessels operating in or near traffic separation 
schemes. Other rules concern the operation of vessels in  narrow channels, the con­
duct of vessels in restricted visibility, vessels restricted in their ability to 
manoeuvre, and provisions concerning vessels constrained by their draught. 53  
Since the adoption of the fi rst international rules of the road,  the number of 
provisions that expressly apply to warships and other naval ships has i ncreased 
steadily. Several types of warships, amongst which are minesweepers and aircraft 
carriers, are covered by the Rules either expressly54  or by implication .5 5  
The demands of good seamanship require that  naval sh ips  comply wi th  these 
in ternational "rules of the road. " Although the total number of naval ships is 
small compared to merchant ships-for  every naval vessel in  1 988 ,  there were 
about ten large merchant vessels56-traffic at sea would resul t  in  chaos if n aval 
vessels would en joy "immuni ty" wi th respect to the substance of  the CO LREGS .  
However, the  text of the  COLREGS shows that  the du ties of S ta te  parties wi th  re­
spect to mili tary vessels are formulated in  less s tringent terms . Most 
conspicuously, Rule l(e) requires that governments endeavour to achieve the 
"closest possible compliance" if  they "have determined that vessels of a special 
construction or  purpose cannot fu lly comply with the provisions of any of the 
Rules ."  The wording of Rule l(e) suggests that governments en joy a measure of 
freedom to determine the extent to which naval vessels should comply with some 
of the substantive provisions.  
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There remains, nevertheless, the question of what legal effects, if any, armed 
conflict has on the CO LREGS. As was explained before, none of the Safety Confer­
ences at which both the international Safety Regulations and the international 
COLREGS were revised managed to integrate the latter with the main provisions of 
the Safety Convention. Because of this legal and technical disunion, the coverage 
of the general provisions of the texts of these Safety Conventions does not extend 
to the international COLREGS.  As a result,  Artic le VI  of the 1 960 Safety Conven­
tion on Suspension in case of War could not be taken to apply to the Annex on 
COLRE G S .  Furthermore, the 1 972  conference revising the C O LREGS adopted a gen­
eral provision on denunciation,57 but no clause on suspension in case of armed 
conflict, jorce majeure,  or any other cases of emergency. 
This does not mean however, that govern ments would not be entitled to resort 
to suspension of certain COLREGS when they find themselves in the circ um stances 
mentioned, e.g. , in Article VI  of the 1 960 Safety Convention. It  i s  submitted that 
even in the absence of an express provision to this effect, States may be entitled to 
resort to special measures in  times of armed conflict by virtue of  general interna­
tional law. Indeed, common sense alone indicates that in times of  armed conflict, 
Sta tes will in any case resort to amending or suspending certain C O LREGS, at least 
as far as  their naval vessels are concerned. This submission can be subs tantiated 
further with the following two elemen ts of treaty practice. 
First, Rule l ee) indicates that State parties may not be  in a position to have cer­
tain vessels "of a special construction or  purpose" compl y with all C O L REGS. The 
same provision urges States to endeavour to achieve the "closest possible compli­
ance," however, "without interfering with the special function of  the vessel . "  I t  is 
submitted that this provision would allow any State party to (auto -determine) the  
extent to which warships need to comply with certain COLREGS when on a special 
m ission or  when entrus ted w ith  such special functions as may be  required in 
times of armed conflict .  
Secondly, since the 1 970s, a number of naval powers have entered into bi lateral 
so-called Incidents at Sea Agreements (INC SEA), following the example of the 
Agreement on Prevention of Incidents at  Sea, concluded between the United 
States and the U S S R  in 1 972 . 5 8  Similar bi lateral agreements were subsequently 
concluded between the U S S R  and the UK, France, FRG, I taly and Canada. 59 
These agreements apply exclusively to naval vessels and are m eant to defuse 
tensions caused by quasi-hostile encounters at sea between naval powers. They 
form part of the body of arms control m easures and are akin to confidence-b uild­
ing measures .60 Taking the first of these agreements as an example, the United 
States and the U S SR solemnly declare in Article I I  that a first means for reducing 
the risks associated with their mili tary competition at sea consists of observing 
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"s trictly the let ter and spirit of the of the International Regulations for Pre­
venting Collisions at  Sea . . . .  " The bulk of this 1 972 INCSEA consists of additional 
undertakings-or special regulations-designed specifically for military encoun­
ters  and operations.6 l  There is a lso an article on the exchange of information 
between Parties on instances of collisions or o ther incidents (Article VII) .  
Although not  explic i tly provided for, i t  i s  patent that this I N SCEA agreemen t 
was not concluded in con templation of hostile conflict between the Parties .  This 
is confirmed by mil itary lawyers who have s tressed that in the event of the out­
break of armed conflict, both Parties may decide, at a minimum, to suspend at  
least some of the I NSCEA provisions, including i t s  references to the CO LREGS .62 
This  in terpretation is reinforced moreover, by the more recent Agreemen t on 
the Prevention of Dangerous Mili tary Activities (DMAA) concluded in 1 989 be­
tween the same two States.63 The DMAA i s  intended to supplement the 1 972 
I N SCEA and is  no longer l imited to n aval inci dents .64 Significantly, the DMAA in ­
corporates a special " savings clause," which refers in  the  jus ad bellum language of 
the UN Charter to the r igh t of individual or collec tive self-defense in accordance 
wi th in ternational law: 
This  Agreement s h a l l  not affect t h e  r ights  and o b l igations of the Part ies  under other 
internat ional  agreements and arrangements in force between the Parties, a n d  the 
rights of individual  or col lect i ve self- defense a n d  of navigation and overflight,  in 
accordance with  internat ional  l aw.  Consistent with  t he foregoing, the Parties shal l  
implement the p rov isions of this  Agreement,  t a k i ng into  account the sovereign 
interests of both Parties .6S  
6 .2 .4 .  Prevent ion of Oi l  Po l l ut ion  
• International Convention for t h e  Prevention of Pollution o f  t h e  S e a s  by Oil 
(OILPOL), 1954 
• International Conference on Prevention of Pollution of the S e a  by Oil, 1962 (OP 
Conference) 
The 1954 International Conference on Pollution of the Sea by Oil  had before it 
the proposals made by the UK governmen t dated April 1 954 .  This included an ex­
emption for warships and naval auxil iaries as in  the 1 948  Safety Convention.66 No 
delegate obj ected to the principle of the exemption, but there was some disagree­
ment about the range of excluded mili tary vessels and the wording of the clause. 
In addition, the idea was aired that even if  Parties could not  be compelled 10 do so, 
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they should nevertheless be urged to apply the convention's provisions on a vol­
un tary basis to categories of vessels formally excluded from application . 67 
I t was finally proposed to exclude "ships for the t ime being used as naval auxi l­
i aries" from the convention and to add a resolution in the annex, on " The 
application of the princIples of the Convention so far as is reasonable and practicable to the 
ships to which the Convention does not apply. " The substantive part of this Resolution 
(N o.  2) reads as follows : 
That the governments of countries which accept the present Convention should a lso, by 
legis lation or otherwise, apply the provisions of the Convention so far as is reasonable 
and practicable to all  classes of sea-going ships registered in  their territories or 
belonging to them to which the provisions of the Convention do not apply, that is  to say, 
warships and other unregistered ships, ships used for the time being as naval auxiliaries. 
(Ita lics added.) 
Delegates subsequently queried why the exclusion of warships had not been 
expressly mentioned in the main exemption clause, Article I I  ( 1 ) . The Chairman's 
explanation was that no such explic i t  reference had been included : 
. . .  because the Convent ion refers only to ships regi stered by Contracting 
Governments.  Wars h ips, not  being registered, were, t herefo re, excluded fro m  the 
Convention,  a l though they were referred to in  Resolution 2 . . . . 68 
Furthermore, the Italian delegate requested that i t  be put o n  the record that 
Resolution 2 was not b inding on governments .  This request was granted, and Res­
olution 2 was carried without further comments . 69 
Soon after i ts estab lishment, IMCO became the administrator and depositary of 
the 1 954 OI LPOL Convention. In 1 962, the "OP" conference was convened to re­
vise the 1954  OI LPOL Convention and to consider, inter alia , a series of 
amendments in  respect of warships and s imilar mi l i tary vessels. A first series of 
proposals was aimed at refining, reformulating or updating the wording of the ex­
clusion clauses, or at in tegrating the text of Resolution 2 in the main part of the 
Convention ?O O ther proposals quest ioned the wisdom of con t in uing the exemp­
tion for warships and/or naval auxili aries altogether? ] A third series of proposals 
aimed at strengthening the recommendations contained in Resolution 2, by using 
more urgent and stringent language. 72 
During the conference the differences between the various positions seemed at 
first irreconcilable.73 In  the end, prel iminary agreement was reached on a formula 
for Article I I  that would still  exonerate warships and ships "for  the t ime being 
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used as naval auxili aries" from complying with the substance of the convention, 
but incorporating also a new "undertaking" b ased on the text of the old Resolu­
tion 2 ? -l The revised text of Article I I, which was finally adopted by the 1 962 OP 
conference, reads in relevant part as  follows :  
( 1 )  T h e  present  Convention s h a l l  apply to s h i p s  registere d  i n  a n y  of the terri tories of 
a Contracting Government  and to unregistered ships h a v i ng t he nationality of a 
Con tract ing Party, except .  . .  ( . . .  J
( d )  naval ships  and ships  for the t ime being used a naval  a uxi l i aries 
(2) Each C o n t ra c t i ng Governmen t undertakes t o  adopt appropriate measures 
ensuring that  requirements equivalent t o  t hose o f  the presen t Conven tion are,  so  far 
as is reasonable a n d  practicable,  applied to t h e  sh ips  referred to in s u b pa ragraph (d)  
of paragrap h (1)  of this  Article.  
I t  is  ques tionable whether as a result of this compromise text more pressure is 
b rough t to bear on Parties to apply the convention to the excluded categories of 
ships.  There remains  of course the decision of the 1 962 Conference to reformulate 
the recommendations con tained previously in Resolu tion 2 of 1954 and  to incor­
porate these in to the main body of the Convention.  The impact of this change 
could only be apprec iated by comparing domestic State practice both before and 
after the 1 962 amendments .  
6 .2 . 5 .  Prevent i on of other forms of Mar ine Po l l ut ion  
• (Oslo) Convention for t h e  Prevention of Mari ne Pollution by Dumping from 
S h ips and Aircraft, 1972 
• (London) Convention on the Preve ntion of Marine Poll ution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter, 1 9 72 
• I nternational Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution by S h ips 
(MARPOL) 73/78 
• Kuwait Regional Convention, 1978 
• Montego Bay Convention on the Law of the Sea,  1982 
• Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of t h e  North-East At­
lantic OSPAR Convention (aS PAR), 1992 
A. The 1 972 Oslo and London Dumping Conventions.  The Oslo Conven­
tion, which regulates dumping in part of the Northern Hemisphere, and the 
London Dumping Conven tion, which is  universal in scope, were adopted in the 
same year but deal with the issue of S tate-owned ships differently. The London 
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Convention was signed at an intergovern mental conference in December 1 972 
and p rovides in Article VII (4) : 
This  Conven tion shal l  n o t  apply to those vessels and a ircraft ent i t led to sovere ign 
i m mun i t y  un der i n tern at ional  law.  However, each party s h a l l  ensure by the 
adoption of  appropr ia te  measures that  such vessels and a ircraft owned or opera t e d  by 
i t  act  i n  a manner consisten t with the ob ject  and purpose of this  Conven tion,  and 
shall  inform the Organiza t i o n  accord i ngly. 
During the p reparation of the London Convention,  its application to public 
sh ips had  been very controversialJ5 Mil i tary powers, and  part icularly the United 
States, maintained that the convention should not apply to vessels and aircraft en­
ti tled to sovereign immunity under international law. O ther countries favoured a 
classic sovereign immunity approach whereby a reservation would be made fo r 
enforcement measures only. The latter-more restrict ive-solution was adopted 
only months earlier by the drafters of the Oslo Dumping Convention, Article 
1 5 (6) of which provides that :  
N o th i n g  in t h i s  Conven t i o n  s h a l l  abri dge sovereign immuni ty. 76 
The formula that was finally adopted at the London Conference was in tended 
as  a compromise between those two approaches. Nevertheless, as Dr. Timagenis  
writes, the  overall effect of  th is  compromise text is very close to  the  classic sover­
eign immunity approach ,  in that only flag State enforcement can be conceived. 
The real difference-at least in theory-lies in the substantive obl igations which 
the latter State should enforce. Under the classic sovereign immunity approach of 
the Oslo Conven tion, the flag State should enforce strictly the provis i ons of the 
convention ; under the London Convention, the flag State i s  offered more flexibi l ­
ity and should adopt appropriate measures to ensure tha t  these vessels act  in  a 
manner consisten t with the ob ject and purpose of the conventionJ7 
I t  was seen earlier that the 1 972 Oslo Dumping Convention was replaced in  
1 992 by the  OSPAR Convention .78 The negotiators of the latter chose to  retain the 
traditional concept of sovereign immuni ty. Article 1 0  (3) of Annex II provides that :  
N o thing i n  t h i s  An nex s h a l l  abri dge t h e  sovereign i m m u n i t y  to  w h i c h  certain 
vessels  are enti tled u n der in terna t i onal l aw.  
B. MAR POL 73/78 and 1 982 UNCLOS. The 1 973 MARPO L conference was pre­
ceded, amongst others, by an official ly convened preparatory meeting earlier that 
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yearJ9 One of t h e  outco mes of this  meeting was the fo llowing proposal (Article 3 
(2))  for a subparagraph dealin g  wi th the exclusio n of warships and similar vessels 
from the scope o f  the convention : 
The present  Convention sha l l  not apply to any warsh ip  or o ther sh ip  (sic) owned o r  
operated b y  a State and used for the t i m e  being, o n l y  o n  government non-commercial 
service (fn .  8). However, each Contracting S tate shall ensure by the adoption of 
appropriate measures that  such ships owned or operated by i t  act in a manner consistent  
with the object  and purpose of the p resent Convention. 
A s  the preparatory work fo r MARPOL foreshadowed, the i m m u nity clause 
would b ecome, once agai n, the focus of debate during the conference. The USSR 
suggested a formula that would m ake the wording of the exemption clause m o re 
precise without, h owever, enlarging the number of exempted ships. 80 Norway and 
Japan wanted to lim i t  the exemptions to warships only. 8 l  Greece wanted to re­
s trict the immuni ty to warships, "or at least to state vessels on ly., ,82 According to 
Spain, the exemption should be formulated in b roader term s, leavi ng scope for ex­
clusion of all ships "entitled to exemption in accordance with international law,,,83 
while according to Mexico,  the exemption clause should only refer to the j urisdic­
tional aspects o f  sovereign i m m unity. 84 Subsequently, the Netherlands tabled an 
amendment which com b i ned elements o f several of the above proposals . 85  
Unfortunately, the summary records of the committee deb ates have not  been 
published. The tex t,  which was finally adopted (Article 3(3)),  reads as follows : 
The present  Convention shal l  not  apply to any warsh ip, n aval  auxi l i ary or o ther s h i p  
owned o r  operated by a S tate and used, for t h e  t i me bei ng, o n l y  on government 
non-commerc i al service. However, each Party sha l l  ensure by the adopt ion of 
appropri ate measu res not i m p a i r i ng the opera t ions  or operat ional  capabi l i t ies of  
such s h i ps owned or operated by i t ,  tha t  such ships  act i n  a m anner consi stent,  so far 
as is reaso n able a n d  pract icable, with  the present Convent ion . 86  
A t  the 1 0th plenary session of the conference, the tex t of Article 3 was adopted 
by 55  votes to none with two abstentions .87  
Despite the relative parsi mony of com ments from the travaux preparatoires , it  is 
n evertheless possible to draw conclusions on the m anner in which the MARPOL 
conference has dealt with the issue o f  State immunity. The exemption clause 
adopted in Article 3 (3) b y  the 1973 MARPOL conference differs from Article I I  ( 1 )  
(d) o f  the 1 9 5 4  OILPOL Conference, a s  a m ended into II  ( 2 )  b y  the 1 962 O P  Confer­
ence, in several respects . First, the range of sh ips absolved from compliance with 
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sub stantive provisions  has been b roadened to include all State-oulned or State-oper­
ated ships as long as they are used on government non-commercial  service.  Second, 
b y  accep ting the 1 962 amendments, State Parties undertook to adopt appropriate 
measures to ensure that requiremen t s  equivalent to those developed for other ships 
apply s o  far as is reasonable and practicable t o  t h e  exonerated mili tary vessels .  Ar­
guably, the rephrasing of this  mitigation clause b y the MARPOL conference h as 
placed a heavier and more stringent duty on State parties, by using terminology 
such as "each Party shall ensure . . .  b y  the adoption of appropriate measures . . .  t h at 
such ships act . . . " in conformity with the conventio n .  
T h e  p hrases " each Party s h a l l  ensure," an d "by the adoption of appropriate 
measures" were most l i kely borrowed from Article VII (4) of the 1 97 2  London 
Dumping Convention.  Unfortunately, the MARPO L con ference did not follow the 
latter's example in reques ting t h at S tate Parties inform the O rganization of the 
measures taken. It  i s  submitted that the i ncorporation of such a reponing req u ire­
ment would significan tly increase the pressure brought to bear o n  State Parties.  
Al though these differences may only be questions of  degree, it  i s  the MARPOL 
formula which has gained wide acceptance in subseq uen t treaty practice, and not 
the formula o f  the 1 972 London Du mping Convention.  Significan tly, t he negoti­
ators of the Th ird United Nations  Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS III)  copied 
the MARPO L exemption/mitigation form ula almost verbatim for inclusion in Part 
XII of 1 9 8 2  UNCLOS on the Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environ­
ment.  The resulting "sovereign" i m munity clause in Article 2 36 of 1 98 2  UNCLOS 
stipulates t h at : 
The prov i s ions of this  Conve n t i on rega rding the pro tect ion and preservation of the 
m a ri ne environment do not  apply to  any warship, naval auxi l iary, other vessels  or 
aircraft owned or opera ted by a Sta te  and used, for the time bei ng, only on government 
non-com merci a l  service.  However, each S tate shall  ensure by t he adoption of 
appropriate measures not impairing operations or operational  capabil i t ies  of such 
vessels or a i rc raft owner or operated by it, th at  such vessels or a ircraft act in a manner 
inconsistent, so fa r a s  i s  reasonable and practicable, with this Convent ion .  
The origins of Article 2 36 can be traced to p roposals submitted by Australi a  in  
1 97 3  during UNCLOS I I I .  These were aimed at exempting warships from the p rovi ­
sions on the p rotection of the m arine envi ronmen t and based explicitly on t h e  
immunity provisions o f  the 1 954  OI LPOL a n d  1 972 London Dumping Conven­
tions. 88 Competing proposals were lo dged by Canada, t h e  USSR and the Uni ted 
States. The Canadian text stated t h a t  the Convention sh ould not apply to : 
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. ,  . t h o se vesse ls and airc raft en titled t o sovereign i mm u n i ty u n der in ternational law 
and co n t i n ued with a p h rase reflect ing the substance of the Austral ian pro­
posa1 . 89  The tex t s u b m i tted by the USSR was more general and referred to t h e  
exist ing imm unity for s u c h  vessels  and aircraft under international l a w ,  b u t  with­
out a m i tigation clause, 90 whilst the U.S.  p roposal was akin to the Canadian 
one.9 1  
T h e  proposed exemption clause w as subsequently discussed in d epth during 
informal meetings. In 1974, the United States tabled a new proposal, visibly in­
spired by the M ARPOL formula, which contained the elements of what would 
b ecom e Article 2 36 .92 Th e only criticism came from Tanzania, whose delegate 
pointed out that : 
(. . .  ) Since the issue under consideration was the prevention of pollution and not the 
protection of ships, the draft articles should deal  with the status rather than the nature of the 
vessels in question . 93  
S u b sequent texts produced as a result  of informal negotiations confirm that the 
issue un der discussion was not merely immunity from j urisdiction, but a genuine 
exemption from the substance of the provision s  of the prospective convention re­
garding the protection and preservation of the marine environment.94 
One of t he main principles underlying Article 2 36 can b e  traced back to several 
other artic les of 1 982 UNCLOS : pri ncipally Articles 30, 3 1 ,  32, 95 an d 96. However, 
the m ajor difference between these artic les an d the stip ulations of Article 2 36 is 
that the former deal prim arily with i mm unity from j urisdic tion, wh ereas the lat­
ter goes much further and gran ts imm unity fro m substantive provisions.  
Altho ugh included in Part XII on the Protection and Preservation of the Ma­
rine Environment, Article 236 should be regarded as bearing on the entire 
Conv ention, for the provisions regarding the protection and preservation of the  
marin e environment are scattered throughout the Convention.95 The end result 
is  that warships are exempt from the material applicability of the pertinent 
rules.96 
Apart fro m  the all-important 1 982 UNCLOS, the M ARPOL formula has been bor­
rowed, often verbatim, by a multitude of other treaties and instruments.  It was 
included, amongst others, in two important instruments concluded in the 1 990s : 
the International Convention on Oil  Poll ution Preparedness, Response and 
Co-operati on (OPRC Convention), 1 990, Article 1 (3) and the Protocol on Environ­
mental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 199 1 ,  Article 1 1  ( 1 ); 
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In addi tion, the MARPOL formula forms part of practically all regional frame­
work maritime treaties concluded under UNEP auspices over a period of  more than 
two decades.97 A prominent example is the Kuwait Regional  Convention for 
Co-operat ion on the Protection of the Marine Environmen t from Pollution, con­
cluded in  1 978 for the Persian-Arabian Gulf ( Kuwait Regional Convention). It 
was seen earlier98 that the applicability of this convention became contentious 
during the 1 980- 1 988 Iran-Iraq war in connection with the 1983 Nowruz Oil 
Spill . I ts exemption clause reads as fo llows : 
Warships or other ships owned or operated by a State, and used only on Government 
non-commercial service, shall  be exempted from the application of the p rov is ions of 
the p resent convention.  Each Contract i n g  S t ate shall ,  as far as possib le, ensure that 
its warships  or ot her ships owned or operated by that State, and used only on 
government non-commercial  service, shall  comply with the present Convention i n  
t he prevention o f  pollution to t he marine environment.99 
The clause not  only bears a strong resemblance to the MARPOL formula, both 
the Kuwait  and MARPOL Conventions deal in principle with the same subject 
m atter : pollution of the marine environment. There i s  consequently no reason to 
believe that  the respective immunity clauses would have a substantially differen t 
meaning.  
Finally, the MARPOL formula has been relied on by countries such as the 
United States and the U K in  "in terpretative statements" made i n  respect of vari ­
ous instruments, including regarding environmen tal sectors other than the 
marine environment .  1 00 
C .  Environme ntal I m pl icat ions i n  G e neral .  The exclusion of warships from 
the substantive provisions of 1982 UNCLOS h as been justified in the l iterature on 
the following grounds : ( l )  Pollution regulations of a general character, including 
international regulations, may be inappropriate to the special  con figuration or 
mission of certain warships;  (2)  I t  was feared that coastal States, in  the exercise of 
powers to prevent and control pollution from foreign ships, could thereby acquire 
leverage over warsh ip passage in general and the passage of nuclear warships in 
particular; a question regarding the compliance of a warship with a particular 
standard might require the inspection or release of data regard ing the sh ip, which 
most flag States would be reluctan t to  disclose; (3) Warships were not considered 
a substantial source of marine pollution, and because the rules of sovereign immu­
nity would have restricted the possibili ties of  enforcemen t against the wi l l  of the 
flag State in  any event, there was no significant opposition to Article 236;  (4) 
1 9 7  
The Newport Papers 
Moreover, given the political mission of nav al vessels that operate far from their 
home shores in peacetime, it would not be unrea l istic to expect a high degree of 
self- imposed environmental dil igence by major flag States. 1 0 1 
There is no question that the configuration and the mission of naval vessels 
differ fundamentally from commercial vessels. S till ,  the s ingle most  important 
reason why immunity c lauses for warships are adopted centres on secu rity issues.  
States are extremely averse to allowing foreign nations access to their military 
ships. 1 02 In  a position paper advocating adoption of 1 98 2  UNCLOS, the U. S .  De­
partment of Defense articulated the rationale in this way:  
[Tjo support milita ry operations around the globe, there must be assurance that military 
vessels and their cargoes can move freely without  being subject to levy or interferen ce by 
coastal states . I 03 
However, the amount of waste generated by such ships is far from trivial. Aircraft 
carriers may house as many as 5,000 crew members . 1 04 The United States owns over 
2 ,000 vessels, including 6 00 Navy ships, with over 3 00,000 crew members. Each sailor 
is estimated 10 generate approximately three pounds of garbage per day. Processing 
and storing such huge quantities of waste presents a considerable challenge to navies. 
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that military operations often require naval 
vessels 10 remain at sea for prolonged periods of time, often conducting operations in 
areas which lack adequate shore disposal facilities. 1 05 
Because of the implications for marine poilu tion, the MARPOLIUNCLOS "so ver­
eign" immunity clause has been the subject of severe critic ism : 
Th is sen'ous derogation [the sovereign immunity clause J is not only irreconcilable with the rest 
of the Convention, it is incompatible with the usual principles of im munity wh ich provide 
only for exemption from enforcement procedures, not from applicability of the law. [TJhere is 
no reason why govern ment ships shou ld not be governed by marine pollutIOn rules. 1 06 
Although campaigns for the to tal abolition of the immunity of State-owned 
sh ips were not unknown around the turn of the century, 1 07 national and interna­
tional public sen timent is  now said 10 turn against such exclusions on 
environmental grounds. 1 08 Sweden spearheaded a recent effort to remove the im­
munity clause from the 1 97 2  (London)  Dumping Convention. 1 09 However, the 
new 1 99 6  protocol to  this convention p roves that this  was unsuccessfu l .  I 1 0 On the 
one hand,  the protocol  s trengthens an d  updates environmenta l  p rotect ion pro­
vis ions through the in troduction  of p rincip les such as "the po l luter  p ays," and 
precau tio nary and preventive m easures . 1 1 1  On the other  hand, the  c lause on 
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immunity  of publ i c  vessels,  far from being dropped, was replaced by the fo l­
low i ng text :  
Article 1 0  (4 ) :  This  Protocol s h a l l  n ot a p p l y  t o  t h o s e  vesse ls  and aircraft entitled to 
s overeign i m m u n i ty under internat i on a l  law. However, each Contract ing Party shall  
ensure by the adoption of appropriate measures that such vessels and aircraft own ed 
or operated by it act in a manner consistent with the object and p urpose of t h i s  
Protocol and s h a l l  inform the Organ isat ion accordingly. 
Article 1 0  ( 5 ) : A S tate m ay, at the time i t  expresses its consent to be bound by this  
Protocol,  or at any t ime thereafter, declare that it sha l l  apply the provisions of this  
Protocol to i ts  vesse ls  and a ircraft referred to i n  para graph 4, recogni s i n g  t h at only  
that State  may enfo rce those provis i o n s  against such vesse ls  and aircraft .  
The fourth subparagraph of the new protocol introduces only cosmetic 
changes to the previous clause, but the fifth subparagraph m akes i t  absolutely 
c lear  that even i f  the convention's substantive provi s ions are  made applicable to  
publ ic  ships ,  i t  does  not entail a waiver by the flag State of j uri sdictional 
immunity. 
In mitigation one should add that the second sentence of the MARPOL!UNCLOS 
formula obligates Parties to use their best efforts to prevent pollution by public 
vessels .  Yet the widespread adoption of this sentence in many other international 
instruments does not reveal the extent to which State Parties comply with this  un­
dertaking.  Moreover, there are  several built- in obstacles preventing such an  
assessment. First, a s  noted above, unlike for the  1 972  London (Dumping) Con­
vention, there i s  no requi rement for States Parties to report to the administrating 
or  depositary organisation on any implementation measures taken. The IMO has 
v i rtually no organised means of monitoring compliance of mi l i ta ry vessels and 
has acknowledged that : 
Sin ce warships are outside MARPOL 73/78, we do not receive any information on the 
national legislation for these ships. Even if it exists, infomzation we do receive from time to 
time is more in the form of research and development work, and this again from more informal 
contacts rather than established procedure. 1 1 2 
Furthermore, the MARPOL!UNCLOS formula entitles State Parties to auto-de­
termine what the "appropriate measures not impairing the operations or 
operational capabilities" of excluded categories of ships are.  Of course, there is  
much force in the argument that this  consequence is  an essential  part of sovereign 
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immunity. l 1 3  Still ,  the lack of international schemes for monitoring, reporting 
and control of compliance by public vessels has convinced some wri ters that the  
second sentence of the  formula in question is  of academic value. 1 l 4 Others indi­
cate that the absence of international control wil l  inevitably cause potentially 
huge differences in implementation by State parties . 1 I S  
On a more positive note, there i s  nonetheless increasing evidence o f  the appl i ­
cation of national and international environmental standards to the mi litary 
sector, especially in industrialised S ta tes. At a meeting organized in 1 995 by 
UN/ECE and UNEP, many countries reported that their armed forces were, a s  a rule, 
subj ect to national environmental standards and legislation. 1 1 6 Wo rld-wide, the 
mil i tary have been fo rced to study alternatives to ozone-depleting substances 
which form part of many mil i tary applications .  Thi s  is  the result of the scheduled 
phase-out of these substances following the protocols and amendments to the 
1 98 5  Vienna Convention which were discussed earlier .  1 1 7  The mil itary response 
was partly motivated by a growing environmental consciousness within the sec­
tor, but also by the realisation that these chemicals would soon become ei ther 
unavailable or too expensive. 1 1 8 NATO has organized two International Confer­
ences on the Role of the Military in Protecting the Ozone Layer l 1 9 and has a lso 
sponsored a Pilot Study on Defense Environmental Expectations to examine the 
impact of mi l i tary activities on the environment in  general . 1 20 
To illustrate a point of interest to this study, the U .S .  Navy is required by domes­
tic law to comply with Annex V of MARPOL 73178, which deals with different types 
of garbage and specifies the distances from land and the manner in which they m ay 
be disposed of. The requirements are much stricter in a number of "special areas," 
but the most important feature of the Annex is the complete ban imposed on the 
dumping into the sea of all forms of plastic. l 2 l As for international developments, 
NATO'S Special Working Group Twelve, a technology-sharing collection of nations, 
is striving to develop "The Environmentally Sound Ship of the Twenty-Firs t Cen­
tury." In addition, in October 1 994, representatives of 1 4  NATO navies and of 
former Warsaw Pact navies met to discuss vessel-source pollution . 1 22 
D. E nviron menta l I m p l i cations d u ri n g  Armed Conf l ict.  The most impor­
tant question in  view of the present inquiry is  the following: what is the fate of 
these environmental requirements when the country at i ssue is engaged in armed 
conflict or other types of hosti le activity? 
An analysis of the environmental legislation applicable to the U.S. Navy indi­
cates that  there are indeed unspecified "peacetime" l imits on the Navy' s  
Environmental Program. The  Navy is  subject to the  National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA), which requires federal agenc ies to document the effects of 
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their actions on the environment,  including the marine environment,  for any ac­
tivity that would he considered a major federal action significantly affecting  the 
quality of the human environment . 1 2 3 However, NEPA provides no express war or 
national emergency exemption . Common sense indicates of course, that U .S .  
commanders : 
. . .  should not be required to prepare an environmental impact statement for amphibious 
assault, nor obtain a pemlit for whale harassment before conducting an attack on enemy 
shipping. 1 24 
That NEPA does not apply to belligerent activit ies can be inferred from the text 
of its provi sions as well. For one, the b ulk of the environmental legislation appli­
cable to the Navy-and to other components of the U .S .  armed forces-is limi ted 
to military activi ties within U.S .  j urisdict ion. 1 25  Furthermore, the preparation of 
environmental documentation such as ErAs is  not required for certain "categori­
cal exclusions," including "maintaining law and order." There are also special 
waivers related to "classified action" and "emergency action s ."  The regulations 
provide that if emergency c ircumstances make it necessary to take action without 
observance of NEPA requirements, the agency should consult the Council on En­
vironmental Quality. 1 26 I t  appears that durin g  Operation Desert S torm, the U .S .  
Department of Defense d id  in  fact  consult with th i s  Council regarding pursuit of 
various emergency mi litary requirements in  the Uni ted States without full NEPA 
compliance. 1 27 
Whilst NEPA contains only implicit peacetime l imi ts for domestic military op­
erations, there are express l imits for U .S .  military activit ies abroad. For the latter 
type of activities, the major  piece of legi slation i s  Executive Order 1 2 1 44, enti tled 
" Environmen tal Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions . ,, 1 28 It applies to the 
"global common s," defined as the geographical areas outside the j urisdiction of 
any nation, and to areas ( land, water, and ai rspace) under the j urisdiction of one or 
more fo reign governments .  Its stated objective i s  to fu rther foreign policy and na­
tional secu ri ty i nterests "while at the same time taking into consideration 
important environmental concerns ."  
If  a "major federal action " i s  determined to do sign ificant harm to the environ­
men t  of a foreign nation or to a protected global resource, the Executive Order 
requi res as a general rule that a prior environmental study, an environmental re­
view, or an environmental impact statement be prepared and con ducted. As with 
operations with in  U . S .  j u risdiction, some of these requirements may be  waived, 
postponed or m itigated in case of "emergencies" and "classified actions ."  But in 
addition to this, the Executive Order expressly exempts a wide range of 
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(hostile/mi li tary) operations and activities related to the U .S .  national security 
from its provisions :  from actions related to armed conflict (encompassing offi­
c ially declared wars  and other  types of hosti lities), actions affecting the national 
security or the nation al interest, to in tell igence activities, arms t ransfers etc .  Addi­
tional case-by-case or class exemptions may be added to this l i st by the 
Department of Defense because of "emergencies, nat ional security consider­
ations, exceptional foreign policy requirements, or other special  circumstances 
which preclude or  are inconsistent with the preparation of environmental docu­
mentation and the taking of other actions prescribed " by the O rder. An example 
of such case-by-case exemptions are "actions that must be taken to promote the 
national defense or  security and that cannot be delayed."  Therefore, the conclu­
sion must be that there are indeed peacetime limits to the U .S .  Navy 
En vironmental Program. 
These limitations to the environmental obligations incumbent on the Navy 
are supported by  the qualifying language of the MARPOL exemption clause. Ac­
cordingly, a Party may determine for itself which measures-comparable or 
equivalent to the MARPOL provisions-apply by analogy to i ts naval vessels, "so far 
as is reasonable and practicable" and  taking into consideration the "operations or op­
erational capabilities of such ships . "  " Operations" in relation to naval vessels is a 
term with a clear mil itary connotation : it is barely coded language that may en­
compass military activities executed in a hostile environment, as is the case 
during armed conflict .  Consequently, the phrase "operations or operational capa­
bi l it ies of such ships" is  a crucial qualifying condition which defines and l imits 
the scope of the MARPOL mitigation clause to unspec ified peacetime mil itary ac­
tivities . I t  seems therefore correct to state that : 
One can not but conclude that the second Sell tellce leaves the protection of the environment 
legally subordinated to operational demands in times of peace and m ilitary necessities in times 
of naval war. 1 29 
As with the war suspension clauses that were examined in  the previous chap­
ter, the MARPOL clause does not point to any automatic-ipso facto-effects of the 
outbreak of armed conflict on  the treaty. However, i t  does suggest that i t  i s  within 
a Party's own, sovereign j udgement to decide which of the MARPOL (or compara­
ble national) provisions may be affected by the outbreak of armed conflict .  Given, 
however, that the i ntegration of environmental concerns in to mi l i tary actions i s  
s till in  i t s  infancy i n  many States, much may depend, ult imately, on the  judge­
ment of an individual commander. A recent study made available by the U.S .  
mil itary uncovered a real void i n  mil i tary environmental planning.  The report, 
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which was l imited to an examination of environmental policy for operations other 
than war (OOTW), acknowledges that a legal basis for such a policy is  currently 
lacking in the United States.  Its author concludes that most environmen tal laws 
affecting the U .S .  military are primarily designed for use at the ins tallation level 
and  are closely linked wi th local civilian environmental s tandards. Fa we de mieux, 
these peacetime environmental standards have been used in environmental an­
nexes in  the Operations Plans of U.S .  "peace" mil i tary operations in Somalia, 
Haiti ,  and the former Yugoslavia .  They are, nevertheless, regarded as too restric­
tive for use across the ful l  spectrum of mil itary operations .  On the o ther hand, the 
report's author asserts that the laws of war do not provide an appropriate level of 
environmental protection during operations short  of war .  As a result, there i s  a 
grey area in which the application of environmental l aw i s  currently being left to 
the discretion of the individual commander. 1 30 
A final observation is that like the many war suspension clauses discussed be­
fore, the phrase "operations or operational capabi li ties  of such ships" constitutes 
rather unsophisticated language from a jus ad bellum perspective. There is no dis­
tinction between, e.g. , legal actions taken in self-defence and operations 
conducted to pursue i llegal aggression in violation of Article 2 (4) of the UN 
Charter. 
6 .2 .6 .  (Civ i l )  Liab i l ity Convent ions 
• (Paris) OECD Convention on Third Party L i ab ility i n  the Field o f  Nuclear E n -
ergy, 1 960 
• Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear S hips, 1962 
• (Vienna) Convention on Civil L i ab ility for Nuclear Damage, 1963 
• International Convention on Civil L i ability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1 969 
• International Convention on the E stablishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution D amage, 1 97 1  
• Convention o n  the Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents, 1986 
• Convention on Assistance i n  the Case of a Nuclear A c c i dent or Rad iological 
Emergenc y, 1 986 
• Convention on Civil  Liability for D amage Caused during C arriage of Dangerous 
Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels, 1989 
• Intern ational Convention on the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious S ubstances 
by S e a  (HN S ), 1996 
• Protocol to Amend the 1 963 Vienna Convention, 1 997 
• Convention on S upplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 1997 
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Since the maritime "civil  l iabili ty" conventions have been largely modelled on 
the schemes set up for the nuclear indus try, it would seem appropria t e  to start the 
an alysis  with the latter conventions.  
A. Th e 1 960 Paris C o nventi o n  a nd the 1 963 Vi e n n a  Co nvent i o n s .  The 
1 960 Paris OECD and the 1 96 3  Vienna IAEA Co nven tio ns apply i n  the first ins tance 
to land-based n uclear installations, b ro adly defined as encomp assing reac tors, re­
p rocessing, m an ufac turing and sto rage facil i ties where nuclear fu el, n uclear 
m ateri a l, and radioactive products o r  waste are used o r  produced. 1 3 1  I n  addition, 
b o th conven tions also apply to the transport of n uclear m a teri al a n d  to the han­
dling of nuclear waste. 1 32 
D espite the lack of express exclusion provisions to that effec t, i t  is accepted 
that neither conven tion appl ies to mil i tary in stallatio ns. 1 33 Thi s  i s  supported b y  
t h e  tenor of the preamble of b oth conven tions, w h i c h  emphasi ses their civilian 
and "peaceful" rationale. Furthermore, as  seen earlier, 1 34 b o th conventions exon­
erate operators fro m  liab ility for damage directly caused by arm ed conflict, 
hostilities, civil war, and i nsurrec tion .  1 35 
A s  far as the Vienna Convention is concerned, the ab ove conclu sion is con­
firmed a contrario by the discussions  held from '90 to '94 within the IAEA's 
Standing Committee on Liabi l i ty for Nuclear Damage. One of the areas up for 
discussion was precisely the p roposed extension of the convention to mili tary in­
stalla tions. 1 36 The result of these discussions are contained in two new 
ins tru ments concluded i n  1 997 .  Accordi ng to Article IE of the new 1 997 Protocol, 
the 1 963  Vienna Conven tion : 
. . .  s h a l l  n o t  apply to n u clear i n s tal lat i o n s  used fo r non-peaceful p u rposes .  
A similar term i s  used in Article I I  (2)  of the new Convention on S upplemen­
tary Compen sation for Nuclear Damage, the scope of which extend s  to:  
. . .  n uclear damage for which an operat o r  of  a nuc lear i n sta l la t ion used fo r peace fu l  
purposes situated in the territory of a Con tracting Pa rty is l i able  . . . .  
What is  meant  b y  " peacefu l  purposes" is  open to i n terpretation . I t  will b e  re­
m emb ered that this expression is also used in 1982  UNCLO S.  The m a i ority 
u n derstanding i n  regard to the latter is  that the clause prohibits  only mil i tary ac­
t ivities i n  violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 1 37 
However, the phrase "(non-)  peacefu l  p urposes " m ay have a different meaning 
in the above IAEA instru m en ts . I t  seems tha t these term s were agreed early on 
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within the S tandin g Comm ittee. Although no official in terpretation i s  available, 
there are reaso n s  to believe that the term " non -peacefu l  purposes " was used to re­
fer to so-called dual -use facili ties and therefore has a broader meaning than 
"m ili tary instal lations , "  1 3 8  I f  this i n terpretation i s  correct, i t  would mean that i n ­
stead of ex tending coverage t o  mili tary i n s tal lations as well ,  t h e  new i n s truments 
wi l l  end up narrowing the field of application of the nuclear liab i l i ty conven tions 
by excluding dual-u se ( m ili tary/civilian ) ins tallations,  
T h e  recen t in teres t for the application of the Vienna Convention to m i l i tary in­
stallations arose as a res ult  of the s erious difficu lties experienced during the 
n ego tiation of two IAEA Conven tions i n  response to the 1 986 Chernobyl n u clear 
disaster. 1 39 D urin g the negotiation of the 1 986 Convention on t h e  Early N otifica­
tion of  N uclear Accidents and the Convention on Assistance in  the Case of  a 
N uclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the n uclear superpowers disagreed 
sharply over whether these should apply to accidents involving m il i tary fac i li ties 
and mil i tary acti v i ties .  Deadlock was only narrowly avo i ded b y  agreeme n t  over a 
tex t which does not expressly m en t ion m i litary an d civilian i n s tallatio n s  or activi­
ties, but w h ich distinguishes instead b e tween acci dents for which n otification i s  
m andatory a n d  those for wh ich notification i s  volun tary. I n  accordance with this  
comprom ise, Article 1( 2) of the  Notification Convention l i s ts  facilities and activi­
ties whic h  are s u b j ec t  to t h e  manda tory notification provision s, w h ich are wi dely 
u n derstood to represent civilian facil it ies  and applications .  Apart from this ,  in ac­
cordance with Article 3, State Parties have the opportun i ty to noti fy "nuclear 
accidents other than those spec ified in A rtIcle I. " This  compro m i se reportedly met the 
wishes of the n uclear powers on the divi sion of mil i tary and civil  matters. In  addi ­
tion, some n uclear weapon States  h ave m ade declarat ions to the effect that they 
are prepared to use Article 3 in order to no tify releases caused b y  acci dents involv­
ing n u clear weapons and nuclear weapons tests .  Nonetheless, since m o st of  these 
declarat ions stress the "volun tary" character o f  such undertakings, i t  is debated 
whether S tate Parties are under a posi tive legal duty to not ify accidents related to 
mil i tary activities o r m ilitary in stallation s . 1 40 The U S S R  is thus far the  only State 
to h ave n o tified two accidents involving m i litary n u clear submarines.  
B .  The 1 962 N uclear Sh i ps Convent ion .  The text of  the  1 962  Nuclear S hips 
Co nven tion (NS convention) was agreed as a result  of n ego tiations conducted 
d uring the 1 1  th session of the Diplo m a tic Conference on M aritime Law, held in 
B russels fro m  1 7 -29 April 1 96 1 .  However, m a j o r  disagreem ents o ver several 
points in the draft text prepared by the COlll ite Maritime Illlernatiollal ( hereinafter 
Comite) and the IAEA, made i t  n ecessary to reconvene the Conference o n  14 May 
1 962 for th e sole purpose of deal ing with n uclear ships. The final  act of  the NS 
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Convention was eventually opened for signature on 2S  May, after it had been 
adopted with a mere 28  votes in favour, 10 against (amongst which were the 
United States and the US SR), four abstentions and with eight of the fifty partici­
pants absent at the time of the final  vote. 1 4 !  
The i ncorporation of nuclear warships in to the N S  Convention continues to 
remain a divisive issue :  it is the principal reason why, more than 30 years after its 
negotiation, not a s ingle licensing State has ratified the convention, thereby pre­
venting i ts entry into force . 1 42 The arguments in favour of the inclusion of these 
warships into the convention were primarily of practical nature: 
• I t  was expected that for years to come the large majori ty of nuclear sh ips 
would be m ilitary ships ;  the ratio in 1 960 was 30 :2  and would increase to 
much higher levels by the end of the decade; 
• I t  was argued that n uclear propulsion represented a real hazard and that the 
p ublic needed protection against  nuclear warships as well ;  1 4 3  
The con trary views were of a more legal, technical ,  and even ideological nature. 
The obj ectors maintained :  
• tha t  rules concerning warships are  a matter of pu bl ic  international law s ince 
any accident involving these wi l l  engage primarily the pub lic, international 
responsibi l i ty of States ; that such rules have no p lace in  a convention on pri­
vate civ i l  liab ili ty; 
• that i f  war ships would be covered, the resulting l imitat ion of l iabi li ty would 
encourage the use of nuclear warships; 
• that coverage of warships by the Convention m ight presage an attempt to 
impose other types of regulations (safety, international inspect ion and l i ­
censing) on these mil itary sh ips, which would be wholly unacceptab le; 
• that no treaty sponsored even in  part by the JAEA may relate to any mi litary 
use of nuclear energy; 1 44 
The warships question was raised relatively late during the nego tiations and 
led to an extraordinary coalition between the two principal Cold War foes.  During 
the preparatory s tages of the Conventi on, the United States had pushed strongly 
for the inclusion of warships, bu t at the Conference i tself, the Uni ted S tates dele­
gate declared that he was no (longer) authorised to do so . 1 45 The Uni ted States 
and the USSR faced a solid block of opposition led by  the UK and formed from del­
egations from al l  continents and ideologies. 1 46 In an attempt to appease the two 
major nuclear powers, the conference agreed on two concess ions : one on the 
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maintenance of l iabi lity insurance, the other on the question of jurisdict ion.  
First, Article I I I . 3  prov ides th at the States operating nuc lear warships, as well  as 
any other ships operated directly by a Contracting State or by any constituent 
subdivision thereof, need not maintain any insurance or  other coverage . 1 47 The 
second concil iatory gesture was that, whereas according to Article X. 1, primary 
jurisdiction lies at the option of the claimant, either in the courts of Licensing 
S tate or  of the Party in whose territory the dam age was sustained. If the cl aim is in 
respect of a warship, resort must be  had exclusively to the courts of the Licensing 
State (X .3) .  
Writing in the beginning of the 1 970s, Professor Szasz noted that  the hesi ta­
tion of the United States to ratify the convention related solely to the question of 
warships, presum ably reflecting the views of the U.S .  Navy. 1 48 L ikewise, during 
the negotiation of the 1 969 C LC and Intervention Conventions, the Russian dele­
gate warned against repeating the fai l ed experiment of the N S  Convention. 149 
Nevertheless, the compromise which was pioneered in the 1 962 Convention­
i .e . , incorporation of a waiver of sovereign immunity related to State vessels, com­
b ined with an exemption for l iabi l i ty coverage and j urisdiction-has re-emerged 
in other civil  l iabi lity conferences. Apart from those related to the maritime sec­
tor, which wil l  be  discussed below, it a lso inspired the negotiations for the 1989 
UN/ECE Convention on Civ i l  Liabi l ity for Damage Caused dur ing Carriage of  
Dangerous Goods by  Road,  Rai l  and In land Navigation Vessels (hereinafter CRTD 
Convention). 1 5 0 Although this convention does not appear appl icable to mil i tary 
premises or installations, 1 5 1 it expressly covers cases in which the carrier is a State 
Party or any constituent part of a State. In furtherance of Article 1 6  ( 1 )  to (4), how­
ever, contracting Parties m ay provide that S tate carriers shall b e  d ispensed from 
the obligation to cover their l iab i l i ty by insurance or other financial security. 
C .  The 1 969 Civi l  L ia b i l ity Convention . The B russels Conference, at which 
bo th the 1 969 Intervention Convention and the Civil Liabili ty Convention (here­
inafter CLC) were negotiated, had before it the draft texts prepared by the IMCO 
Secretariat. The draft articles for the C LC contained a substan tive exoneration 
clause for warships or other ships owned or operated by a S tate and used for the 
time being, only on government non-commercial service. 1 52 
This proposal el icited several comments and amendments revealing widely 
different views on the m atter. With the support of other countries, Norway argued 
that the CLC should contain no such exception, asserting th at the purpose of the 
convention-ensuring that adequate compensation would be availab le  to persons 
who suffer damage caused by the escape of discharge of oil  from ships-applied as 
much with regard to warships and State-owned ships as to merchant ships .  
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Neverth eless, the Norwegian government was wi ll ing to consider an exception to 
th e provisions on compulsory i n surance and j u risdi ction, modelled on the com­
p romise ac hieved at  the 1 962 NS Convention. 1 5 3  S i m i larly, the U K  government 
co mmented that  there was no just ification for the exoneration proposed by IMCO, 
adding that th ese sh ips  might need to be exem p ted from the p rovisions on j uris­
dict ion.  I n  any case, the UK did not  think that the issue was l ikely to affec t 
genuine warshi ps,  s ince they did not  carry o i l  i n  bulk as cargo . 1 54 
J apan and the United States did no t ob j ec t  to the IMCO proposal as such, but  
wished to  add a special provision by which State parties would waive j urisdic­
tional immunities with regard to State-owned o r  State-operated ships used for 
comm ercial purposes. I S S  
However, during the discussi ons i n  the conference commi ttee, most delegations 
warned that there had been many difficulties in the past with sub j ecting warships to 
the substantive provisions of conventions. The declaration made by Mr. Zhudro of 
the Soviet delegation was ch aracteristic for this school of reluctant States. He 
poi n ted out that State-owned ships were already exempted under several conven­
tions; that i t  should be borne in  mind that the prospective convention would 
necessarily be linked with the liability provisions of the 1 95 7  and 1 924 Conven­
tions, neither of which applied to warships;  that attempts to exten d the provi sions 
on the Liability of Operators of N uclear Ships to warships and State-owned ships 
had led to the failure of the 1 962 NS Conven tion, which not a single State had rati­
fied, and that this unfortunate experience should not be repeated. 1 5 6  
The Norwegian amen dment was subsequently rej ected b y  1 9  votes t o  1 0  with 
12 abstentions . I S7 B y  contrast, there was a much clearer maj ority of delegates in  
favour of wai ving sovereign immunity i n  regard to State-owned or State-operated 
ships used for comm ercial purposes. An amendment to that effec t was carried 2 8  
t o  6 with 7 absten tions,  over strong o b j ections by t h e  USSR. I S S  T h e  text (Article 
XI), fi nal ly agreed on, reads as follows: 
( l )  The provis ions of t h i s  Convention shal l  not apply ro warships or  o ther sh ips  
owned or operated by a S tate and used,  for the  t ime  being, only on Government 
noncommerci al service; 
(2) With respect to  ships owned by a Contract ing S ta te  and used for commercia l  
purposes, each S tate shal l  be subject  t o  sui t  in  the jur isdict ions set  forth i n  Art ic le  IX 
and shall  waive al l  defences based on i t s  s ta tus  as  sovereign S t ate .  
D .  The 1 971  I O PC Fund Convention .  As had been the case for the 1 969 CLC, 
the IMO Secretariat proposed excluding coverage for oil pollution damage caused 
by warships from the lope Fund Con vention . I S 9  Th e  proposal to exonerate the 
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Fund from liabil ity for damage caused by armed conflict or natural phenomena of 
an exceptional character was hotly debated at the conference. 1 60 By contras t ,  the 
exemption provision relating to warships and other S tate-owned ships was ac­
cepted without discussion. The final provision (Article 4(2» reads as follows : 
The Fund shal l  i ncur  no o b l i gat ion under the p recedi ng paragraph i f: a) i t  proves 
t hat  the pol l u t i o n  damage resulted fro m  a n  act of  war,  hos t i l i t ies,  civi l  war  or 
i nsurrection or wa s caused by o i l  w h i c h  h a s  escaped or been d i scharged fro m  a 
warship  or other shi p  owned or operated by a S t ate and used,  at the t i me of the 
i ncident,  only on Govern men t non-comm erci al service.  
Use of the terms "escape" and "discharge" clearly indicates that both acciden­
tal and non-accidental releases are excluded from coverage when caused by  these 
State-owned vessels . 
E .  The 1 97 1  Convention on Marit ime Carriage of N uc l ear  Materi a l .  This 
1 97 1  Convention does not contain an express exoneration clause for warships and 
other S tate-operated or  State-owned ships. Yet, apart from arguments derived 
from general international law, there are several legal-technica l  reasons implied 
i n  the treaty i tself pointing to such an exemption, As explained previously, the 
convention was concluded to unlock serious problems that had arisen for the mar­
it ime tran sport of nuclear material since the conclusion of the Paris  Convention 
and Vienna Conventions.  According to an OEeD report on the m atter, commercial 
transport of such m aterial had virtually come  to a standstil l  because of the indem ­
nity coverage requested by the commercia l carriers . Nuclear operators had to rely 
on transport by a ir, or wait ins tead for a warship to be m ade available. 1 6 1  Seen 
against this  b ackground-reflected in the preamble of the 1 97 1  Con ven tion-i t i s  
clear that the  latter was  intended to  deal with private, commercial transport of nu­
clear material and not with warships .  Secondly, the wording of Article 1 
demonstrates that the provisions of the 197 1 Convention should b e  interpreted in  
conj u nction, inter aiza, with both the Paris and Vienna Conventions : 
Any person who by v i rtue of an in tern a t i o n a l  convent io n  or n a t ional  law appl icable  
in t h e  field of mari t i me transport  migh t be held l i able fo r damage caused b y  a 
nuclear  incident .  . . .  
Therefore, any defence under the established (civil)  nuclear l iabi l i ty regimes 
will  by analogy be avai lable under the 1 9 7 1  Convention as well .  As was explained 
above, i t  i s  commonly assumed that neither the Paris nor the Vienna Conventions 
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applied to military installations and activities.  The two new instruments con­
cluded in  1 997 appear to have confirmed this and extended the exclusion to 
" dual-u se" installat ions . 1 62 
F. The 1 996 H N S  Convent ion.  Almost two decades after it was first plann ed, 
the Interna tional Conven tion on Liability and Compen sation for damage in con ­
n ection with the carri age of Hazardous an d Noxious Substances (HNS) b y  sea, was 
finally adopted in 1 996 under I M O  ausp ices. It was only at a very late stage, in 
1 99 1 ,  that the first p roposals on State-owned ships surfaced wi thin IMO's  Legal 
Com mittee. 163  It would soon become clear that some d elegati ons were of the view 
that sovereign immunity of State-owned ships was satisfactorily regulated by gen ­
eral in tern ational law and domestic law, whereas others though t that the HNS 
Convention could usefu lly contrib ute to achieve uniform ity a n d  consi stency in 
this area. 
The Committee's first draft was strongly inspire d  by the civil  liabi l i ty regi mes 
for oil pollution dam age, and based on the relevant  provisions of the 1 969 CLC an d 
1 9 7 1  Fund Con ven tion s . 164 These p roposals were imm ediately cri ticised on sev­
eral grounds.  One delegation considered the p rovisions sup erfluous on the 
ground that i t  was adequately regulated by Arti cle 96 of 1982 UNCLOS .  However, 
another delega tion poin ted out that the paragrap h m i gh t still be of use i n  the case 
of States not party to 1 9 8 2  UNCLOS. Other delegations voice d  their p referen ce for 
the wordi ng of A rticle 4 of the 1 9 89 Salvage Con ven tion, 1 6 5  claiming that this 
represented a more recen t formulation of the sovereign imm unity doc tri ne. 1 66 
Mexico i nsisted that the exon eration provision should be amen ded so as to in­
clude a recom men dation to States "when reasonably possible," to  en deavour to 
ensure that such s h ips do not h i n der the application of this convention . 167 
Discussion of the issue was resumed at the Legal Com m i ttee' s 66th sess ion in 
March 1 992, on the basis of altern ative proposals tabled by th e  Uni ted States and 
Mexico. The n ew texts were b ased on provisions borrowed from A rticle 4 of the 
1 989 Salvage Convention and Arti cle 236 of 1 98 2  UNCLOS. The draft was thor­
oughly amen ded and discussed during subsequent sessions a t  which i t  became 
clear that some delegations still  hel d  opposite views o n the m atter. Some regarded 
a detailed regulation of the m atter desirable to promote uniformity and consis­
tency on the m atter of  sovereign immunity in the field of mari time law, others 
claimed that the issue of a possible waiver o f sovereign imm unity was a matter of 
domestic law. 1 6 8  
After still more discussions, 1 69 agreemen t w a s  eventually reached within the 
Legal Committee on a version combining elements of three previ ous con ven ­
tions : 1 969 CLC, 1 989 Salv age Conven tion and 1 9 8 2  UNCLOSPO This latest 
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proposal formed the basis of the provision finally accepted by the 1 996 Confer­
ence. Article 4 reads in relevant part as fo l lows : 
(�) Except  as provided in paragraph 5, the provis ion of this  Conven tion shal l  not 
apply to warships,  naval  a uxiliary o r  o ther ships owned o r  operated by a State and 
u sed, for the t ime being, only o n  Government non-commercial  service.  
(5)  A State Party may decide to apply the Conven t ion to i ts  wars h i p s  or other vessels 
described i n  paragraph 4, in which case i t  shall  n o t i fy t h e  Secret ary-General thereof 
specifying the t erms and condit ions  o f  such applicatio n .  
( 6 )  With respect to s h i p s  owned b y  a S t a te Party a n d  u s e d  for commercial  pu rposes, 
each S t a te s hal l  be  subject to  suit i n  the j u ri s dictions set  forth in  article 3 8  and shall  
waive all  defences based o n  its s tatus a s  a sovereign S ta te .  
The exemption clause for the "Fund" part of the conven tion was never chal­
lenged, and covers accidental and non-accidental releases. Final Article 1 4  (3)  (a) 
exempts the Fund when i t  proves that :  
t h e  damage was caused b y  h a z a rdous a n d  noxious substances w h i c h  h ad 
escaped o r  been d i s c h a rged fro m  a warship  or o t her  s h i p  or owned o r  operated b y  a 
S ta t e  and u sed,  at t h e  t i m e  of t h e  i n c i dent,  only on Govern men t no n-commercia l  
service.  
6 .2 .7 .  I ntervent ion Ser ies 
• International Convention Relating to I ntervention on the High S e as in Cases of 
Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 
• Protocol Relati ng to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Marin e Po llution 
by Substances other than Oil, 1973 
A.  Th e 1 969 I ntervention C onventio n .  The 1 969 Interven tion Convention 
was adopted under IMeo auspices by  the International Legal Con ference on  Ma­
rine Pollut ion Damage, 1 969 .  This  was held in the wake of  the 1 967 Torrey 
Canyon disaster, in which a Liberian - regis tered tanker,  stranded outs id e Brit ish 
terri torial waters near the Sc i l ly Isles ,  was seriously pol lut ing beaches in 
Cornwall, Devon, the Channel, and  Bri ttany. The U K  took  unprecedented ac­
tion to protect its interest :  i t  employed mi litary a ircraft which used rockets and 
napalm to bomb and destroy th e vessel an d to set fire to the oi l .  Naval  forces as 
well carried out extensive spraying of  the oi l  s l ick with chemicals  and by me­
chanical means . 1 7 1  
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One of the main purposes of  the  1 969 Conference was to c lar ify the  mea­
sures  which  coasta l  S tates may take  in s i m i lar c i rcum s tances .  Without  
pass ing direct  j u dgement  on the  UK act ions ,  the  conference  part ies were ab le  
to  reach  agreemen t o n  the  condi  t ions  an d  modal i  t i es of  the r igh t of  interven­
t ion b y  coasta l St ates with respect to  certain m ari t ime casua l t ies occurring 
o n  the  h igh seas .  I n  the  case  of  a mari t ime casua l ty, defin e d  in  the Conven­
t ion a s :  
. , , a c o l l i sion  o f  s h ips, s tranding o r  i n c i dent  o f  navigation,  o r  other occurrence on 
board a ship external to i t  resul t ing in m a terial  damage or  i m m i nent  threat  of  
mater ia l  damage to a sh ip  or ca rgo , l 7 2  
State Parties to  the  1 969 Convention : 
may take such measures on the high seas as may be necessary t o  prevent, mi tigate or  
e l i minate grave and i m m i nent  danger t o  thei r coastl i ne or related i n terests from 
pollution or th reat of pollution of the sea by oil .  . . .  1 73  
Furthermore, the terms "related interests," which a coastal  State may take into 
account, include conservation of living marine resources and of wildlife . 1 74 
However, before taking the measures deemed necessary, and unless extreme 
urgency requires otherwise, 1 7 5 the coastal State is  ob ligated to notify and consult  
other affected States, including the flag State as  well as independent experts 
drawn from an IMCO list. 1 76 Furthermore, any measures taken by the coastal State 
wil l  need to be proportionate to the damage actual or threatened to it, and may not 
go beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose laid down in Arti­
cle 1 . 1 77 Any Party which causes damage by contravening the provisions of the 
Convention is liable to pay compensationYs 
The Conference parties had before i t  a draft text wh ich was  the outcome of  al­
most two years of discussions within IMCO's  Legal Committee. The resulting 
draft included in Article I an explicit but partial  waiver with respect to 
State-owned ships, as follows : 
However, no measu res shal l  be ta ken un der this  Convention agai nst  any warship or 
other sh ip  owned or operated by a State  a n d  used for the time being o n ly on  
government non-commerc i a l  serv i ce , I 79 
This draft exemption clause was objected to on several  grounds :  
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• Since the purpose of the convention was to deal with measures in case of 
(oil)  pol lut ion casual ties, no ship should be  allowed to escape the conven­
tion by  a virtue of its special status or ownership ; 1 80 
• A blanket prohibi tion to take measures against the ships m en tioned in the 
clause would only be  acceptable if  the coastal State had an undisputed right 
of recourse to the flag State (quod non ) ;  1 8 1  
• In a Resolution on t h e  sub jec t  adopted by t h e  Inst i tut  a t  i t s  session a t  Edin­
burgh on 1 2  September 1 969, all oil tankers had been excluded from an 
otherwise ident ical ly worded warship exemption c lause ;  1 82 Ghana sub­
sequent ly  l odged an amendment  with t h e  IMCO conference in this  
sense;  1 8 3  
• Some delegations were dissatisfied with IMCO'S proposal t o  exempt certain 
State-owned ships in addition to warships .  The Italian delegation consid­
ered i t  arbitrary and tabled an alternative proposal according to which no 
measures would be allowed "against any warship or other ship owned by  a 
State and used to carry oi l  for military purposes" ;  1 84 Other intervenors also 
though t that the IMCO proposal seemed to place the b urden of proof unfairly 
on the coastal State; 1 85 
• Norway regarded the draft clause as ambiguous and proposed a separate ar­
ticle to exempt warships and other State-owned ships-used for the t ime 
being on government non-commercial service-from the scope of the con­
vention altogether; 1 86 
However, after extensive debate, none of the above views carried the day. The 
Norwegian proposal was not  put to the vote, because i t  was fel t  that i t  might imply 
that warships could not be used to preven t o r  el iminate pollu tion of the sea. 1 87 All 
other proposals were rej ected by substantial majorities. 1 8 8 The vi ews held by ma­
jority can be summarised as follows : 
• The USSR and other Eastern Block countries invoked general international 
law, which in their view left no room for doubt :  warsh ips could not be mad e 
subj ect to the j u risdiction of another S tate; furthermore, the proposal to ex­
empt measures against  State-owned ships used on non-commercial service 
was similar to Article 9 of the 1 9 5 8  Geneva Conven tion on the High Seas. 
The USSR added that i t  "would be a poli t ical error to grant immunity exclu­
sively to warships, since the conference would give the i mpression of 
favouring warlike interes ts" ;  1 89 
• Sweden, Germany and  Poland  appealed to " reali s m "  and  po in ted out  tha t  
all conventions made excep t ions  for warships and S tate -owned ships, 
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a n d  t h a t  h e n c e  many c o u n tries  w o u l d  oppose  t h e  deletion of the exemp­
tion ; 1 9 0  
• Finally, t h e  Chairman of IMO's Legal Committee assured delegates t h a t  t h e  
p roposed exem ption w a s  t h e  outcome of two lon g  yea rs of thorough discus­
sion and research, during which,  al l  legal aspects of the problem had been 
considered. 1 9 1 
The fin al p rovision ( A rticle 1(2)) reads in relevant part as follow s :  
However, n o  measure shall  be  taken u nder t h e  present Convention against a n y  
wa rship or  other s h i p  owned o r  operated by a State and u sed,  for t h e  t i m e  being, o n l y  
on government non-commercial  services.  
B. The 1 973 Protocol. The 1 973 Protocol to the 1 969 Intervention Convention, 
as its title indicates, was concluded to establish a right of intervention by coastal 
States for marine casualties on the high seas involving marine pollution by sub­
stances other than oil. I t  was adopted by the same international conference that led to 
the 1973 MARPOL Convention. 1 92 On the question of warships and other State-owned 
ships, IMCO proposed that the Conference adopt the same solution as agreed in 1 969 
for oil pollution casualties. 193 This proposal did not encounter any opposition.  The 
relevant artic le was adopted by forty votes to none, with six abstentions . 194 
C. Concl usions Regardinq the Intervention Series.  From the views that 
prevailed during the preparation of the 1 969 Conference, i t  is clear that the nature 
of the agreed exemption clause relates only to j urisdictional immunity. What the 
drafters of the convention wanted to p reven t at  all cos t  was establishing a righ t of 
intervention or interference on the high seas by a coastal State with regard to vessels 
and property owned by a foreign State. Protests that this would be unfair to coastal 
States, especially since there was no general right of recourse to the flag State, fell on 
deaf ears .  Another "p rogressive" view that was aired but quickly dismissed during 
the conference was that pollution and environmental considerations should out­
weigh conservative m isgivings based on sovereign immunity. Whether these views 
have undergone c hange in later IMO conventions will be examined below . On the 
other hand, it is  now accepted that the right of intervention by coastal States be­
yond their territorial sea has become part of customary international law. 195  The 
1 969 Convention has been widely ratified, and similar provisions can be found in 
A rticle 22 1 of 1 982 UNCLOS and, as will be seen below, in the 1 989 Salvage and the 
1990 OPRC Conventions .  1 96 Moreover, there have been no serious disputes in p rac­
tice involving coastal States' rights of intervention . 1 97 
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Finally, since the type of immunity agreed in the 1969 Convention and the 
1 97 3  Protocol is of a pure j urisdictional nature, i t  is imposs ible to draw conclu­
sions on the fate of the convention and its protocol during war/armed conflict on 
the basis of the exemption clauses alone. 
6 .2 .8 .  Salvage 
• Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Assistance 
and Salvage at Sea,  1 9 1 0  
• 1926 International Convention for t h e  Unification of C e rtai n  Rules relating to 
the Immunity of State-owned Vessels, 1926 
• International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Assis­
tance and Salvage of Aircraft or by Aircraft at S ea, 1938 
• Montevideo Treaty on International Commercial Navigation Law, 1940 
• Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rule s  of Law 
relating to Assistan ce and Salvage at S ea, 1967 
• International Convention on Salvage, 1989 
A. The 1 9 1 0  Salvage Conventio n .  On September 2 3 ,  1 9 l O, two conventions 
were signed in Brussels at a Conference convened under the auspices of the 
Comite : one establishing uniform provisions on rules relating to collisions, the 
other relating to salvage. The ini tiative for a convention on salvage rules dated 
back from 1 8 85  and  was discussed at three international conferences before the fi ­
nal  text could be agreed on . 1 98 
Pursuant to Article 1 4, the Convention does not apply to ships of war and gov­
ernment ships appropriated exclusively to a public service. While there is little 
trace of any substantive discussion in the conference records, the exemption be­
came the subject of divergent interpretations after the conclusion of the treaty. 
Although Article 14 does not distinguish between salvage services rendered by or 
to the exempted categories of ships, i t  was suggested that the article would not ex­
clude application of the convention to services rendered by warships . 1 99 
Such views were firmly rejected by Dutch commentator Wildeboer, on the fol­
lowing two grounds : 1 )  At the time the 1 9 l O  Convention was negotiated, the 
question of whether warships were entitled to salvage remuneration at all, was 
heavily debated amongst  scholars ; 2) Article 14 reflects a simple truth : the con­
vention was intended to regulate m atters of private m aritime law and not matters 
of public international law. In particular, Article 14 does not s tate that no salvage 
awards can be obtained for services rendered to a ship belonging to the excluded 
categories, but  neither does it state that such ships would not be entitled to a salvage 
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reward for salvage services rendered. 200 Wildeboer maintained that all  that can be 
derived from Article 1 4  is that no salvage award could be claimed for services ren­
dered to or by the excluded categories of sh ips on the basis of the convent ion . It was 
up to the domestic law of the contracting Parties to regulate i nstances involving 
public vessels. This account concurs with the comments made by a French 
writer. 20 1 
B.  The 1 967 Protocol . On May 27 ,  1 967,  a protocol amending the 1 9 1 0  Con­
vention was adopted at a Diplomatic Conference convened in B russels at the 
init iative of the Comite. Its sole purpose was to introduce a new provis ion202 com­
pletely reversing Article 1 4. In furtherance of the fi rs t paragraph of Article 1 of the 
protocol, the 1 9 1 0  Convention also appl ies to assistance or salvage services ren­
dered to or by ships of war and other State-owned or  State-operated ships.  The 
second paragraph stipulates that claims for salvage awards rendered to such ships 
shall  only be brough t  in  the courts of the State concerned, whereas according to 
the third paragraph, State part ies h ave the right to determine to what  extent the 
duty to render assistance laid down in Article 1 1  of the main convention applies to 
the State-owned ships in question 
The reason for this striking reversal i s  that Article 1 4  of the 1 9 1 0  Convention 
had reportedly become outdated; by  the 1 960s, salvage rewards could be obtained 
in  most countries for services ren dered to the previously exclu ded categories of 
ships . 203 This change was reflected in  various i nternational instruments con­
cluded s ince the beginning of the century. In  accordance with these, State parties 
agreed to waive their jurisdictional im munity in  part, in  regard to claims invo lv­
ing assistance and salvage services rendered to publ ic  sh ips.204 
It is noteworthy that the 1 967 Brussels Protocol differs from these instruments 
in  that i t  also deals with the question of salvage services rendered by warships and 
other State-owned ships.  Thi s  i ssue was addressed at the Comite's Rijeka Confer­
ence in 1 959, at which proposals for modification of Article 1 4  were discussed.20S 
Subsequently, the conference passed a reso lution on the matter which stipulates, 
inter alia : 
When a ship  of war or any o ther ship  owned or opera ted by a State or a Pub l i c  
A u t h o r i t y  has  rendered ass is tance or s a lv age services, such State  or  Pub l i c  A ut hority 
has l iberty to claim remuneration b u t  only pursuant to  the provis ions of the 
Convent ion .  
If  such i s  the meaning underlying Article 1 4, as am ended by  the 1 967  protocol, 
it involves a s ignificant change in the scope of the rules on sovereign i mmunity 
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for State parties to the 1 967 protocol .  Indeed, in addition to a (partial) waiver of 
their jurisdictional immunities in  regard to salvage services rendered to 
State-owned ships, parties to the Protocol would thus undertake to subject their 
ships to the substantive rules of the treaty regarding salvage services and remunera­
tion by such ships .  
The last paragraph of Article 1 of the 1 967 protocol modifying Article 14 of the 
1 9 1 0  Convention confi rms  the view expressed above; 206 namely, that  Article 1 1  
on the duty of ship masters to render assistance to all persons in danger a t  sea, even 
if  they are enemies, does not a llow for any conclusions on the application of the 
1 9 1 0  Convention between opposing belligeren ts in time of war. Indeed, the mean­
ing of the last paragraph of Article 1 can be  traced to a sentence in the above 
mentioned Rij eka resolution which reads :  
The High Contract i ng Parties reserve themselves the  righ t o f  fixing the conditions 
in which Article 1 1  w i l l apply to Masters o f  ships of war. 
This phrase demonstrates that what Article 1 1  was meant to address was the 
universal moral du ty incumbent on any master of a "civilian ship" to render assis­
tance to persons in need, a du ty which held good in times of war. Finally, i t  should 
be noted that the 1 967 protocol has received only a moderate following. I t  took ten 
years to receive the required five instruments of rati fication or accession neces­
sary for i t s  entry into force207 and has at  present barely 10 State parties .208 
C .  The 1 989 Salvage Conventi o n .  Following the 1 9 7 8 A moco Cadiz disas ter, 
the subject of the shortcomings of the international law on salvage was placed on 
IMCO's agenda at the insis tence of France.209 In March 1 979 the Cornice offered to 
assist I MCO in the preparation of a new draft convention .  The offer was accepted 
and the Cornice adopted a draft a t  i ts 32nd Conference held in Montreal in 1 9 8 1 .  
The proposal was then submi tted for consi dera tion by IMeo's Legal Committee at 
its 46th session held  the same year. 2 l O  
The 1 989 Convention differs from the 1 9 1 0  Conven tion i n  many respects. One 
of these differences was already highligh ted,  namely the explici t  incorporation of 
financial incentives to minimise or reduce environmental pollution into the sal­
vage award.2 1 1  Furthermore, the 1 9 1 0  Conven tion regula tes matters generally 
considered as belonging to the sphere of private marit ime law and is concerned 
only with the con tractual relationships between the salvor, the master of the ship, 
and the owner of the property. In contrast, the 1 9 89 Convention is not only con ­
cerned with these relationsh ips bu t  adds to the international l aw of salvage a 
substantial body of rights and duties that  belong to the sphere of public 
21 7 
The Newport Papers 
in ternational law. The most  conspicuous i n novations, apart from the 
above-mentioned financial  incentives, are the explicit  duty of the salvor, mas ter 
and the owner to exerc ise due care to preven t or minimise damage to the 
environment2 1 2  and the explici t recogn i  tion of the righ ts of coastal States " to take 
measures in accordance wi th generally recognised princ iples of international law 
to protect its coastl ine or related in terests from pollution," including the righ t to 
give instructions to the salvor.2 1 3  
The conference records o f  the 1 989 Conven tion are o f  particular in terest for 
the evolution of the concep t of immunity and its  application to marit ime con ven­
tions. During the p reparatory work in IMO's Legal Committee, the provisions 
touch ing on sovereign immunity were ex tensively debated by govern ment dele­
gates. The ensuing declarations and the provisions of the treaty i tself constitute in 
many respects among the most recent evidence of treaty practice an d opinio juris 
on the subject .  
The 1 9 8 1 draft by the Com ite, which served as a basis for discussion by 
IMCO/IMO, followed the 1 9 1 0  Convention in exempting from the scope of the 
conventio n :  
. . .  warships or o ther vessels owned o r  o perated by a S t a te a n d  being used at  t h e  time 
of the salvage operations exclusively on governmental  non-com mercial services.2 1 4  
I n  i ts commentary to this provision, the COmile noted that whilst such 
State-owned ships had been excluded from the 1 9 1 0  Convention, the situation was 
reversed by the 1 967 Brussel s Protocol . However, the COmile felt that in view of the 
rather limited accep tance of the latter i nstrument, the new Convention should not 
deal with these issues, which should instead be left for separate regulation .2 1 S  
The question o f  the status o f  warsh ips an d other S tate-owned vessels led t o  di­
vergent views from the very moment th at IMO's Legal Committee commenced the 
in- depth stu dy of th e Comite's draft .  During its 52nd session in 1 984, and subse­
quent sessions up to the 56 th, several delegates argued that they saw no reason why 
these s h ip s  should not be subject to the ordinary rules on salvage, while others 
wanted to allow an option for States to apply the provisions of the draft if  they saw 
fit. Still other d elegates wanted to broa den the exemption to include govern­
m ent-owned non-commercial cargo as well. The Comite's draft was also criticised 
for failing to distinguish between ins tances where State-owned ships rend ered 
salvage services and those where salvage services were rendered to such ships,  and 
for not dealing with the question of State-owned cargoes transported on commer­
cial ships .  Finally, some delegates thought th at the matter shoul d be left out from 
th e convention altogether, claiming that the question of immunity shoul d  either 
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b e  dealt with by a special con ven tion on the sub j ect  or b y  the laws of the i ndivid­
ual States. Others drew atten tion to  the fac t  that  the m atter of sovereign immunity 
was being stu died b y  the I LC. 2 1 6  
The first genuine alternatives t o  the Comite's draft were proposed i n  1 986 dur­
ing the 56 th session of IMO'S Legal Commi ttee, during which t h ree alternatives 
were propo sed. Acco rding to the first one, a State party m ay stipulate i n  i ts na­
tional legislation that the con vention shall not apply to warships  and other 
State-owned ships either fo r services ren dered to such s h i p s  or for services ren­
dered by such ships .  The State would be requ ired to notify the d eposi tary of such 
an exemption . According to the secon d alternative, a State party wishing to apply 
the convention to public ships would be required to so notify the depos i tary. In fur­
therance of a third alternative, the con ven tion would contain a prov ision 
exten ding the scope of its  appli cation express Is verbis to salvage services rendered 
to warships an d other enumerated S tate-own ed ships, whilst  States would h ave to 
notify the depositary should they wish to apply the con vention to State-owned 
ships beyo n d  that. 2 1 7  
Shortly thereafter, a further proposal was submi tted t o  the Legal Comm ittee's 
57 th session, according to which the convention would not apply to "property 
owned, possessed, s h ipped or con trolled b y  a State an d  not i n  use or in tended for 
use for commercial p urposes . ,,2 1 8  The Un ited States in p articular warned that fail ­
ure to specifically exclude governmental non-commercial  c argo would have a 
significant  impact upon traditional principles of sovereign i mm u n ity.  She ac­
cepted that the application of the conven tion to govern m en t-own ed commerc i al 
ca rgo was entirely appropriate, b u t  argued th at  application to non-commercial 
cargo in terfered with vital  governmen t  functions and wou l d  b e  in consistent w i th 
current in tern ation al an d U . S .  n a tional law . 2 1 9  
The report o n  the Legal Comm ittee's 57 th session shows that  most delegates 
were concerned that extending the scope of the con vention automatically to war­
ships an d State-owned ships might encroach on the principle of sovereign 
immunity by su b j ecting these ships to all of the treaty's provisions.  There was a 
clear majority for the p roposal to exempt warships and o ther State-owned or 
State-operated ships in principle from the conven tion an d  to add a paragraph to the 
effect that States t h at elect to waive this exemption shall  so notify the depositary. 
On the other hand, the U.S .  proposal to exonerate in addition State-owned non­
commercial cargo ran into opposition on practical grounds.  Many delegates argued 
that it would be very difficult  for a salvor rendering assistance to a vessel to deter­
mine which of the cargoes on board fell within the scope of the exemption .220 
During the Legal Committee's 5 8 th session, the above views were fi rmed up. 
Agreement was reached on the text of a new article (code-named "Y")  fo r 
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i nclusion among the fin al clauses of the convention.2 2 1  At the same session, dele­
gates engaged also in an in- depth discussion of a revised U . S .  submission to 
exemp t from the scope of the conven ti o n :  
. . .  property owned o r  shipped b y  a S tate [or governmental a n d  non-commercial purposes 
whether on board a vessel descri bed in  subparagraph (c) or a commercial vesse l .  
However, the various mi sgivings among the Committee's  members on this is ­
sue could not b e  ironed out.  Objections were voiced on practical  grounds-th e  
i mpossibili  t y  for a salvor to i dentify t h e  c argo benefi ting from immunity-an d  on 
legal-technical grounds : th e term "property" was  consi dered as being too wide 
and d eviating from the concept of State-owned cargo i n  the 1 926 B ru ssels Con­
ventio n ;  on the whole, the number of exemptions from the salvage treaty would 
become too numerou s . 222  
The International Conference on Salvage was  convened in London, i n  April 
1 989. Two countries made fu rther special su bmi ssions for consideration by the 
Conference. Germany ( FRG) claimed that the above mentioned article "Y" confused 
two elements of generally accepted principles of public international law. She ar­
gued that exten ding the Convention's provisions to warships should ei ther be 
entirely up to the national legislator without any ob ligation to notify this act,  or that 
there should be a reservation clause combined with a duty of notification. However, 
the delegate indicated that Germany would be prepared to accept a provision like 
Article 1 of the 1 967 Brussels protocol amending the 1 9 1 0  Convention .2 2 3  
T h e  U n ited S tates submitted p roposals for two new articles to the  conference. 
The fi rst related to the status of S tate-owned p roperty/cargo o n  commercial ves­
sels .  I n  the text accompanying th i s  submission, the Uni ted S tates explained at  
length that i t  was not co ncerned with the substantive issue, for i t  recogni sed that  
govern men t owners were obligated to pay for salvage services ren dered i n  respect 
of such cargo, but that i t  wanted to ensure that the  Con venti on would not be used 
"as a basis  fo r a b ri dging sovereign i m m unity pri nciples . "  The following new pro­
vision was proposed : 
U nless t h e  S t a te owner consents, no provis ion o[ t h i s  Co nventi o n  s h a l l  be used as a 
b a s i s  [or t h e  seizure, arrest or detention o[ cargoes owned by a State a n d  e n t i t l e d  to 
sovereign immunity u n der accepted pr inc iples o[ i n tern a t i on a l  law, nor s h a l l  
a r t i c l e s  4,  2 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 1 9, 2 1  and 22 apply  to  such cargoes .  
I n  the eyes of i ts promo ter, the text had two main advan tages : i t  would recon­
cile the Salvage Convention with what  it  regarded as the "evolvi ng n a ture" of 
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sovereign immunity an d would also take the specific treaty obligations of State 
Parties to the 1 926 Brussels Conven tion on the Immunity of State-owned Ships 
into account .22 -l 
The second proposal related to a new sub ject, the status of humanitarian car­
goes donated by the State to private charities and shipped world-wide. There are 
cases in  which the donating State does not hold tit le to such cargoes as a conse­
quence of which they wou ld not be covered by the sovereign immunity 
exemption. The United States suggested that in cases where the donor State  vol­
untarily undertakes to pay for salvage services in  respect of such cargoes, a way 
should  be found to avoid subjecting such cargoes to unnecessary delay. I ts delega­
tion therefore proposed an additional provision to this effect .225 
During the conference, the sovereign immu nity issue raised much less contro­
versy than was p resaged by the preparatory work. First ,  the proposed article "Y" 
on State-owned vessels was accepted after provision was made for salvage opera­
tions control led by public authorities . 226 The U .S .  proposal in relation to 
humanitarian cargoes was well received, whilst the proposal on State-owned car­
goes was debated by an informal working group.227 
The text of the final provision relating to State-owned vessels (Article 4), reads 
as follows :  
( 1 )  W i t h o u t  pre j udice to article S ,  t h i s  Convention sh a l l  n o t  a p p l y  t o  warships o r  t o  
o t her non-commercia l  vessels owned o r  operated by a S tate  a n d  entit led,  a t  t h e  time 
o f  the sa lvage opera t i ons, t o  soverei gn i m m u n i t y  under genera l ly  recognised 
principles of i n terna t i o na l  law unless t h a t  Sta te  decides otherwise .  
(2)  Where a Sta te Party decides to apply t h e  Convent ion t o  i ts warships  o r  o t her 
vessels  described in  p a ragraph 1 ,  i t  shall  not ify the Secretary-Genera l thereof 
specifyi ng t h e  terms a n d  condit ions o f such appl ica t ion .  228 
D. Eva l uation .  
( 1 )  The 1 989 Convention entered into force on 1 4  July 1 996. I t  has  thus  far a t ­
tracted 25 States rep res en t ing 27 .67  percent of  world tonnage. 229 Although i t  does 
not contain an express c lause to that effect, there can be little doubt that i t  is 
meant to replace the whole of the 1 9 1 0  Bru ssels Convention .  This fol lows from 
the rules of general treaty law on successive conventions on the same subject2 30 
but can also be substantiated with observations made during the Comite's  prepara­
tory work.2 3 1 This is confirmed by the title page of the Report and Commentary 
prepared by Comue.1 32 
The above issue is importan t b ecause conflicts between the rights and du ties of 
States that  are parties to two or more of the discussed i n ternational instrumen ts 
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on salvage cannot be excluded.2 33 Precisely the provisions on immunity of public 
vessels might conceivably be a source for conflicts, for they were treated differ­
ently in each of the instruments discussed. 
(2) A second question is that of the nature of the exemptions related to immu­
nity that  were incorporated into  the  1 9 89 Convention.  This  has taken on added 
i mportance because of the convention's environmental protection provisions.  
Thus far not a s ingle State has taken advantage of the offer contained in Article 
4(2) and notified IMO of its desire to apply the provisions of the convention to its 
warships and other state-owned ships.  Presumably therefore, the convention does 
not apply to the majority of the current Parties' public vessels. B u t  does this mean 
that masters of such ships, in case they are involved in salvage operations, are also 
exempted from the duty "to exercise due care to prevent or  minimise damage to 
the environment ,, ?2 3-l 
I t  i s  submitted that the answer to this question cannot be derived from the 
treaty itself  but should be sought in general public international law and the do­
mestic laws of States for the following reasons :  
• I t  was  submitted that the  better interpretation of the  warships provision in  
the 1 9 1 0  Convention was  that the  latter regulated provisions of private mar­
itime law and was not intended to deal with matters of public  international 
l aw at all .  Although the 1 989 Convention covers matters of public intern a­
tional law in addition to contractual ones, the discussions held within the 
Comite, within IMO 'S Legal Committee and during the 1 9 89 Conference do 
not permit to conclude that  the tenor and scope of the exemption relating to 
State-owned vessels would have changed. Obviously, this  consideration 
leaves aside the reversal of the exemption by the 1 967 Protocol, for that solu­
tion seems to have fallen out of international favour. Thus, the 1 9 8 1  d raft by 
the Comite and the commentary in relation to the proposed exemption re­
lied entirely on the 1 9 1 0  Convention and advised against  adopting the 
solution of the 1 967 protocol. I t  i s  noteworthy too that the draft articles on 
Jurisdictional immunities of States and their Property, which were pre­
sented by  the ILC to the UN General Assembly in 1 99 1 ,  confirm the general 
direction taken by the 1989 Salvage Convention : draft provisions Article 1 6  
( 1 )  and Article 1 6  ( 5 )  explicitly exempt  warships  and other State-owned ves ­
sels used for non-commercial purposes, in addition to ditto State-owned 
cargoes, from the proposed rules on proceedings in respect of salvage and 
other instances of marine emergency. 
• The 1 989 Convention deals in Article 5 with "salvage operations controlled 
by  public authorities . "  This Article was proposed by the Comite and has 
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been adopted without change by I M O .  In  its commentary to the Article the 
Comite explained the tenor of this article as follows :  
The draft convention does not deal direclly z:,ith quesliollS related t o  salvage operations by o r  
under the control  of public authorities, n o r  does i t  deal with the r ights of salvors t o  paymelll in 
such cases from the authorilY concerned. 2 3 5  
Since such salvage operations may involve State-owned vessels, although ad­
mittedly not a lways, the Comite's commentary i s  indicative of the fac t  that  much 
like in 1 905 - 1 9 1 0 , the drafters of the revised convention preferred to adopt a 
hands-off approach for issues related to public authority. 
• Whenever the question of immunity came up during the context of the pre­
paratory work of the 1989 Convention,  only j urisdictional aspects of 
immunity were addressed. This limitation of the scope of the discussed ex­
emptions is also apparent from the sub jec t  m atter of the o th er international 
instruments to which reference was made during the discussions-e.g. ,  the 
1 926  Brussels Convention and  the work of the ILe.  
• The text of the provisions on State-owned cargoes and humanitarian car­
goes itself leaves no doubt about the l imitation of the breadth of the 
exemption s :  Articles 25  and 26  only mention jurisdictional or procedural 
I ssues. 
• I t  was seen above that the prob lem of "Humani tarian cargoes" was pre­
sented as an i ssue related to the sovereign immunity of  State vessels and 
State-owned cargoes. Although the  protection afforded by Article 26 resem­
b les j urisdict ional i mmuni ty, i t  should not be considered an addition to 
theory and practice of "sovereign immunity. " This is  so because the State 
which donates the cargoes-as explained by the promo ter of the arti­
cle-does not  always retain title to the property; furthermore, the 
prohib ition contained in Article 26  i s  far from uncondi tional :  the cargoes 
cannot be seized "if such State has agreed to pay for salvage services ren­
dered in respect of such humanitarian cargoes." In other words, the article 
does not exclude li tigation involving such cargoes .  
( 3 )  The next question that arises is how the above reflects on the status of the 
convention during armed conflict .  Clearly, the 1989 Salvage Convention is  an ex­
ample of a treaty the drafters of which did not wish to be drawn on the issue of the 
application of the substantive provisions of the convention to public vessels . 
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Consequen tly, the exemption of warsh ips in Article 4(1) cannot be taken to 
imply that these vessels would not be  under a du ty to take due care to protect th e 
environment when engaged in salvage operations. The extent of the environmen­
tal duties incumbent on such vessels would depend ( 1 )  on  the domestic law of the 
State concerned ; (2)  on wh ether this State has made a notification in accordance 
with Article 4(2)  to the effect that it  shall apply the provisions of the conven tion to 
i rs vessels ;  ( 3 )  on general international law. With respect to the l atter it should be 
remembered that  the incorporarion of environmen tal provi s ions into the interna­
tional law of salvage is of recent  vintage, and that the convenrion itself en tered 
in to force for State parties by mid- 1 996 only. Therefore, i t  is rarher unlikely that 
i ts  environmental provisions would have reached customary law status.  
Ir  is nonetheless possib le to draw some conclusions on the effect of  the 1989  
Salvage Conven tion during naval war. This  will be done in the next chap ter. 
6 .2 .9 .  The 1 990 OPRC Co nve ntion  
• I nternational Convention on O i l  Pollution Preparedness,  Response and Co-op­
eration (OPRC Convention), 1990 
As sugges ted earlier, the 1 990 OPRC Conven tion occ upies a special  place in the 
contex t  of this enquiry.236  I t  was resorted to by IMO to deal with the aftermath of 
(an) oil sp il l(s)  caused in the course of the 1 990- 1 99 1  Gulf war. Some of i ts provi­
sions were implemented on a provisional basis in  1 99 1 ,  well before i t  formally 
entered in to force in 1 995 .  Furthermore, as will be seen immediately below, part 
of the preparatory work for the convention was held during the Gulf war i tself. 
Iraq invaded Kuwai t  on August 2, 1 990; the diplomatic conference leading to the 
OPRC Convention was held in November 1 990 when the Desert Shield operation 
took place, during which troops were deployed in preparation for the Desert 
S torm phase of rhe Gulf war. The latter phase s tarted on January 16 - 1 7, active 
combat was stopped on February 27, and the terms of a cease-fire were set by  Secu­
rity Council  Reso lu tion 686 of March 2, 1 99 1 .  The reason why this t ime frame is 
important is that several of the principal "belligerents" participated in  the prepa­
ratory work for the Convention : e.g. , the United Sta tes, the U K, Saudi Arab ia, and 
Kuwait. 
The catalyst for the 1 990 OPRC Convention was, once again, a genuine mari­
time inciden t .  Following the March 1 989 Exxon Valdez disaster in  Prince William 
Sound in Alaska,2 37 the IMO Assembly requested the Marine Environment Pro­
tection Committee (hereinafter M E PC) to : 
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. "  develop, for considera t i o n  at a conference, a draft i n ter n a t i o n a l  co n ven t i on on o i l  
pol l u t i on preparedness a n d  response w h i c h  w o u l d  prov i d e  a framework fo r 
i n tern a t ional  co-operat ion fo r combat i n g  m a j o r  o i l  poll u t i on i n c i d e n t s  t a k i n g  i n t o  
acc ount  t h e  experience gained wi t h i n  ex is t ing regional  arrangements on combating 
marine pol l u tion . . . . 238  
Sub sequen tly, the M E PC estab lished a Work ing Group which was i ns tructed to 
prepare a draft for a conven tion .239 This was based on a proposal  made earlier by 
the Uni ted States, devel oped in informal consultations wi t h  experts from several 
IMO Mem b er S tates, the EEC and the IMO Secretariat .24o 
The nex t stage was the convening of a Preparatory Meeting for the Conference 
on In tern ational Co-operation on Oil Pollution Prepared ness and Respon se, which 
was held at L\W headquarters from 14- 1 8  May 1 990.241 This Preparato ry Meeting 
reviewed the text of the draft convention as well as the report prepared by the MEPC 
Working Group.242 The ou tcome of this meeting was a new draft for an " I n terna­
tional Co nven tion on Oil Pollution Prepared ness and Response" as well as seven 
draft resolutions dealing, inter alia , \vith an appeal for the early i mplementation of 
the Con ven tion and with the expansion of the scope of the Conven tion to Hazard­
ous and Noxious Substances. 243 During none of these p reparatory s tages did 
questions related to warships and o ther State-owned s h ips arise. 
The Conference on I n terna ti onal  Co-operation on Oil  Pollution Preparedness 
and Response was convened in Lon don from 19  to 30 November 1 990 .  I t  i s  worth 
observing that i t  was a ttended by Kuwai t, Saudi Arabia, the UK, the U n i ted 
States an d many o ther cou n t ries th at \vould form part of the Gulf War Coalition, 
in addit ion to Iran (but  n o t  Jraq). 244 Only at  th is fairly advanced s tage was the sta­
tus of \varships and o t h er S t a te-owned ships under the prospective convention 
b rough t up. As h a s  b een the case with so many other t reaties, the init iative cam e 
agai n from the U . S .  delegatio n .  S h e  explained that her proposal was borrowed 
from l\lARPOL 73/78, giving the fol l owing j u s tification : 
The draft COIl'iWlltioll calls upon PLlrties to impose certain requ irelllents upon S/llpS flying 
their respective flags. Such regu latory requ iremen ts arc appropriately applied, pursuant  to 
illlenwtional agreelllen ts , to sh ips engaged in colllllzcrc wl servia. Ho,:'ever, it ZL'ouid be 
incollsis tent 1i ' l lit 10llg-stalldlllg interllotiollol pwoice for all internatiol lol  convell tion to 
reqUl J"C the application of sllch requ irL'men ts to warsh ips, naval a u xiliaries, or other ships 
owned or operated by a State and u sed, for the t i llle being, only on glY"<Jenzmclll  
l IOn-commercial  serL'ice . 245 
Apart  from "long-standing i n tern a ti o n al practice," it might be that  the impe­
tus for the U.S. proposal was i n spired by the then on-goin g  m i l itary bui ldup in 
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the Persian/Arabian Gulf. But this  is only an assumption,  s i n ce there i s  n o  wri tten 
evidence that the Persian Gulf situation was discu ssed during the November con­
feren ce. I n  any event, the U . S .  proposal for the insertion of an i m munity clause 
modelled on MARPO L 73/7 8 , was adopted without m u c h  discussion.246 The final 
tex t can b e  fo und in Article 1(3) of the Conven tion . 
As for the scope of th e immunity clause of the OPRC Co nvention, i t  is manifest 
that the State-owned sh ips i n  question are form ally exempted from the sub stan­
tive provi si ons of the Conven tion;  this  follow s not only from the fact that  t h e  
clause was b orrowed in i ts  entirety from MARPOL 73/7 8 , b ut also from t h e  com­
men tary provided by i ts  init iator, the U.S.  delegation.  Consequen tly, what has 
b een said above on t h e  environmental implications of the MARPOL formula in 
general, and during armed conflict in panicular,2.J7 app l i es mutatis mutandis to the 
OPRC Convention as well. 
6 . 2 . 1 0 .  Wreck Removal 
• D raft Conven tion on Wreck Removal 1995 
In the view of its advocates, the proposed i nternational convention on wreck re­
moval would enh ance and complement the international law relating to m aritime 
casualties by clarifying the duties of shipowners and States with respect to hazard­
ous wrecks.  Shipowners would not only be re sponsible for making a full report on 
casualties i n volving their ships i n  accordance with IMO guidelin es, but would also 
be financially li able for locating, marking, and removing the hazardous wrecks.248 
The States whose i ntere sts are the most directly threatened by the wreck would be 
responsible for determining wheth er a hazard exists .  Furthermore, the prospective 
convention would provide guidance for this determination through a non-exhaus­
tive list of criteria encompassing consi derations relat ing to the marine 
envi ronment, public health and the economic i nterests of the coastal States.249 
The 1 995 draft su bmitted to IMO's Legal Commi ttee contains a proposal for an 
exoneration clause, i dentical to Article 4(1) and (2 ) of the 1 9 89 Salvage Conven­
tion.250  Its promoters h ave j u st ifi ed this  provision citing grounds of general 
i n ternation al law: 
I n  accorda nce wi t h  custom a ry i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law (as  reflec ted in Articles 32, 9 5  and 
96 ofU NCLOS) the Convention woul d not  apply t o  wa rships and other ships owned 
or operated by a S t a te and used fo r non-Commercial  p u rposes.2 5 1  
One may conclude therefore that i n  accordance with t h i s  comment, Article 4 of 
the 1 9 89 Convention and proposed Article III  of the draft Con ven tion on Wreck 
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Removal constitute either a reflection or a special application of the general rule 
of international law on the substan tive aspects of immunity of public vessels .  
6. 3. Conclusions to Chapter VI 
I .  The above exam ination has borne out that there exi sts a great di versi ty of ex­
emption clauses fo r S tate property in m arit ime and other treaties. The differen ces 
rel ate not  only to the wording of the clauses, but also to their meaning an d scope, 
and in pa rticular to the question of  whether they offer only j urisdictional immu­
nity or ,  i n  addi tion, immunity from the m aterial provisions of the ins trumen ts.  It 
would be impossible  to formulate gen eral conclusions, in  particular regarding the 
relationship between armed conflict and these treaties.  Nonetheless, the follow­
ing tren ds can be discerned 
2. During the preparatory work for m any m aritime conventions, i t  was often ar­
gued that exempting warships and other State-owned ships was a sensible solution, in 
view of the principle of sovereign immunity. There can be l i ttle doub t that sovereign 
(jurisdictional) immunity of public vessels forms part of customary in ternational law. 
However, whether this should be broadened to cover exemption from substantive 
provisions of maritime conventions is the subject of continuous debate. In addi tion, 
the above analysis has shown that international law on jurisd ictional immunity i tself 
is  not immutable. Some of the trea ty clauses discussed here have made a substantial 
con tribution to general public international law by either confirming the accepted 
wisdom, or by producing a refined version of the pre-existing rules. 
3. The above exam ina tion has also demonstrated that especially in  the 1 960s, 
m any coun tri es s tarted to question the tradi tional  wisdom that warships should 
b e  exemp ted autom atically from compliance with maritime convention s. Most  
conspicuous in th is regard were the di scussi ons held during the following confer­
ences: the 1 962 "OP" Con ference to amend the 1 95 4  OI LPOL Conven tion, the 
Brussels Conferen ce leading to the 1 962 NS Convention, the 1 967 Brussels Con­
ference of the Comire leading to the 1 967 Protocol to the 1 9 1 0  Salvage Convention, 
and the 1 969 Brussels IMCO Conference leading to the 1 969 In tervention Conven­
tion a n d  the 1 969 CLC. 
4. Alth ough the principle of  the exemption of warships was not seri ously chal­
lenged as such, the 1 973 MARPO L Conference constitu tes in a sense a watershed.  I t  
was seen that the compromise formu la which was agreed during that conference 
h as been wid ely copied by an impressive range of  treaties an d other international 
instruments, both within and ou tsi de I M CO/I MO con tex t, and is used even in in ter­
pretative statements in regard to treaties dealing with media other than the 
marine environment.  Crucial ly, the MARPOL formu l a  was included i n  1 982 
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UNC LOS.  As a result, one may conclude that it is now a rule of general public inter­
national law that States should apply appropriate rules and s tandards for the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment to public  vessels "insofar 
as reasonab le and practicable," and "wi thou t impairing their operations or opera­
tional capabilit ies . "  It was seen too that the entire military sector is increasingly 
required to comply with domestic environmental legislation, at least in 
peacetime. 
5. When the groundwork was laid for the 1989 Salvage Convention, the issue of 
immunity of warsh ips, of other State-owned ships and  ditto cargo was again sub­
j ected to a thorough review by delega tions of various countries. The outcome of 
this was, at a minimum, the addition of a nuance to and a change of tone of the 
classic exemption clause. Whereas under the MARPOL formula, Parties undertake 
to apply equivalent standards to State-owned ships, they are not required to report 
such measures to the depositary or o ther State parties. Under the formula of the 
1989 Salvage Convention, States are explicitly offered the opportunity to apply 
the Convention to ships which are normally exempted. In addition, States that 
wish to take this course need to inform the depos itary of this fact. S ince the new 
Salvage Convention entered into force in 1 996, i t  is too early to tell whether the 
new formula represents not only a development of the doctrine, but whether it 
will be widely accepted as a new ( treaty) norm. Already, the record seems mixed. 
I t  is true that the 1989 "Salvage formula" has been used in the texts of two other 
IMO conventions : in the HNS Convention, adopted in 1 996 and in the recently ta­
bled draft convention on Wreck Removal . On the other hand, none of the States 
that have thus far ratified the 1 989 Salvage Convention have made use of the offer 
to apply its provisions to the State-owned ships in question .  Furthermore, the im­
munity clause incorporated into the 1 990 OPRC Convention fo llows the MARPOL 
Convention and not the Salvage Convention . The 1992 OSPAR Convention, re­
placing the 1972  Oslo Regional Dumping Convention, includes a reference to 
mere jurisdictional immunity. Finally, i t  was seen above that in response to criti­
cism on the exemption of public vessels, the most recent protocol to the London 
(Dumping) Convention, concluded in 1996, clarifies that S tates may in deroga­
tion of the general principle elect to apply the substantive provisions of the 
protocol to pub lic vessels without, however, waiving their r ight to jurisdictional 
immunity in this regard. Although not entirely identical, this resembles the solu­
tion chosen in the 1 989 Salvage Convention .  
6 .  T h e  effect o f  the exoneration clauses o n  the status o f  the treaty during 
war/armed conflict and other types of hostili ties was discussed above for each of 
the conventions under considerat ion The first  general ru le that can be distil led is 
that an exoneration clause---e.g., the 1 989 Salvage Convention or the 1 992 OSPAR 
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Convention-which deals only with j u risdictional  i m m u n ities,  i s  not  in i tself a 
good i n dicator of the status of the convention during war, a rmed conflict  o r  other 
types of hos tilit ies .  On the other hand, there are exonerati on clauses that  gen u­
inely affect  the substan tive o b l igations under the conventi o n .  If  the wording of 
the exoneration c lause exempts warships and s imilar  vessels  or  0 bj ects fro m  the 
su b s tan tive provisions  o f  the treaty a l together-c.g.,  the 1 969 CLc-the logical 
conclusion i s  that this  exemption rem ains valid in  the even t of the o u tbreak of 
war,  arme d  conflict,  o r  other types of hosti l it ies .  Ho wever, i f  the exonerati on 
clause is  tempered in the treaty i tself by a m i tigation clause,  the conclusio n  might 
b e  different .  The upsho t o f  the relevan t provisions of MARPO L 7 3/7 8 i s  that  State 
parties would not  be j u s tified i n  exempting warships ipso facto fro m complying 
with the substance of the provis ions  of the convention o r  of  co mparab l e  domestic 
p rovis ions ;  this  is,  a fortiori, the case with the in ternational  COLREGS, which States  
are requi red to apply to the maximum extent poss i b l e, to warships and o th er pub­
l i c  vessels .  The above a nalysis  h as shown that while the vessels at issue are 
normally subj ect to the sub stance of the p rovisions of these conven tions, S tate 
parties may decide to suspend some of these i n  the eve n t  o f  war, armed conflict, or  
other types o f  hosti l i ties.  S ti l l ,  as was the case with the  c o n tingency clauses that 
were discussed in the previous c h ap ter, the  drafters of these i m m u n ity c lauses in­
tended to provide pragmatic solutions and were evi dently unconcerned by the 
in tricacies of the  new jus ad bellum u nder the Charter.  
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Conclusions on the Relationship between Maritime 
Treaties and Na va l  War 
THE AIM OF THIS  CHAPTER IS TO MAKE A FINAL ASSESSJ'I,lENT of the relation­ship between armed conflict and the treaties reviewed in this study. To this 
end, the conclusions reached in the previous chapters wil l  be  collated and evalu­
ated together wi th other relevant information .  The conventions that will be 
examined in  this chapter have been grouped around the following themes :  1 )  
Conventions dealing with Safety Aspects and Navigation; 2 )  (Civil) Liab i l i ty 
Conventions;  3 )  Conventions on Prevention of Oi l  Pollution and other forms of 
Marine Pollution; 4) Conventions Dealing with Maritime Emergencies. 
7. 1 .  Conventions Dealing with Safety Aspects and Navigation 
7 , 1 . 1 .  The 1 966 Load Lines Convent ion 
The 1 966 International Convention on Load Lines  has proven of special inter­
est to this s tudy. I t  was in response to past State practice that its drafters agreed on 
an express provision (Article 3 1 )  dealing with armed conflict .  Pursuant to this 
clause, any contracting Party, irrespective of its position in  the armed conflict 
m ay unilaterally decide to suspend the operation of the whole of the convention 
or  a part of i t .  As discussed earlier, armed conflict  has been b roadly defined b y the 
convention as "hostili t ies" or  other "extraordinary circum stances" affecting the 
"vital interests" of the State party contemplating suspension. l In addition, the 
means of recourse or protest of other Parties under the convention are l imited : 
apart from a mere procedural right to be informed of the suspension and i ts termi­
nation, th ird  Parties cannot be  deprived of their right of control granted by  the  
convention to port  States. Any d isagreement on the  application of Article 3 1  will  
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need to be solved via d iplomatic c hannels,  alth ough one can never exclude j u di­
cial review. 
Furthermore, fol lowing Article 5 ( 1 ), warships are exempted from complying 
with the substan tive ru les established by the treaty; b ut unl ike  the exonera tion 
clause of lvlARPO L 7 3/78 ,  the 1 966 Load Lines Convention does not require State 
parties  to app l y  equivalen t domestic provisions to their pub lic vessels .  Eviden tly, 
th is exemption of warsh ips in peacetime will s tand should the emergency condi­
t ions defined in Article 3 1  materia lise.  
7. 1 . 2 .  The 1 972 I nte rnat iona l  Co l l i s i o n  Regu lat ions 
The International Collision Regulations (COLREGS) were s ingled out  in the  pre­
vious chapter because of  their explicit incorporation of provisions applicable to 
State ships, including warships and minesweepers. However, the wording of Rule 
lee) of the 1 972 Convention, as well as the complementary treaty practice of the In­
ciden ts  at Sea ( INSCEA) agreements, demonstrate that the application of COLREGS to 
State ships may be less straightforward in conditions other than times of peace. It 
was argued on the basis of the two elements j u s t  mentioned that States are entitled 
to suspend part of the COLREGS applicable to warships, in  case of arm ed conflict, at 
least insofar as relations with opposing bell igerents are concerned. 
One may venture to suggest that s ince the COLREGS are an expression of the 
rules of good seamansh ip, bell igerent Sta tes wou l d  not be just ified in ignoring 
these " r u les of the road" in their relations with States not invo lved in th e conflict. 
Ignoring s uch widely accepted standards would be a self-defeating attitude:  i t  
would ra ise ques tions of State responsib ility and m igh t possi bly lead to  a broad­
ening of the geographical scope of  the hosti l i ties . 
I n  sim ilar vein, there would normally b e  no reason why genuine merch an t ves­
sels would not co ntinue to be bound b y the COLREG S  in  the event of the outbreak 
of armed conflict .  Usually, merchant vessels s teer well clear of war zones at  sea, 
and furtherm ore, the 1 972 COLREGS Convention provides for special circum­
stances  a t  sea : Rule 2 (a) on Responsib ility refers to the requ irements of "the 
ordinary practice of seamen," and of the "special circums tances of the case. "  This 
word ing i s  flexible enough to include emergencies such as war, armed conflict, or 
oth er type of hos tilities . 
7. 1 . 3 .  The 1 974 Safety of Life at Sea Co nve nt i o n  (SO LAS) 
In Chap ter Five, much attention has b een paid to the Safety Conferences of 
1 94 8  and 1 960, du ring wh ich, contingency clauses on armed conflict were 
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accepted after thorough debates among State delegates .2 First, there is unequivo­
cal evidence that several Parties had unila terally suspended (parts of) the 1 929 
Safety Convention during the second World War. This was acknowledged by the 
1 948 Conference in  two ways. According to a special con tingency clause-Article 
VI-any Party would, in  case of war, irrespective of its  posit ion in the conflict, be 
allowed to suspend part or whole of the Safety Regulations .  As with the 1 966 Load 
Lines Convention, the r ight of recourse or protest of other Parties under the con­
vention was l imited to a procedural r ight to be informed of the suspension and i ts 
termination and to the preservation of their rights of control under the conven­
tion.  The second element pointing to the effect of war on  the Safety Convention 
and its Regulations came with the adoption of Resolution I ,  according to which, 
State parties were granted a temporary waiver to deal with "the situation created 
by the second World War."  
After much debate, the 1 960 Safety Conference accepted a proposal not only to 
retain the suspension clause in the main part of the Convention but  to broaden 
the circumstances in which suspension might be just ified from "war" to "war or 
other hostili ties . "  
In view of th i s  legacy, the move to drop the  contingency clause from the  1974 
SOLAS Convention comes as a surprise, the more so since the deletion aroused ap­
parently very little official  comment .  I t  was submitted that the deletion of the 
special suspension clause should not be equated with an abrogation of the righ t 
for State parties to resort to suspension.  As demonstrated by the tra'Daux 
priparatoires of many of the conventions discussed in Chapter Five, there is evi­
dence of State practice and op in io juris pointing to the existence of such a right 
under general in ternational law : i .e . , States may, under certain emergency condi­
t ions,  at  the outbreak of war, armed conflict, or other types of host i l it ies, suspend 
part or  whole of the operation of maritime conventions by  virtue of general in ter­
national law, i rrespect ive of whether this has been explic i t ly recorded in the 
convention or  not .  The incorporation of the contingency clauses into the 1 948 
and 1960 Safety Con ventions had been preceded each time by extensi ve and often 
pass ionate debates. Hence, if i t  had been the intention of the 1 974 SOLAS Confer­
ence to abolish the right to resort to suspension in such circumstances, one would 
expect that this would have been reported in a much more explicit  way. 
Finally, according to Regulation 3 of the General Provisions, the 1 974 S O L,\ S  
Regulations do not apply to ships of war nor to troopsh ips, "unless expressly pro­
vided otherwise . "  No such explicit  provision has been adopted. Since this clause 
affects the substance of the Regulations, there can be  no doubt that warships and 
troopships are, a fortiori, exempted from the 1 974 SOLAS Convention in case of 
war, armed conflict, or  other type of hostil it ies .  
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7. 2. Maritime (Civil) Liability Conventions 
• The 1 962 Nuclear S h i ps Convention (NS Convention) 
• The 1 969 Civil Liability Convention (CLC) 
• The 1971 Fund Convention 
• The 1971  Convention on Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material 
• The 1 996 Hazardous and Noxious Substances Convention (HNS Convention) 
It was seen in Chapter IV that exc lusion of war damage has become a standard 
clause in all civil liabili ty conventions3 and that i t  i s  implied in the 1 97 1  Conven­
tion on  Maritime Carriage of N uclear Material. The wording of each of the 
reviewed war damage clauses unambiguously excludes coverage of marine pollu­
tion caused by practically all types of armed conflicts : acts of war, hostilities, civil  
war, insurrection. This is  barely mitigated by the fact that the burden of proof of 
such circumstances lies with the person,  the company, or the fund to which the 
main liab ility has been channelled. 
All of the reviewed civil liability conventions contain, in addition, an express 
provision excluding application of the substantive rules to warships or other n a­
val vessels. The only exception i s  the 1 962 NS Convention, but it was seen that i t  is  
precisely because of the explicit inclusion of warships that this  treaty is not yet in 
force.  In  addition, the discussions held du ring the preparation of the 1 969 CLC, for 
example, clarify that it was the drafters' intention to exclude claims for war dam­
age regardless of the status of the victim (belligerent or  neutral) .  
The inevitable conclusion i s  that the reviewed liability conventions do not ap­
ply to c ircumstance of war, armed conflict, or  other types of hostili ties, such as 
civil war and insu rrection. 
7. 3. Prevention of Oil Pollution and oth er Forms of Marine 
Pollution 
• The 1954 OILPOL Convention 
• The 1 972 Oslo Dumping Convention 
• The 1972 London Dumping Convention 
• The MARPOL 73/78 Convention 
The 1954  Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by  Oil, as 
amended by the 1 962 OP Conference, contains an explicit provision (Article 
XIX) that allows any State party, regardless of its status in  relation to the conflict, 
to suspend any part or  even the whole of the treaty, if  i t  "considers that i t  is  af­
fected" by "war or other hostilities . "  As was the case under the 1 948  and 1 960 
Safety Conventions, and st i l l  is the case under the 1 966 Load Lines Convention, 
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the suspending government is under a procedural duty to notify the depositary of 
the Convention of its actions under Article XIX.  Unlike the other conventions just  
mentioned, the wording of the 1 9 5 4  OILPO L suspension c lause does not include a 
reference to any rights retained by  other Con tracting Parties in case suspension i s  
resorted to  under  these c ircumstances. 
As discussed earlier,4 while this suspension clause was not challenged at all 
during the 1 962 OP conference, it has not been incorporated into MARPOL 7 3/78, 
which was in tended to supersede the 1 95 4  O I LPOL Conven tion. What has been 
said above in relation to the deletion of the suspension clause by the 1 97 4  SOLAS 
Convention applies mutatls mutandis in this case. It was submitted that the non-in­
corporation of the suspension clause in MARPOL 7 3/7 8 cannot be in terpreted as an 
aboli tion of the right to suspend part or whole of the operation of its provisions in 
circums tances of war, armed conflict, or  other types of hosti l i ties . There i s  no  in­
d ication that the 1 973 M A RPOL Conference intended to rest ric t or abolish the 
customary right of States parties to resort to suspension of some or all of the p rovi­
s ions in case of armed conflict. 
Finally, warships and other State ships are, in principle, exempted from com­
plying with the substantive provisions of both  the OILPOL and the MA R P O L  
Conventions, a l though State parties are, to varying degrees, expected to apply 
equivalent measures "insofar as reasonable and practicable," to the exempted cat­
egories .  In  the case of MARPOL 7 3/7 8 ,  however, this application should not impair 
" the operations or operational capabilities" of such ships. Apart from the limita­
t ions inheren t in this qualifying terminology itself, an analysi s of the 
imp lementing legislation for the U . S .  military sector confirms that the applica­
tion of the mitigating factors i s  sub ject  to conditions of peace. 
It was shown earlier that whilst  the Oslo and London Dumping Conventions 
contain different immunity clauses, the M A RPOL formula for the exoneration of 
State ships has been widely copied no t only in other maritime conventions but 
also in conventions dealing with other media . 5 The latter can therefore be consid ­
ered reflective o f  customary international law. In  addition, some commentators 
believe that there are strong grounds for treating MARPOL 7 3/7 8 as a customary 
standard to be complied with by the vessels of all states, whether or not they have 
chosen to ratify. 6 
7.4. Conventions Dealing with Maritime Emergencies 
7 .4 . 1 . The 1 969 I nterventi on Co nvent ion and the 1 989 Salvage Convent ion 
I t  was  submitted in the prev ious chap ter that  i t  proves impossible to d etermine 
the legal effect of either treaty during armed conflict . 7 One reason i s  that  the only 
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treaty clauses with a bearing on  armed conflict  deal with classic sovereign immu­
nity  and hence concern only ju risdictional  aspects : Article 1 (2)  of the 1 969 
Convention and Articles 4, 2S and 26 o f  the 1 989 Salvage Convention .  Ano ther 
reason is that there is no trace in the tra�'aux preparatoires of any discussion of the 
effect of armed conflict on the treaties in  question.  
Despite the foregoing, one may venture to suggest the following regarding the 
status of the 1989 Salvage Conven t ion in times of armed conflict. It wil l  be remem ­
bered that there is case law indicating that the 1 9 1 0  Salvage Convention was applied 
or at  least considered to be applicable between mutually friendly countries during 
the Second World War.8 1t was also seen that Article 14 of the 1 9 1 0  Convention re­
fers exp licitly to a duty incumbent on the shipmaster to ren der assistance to persons 
in need, even to enemy nationals .  It was subm itted that this article in dicates that 
the Convention as a whole, apart from the preceding moral duty, was not applicable 
between opposing belligerent S tates. Building on the foregoing, one  could make the 
following-admittedly obvious and "soft" law- deductions with respect to the ef­
fect of armed conflict on  the execution of the 1989 Conventio n :  
( 1 )  Presumably, b etween opposing belligerents that are a t  the same time party 
to the 1 989 treaty, the latter may become inoperative o r  irrelevant fo r the d ura­
t ion of the armed conflict;  
( 2 ) However, nothing prevents the treaty from b eing applied b etween S tate 
parties not involved in the armed conflict;  
(3) The treaty may even be applicable between a State party to a co nflict and a 
Party not involved in the conflict;  
(4) The incorpo ratio n of a provision on Hu man itarian cargoes in Article 26  of 
the Salvage Convention demonstrates at the very l east that the drafters of  the 
treaty did not assume that the outb reak of armed conflict would engender any 
automatic "cut-off' effects on the execution of the treaty .  9 
As for the 1 969 Intervention Convention, it will b e  rem embered that the main 
p re-occupation of  the drafters of the immunity clause was to avoid at al l  cost ac­
knowledging a righr of interferen ce by coastal S tates on the h igh seas vis-a-vis 
warships  and orher vessels owned or operated by a foreign State. L O 
While c i rcumstances of both international and internal a rmed conflict were 
discussed at length in the context o f  the 1 969 CLC'S "war damage exclusion 
clause," L L the matter was not touched on  at all in relation to the draft articles on 
Interven tion.  Sti l l ,  it could be argued that the fact  that bo th conventions were 
adopted by the same conference in d i cates that i f  ci rcu mstances of  armed con­
tlict were excluded from the scope of  the CLC, the  same shou ld  hold t rue  fo r th e  
236 
Interna tional Environmenta l  Law and Naval War 
I n tervent i o n  C o n v e n t i o n .  H owever,  s u c h  a n i n ference i s  open to c h a l lenge 
on several  groun d s .  A m a j or o b j e c t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  1 969 C L C  a n d the 1 969 I n ter­
vent ion C o n ve n t i o n  deal with two e n t i r e l y  d i s t i n c t  m a tters .  D u r i n g  the 1 969 
B r u s se ls  C on v e n t i o n ,  the d r a ft for the c i v i l  l i a b i l it y  c o n ven t i on was though t 
of a s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  th e q u e s t i o n  o f  ( p r i v a t e )  c i v i l  l i a b i l i ty of s h ipowners ,  
w h e r e a s  t h e  d r a ft C o n v e n t i o n  on I n terven t i o n  w a s  meant  t o  d e a l  w i t h  m a t ­
ters o f  p u b l i c  in  terna t i o n a l  l a w .  A s e c o n d  p r o b lem i s  t h a t  a n y  
c o n te m p o ra n e o u s i n terpre t a t i o n  b a sed o n  o b servati o n s  m a d e  d u ri ng the 
travaux prepa ra lo ires i s  o f  doub tful  v a l ue i n  v i e w  of t h e  plain m e a n i n g  o f  the  
t ex t s :  t h e  fa c t  rem a i n s  that  war d a m age i s  ex p l i c i t ly  exc luded fro m  the  1 969 
CLC, but t h a t  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  o f  war or  a r m e d  c o n fl i c t are n o t  m e n t i o n e d  at a l l  
i n  the 1 969 I n  terve n t i on C o n  ven t i o n .  
B u ilding o n  the forego ing, i t  cannot be rule d out  that t h e  defin it ion of mari­
time casualty, defined i n  Article II  ( l )  of  the latter convention as:  
. . .  a coll is ion of ships,  stranding or incident of navigation, or other occurrence on boa rd 
a ship or extern al  to it resulting in materia l  da mage or imminen t th reat of material 
dam age to a ship or cargo 
co u l d  encompass inci dents caused by b el ligerents in the course of arm e d  conflict .  
I n deed, the purpose of this  convention i s  to estab l i s h  and regu la te the righ t  of 
coastal  S tates  to  in tervene on the high seas i n  order (Article I ( 1 )) :  
. . .  t o  p revent ,  mit igate o r  el iminate grave a n d  i m m i nen t da ngers t o  their  co astl ine or 
rela ted i n terests 
caused by m arit ime casualties . From the point of  view of the threatened coastal 
State, the exact c ircumstances in  which such casualties occur make l i t tle d i ffer­
ence. Yet, in spi te of  its common- sense appeal,  the vali dity  of thi s d eduction 
rema ins uncertain .  The negotiating hi story of m any m ari t ime conven tion s shows 
that advocates of co mmon-sense arguments favouring the in teres ts of the vict ims 
invariab ly  lost  out to propo nen ts of conservative views on is sues such as armed 
conflict and the immunity of  warships.  For instance, i t  wil l  be  recalled that dur­
ing the 1 969 B russels Conference, a proposal to exclude a l l  o il tankers fro m  the 
exemp tion provisions ,  irrespective of their s tatus  or ownership ,  was rej ec ted on 
groun d s  of "sovereign " immun ity. 1 2  
On t h e  whole, the effect o f  armed con flict  on t h e  1 969 I n terven tion Conven­
tion rem ains uncertain .  If one considers the 1 969 In tervention Conven tion on i ts 
own, one m ight conclude that the taking of measures by a coas tal State against  a 
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foreign nation's warships under the convention remains forbidden, regardless of 
whether the nations involved are at peace or whether one or more i s  involved in 
armed conflict. On the other hand,  there i s  no recorded evidence pointing either 
to the application or the non-application of the convention with respect to civi l ­
ian ships between State parties during the course of an armed conflict .  Any 
conc lusions to that effect remain purely speculative . 
7 .4 . 2 .  The 1 990 OPRC Co nvent i o n  
At first sight, the  1 990 OPRC Convention poses the same dilemma as the  1 969 In­
terven tion and 1989 Sa lvage Conventions: the only clause that migh t have an 
apparent bearing on armed contlict is Article 1 (3), under which, warships and other 
S tate-owned ships are exempt from the scope of the Convention. Yet, the 1 990 OPRC 
Convention presents a different case altogether. First, the exoneration clause of Ar­
ticle 1 (3) deals with the substance of the provisions of the Convention and goes 
beyond preserving mere j urisdictional immunities. This means, for instance, that 
warships are not under as strict an obligation as civil ian ships to carry the shipboard 
oil pollution emergency plans described in Article 3 of the Convention. Further­
more, warships are not under the same firm obligation to comply with the oil 
pollution reporting procedures dealt within Article 4 of the Convention .  
As was mentioned earlier, the  i mmunity clause of Article 1 (3)  was inserted at 
the request of  the U . S .  delegation, who borrowed the text from M A R P O L  73/78. 1 3  
Hence, the conclusions that were reached for the MARPO L formula apply mutatis 
mutandis to the OPRC Convention : ! . c.,  during armed conflict, the ob ligation of 
Sta tes to apply equivalent provisions to the exempted categories of  sh ips is prob a­
bly non-existen t .  
Secondly, a m ore striking difference between the other conventions on mari­
time casualties and the OPRC Convention i s  that  the latter was applied even prior 
to its en try in to force in connection w ith the oil spill(s) that occurred during the 
1 990- 1 99 1  Gulf conflict. The genesis of the Gulf War oil spill( s) 14 and the negoti ­
at ing history of the OPRC Convention 1 5  were desc ribed earlier. An indication was 
also given of the chronology of the events of the 1 990-1 99 1 Gulf conflict, putting 
the sal ient steps in the preparation of the OPRC Convention in historic relief. It 
was noted that the final d iploma tic conference was held in N ovem ber 1 990 during 
the Desert Shield phase of  the contlict,  and that many of the Governments repre­
sented were either a lready involved in the conflic t  or would shortly form part of 
the Desert Storm coalition. 1 6  Yet ,  there is no recorded evidence in the conference 
records that circumstances such as war and armed conflict  were taken into consid­
eration by the drafters. 
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Considered in isolation, the definit ion of "oil  pollution incident" adop ted by 
the OPRC Conference could techn ically cover both acciden tal-non-war  re­
lated-disasters as well as spills deliberately caused during armed conflict :  
Art.  2 (2 ) :  "Oil  pol lu t ion incident" means  an occu rrence o r  series of occu rrences 
h aving the same origin,  which res ults o r may res u l t  in a discharge o f  oil ,  and which 
poses o r  may pose a th reat to  the marine  environment,  or  to  the coast l i n e  o r  related 
i n terests of one o r  more States, and which requires emergen cy action o r  other 
i m mediate response .  
Yet, there are plenty of indications  that  during the preparatory stages of the 
OPRC Conven tion only peaceful  and not deliberate wartime spills were thought of: 
• The i mpetus and catalys t for drafting of the convention was the 1989 Exxon 
Valdez disaster that occurred en tirely in peacet ime ;  
• During the  preparatory s tages of  the OPRC Conven t ion ,  reference was  often 
made to the 1 969 CLC and the 197 1 ropc Fund Convention. The possibility 
of pre-financing or  coverage by the  latter fund  of the cost of actions dealing 
with pollution or th reat of pollution was thoroughly examined, 17  and i t  was 
decided even tually to include references to both conventions in  the pream­
ble to the O P RC Convention .  The point  here i s  tha t  the 1969 CLC and the 
1 97 1  rope Fund Conventions explici tly exclude coverage for dam age caused 
during armed conflicts ; 
• Simi larly, the  ques tion whether only "oi l  pol lu t ion" inc iden ts should be  
covered or  whether the prospective  convention should also dea l  with "haz­
ardous and noxious substances" (hereinafter H N S )  was content ious 
during the preparatory s tages of  the OPRC Conven tion . 1 8  Eventually, a 
compromise was reached under which HNS substances would be left ou t from 
the convention, whilst a special resolution would be adopted on the subj ect 
(Resolution 1 0) urging IMO and S tate parties to expand the scope of the con­
vention to HNS. 1 9  I t  is  noteworthy that the 1996 HNS Conven tion excludes 
war damage; 20 
• What i s  more, the resolution adopted by the O P RC conference on the HNS 
quest ion mentions only accidental d ischarges . I ts third preambular para­
graph reads : 
Recognising that  pollut ion of the sea by accidental d i scharge of h aza rdous and n oxious 
substances into the waters may th reaten the marine environment and the i n terests of 
coastal States . . . .  ( I talics added . )  
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The latter point needs to be addressed in more detai l .  The HNS resolution was 
proposed early on by a Working Group. In the accompanying commentary, it was 
noted that some delegatio ns were of the view that the Convention should apply to 
HNS substances and that th e proposed resolution was a compromise in tended to 
form " a  p ack age w i th the Conven tion," to b e  considered "by the Con ference in 
conjunction therewith . , ,2 1  
I n  view o f  the foregoing, one can only conclude that the OPRC Convention was 
intended for non-acci dental oil  spills such as the 1 99 1  Gulf war oi l  spil l .  This was 
con firmed later by the Secretary-Gen eral of I M O :  
Delega tes to the November Conference had been ch inking of a n  accidenLa l disaster, such as 
spillage from a lanker . . . .  22 
Because of this nego tiating history, the resort to i t s  mec hanisms in connection 
with the 1 990- 1 99 1  Gulf war appears all the more remarkable.  None rheless, it  
would be wrong to conclude on the b asis of this  single precedent that the OPRC 
Convention could be appl ied u nreservedly during armed con flict in the future. A 
close scrutiny reveal s that there are serious constraints on the application of t h e  
convention machinery during armed conflict .  
• I t  is  noteworthy that the early implementation of the OPRC machinery was 
already envisaged before the oil  spill  became known . Indeed, the November 
Conference adopted a resolution (No. 2 )  calling for the early i mplementa­
tion of the Conven tion pending i t s  entry i n to force,2 3  and ano ther 
resolution (No. 3) on the early implementa tion of Article 1 2  of the Con ven­
tion .2 4  The latter article deals with inst itutional arran gem ents and outlines 
the tasks and responsibi lities given to IMO, whilst Resolution 3 calls  upon 
the S ecretary-General Of IMO to i n itiate the early implementation of the arti­
cle in question . 
• U nlike in the 1 98 3  Nowruz o i l  spill, the  1 99 1  oil  sl ick had affected regions 
largely outside the zones o f  active combat.  Even if the opposing belligeren t 
(Iraq) would have wished to, s h e  would probably h ave been u n able to p re­
vent the initial  relief and remedi ation efforts u ndertaken by orher stares. 
• Nevertheless, i r is  importan t to note rha t mos t o f  the in tern a tional relief ef­
fort could only take place after the cessation of hos tilities,  and that the 
acti vities of IMO under the OPRC Conven tion were no excep tion to this.  Op­
eration Desert S torm commenced on 1 6- 1 7  J an uary 1991 with large-scale ai r 
and missi le attacks, and the Coalition groun d  offensive was s tarted on 24 
Feb ruary 1 99 1 .  Kuwait was liberated and all fighting was ceased on 27 
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February 1 99 1 .  The first reports of the  Gulf War oi l  spill reached the outs ide 
wo rld by the end of January 1 99 1 ,  and shortly thereafter, I M O  began receiv­
ing offers of assi stance to the country that was seem ingly worst affected, 
Saudi  Arab ia . 25 As mentioned earlier, the impacts of the oil spi ll(s) on the 
coastal and marine environments were most severe along the Saudi Arabian 
coast, with lesser effects for the Kuwaiti, I raqi, and Iranian coasts .  2 6  During 
the hostil ities, local teams i n  Saudi Arabia  managed to save strategic instal­
lations from impending disaster . The IMO dispatched its first civil ian 
co-ordinator to Saudi Arabia some 10 days after the cease-fire, and IMO Sec­
retary-General O'Neill called for the establishment of a special trust fund 
and the setting up of an in ternational  co-ordination centre in the month of 
March 1 99 1 .  27 The first money from the fun d  was disbursed in  early April  
1 99 1 .  
• A fur ther observation i s  that I M O  concentrated i ts  relief efforts  on Saudi 
Arabia, the country that was  most  severely affected by the  oil  s lick .  How­
ever,  i t should be noted that this was i n  response to an explicit  request  for 
ass i stance by this v ictim State, and that I M O  depended for i ts  operations 
not  only on the co-operation but  also on the i n it iative of  the la t ter.  Al­
though it was the IMO Secre tary-General him self who concluded at an 
ear ly stage that the oil spill  was of the "severity" envi saged by Article 7 of 
the OPRC Convention, the text of  this provision places the righ t of in i ti a­
t ive for co-operation and assistance squarely with State parties .  In view of 
the Nowruz experience-which will be fur ther discussed below--it is  un­
likely that the O PRC Convention could be relied on when Sta te parties 
disagree or when a belligeren t has the power to block rel ief efforts .  
• Finally, now that the O P R C  Convention has entered in to fo rce, S ta te parties 
are obliged to give effect to Arti cles 4 and 5 of the Convention . These deal 
with oil pollution reporting procedu res and actions subsequent to  receiv­
ing an oi l  pollution report .  While the 1 99 1  Gulf War oil  spill  was 
publi cised world-wide soon after i ts  occurrence, it  should be recalled that 
pursuant to the exemption c lause of Article 1 ( 3 )  of the OPRC Convention, 
warships, naval auxi l i aries or other ships owned or  operated by S tate par­
ties for non-commercial purposes are under no duty to report oil spills 
encountered during armed conflict .  
7 .4 .3 .  The 1 978 Kuwait  Reg iona l  Convent ion 
The 1 990- 1 99 1  Gulf war precedent stands in sharp contrast to the situation 
surrounding the 1983  Nowruz oil  spill. As mentioned earlier, although the origin 
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of this spill was probably accidental, Iraq soon aggravated it by regularly bombing 
the oil  field.28 During the entire inciden t, co-operation between the belligerent 
States was lacking, and the various meetings held under the auspices of the Re­
gional Organisation established under the Convention (Ropme), failed even to 
lead to a partial cease-fire in order to allow capping of the burning wells .  29 As a 
consequence, international as well  as uni lateral relief efforts were effectively ruled 
our si nce i t  would have required entering an acti ve war zone. 30 In addi tion, most 
of the unilateral remediation efforts planned or u ndertaken by Iran proved futile, 
s ince Iraq resumed bombing of the fields feeding the spill. 3 1  
On the  basis of  the  conclusions reached above regarding, inter alia , the MARPOL 
and the OPRC Conventions, the various claims made during the Iran- Iraq war re­
garding the 1 978 Kuwait Regional  Convention can now be evaluated. 
I t  will be  remem bered that this Convention contains no express clause on 
armed conflict .  It  does, however, contain a provision (Article IX (a)) on "pollu­
tion emergencies," which obligates al l  Parties to  take individually and/or jointly:  
. . .  a l l  neces sary measures . . .  to  deal  wi th  pol lut ion emergen cies in  t h e Sea Area,  
whatc'i}er the  cause of such emergencies, a n d  to  redu ce or  el im i n ate damage result ing 
therefro m .  ( I ta l ics  added . )  
Furthermore, i t  contains an exemption clause, Article XIV,  providing that :  
Wa rships or ot her ships owned or operated b y  a State,  a n d  used only on Governmen t 
non-commerci al  service, shal l  be exempted fro m the ap plicat io n of the provisions  of 
the present convent ion .  Each Contracting State s h all,  a s  far as possible, ensure th at 
its wa rsh i ps or other ships owned or operated by that State, and used only on 
government non-commercial service , s hal l  co mply with the present  Convention i n  
the preven t i on o f  po l lution to t h e  marine environment.  
I t  was seen that I raq justified its behaviour during the Nowruz incident by as­
serting in a letter to the UN Secretary-General that :  
. . .  t h e  provisions of t h e  Kuwait Regio nal convention on Cooperation for t h e  ProtectIOn of the 
Manne Environmen t from Pollution and the protocol annexed thereto hG7x no 4fect in cases 
of a rmed conflict. 32 
Whilst there is no record of any official reaction from other States, the Iraqi po­
s i tion was rejected explicitly by five experts convened by the EC Commission. 
They argued that since the Kuwait Regional Convention was negotiated for a 
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region where tensions were known to exist, the terms "w ha tever the cause of such 
emergencies" in Article IX (a)  must be taken to include ins tances such as the 
Nowruz oil  spi l l .  They further suggested that s ince the convention contained no 
express provision to that effect, S tate parties would not  be en titled to suspend the 
operation of the convention , or  at  least not  in their relations with neutral S tates. 33 
To assess these claims, two m ain questions have to be  distinguished. Can the 
Kuwait Regional Convention be said to apply at  all  during armed conflic t ?  I f  so, 
would I raq be entitled to suspend a part or the whole of the operation of the treaty 
on the ground of armed conflict ?  
First, there i s  incontrovertible evidence that the m ultilateral institution estab­
lished by the Kuwait Regional Convention,34 although no doubt "affected" by the 
1 980- 1 988 Iran-I raq conflict, and despi te the fact  that i t  failed to reach any mean­
ingful result, con tinued to function . The sources consulted for this work indicate 
that both bell igerents continued to participate in the meetings of the Regional 
Organisation established under the 1 978  Convention. Therefore, and despite 
Iraq's s tatement to th e UN, the Kuwait Convention continued to operate, at  least 
in part, during the I ran- I raq conflict .  
I t  is an entirely different issue, however, whether the 1 978  Convention could 
be construed so as to deny I raq the righ t to attack the Nowruz oil  field. As dis­
cussed in Chapter I I ,  under current jus in bello , oil fields and oil ins tallations are 
not, as such, immune from attacks by belligeren ts. 35 Could a belligerent such as 
Iraq nevertheless be denied the right to attack the Nowruz oil field on the basis of 
its  adherence to a m aritime treaty which obligates Parties to prevent incidents of 
m arine pollution and to co-operate in their resolution?  Insofar as  the relation­
ships between contending States are concerned, i t  is  submitted that this question 
has to be answered in the negative, for two principal reasons .  
In i ts advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or  Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
the ICJ indicated that for questions related to the conduct of belligerent activities, 
the law of armed conflict operates as lex speczalis with respect to mul tilateral envi­
ron men tal treaties. 36 Insofar as the attacks by Iraq on the Nowruz oil  field 
conformed to the requi rements of the law of armed conflict, any rights derived by 
Iran from the Kuwait Regional Convention were overridden by the law of armed 
conflict. 
This conclusion is  supported by a close examination of the convention i tself. 
As argued i n  the previous chapter,37 the exemption clause of Article XIV of the 
Kuwait Regional Convention means that I raqi warships are not  required to com­
ply with the substance of the treaty nor with any possible equivalent domestic 
provisions in time of armed conflict. This  suggests that th e Convention was not 
intended to regulate questions of armed conflict.  
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Moreover, contrary to what was claimed by the EC experts, there is reason to 
b elieve that the Kuwait Convention was conc luded only with accidental,  non-war 
related emergenc ies in m ind. This is  supported by a protocol concl uded on the 
same day as the main framework convention and wh ich forms an i n tegral part of 
the Conventio n . 38 The Protocol Concerning Regional Co-Operation in Com­
b ating Oil an d  Other Harmful Substances i n  Cases of Emergency defines "marine 
emergency" as:  
. . .  any casual ty, incident, occurrence o r  s ituation,  however caused, re su l t i n g  in 
s ubstant i al pol lut ion or i mminent t h reat of substant ia l  pol lution to the marine 
enviro n ment by oi l  or  other harmful substances . . .  39 
However broad and al l -encompassing this phrase may seem , the provision 
ci tes o n ly non-intentional and non-war related acciden t s :  
. . .  inter alia, . , , coll isions,  strand ings a n d  other i n c i dents involving s h i p s ,  i n c luding 
tankers,  blow-outs aris ing fro m  petroleum d rilli ng and production activit ies,  a n d  
the presence of o i l  or o t h e r  harmful substa nces ari s i n g  fro m the fa i lure o f  i n d ustr ia l  
insta l la t ions .  , . .  
Whether the above analysis is  equally va l id  for the relationships between Iraq 
and third States tha t were affected by the Nowrnz oil spill is more difficult  to an­
swer. First, in c ase the affected third S tate was not a party to the Kuwait Regional 
Convention,  the latter could derive no rights vis-a-vis Iraq on the basis  of  the lat­
ter agreemen t. 
S econ dly, i f  the affected State was a party to the Convention, several further 
variables complicate the analysis . The first question to b e  asked is whether the af­
fected State was truly neutral in the conflict or ins tead a co-belligeren t s iding wi th 
one of the parties involved . If the latter, it is submitted that the affected State's 
c laim to immun ity from the effects of  the conflict would be in any event tenuous, 
regardless of  whether th is claim is based on the law of armed conflict or on any 
purported rights arising from the Kuwait Convention.  I f  the affected S tate was 
genuinely neutral in the conflict, current international law, as seen in Chapters II 
and III, offers no clear answer to the question of whether such a S tate may invoke 
the righ t to be immune from the effects of armed conflict between other S tates, 
and if  so, to what exten t .40 
However, even i f  the law of armed conflict and the law of neutrality offer no 
clear guideli nes, the analysis of the Kuwait Regional Convention does seem to in­
dicate that, on balance, it did not outlaw the I raqi belligerent conduct in  question, 
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even if th is affected third S tates.  T h e  reaso n for this  sugges tion is twofold.  First, 
Article XIV, as seen above, exemp ts Iraqi warships fro m the duty to comply with 
the su bstance of the conven tion and leaves the protection of th e environment le­
gally subordinated to operati onal demands in times of peace and mil i ta ry 
necessiti es in t imes of naval  war.  Secondly, Iraq woul d  i n  any event be entitled to 
su spend th e operat ion of the entire conven t ion b ecause of the ongoing conflict .  
The v iew that  suspension of t h e  convention could not b e  al lowed fai ling an ex ­
press provision to that  effect,  however at tractive from an environ mental  point of 
view, could only b e  accepted if the Kuwait  Conven tion were to be consi dered in 
isolation.  The latter premise is,  however, open to ch allenge. The exam i nation 
condu cted in  the previous  chap ters i ndicates tha t  the Kuwait Convention is but 
one treaty in a long list  of treaties on the marine environment that point to th e ex­
istence of  rules of  custom ary interna t ional law on t he su b j ec t  of the l egal effect of 
this type of multi lateral treaty durin g i nternational armed conflict .  I t  was argued 
in Chapter Five that the rule accordi ng to wh ich S tate Parties-regardless of their 
status in the conflict-are allowed to suspend maritime treaty provisions in 
armed conflict i s  st i l l  current i n t ernational law, despite the fac t  that  most  treaties 
concluded since the 1 970s no longer contain such an express contingency clause.  
Finally, i t  should be noted that these conclusions are advanced as a m atter of 
principle .  They neither approve of the Iraqi conduct  i n  general  nor  of  t h e  contin ­
ued bombing of the oil field in particular .  Procedural qu es tion s h ave been left 
aside in this  assessment, wh ilst  perhaps more importan tly, th e implica tions of the 
prohib ition to u se armed fo rce in international relations  were n ot con sidered. 
The main i mport of the above analys i s  is twofold. First,  i t  was not the i n tention of 
the drafters of  the Kuwait Regi onal Convention to regu late activities and conse­
quences related to armed conflict .  Secon dly, ! I I  abstracto, Iraq would be j ustified in 
claiming that she could not be denied th e righ t to bo mb the Nowl'Uz oil field on the 
ground o f  any contractual obligations under the Kuwait Regional Convention. 
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General Conclusions on the Legal Effect of  
Multilateral Environmental Agreements during 
International Armed Conflict 
• I t  was seen in the first chapter that the most clearly estab lished principle of 
general lEL i s  that no State may conduct activi ties or permit the conduct of 
activities on its territory or in international areas that cause harm to the ter­
ritory of another State if that harm is of serious consequence and is 
estab lished by clear and convincing evidence. I t  was demonstrated also that 
modern lEL is predominantly treaty-based and that it encompasses detailed 
regimes for various environmental sectors such as the marine environment, 
freshwater resources, b iodiversity, and the atmosphere. 
• I t  is now well accepted that States need to take environmental consider­
ations into account in the pursuit of mil i tary activities, including during 
armed conflict. The analysis of the lex specialis of the laws of armed conflict 
in Chapter I I  has demonstrated not only the environment-protective poten­
tial but also the limitations of current jus In bello, jus ad bellum,  and 
neutrality law . I t  was seen lOO that the generally accepted principles of envi­
ronmenta l  protection during military operations remain at a very high level 
of abstraction. The main purpose of this study, as set out in the introduc­
tion, was to examine the extent to which international law has developed 
more detailed rules to protect the environment in armed conflict. 
• In Chapter III, the author has examined the main legal principles involved 
and suggested a methodology to determine the legal effect of general IEL dur­
ing armed conflict. 
Following, inter alia, the 1 996 Advisory Opinion of the lCJ on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons and the records of the 1 972 UNCHE and the 1992 
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UNCED conferences, i t  was submitted that the laws of armed conflict operate as lex 
specialis for questions related to the conduct of armed conflict .  This means that 
whilst certain S tate obligations towards the environment continue to apply dur­
ing armed conflict, IEL cannot be construed as overriding a S tate's right to use 
armed force in  self-defence. 
To determine the legal effect of multilateral en vironmen tal agreemen ts in gen­
eral during armed conflic t, two doctrinal questions were distinguished. First, can 
these agreements be said to apply at  all to belligerent activities during interna­
tional armed conflict?  If  so, do contracting Parties h ave the legal right to 
terminate or suspend the operation of such agreements during the conflict? 
I t  was noted that modern international State practice, case law, and legal the­
ory led to two main principles of interpretation. First,  as mentioned before, the 
laws of armed conflict operate as lex specialis vis-a-vis IEL.  Second, there is  a strong 
tendency towards maintaining the val idity of treaties insofar as compatible with 
national policy and with obligations stemming from Security Council decisions 
under Chapter VII.  
Drawing further on the two main disciplines involved, the Law of Treaties and 
the Law of State Responsibili ty, i t  was suggested that each multilateral treaty 
needs to be examined separately in order to determine its application to the prob­
lem in question. First, the pactum between contracting States needs to be 
examined, applying the relevant articles of the 1 969 Vienna Convention on treaty 
interpretation as well as those principles related to armed conflict. Second, provi­
sion needs to be made for obl igations arising from jus cogens, humanitarian 
provisions, and binding Security Council decisions .  Th ird, regard must be had to 
the grounds of suspension and termination arising from the Law of Treaties, and 
fourth to the "c ircumstances precluding wrongfulness" arising under the Law of 
State Responsibil ity. The final possib il ity which needs exam ining is whether 
there are any customary rules on the fate of multilateral environmental agree­
ments during armed conflict, outside the frames of reference of the Law of 
Treaties or the Law of State Responsibility. 
• For the reasons explained in the introduction, the second part of this study 
focused on the marine environment, examining the legal relationship be­
tween naval warfare and a series of representative treaties dealing w ith 
maritime safety and marine pollution. 
The analysis conducted in Part Two confirms that each treaty needs to be ex­
amined separately to determine its possible effect during armed conflict .  For in­
stance, there is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that none of the 
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reviewed civil l iability conventions apply to questions of armed conflict .  By con­
trast,  the analysis of the pactum agreed in M.ARPOL 73/78 and the 1 972  COLREGS 
Convention indicates that these agreements could, in principle, apply in their en­
tirety during armed conflict .  As for the 1 989 Salvage Convention, i t  was submit­
ted that i t  does not apply between contending States, but that i t  may continue to 
be relevant for relationships involving non -contending States .  
Nevertheless, it  i s  difficult to escape the conclusion that a great number of the re­
viewed maritime treaties are unlikely to apply during armed conflict, either because 
war damage is expressly excluded or because the treaties do not apply to warships. 
I t  was seen that the drafters of the maj ority of the reviewed treaties tended to 
adopt a categorical "hands-off' approach to the subjec t  of in ternational armed 
conflict .  The overriding concern of the negotiators of the mari t ime treaties re­
viewed in  this  study was to p rovide pragmatic solutions to cerrain problems 
encountered at sea, not to solve questions related to armed conflict. Whenever 
pressed to take an official  stand on the issue, drafters opted ei ther for excluding 
the matter from the convention altogether (e.g . ,  through war damage exoneration 
clauses and warship exemption clauses), or for leaving i t  up to the discretion of 
the State parries (e.g., through armed conflict contingency clauses and warship ex­
emption clauses). However unsatisfactory from an environmental and jus ad 
bellum point of view, i t  is  difficult  not to conclude that the majority of the re­
viewed treaties were not intended to deal with belligeren t activit ies nor with the 
consequences of armed conflict .  
• As for the treaties that are in principle applicable during a rmed conflict ,  the 
analysis shows that, under in rernational law, all contracting Parties, regard­
less of their status, h ave the legal right to suspend those treaties, ei ther 
wholly or partial ly. Thi s  conclusion has wider implications, since i t  sup­
porrs the existence of a customary rule of law according to which all 
contracting Parties have the legal right to suspend (certain) multi lateral 
treaties in whole or in parr during circum stances of war, armed conflict, and 
other types of hosti l i ties .  Because of the discretion which the discussed con­
tingency clauses accord to State parries, i t  was argued that this constitutes a 
separate ground on which treaties may be suspended, which differs, inter 
alia , from the rebus s ic stantibus ground arising under the 1969 Vienna Con­
vention on the Law of Treaties and the "state of necessity" defence under 
the general Law of State Responsibil i ty. 
• There is  no supporr in the treaty practice examined in  Parr Two of th is 
study for any mechanical consequences linked to the "outbreak " of armed 
conflict :  none of the reviewed treaties become automatically "inoperative. " 
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Moreover, contracting Parties woul d  only b e  allowed to suspend part or 
whole of the opera tion of a treaty on the ground of in tern a tional armed con­
flict, but  would not be entitled to withdraw permanently from a treaty . 
• This study confirms also that it would b e  difficult to formulate an all-pur­
pose single rule on the legal effect of the reviewed treaties during 
international armed conflict .  One may even venture to suggest that there is 
l ittle prospect of any such rule developing in the future. There is  probably 
no single rule capab le of satisfying the many divergent interests of States in 
regard to multilateral treaties during armed conflict.  Resort to armed force 
in international relations is per definition a b reakdown of international di­
plomacy. In these circumstances, S tates involved or affected by  the conflict 
naturally wish to recapture their freedom as m uch as possible in respect of 
treaties they have entered into previously. 
• This study also reveals that there have been m any ins tances in which at­
tempts to adapt the old contingency rules to the new jus ad bellum failed .  As a 
result, most of the current armed conflict  contingency clauses m ay be re­
garded as defective or even out of date. No  distinction is m ade between 
aggressors and victims, and all con tracting Parties, regardless of their status 
in the conflict, enjoy broad discretion not only as to when to suspend the op­
eration of a treaty in whole or in part, but in addition, as to when to 
terminate the suspens ion. 
Because the prohibition to use armed force in international relations is jus 
cogens, and because of the primacy of the UN Charter law, it was submitted in 
Chapter III that measures taken pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter may 
override certain treaty rights  and obligations. Therefore, the rights or wrongs of 
hostile mil i tary activity under U N  Charter law may affect the operation of the con­
tingency clauses of m aritime treaties. 
Nevertheless, it  was seen in Chapter I I  that under the current U N  collective se­
curity system, authoritative judgements on the legality or i l legal ity of belligerent 
activity are rare and that the status of non-contending States is unsettled and 
complicated, to say the least .  
• The question that arises, then, i s  whether one should expect every jus ad 
bellum contingency to be provided for in treaties on technical matters such 
as maritime safety and prevention of marine pollution. The treaty practice 
and the travaux preparatoires discussed in this study suggest that this would 
not be realistic .  Failing widespread agreemen t internationally on the legal­
ity of particular instances of use of armed force, i t  would be too much to 
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ask-if not futile to expect-that  Parties to a treaty such as MARPOL 7 3/78 
agree on which belligerent is waging a bellum illegale and should h enceforth 
not be allowed to resort to the suspension of the convention or  its equivalent 
domestic provi sions. If, on the other hand, there i s  consensus within the in­
ternational community as to the identity of the i l legal aggressor(s) ,  the 
ensuing international sanctions  may include b inding decisions on matters 
of treaty law, as i l lus trated by Res .  687 ( 1 99 1 )  on the cease-fire conditions 
imposed against Iraq, and particularly by  the ongoing work of the UN Com­
pensation Commission . 
• I t  may nevertheless be  useful  to provide expressly for the con tingency of 
armed conflict  in multi latera l environmental treaties .  This would  counter 
the customary presumption that where an instrument is s i lent, any Party 
may decide to suspend the treaty or  some of i ts provisions during armed 
conflict .  
A fi rst requirement would be that th e  possibility of the occurrence of armed 
conflict be  discussed at the negotiating stage of a treaty. To reduce the negative ef­
fects of auto-determination by any Party, the contingency clause should be  
restrictive and  leave the treaty righ ts of other Parties unaffected to  the  m aximum 
extent possible .  To bring future international environmental treaties at least  for­
m ally in line with the current jus ad bellum precepts, the right to suspend a treaty 
should be reserved strictly for non-aggressor States. Finally, the resort to suspen­
sion should be subject to continuous review by the other Parties to the treaty­
provided of course that they are also non-victim States. 
• There seems little j ustification for the unqualified substantive exemptions 
which m any maritime treaties continue to grant to warships and other 
S tate-owned craft .  This study has indicated that military forces are by virtue 
of the domestic laws of several States already under the obligation to comply 
with the environmental duties imposed on other sectors of society, at least 
in times of peace.  In  this day and age, when military roles are changing, one 
may require that the lat ter comply with current environmental standards to 
the maximum extent possible .  Therefore, a case can be made that  exemption 
clauses in  maritime treaties need to be adapted so as to better reflect these 
national practices. 
• Finally, this study has signalled that there is  major work to be done regard­
ing the inco rporation of environmental standards in the ful l  spectrum of 
contemporary mi litary operations .  Military commanders need to be given 
appropriate guidance on environmental standards for all types of mi litary 
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operations, including for the so-called operations other than war (OOT\'(I), 
which have taken on added significance s ince the end of the Cold War. This 
i s  required to i mplement the adm on i tion of  the Ie] in  i ts  advisory opi n ion 
on the Legality of {he Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons : 
. . .  S t a tes must  take e n v i ronmenta l  consi dera t i ons  i n to accou n t  when assess ing w h a t  
i s  necessary a n d  proport i onate i n  the pursui t of legi t imate  m i l i tary ob ject ives .  
Respect  for the e n v ironmen t  i s  one of the elements  that  go to assess ing whether  a n  
a c t i o n  i s  i n  conformity w i t h  the principles  o f  necessity a n d  p ropo rt ional ity. ! 
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78. See final Art. V on Carriage of Persons in Emergency based on a proposal (Art. 3(b» by the 
U . S .  
79. U.S .  statement, General Provis ions Committee, Minu tes, 3'" meet ing,  May 3 ' " ,  1 948, 2 .  
8 0 .  IMCO press release, 6 May 1 960. 
8 1 .  Supra, 5 .2 . 2 .  B. 
8 2 . In ternational Conference on Safety of Life a t  Sea, Heads o f  Delegations Conference, May 24'\ 
1 948, Minu tes, 2 °" meet ing, Report on the work of the General Provisions Commi ttee, I .  
8 3 .  Supra, 3 .4 .4 .  
84 .  Yearbook ILC ( 1 980), vol. I I ,  pt . 2 , 49, para 3 1 .  
8 5 .  Judgment o f  2 5  Sep tember 1 997,  ICJ General Lis t  No. 92,  paras 5 0-5 8 .  
8 6 .  Supra , 3 .4 .2 .D.  
87 .  IMCO/SAFCON/ l , 2. 
88. Ibid. , 2.  
89 .  IMCO/SAFCON/Plenary S.R. 3, June 1 0 ' "  1 960, 5 . 
90. Ibid. 
9 1 .  GEN/SR/ l ,  1 8  May 1 960, and GEN/SR. I/Cor. 1 , 20 May 1 960, 3 ; IMCO/SAFCON/Plenary S .R  
3, 10 June 1 960, 5-6. 
92.  GEN/SR/I ,  1 8  May 1 960, as corrected by GEN/SR. I /Cor. l ,  20 May 1 960, 3 .  
9 3 .  GEN12 1 o f 27 May 1 960;  on the 1 9 5 4  Conven tion see mfra , 5 . 2 .4 .  A. 
9 4 .  GEN / SR/ l 6  o f  3 1  May 1 9 6 0 ,  i n c l ud i ng  corre c t i on s  i n  GEN / S R . 1 6/Cor . l ,  8 J u n e  1 9 6 0 ,  
2 .  
9 5 .  Ibid. , 3 :  ( a )  Vote of 5-23- 1 on d eletion of Ar t .  VI ;  (b )  Vote o f 20-8-2 on U . S .  proposal in regard 
to Art. VI (a). 
96. IMCO/SAFCON/Plenary S.R. 3, 10 June 1 960 and IMCO/SAFCON/Plenary SR. 3 ,  6. 
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98 .  I n terna tional C o n ference on t h e  Safety of Life at Sea,  1 974, Com m i t t ee I ,  
SOLAS/CO N F/C . l /4 , 2 5 October 1 974, 3 a n d  SOLAS/CON F/S R. 5 ,  29  Ja n u ary 1 975 , 4--6 . 
99. Birnie  & Boyl e, op. nl. , 266. 
1 00.  Supra, 5 . 2 . 3 . C. 
1 0 1 .  The published lraz'aux prepara lOires do not contain any exp lanation for this a d d i t ion .  
1 02.  A sim ilar obligation t o  l im i t t h e  suspension for  the d u ra tion o f  t h e  hos til i t ies follows from 
Art .  22 of the Was h ing to n  Naval Disarm a m e n t  Treaty ( Five Power Naval Treaty), conc l u d e d  in 1 922; 
see infra, 5 .3 . 
1 0 3 .  I n tern a t i onal  Confere nce on Pollu tion of the Sea by Oil,  1 954.  
1 04. I n ternational Conference on Pol l u tion o f  the Sea by O i l ,  1 962.  
105 .  Infra , 6 .2 .4 .  
1 06. Sup ra ,  5 .2 .2 .  B .  
1 07 .  Birnie & Boyle, op. cil. , 266. 
1 08.  I n terna ti ona l Conference on Marine Pol l ut ion,  he ld i n  London, 1 973 ,  IMO Docs MP/CONF/ 
I ff.  
109 .  None of the publ ished lravallX preparatoires ( l abelled "PCMP," a n d  distrib u ted at the Con fer-
ence as "MP/CON F/ ... " )  contains a suspens ion c l ause related to war. 
1 1 0 .  Infra, 6 .2 . 5 .B.  
1 1 1 . Supra , 1 . 2 . 1 .  A. 
1 1 2 .  Art.  III  (3) .  
1 1 3 .  Source: I MO/Lloyd 's data a s  a t  I February 1 998 .  
1 1 4 .  A r t .  I I I  ( I )  & ( 2 )-
1 1 5 . A rt . IV. 
1 1 6. Art.  V (3).  
1 1 7 .  Art .  V ( I ). 
1 1 8. T itle I I I  of P ub L. 1 00-688, 1 02 S t a t .  41 52 ,  33 USC 2 5 0  I et seq. , para 3 1 0 4;  CUlIluiatic'e Digest of 
US Practice 111 International Law, 1 98 1 -88, vol.  2, 209 3 .  
1 1 9 .  Art.  3 8 .  
1 20 .  A r t .  89. 
1 2 1 .  S ee 1 948 Convention,  Art. IV on cases o f  Force MaJeure . 
1 22 .  Art.  3 1 oi t h e  I LC's curren t draft on S tate Respon s ibili ty describes gro u n d s  of Force lIlajellre 
a n d  for t u i tous events  as follows : ( I )  The wrongfulness of an act  of a S t a te n o t  in con form ity w i t h  an in­
tern a t i onal obliga tion of that S tate i s  precluded i f  th e ac t was due to a n  irres is t ible force or to an 
u n foreseen ex ternal even t beyo n d  i t s  control which made i t  materially i m possible fo r the S tate  to act  
i n  conformi t y  with that  obliga tion or to know t hat  i ts con d u c t  was not  in conformity with t h a t  obl iga­
tion ; (2) Paragraph I shall not  apply ii the StJte i n  quest ion h as contrib u t e d  to the occurrence of the 
si tuation of material impossib i l i ty ;  see in th is sense ;] Iso : Ra inbow Warrior A rbztra/lOll ( 1 990),  82 ILR , 
499, 55 3-4, p ara 7 8 .  
1 2 3 .  Supra, 5 .2 . 2 .  A & B. 
1 24. Supra , 5 . 2 . 3 .  C. 
1 2 5 .  Supra, 3 .4 .2 .  C. 
126.  An.  28. 
1 2 7. Art .  32.  
1 2 8 .  Art .  3 5 .  
1 29 .  Supra , 3.4 .4 .  
1 30 .  Supra, 5 . 2 . 3. D .  
308 
International Envlrollmental Law and Naval War 
1 3 1 .  SlIpra , 5 . 2 . 2 .  B .  
1 3 2 .  Supra , 5 . 2 . 3 .  E .  
1 3 3 .  Supra , 5 . 2 . 4 .  B.  
Chapter VI 
I .  Simon ds, 2 9  SWIl[ord JIL ( 1 992) ,  1 94; Sands,  op. C l t. , 2 3 2 .  
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Malanczuk, op. cit . , 1 1 9-2 1 .  
1 0 .  Joseph v. Consulate General o[Nigen'a el al. ( 1 987),  1 0 1  ILR , 4 8 5 ,  493 ; Sallany and Olhers v .  R ea­
gan el al. ( 1 98 9), 87 ILR 680; Jaffe v. M / ller a nd Others (1 990) ,  87  ILR, 1 9 7 ;  O'Connel l ,  M . ,  3 Ind. ]. 
Global Legal S tud ( 1 995) , 5 9 .  
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ofjll s cogens for w h ich no so vereign i m m u n i ty existed.  
1 3 .  99 ILR , 80 ; wri t  fo r certioran denied.  
1 4 . 66 ILR 2 1 2 a t 2 2 5 .  
1 5 . S h earer, I I  EPIL ( 1 989),  3 2 1 ;  Hein tschel v .  Heincgg & Donner,  3 7  G YIL ( 1 994), 298.  
16.  7 Cransch ( 1 8 1 2 ) ,  1 45-4 6 ;  U N ,  Matenals 01 1  Jurisdictional 11II11lunities o[ Stales and theIr Property 
( 1 982),  UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/20, 1 0 0 .  
1 7 .  For a discussion o f  subs equen t U . S .  a n d  in ternational c a s e  law,  see Rex. v .  Campania De 
Vapom, SA , ( 1 9 8 1 ), 7 2  ILR ,  93.  
18 .  The Parlelllell t Bdge ( 1 879) 4 P.D. a n d  o n  appeal ( 1 8 8 0) 5 P. D. 1 97 ;  for more recent applica­
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( 1 975) , 64 ILR , 90; I COIlgreso del Partido ( 1 979)  64 ILR , 22 7 ;  US v. RlIlz ( 1 985) ,  1 02 ILR ,  1 2 2,  1 2 4-7 ; 
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P"IlY, 1 03 JLR, 340 at 398 ; KPMG l' Davisoll ( 1 996),  1 0 4 ILR,  52 6[f. 
1 9. Done a t  Brussels, April 1 9, h ,  1 962 ; I L C  Repor t ( 1 9 9 1 ), UN Doc. A/46/1  0, C h ap ter I I , }lIrisdic­
tional illllll l l1 l l tzeS o[ Sllltes and their Property [here i n a fter JIITlSdiclional 11Imzun ities ] ,  1 7 3, Art .  3, para I .  
20. Signed a t  B russels, 2 4  May, 1 934, Jurisdicl ional Il/l IIlI/ u iries ,  1 7 5 ,  Art.  IV.  
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2 1 .  Signed at Montevideo, 1 9  March I 940,]lI risdictIDllaI Imm u n ities, 1 7 7,  Arts .  3 5  & 36 ( I ) . 
2 2 .  Art .  30 of Convention, ihid. , 1 5 6  a t 1 6 5 .  
2 3 .  Art .  1 6  ( \ ) ,  (2), (3 ) .  
2 4 .  Shearer, I I  EPI L ( 1 989),  320 .  
25.  For a judicial interpretation of  the term warsh ip, see: Nava l and Military !Forks or  Materials , 
US alld Germany: Mixed Cla illls CommiSSlOll , A 111 1 .  Dig. ( 1 92 3-24), Case No. 22 1 ,  405;  For the U.S.  un­
ders tanding of "warsh ips" an d "auxiliaries," see: CUIIl1llative Digest of us PractIce ill Illtemaliollai Law, 
1 98 1 -8 8 ,  vol .  2 ,  1 3 82-86. 
26. S m i th, op. cit. , 1 2 3-4 1 .  
2 7 .  J1Irisdictiollai Imm u n ities , Commentary o n  Art. I ,  1 1 - 1 2 .  
2 8 .  Shearer, I I  EPIL ( 1 989),  3 2 2 ;  Treves, i n  Dupuy & Vig nes, op. cit. , vol .  1 , 902. 
29. Timagenis, Iwemational Coll/rol of Marine Pollu tioll ( 1 9 80), vol. 1 , 6 1 .  
30.  Rolph ,  1 3 5 Military LR ( 1 992),  Win ter Issue, 1 37-6 5 ;  Nagle, I VJIL ( 1 990), 1 3 1 - 2 .  
3 1 .  E.g. , t h e  ILC repeatedly s tressed that  it would not deal  with " th e  ques tion of e i ther 
Sta te-owned or S tate-operated a ircraft engaged in commercial serv ice," ne i ther w i th "the question of 
space ob jects " :  Jurisdictio>zal Imm u n ities , 1 0  & 1 2 7 .  
3 2 .  A r t .  5 .  
3 3 .  Art. 2( 1)(a). 
3 4 .  Supra , 5 . 2 . 2 .  B .  
3 5 .  IMO Doc . LL/CONF/I, U.S .  proposal, 2 4 ;  observa tions by the Neth erlands and  France,  ih id. ,  
24--5 ; LL/CON F/C. l/WP.2 l ,  1 6  March 1 966;  L L/Conf/SR.3 of 1 2  Oc tober 1 966;  L L/CO N F/C . 1!SR .  
1 9, 20 Oc tober 1 966.  
3 6 .  Treves, op. cit. , 903.  
3 7 .  The Rules of the Road at Sea were or ig inally customary rules of seamanship, ascertained by 
the English Admiralty Court .  They were publ ished in 1 840 in code form by Trin ity House:  O 'Con nell, 
D . , op. cit. , 7 7 0  & 83 1 .  
3 8 .  Arts .  2 ( 1 ) ,  40, 6 5 .  
39.  Art .  40 on U K  mandate .  
40.  General  Prov isions Committee, Minu tes ,  I"  meeting, April  28'" 1 948, 3, i tem 9.  
4 1 .  General Prov is ions  Commi t tee, Draft Minutes, 9th meeting, May 20th, 1 948, 4. 
42. Ih id . 
4 3 .  U.S .  proposal : Section 3 (a) of Chapter I of SAFCON 4; French comments : General Provi-
sions Commit tee, Draft M inu tes, T" meeting, May 1 3 '\ 1 948, 2 .  
4 4 .  General Provisions Committee, Draft M inu tes, 8 ' "  meeting,  M a y  19 '" ,  1 948,  2 .  
4 5 .  Infra, 6 .2 .4 .  
46. A t  that  t ime the Soviet Icebreaker Lell ill and [he USS Savantzah were the only civilian nu­
clear-powered vessels in operation : Discuss ions of  the  Plenary, In ternational Conference on Safety of  
L i fe at Sea ,  1 960, IMCO/SAFCON/Plenary/SR 4, 1 3  June  1 960, 6-7 , i t em 4 .  
4 7 .  A proposal by Germany to ex tend the exemption to mil i tary auxiliary s hips was  with drawn : 
IMCO/SAFCON/l, 1 0 ;  GEN/SRA, 1 9  May 1 96 0 as correc ted by GEN/SR. I/Cor. 1 , 20 May 1 9 60, 2 .  
4 8 .  T h e  1 960 Convention en tered in to force o n  2 6  May 1 965 . 
49. Infra , 6 . 2 . 3 .  
5 0 .  T reves, op. cit. , 903. 
5 1 . Conference on Rev ision of the In ternational Regulations for Preven ting Collisions at Sea 
1 972,  held at IMO headquarters, 4-20 October 1 97 2 .  
5 2 .  Source : IMO/Lloyd's da ta as a t  3 1  December 1 994. 
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5 3 .  IMO informa tion sheet . 
54. Rule I (c ) ,  Rule 3 (g), ( iv), (v), Rule 27 (b), ( /). 
5 5 .  As in Rule I (e) on vessels of "special construction or purpose" ; Warships and other mi l itary 
ships are furthermore subject to all provisions which by their wording apply to "all vessels" without 
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se ls not under command ." 
56 .  In 1988 ,  it was estimated that there were abou t 7,020 naval ships afloat on the world's oceans, 
agains t  an estimated 7 5 ,680 merchant vessels of 100 gross tons or larger :  Lloyd's Register of Shipping 
Statistical Tables 1 988 (London : 1988 ) ;  Morgan, in Van Dyke et ai. , Freedom for the Seas ill the 21" Cell­
tury ( 1 993), 439. 
57. Art.VII. 
58. I I ILM ( 1 972) ,  778 .  
59 .  Agreemen t between the Governmen t of the U K  and the Governmen t of the USSR concerning 
the Preven tion of Incidents a t  Sea Beyond the Territorial Sea, done 15 Ju ly 1 986, 37 ICLQ ( 1 988) ,  420 ;  
The o ther agreemen ts were concluded in 1 988 and 1 989 :  Nagle, 1 V]IL ( 1 990), 1 43 .  
60 .  Ibid. ,  1 26 .  
6 1 .  E.g.,  Arts .  I I  (3 ), (6) .  
62 .  See Nagle, 1 V]IL ( 1 990), at  1 3 1 ,  fn. 33 ,  quoting the American naval authority Ashley Roach 
and the late Australian mi l i tary commander and lawyer Dan iel O'Connell. 
63. Done at Moscow, 12 June 1989, 28 ILM ( 1 989), 877 .  
64 .  Ar t .  II ,  which l i s ts four types of "dangerous mili tary act ivi ties . "  
65 .  Art. VIII ( 1 ) . 
66. At page 2, para 6 of the proposals by the government of the UK, da ted April 1 9 54, to be found 
in compilat ion of texts on the 1 954 OILPOL Conference, he ld  by IMO, London. 
67 General Committee, Minutes, 8 ' h  Meeting, May 1 0'" , 1 95 4, 1 2 ;  Minutes, 9'h Meeting, May 1 1 '", 
1 954, 1 -2 .  
68 Ibid., 1 4 .  
69  Third and  Fina l  (Plenary) Sess ion , May  1 2 '" ,  1 9 54 ,  Report by  the Chairman of the  General 
Commi ttee, 1 0 .  
70 IMCO, In ternational Conference on  Preven tion of Pollut ion of  t he  S e a  by  Oil .  Held in Lon­
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7 1 .  Ibid. ,  1-2 (France), 5 (Germany), 6 ( India) ;  see too OP/CONF/3/Add. l, 8 January 1 962, Norwe­
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7 3 .  E.g.,  the deba tes reproduced in OP/CONF/C.I/SR.l, 13  Apri l  1 962, Summary Record, I"  meet-
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86 .  M P/CONFJ\XlP. 1 7, 30 October 1 97 3 , 2 .  
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Environmen t of  the  South Pacific Region (SPREP), U .S .  Unders tanding Sen .  Treaty Doc., 1 0 1 -2 1 ,  p .  
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